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Abstract 
Following privatisations in the 1980's, the UK financial industry embarked on a 
series of demutualisations, which developed into a global trend in the late 1990's. 
This structural shift has generated numerous debates in academic circles 
concerning various managerial issues of mutual versus stock owned companies. 
Informed by agency theory, this thesis contributes to this debate by exploring the 
link between ultimate organisational form and the behaviour of companies in the 
U. K unit trust industry. The UK unit trust fund industry provides an excellent 
environment to explore this line of research because ultimate organisational form 
varies, and because the intra-industry variations are far smaller than those of 
other industries in term of regulations, income structure, and the use of 
information technology. 
For the purpose of analysis, the thesis compares unit trust management 
companies belonging to mutual and stock owned groups along three dimensions: 
(i) risk-taking and (ii) efficiency at the corporate level, and (iii) quality of their 
products, e. g. risk and fee adjusted performance of unit trusts that the companies 
offer. To this end, a number of quantitative analyses are undertaken, including 
Tobit regression and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), using data from a 
sample of 130 unit trust management companies for the financial year 1999- 
2000. 
The results support the agency theory hypothesis, revealing that at the corporate 
level, stock owned companies show higher managerial efficiency than the mutual 
1 
counterparts whilst undertaking higher risk activities than the comparable mutual 
companies. Nonetheless, at the product level, no difference is found by ultimate 
ownership type with regard to risk-fee-adjusted performance of unit trusts. The 
latter indicates that competitive product markets remove the performance 
distinctions between mutuals and proprietary companies. Overall, these findings 
suggest that mutual organisations exhibit weaker cost control in conducting unit 
trust business via their affiliated companies. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
1.1 Background to the research 
1.1.1. Overview from financial literature 
Research into collective investment schemes such as mutual funds in the US and 
unit trusts in the U. K (hereafter written as mutual funds) has been very popular 
subject in modern financial literature. The focus of early studies on mutual funds 
was whether these professionally managed funds yielded higher returns than 
market indices. Pioneered by Jensen (1968), scholars found that, on balance, 
mutual funds were unlikely to "beat" their target indices after the funds' risk was 
considered. The view of the poor investment skill led to another well-known 
debate concerning the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). Reviewed by Fama 
(1970) in his famous article, the hypothesis asserted that it is unlikely to achieve 
continuous superior returns from capital market investments because all market 
prices immediately reflect all the available information. Based on these lines of 
research, one can classify previous literature dealing with the issue of mutual 
funds into two research subjects: (i) how the performance of a fund should be 
evaluated, e. g. performance measurement, (ii) whether fund managers can 
generate superior returns, and if so, does their good performance persist e. g. 
performance persistence ? 
As for the first topic, a simple return of a fund is not an adequate measure of 
performance. The reason is the simple return is dependent partly on the target 
risk level of the fund and partly on the return of market that the fund attempts to 
outperform. Overcoming the risk-return trade off and the market effect, Sharpe 
ratio and Jensen's alpha are classic examples for the risk-adjusted performance 
measures. Nevertheless, all these measures suffer from potential pitfalls such as 
mis-specification of the market index (Roll 1980 and Lehmann and Modest, 
1987). As no perfect method for the performance evaluation is established yet, 
the development of accurate and reliable measure has been stimulating the 
financial literature for a long timer. A recent study by Dowd (2000) is an 
example to improve the traditional Sharpe ratio by considering the correlation 
element between the existing portfolio and the alternative portfolio (see Chapter 
V for details) 
The second research topic has also been a central concern among academics and 
business practitioners. Some studies indicate that investment professionals do 
not have genuine superior skills that can beat the market consistently (for 
example, Jensen 1969 and Malkiel, 1995). Interestingly enough, poor 
performance seems to persist over time (Carhart, 1997, and Blake and 
Timmermann 2003). Other studies present the contradicting evidence that some 
fund managers can outperform the market and their superior risk-adjusted returns 
persist over time (for instance, see Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 1994). Hence, 
given the overall evidence, research has so far proved inconclusive with regard to 
the superior performance and its persistency. 
I An extensive bibliography on performance evaluation can be found 
in Knight and Satchell (2002) 
As noted before, the two issues are critical to academic scholars because the 
importance of the two issues lies in the fact that they challenge the efficient 
market hypothesis. In a similar vein, it is worth pointing out that the two topics 
are essential parts of business for fund manages and their fund investors. 
Similarly, investors seek a method that could evaluate the service provided by 
the fund management company whilst justifying the fees that the investors are 
paying. The fund management company wants to emphasise the importance of 
their role, justifying why investors need to buy the company's actively managed 
funds as opposite to the passively managed funds, i. e. the index tracker funds. 
More recently, there has been a renewal of interest in mutual funds from a 
slightly different angle. Namely, studies of the behaviour of fund managers and 
their retail investors are increasingly prevalent in academic finance literature. 
This recent rising popularity is mainly driven by the fact that (1) the performance 
related issue has been explored considerably although opinions remain divergent 
on these issues. (2) More importantly, as the fund industry has experienced 
spectacular growth in the last decade, the industry plays a more significant role in 
the economy. For example, at the end of the first quarter of 1998, mutual funds 
in the US were managing 3.3 trillion dollars in assets. The amount, in fact, 
exceeds all banks' saving deposits (Zheng, 1999). In the U. K, total funds under 
management have more than tripled over the last ten years from 36 billion 
pounds in 1987 to 269 billion pounds in 1996 (AUTIF 2000). 
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With the enormous growth of the assets under management in the industry, new 
studies express concern about the risk taking of fund managers, whose decisions 
are crucial determinants of their fund's returns. From various incentive 
viewpoints, a number of recent papers have analysed an individual fund manager 
as a unit of risk decision making. For example, different abstractive models such 
as utility maximisation models (e. g. Starks, 1987; Cohen and Starks, 1988) and 
option pricing models (Grinblatt and Titman 1989) were presented to show the 
connection between fees and risk taking of fund managers. 
Implicit but more realistic incentives of fund managers have been elaborated on 
in more recent empirical studies; money flows into funds with superior returns 
(Chevalier and Ellison, 1997), a tournament mechanism in the industry (Brown 
et al 1996, Busse, 2001), career concerns (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999) and the 
job threat for the under performing managers (Khorana 1996). By and large, that 
research has revealed several implicit incentives as control devices of fund 
managers' risk taking. 
However, until very recently, little has been documented regarding connections 
between risk taking decisions and the performance of fund management 
companies (rather than individual fund managers) and their organisational forms. 
1.1.2. Overview from agency theory literature 
The lack of studies on the effects of organisational form in the fund management 
literature is rather peculiar if one is aware of agency theory literature. An axiom 
4 
of agency theoretic studies is that conflicts of interest among different property 
claimants are costly (the agency cost) in modern firms. This agency perspective 
has stimulated a great deal of research on the effects of ownership structures 
(Chen and Steiner 1999). Ratios such as shareholders versus debt-holders, (e. g. 
Agrawal and Knoeber 1996), and managerial ownership (see, in particular, Byrd 
et al, 1998) have become explanatory variables for the performance of a firm. 
Furthermore, several authors consider the proportion of insider ownership, equity 
versus debt as key determinants of the risk taking of firms in various industries: 
market listed companies (Wright, Ferris, Sarin and Awasthi, 1996; Chen and 
Steiner, 1999), banks (Saunders, et al, 1990) S&Ls (Knopf and Teall, 1996; 
Chen, Steiner and Whyte, 1998). 
More importantly, the line of research is extended in Fama and Jensen (1983a, 
1983b ), Mayers and Smith (1988,1994) and Esty (1997a, 1997b) who consider 
organisation forms as explanatory variables of risk taking by mutual and stock 
financial companies. Previous works in this area also give weight to the 
performance differences (McNamara and Ghon, 1992; Mudambi and Nicosia, 
1998; Genetay, 1999) and the different efficiencies (Cebenoyan et al, 1993; 
Cummins et al, 1999) between the two different organisational forms in the 
insurance industry. Lately, sparked by the large number of bankruptcies in the 
US saving and loans (S&L) industry, there has been renewal of interest in 
ownership effects on performance (Cole and Mehran, 1998), and risk taking 
(Barth, et al, 1995; Esty 1997a, b) of the S&L companies. 
Nevertheless, most of the mutual versus stock company literature has limited 
itself to studying either insurance or the banking industry in the US. 
Consequently, the previous studies may not be applicable to different financial 
service industries in different countries. In brief, the link between organisational 
form and risk-taking, efficiency and product performance of the U. K unit trust 
companies has never been directly investigated neither from the investment 
literature nor from the agency literature. In this regard, this thesis makes 
important contribution to the existing literature. 
1.2 Research topics 
The central proposition addressed in this thesis is: Does ultimate organisational 
form matter in the UK unit trust company? Essentially, adopting the three-topic 
structure, this thesis attempts to examine the central research question from three 
dimensions. The first empirical study looks at the link between the risk taking of 
a unit trust company and the ultimate ownership of the company. The second 
empirical investigation addresses the linkage between organisational form and 
efficiency of the unit trust companies. The final empirical analysis concerns 
influences of the organisational form on the performance of their individual 
funds under the premise that the operations and monitoring of firms with 
different organisational structures should differ. 
It is apparent that the three research topics can be divided into two groups. 
Consistent with a large number of studies on fund performance, the third 
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research topic considers performance of individual unit trusts. By contrast, the 
first and second topics attempt to formulate risk-taking and efficiency measures 
viewed from the perspective of owners of the unit trust management company. 
1.3 Value and contribution of this research 
1.3.1 Overall significance 
This thesis offers a useful contribution to the research on effects of ultimate 
ownership in the unit trust industry in three ways. Primarily, as previously noted, 
only a small number of attempts have so far been made at studying fund 
management companies whereas previous fund literature considers either 
individual funds or aggregated funds in the industry as a unit of analysis. The 
lack of research on this point is somewhat surprising given the growing presence 
of fund management companies in global capital markets. For example, Fidelity 
Investments, the largest mutual fund company in the US, has $1 trillion in assets 
under management in 290 funds2 whilst the Vanguard Group, the second largest 
mutual fund company has 139 funds, 14 million individual and institutional 
shareholder accounts and $550 billion in assets under management3. In case of 
the UK fund managers, their domestic equity assets under management reached 
90 billion pounds at the end of 19974. As the top 30 unit trust companies manage 
2 
"Money Movers" Forbes; New York; Oct 9,2000 
Palmer. George; Bina Brown (2000) "Vanguard sets sail for Europe" Global Investor; issue 133, p 13-16, 
London. 
4 Source: Walter, Ingo (1999) "The Global Asset Management Industry: Competitive Structure and 
Perfromance", Financial markets, Institutions & Instruments. Vol 8 No. I 
-, 
more than 80 % of these assets (the FT fund directory, 1998), there is no doubt 
that the UK unit trusts play an important role in the equity market. Nonetheless, 
little is documented to date on the issue of fund management companies. 
Secondly, from a corporate governance point of view the research problem is 
timely because the implications of this thesis increase the understanding with 
regard to recent demutualisations in the UK, where a number of financial mutual 
institutions are becoming quoted public companies owned by shareholders. 
Observing the demutualisation boom, a number of newspaper articles outline the 
pros and cons of the demutualisations5. However, little attention has been paid to 
the effects of the demutualisation on the financial products such as unit trusts, 
which the ex-mutual companies are managing and selling via their subsidiaries. 
The lack of such information is rather peculiar if one takes into account different 
stakeholders' perspectives: (a) In the UK, there are 18.89 million unit holders 
whose total assets reached to £195 billion at the end of 2002 (The Association of 
Unit Trust and Investment Funds, hereafter AUTIF, January, 2003). From the 
unit holders' perspective, what really matters are returns of their invested wealth, 
which depend on performance of the fund managers or of their management 
companies. (b) From the owners' standpoint, i. e. holding companies of unit trust 
managers, unit trust business via their subsidiaries must be a matter of great 
concern since the activities affect risk and the profitability of the holding 
companies (See, for example, Gallo, Apilado, and Kolari, 1996) 
5 See, for example, Brow n-Humes. Christopher "Our ex-mutual friends", Financial Times 14 Februar\ 1998 
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This thesis therefore attempts to clarify some ramifications of the 
demutualisations through comparing unit trust companies ultimately owned by 
mutual institutions with those owned by shareholders. 
Finally, from a methodological perspective, this thesis takes advantage of Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) in researching the U. K unit trust industry. To the 
best of my knowledge this is the first study to employ the DEA for analysing 
both the relative efficiency of the unit trust management companies and 
performance of their managed unit trusts. 
Data availability has been concern for the analysis with regard to performance of 
fund management companies (Siggelkow, 2003). In the case of the U. K unit 
trust management companies, some of accounting items required for 
conventional ratio computations are difficult to obtain from the financial 
statement or these are low levels of precision. Such limitations are mainly due to 
the parent- subsidiary accounting practice in the industry. This is where the DEA 
comes into play by estimating the relative efficiency score for the company with 
a few limited but critical accounting items. The accounting information used 
includes revenue, shareholder's fund and long-term debt e. g. capital employed in 
total, and administration expense. Specifically, the latter two financial statement 
components play critical roles for estimating the relative efficiency between the 
mutual and stock owned companies. 
As for the capital employed, the ability of raising the capital employed is 
considered as the predominant motivation for the demutualisation decision (Cook 
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et al 
, 
2001; Cummins and Viswanathan, 2003) Stock owned companies, more 
precisely, market listed companies have flexibility in raising new capital through 
a variety of stock and debt offerings. By contrast, mutuals typically rely on their 
retained surplus for future expansion. As the capital is not easily replaced, 
hence, being precious to the mutuals, it is hypothesised that mutauls are lower 
risk organisations than the plc counterpart, inhibiting diversification into higher 
risk activities (Stephens, 2001). Furthermore, it is argued that if no profitable 
venture exists, mutuals face the risk of being over-capitalised, using their funds 
inefficiently (Cummins and Danzon, 1997). 
The administration expense is also a key element under the agency theory 
paradigm that rather than maximising the value of a company, managers attempt 
to maximise their own utility via excessive perquisite spending or inefficient 
activities. Such managerial behaviour is originally defined as expense preference 
by Williamson (1963). The expense preference hypothesis predicts that 
compared with stock owned companies, mutuals are more likely to suffer from 
opportunistic behaviour by managers because of the lack of owners', e. g. policy 
or account holders' monitoring over their managers' activities. 
For these grounds, the capital employed and administrative expenses are 
indispensable elements in analysing the relative efficiency between the mutual 
and stock owned companies. Although care needs to be taken due to the group 
accounting practices utilised by different company groups, these figure are at 
least in public domain and available from the U. K regulatory body, e. g. 
Companies House. 
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1.3.2 Justification for the study on the U. K unit trust industry 
The setting of the U. K unit trust industry is particularly well suited for the 
purpose of this study. The following remarks highlight the way which the U. K 
unit trust industry is valuable in order to achieve the objectives of this thesis. 
For the purpose of this study, the U. K unit trust industry offers a unique data set 
in terms of the number of companies, the type of ultimate ownership, and the 
degree of the market concentration. The U. K unit trust industry is comprised of 
more than 150 companies whose ultimate owners vary from mutual institutions 
to small private companies. Moreover, the top five companies account for 30% 
of the total industry asset. When one compares the UK unit trust industry with 
other European counterparts, it becomes evident that studying the UK industry 
with such distinctive characteristics has an advantage. For example, the ten 
largest French fund management companies held 65% of the industry asset 
(Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2000-a). Similarly, the German fund industry is 
dominated by six financial groups, reflecting the structure of the German banking 
sector. Their assets under management account for 70% of all the assets in the 
industry (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2000-b). Hence, the U. K unit trust industry 
provides enough sample companies, allowing us to study the organisational 
effect in a meaningful way. 
For a slightly different reason, the study on the U. S mutual fund industry is also 
limited. Let us take a look at recent studies conducted by Massa (2003) and 
Siggelkow (2003). Their common research interest is whether a corporate 
strategy matters not only to the corporate performance, but also their funds' 
performance. However, their corporate performance measure, based on the cash 
inflows into the company, is incomplete to the extent that their measures exclude 
any cost components. The simple reason for the lack of the cost aspects is that 
"a directly profitability measure for fund providers is unfortunately not available 
(Siggelkow, p 132). " 
Using DEA to calculate the efficiency ratio, the study of the U. K unit trust 
industry can overcome the problem of the missing cost factors in the recent U. S 
studies. By law, the U. K companies have to submit their financial reports to the 
U. K authority, e. g. the Companies House where these annual reports are 
accessible. The reporting designs are not necessarily identical among the 
companies because the companies employ various accounting methods within 
the accepted accounting rules. Consequently, care is needed in formulating the 
corporate performance measures. Nonetheless, the key cost items are 
indispensable features in some ways and obtainable from these reports. Such 
financial data with a limitation allows for the efficiency score as an alternative to 
conventional performance ratios such as return of assets, return of capital 
employed. In this connection, the analysis of the U. K will be able to shed new 
light on the impact of the corporate strategy on their management efficiency. 
There is a practical justification for studying unit trust companies in the U. K. By 
the Financial Service Act (1986), the unit trust management company must be a 
corporate body established in the U. K. Moreover, the company are not allowed 
to engage any type of business other than unit trusts management business. Such 
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a legal criterion is likely to minimise regulatory and tax variations between the 
unit trust management companies owned by mutual institutions and those owned 
by proprietary companies. Controlling for such intra-industry heterogeneity 
across the companies, the comparison of the companies with different ownership 
becomes more valid. 
In addition to the practical motive, there is a theoretical justification in light of 
the following Mayers and Smith's argument (1994). Mayers and Smith state that 
the control problem facing the mutual members is "potentially more severe for 
stock companies owned by the mutual associations since they are not eligible to 
participate in a parent's proxy fight. Their major control mechanism is the 
withdrawal of patronage. Hence, in competing for business, a stock company 
owned by a mutual is more likely to rely on implicit contracts and reputational 
capital (Mayers and Smith, 1994, p641)". For these reasons, this thesis focuses 
on the unit trust management companies in the U. K. 
1.4 Overview of research method 
The primary hypothesis to test is whether ultimate ownership of a fund 
management company relates not only to risk taking and efficiency of the 
company, but also to performance of unit trusts that the company offers. 
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1.4.1 Research Designs 
In order to test the primary hypothesis, this thesis will employ non-experimental 
and cross-sectional research designs. The basic approach is a two-group 
comparative design where the proprietary companies are compared with the 
mutual owned companies in terms of risk-taking, and efficiency at the company 
level, and the performance of their unit trusts. More specifically, the empirical 
analyses employ a two-step approach with the cross-sectional study format, 
which is consistent with the 1993 study carried out by Cebenoyan et al (1993). 
1.4.2 Research procedures 
Variable specification 
The first step is to develop several proxies for risk-taking decisions, managerial 
efficiency at the company level and performance at the unit trust level. The ways 
in which these variables are computed is vital because the relationship between 
organisational form and these proxies can be sensitive to the frameworks of the 
proxies (Regan and Tzeng, 1999). 
In response to the issue of the proxy formation, the first empirical study develops 
risk-related measures in three ways; business specialisation, business 
concentration and proportion of risky unit trusts within the company. These risk 
measures are based on the company's product mix consisting of a number of unit 
trusts. As the company's fee revenues are generated from the unit trusts, these 
risk proxies reflect the nature of risk that the unit trust management company 
bears. 
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With regard to the efficiency measure for the unit trust management company. 
this thesis takes advantage of data envelopment analysis (DEA) where one 
output, e. g. the total revenue and two input variables, (e. g. administration costs 
and capital employed) are simultaneously compared and subsequently the 
efficiency score is generated. Two reasons for the use of the DEA are: (a) the 
unit trust management companies are non-market listed ones so that a stock price 
based measure is not available. (b) the standard financial ratios may not reflect 
the true picture of the companies. This is partly because a potential transfer 
pricing may exist between the unit trust management company and their 
affiliated group companies, and partly because the unit trust management 
company has a limited disclosure requirement as a subsidiary of the parent or 
holding company. Such practices are likely to reduce validity of the popular 
financial ratios. Under the data constraints, DEA can facilitate the efficiency 
score with multiple inputs and outputs whilst holding the basic ratio structure. 
In a manner similar to the efficiency measure, the performance of individual unit 
trusts is evaluated by taking advantage of the DEA. As noted in section 1.3, the 
DEA allows for the potential interactions amongst the variables; return, risk and 
fees of an individual unit trust. This is the major advantage over the 
conventional risk-adjusted performance measures. 
Before moving on to the second analysis, non-parametric independent tests are 
used to see whether these variables differ by ultimate ownership type. 
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Model specification 
The second step attempts to relate these variables to ultimate organisational form 
whilst controlling for influential factors. The general reasons for using a 
regression model are; the regression can indicate whether the relationship exists 
between the explanatory variable of organisational form and the dependent 
variables such as the company's risk-taking, efficiency and their funds' 
performance. Moreover, the regression model can display the nature of the 
relationship amongst these variables. From a technical perspective, the Tobit 
model is more appropriate than the ordinary least square regression because the 
variables from the first step are limited within certain ranges. 
1.5 Data and Sample 
1.5.1 Data Collection 
The sample data on the UK unit trusts and their management companies is 
mainly from the following resources; The Financial Times Unit Trust & OEICs 
Year book 1999/2000, The UK Fund Industry Review and Directory 2000, 
Money Management, Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME), Companies House 
Direct, and The Association of Unit Trust and Investment Funds' web-site. 
Based on the Financial Times Unit Trust & OEICs Year book and the UK Fund 
Industry Review and Directory, each company's ultimate ownership is identified. 
Companies House Direct's web site provides an annual financial statement of a 
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unit trust management company with their original format. If it is necessary. a 
comparable document is also downloaded from the FAME web site for the cross- 
check purpose. 
Concerning the unit trust information, the two directories also provide fund 
information that contains the sector classification, the size and the fee charges of 
individual unit trusts within a management company. Money Management 
provides returns of a unit trust for various investment periods, and the price 
volatility of the unit trust over 36 months. 
Finally, in order to create the risk proxies based on the investment objective of a 
unit trust, the sector data is collected from the AUTIF web-site (for the money 
flow into each sector) and from Money Management (for the historical price 
volatility of each sector). 
1.5.2 Sample Data 
The sample period in this study is based on the financial year 1999-2000. The 
key reason for this period is that this is the most stabilised period as less frequent 
demutualisations occurred in the U. K financial industry after the mid-1990's 
demutualisation wave. The data used in this study includes all UK unit trust 
companies for which both sector data from Money Management and ownership 
data from the two industry directories are available. As a result, 12 unit trust 
companies are excluded from the sample because of their unknown ultimate 
ownership status. Furthermore, observations with pension sector funds are 
eliminated because the sector data were not available from Money management. 
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This is not a major problem because the overall sample asset size is 253.442 
million pounds, accounting for 99% of the industry assets at the end of 1999. 
The final sample consists 142 unit trust management companies and 1680 
authorised unit trusts. 
Based on the fact that unit trust management companies are usually subsidiaries 
of financial groups, the empirical analyses divide the ownership characteristics of 
the financial groups into the three forms; stock owned companies, i. e. market 
quoted companies, privately owned companies and mutual owned companies. 
Consequently, the sample data on the UK unit trust management companies 
includes 87 quoted company owned, 31 private company owned and 24 mutual 
owned. 
1.6 Definitions 
As definition adopted by academic literature are not uniform it is worth 
clarifying key terms used in this thesis. 
1.6.1 Risk-taking 
Risk-taking at the company level refers to as managerial decisions which incur 
discretionally risk related to the product mix affecting the company's 
profitability. In this respect, this thesis is concerned only with financial risk as 
opposed to operational risk. The sources of risk addressed in this thesis is based 
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on the company's product set, consisting of funds differentiated into the 
investment categories. Justifications for the choice are as follows. As recent 
papers (Massa 2003, and Siggelkow, 2003) reveal, the decision to set up a fund 
with a specific characteristic affects the company's cash flow. Cash flow is 
essential to an organisation because the organisation can pursue its objective with 
the cash. More theoretically, the cash flow is vital because the (net) cash 
determines the value of the organisation under the axiom of modern financial 
theory (Brealey and Myers, 1996). At the product level, e. g. individual unit 
trusts, the risk-taking is simply defined as the standard deviation of the unit 
trust's return (Haugen, 2001, p. 57) 
1.6.2 Performance and Efficiency 
It is of use to understand the difference between performance and efficiency in 
this thesis despite the fact that some authors use efficiency and performance 
interchangeably. The term efficiency in this thesis is the measure of how well the 
company's resources expended are utilised in the ratio form of inputs (i. e. 
resources) over outputs (i. e. revenues). The inputs are the amount of capital 
employed and administration expenses whereas an output is the revenue, largely 
derived from the management and initial fees. The reason for this efficiency 
approach is that shares of the unit trust management companies are not traded in 
stock exchanges so that the stock-based performance measure is not available. 
Another reason is that the data is limited in terms of financial statement 
components because of the complexity of inter-group accounting practices. 
However, section 5.5 points out, the input items and the output items should 
serve as the key observation points for the hypothesis testing in this thesis. 
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Brockett et al (1998) and Cummins et al (1999) conduct similar studies on the 
U. S property-liability insurance industry by measuring the company's efficiency 
score. 
According to popular theories of modem finance, "differences in risk should be 
the principal determinant of differences in expected return from one investment 
to another" (Haugen 1999, p. 15). From the risk-expected return paradigm, one 
may raise a concern that the relationship between the efficiency measure and the 
risk-taking proxy is not clear. The justifications described in the preceding 
sections, 1.6.1 and 1.6.2 are primary responses to the inquiry about the risk and 
efficiency approach. Summarising the recent studies, section 1.6.1 addressed the 
product mix of the fund management company affects the company's 
profitability. Section 1.6.2 noted that it is practically difficult to employ standard 
performance measures because no stocks are listed, and group accounting 
practices are often complex. 
There are a few additional reasons for the risk-efficiency approach employed in 
this thesis. First of all, the ultimate objective of this thesis is neither to estimate 
the risk-performance nor to solve the risk-efficiency relationship. Rather, the aim 
of the thesis is to examine the ultimate ownership effect on their operational 
characteristics and managerial efficiency. The risk-performance relationship at 
the company level within the unit trust industry would seem to be an interesting 
future research topic. This line of research is possible by studying several 
"listed" fund management companies whose share price information is much 
more easily obtainable. 
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Secondly and more importantly, it would be ideal if the distributions of the risk 
and expected return that a unit trust company is taking is known. Nonetheless. 
the data for the risk and expected return is limited because of frequent changes of 
product classifications. Specifically it is difficult to estimate the expected return. 
From the viewpoint of the company's profitability, returns of their unit trusts 
consist of not only investment returns from underlying assets that the unit trust 
hold, but also the positive money flow into the unit trusts. Specifically, the data 
of net money flow at any levels, e. g. individual unit trust, company and product 
category, is very difficult to obtain. 
For these reasons, this thesis focuses on risk and efficiency separately and it is 
true that the efficiency score derived from DEA itself is not explicitly risk- 
adjusted. Hence, the present thesis attempts to isolate true efficiency from the 
risk factors by including the company's product mix that relates to market risk 
and business risk into the Tobit regression model. 
1.6.3 Fund performance 
The term, performance used in this thesis is used for evaluating individual unit 
trusts that the company offers. Performance is measured on the basis of the 
fund's risk-taking and its fee charges in accomplishing the investment return 
forwarded to their fund investors. How the performance measure in this thesis 
differs from the conventional measures is to include the fee factor. The main 
advantage to include the fees into the performance evaluation is that for the fund 
investors, the impact of fees can be substantial. Recently, Galagedera and 
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Silvapulle (2002) and others investigate the fund performance by incorporating 
the fee factors whilst utilising the DEA methodology (See Chapter VI). 
Moreover, the advantage of the performance measure used in this thesis is free of 
benchmark errors. 
1.7 Delimitation 
This thesis is narrowed with a few scopes: the data sample, the research issue and 
the control variables. 
1.7.1 The data sample and observation period 
At the corporate level, this thesis confines itself to examining the unit trust 
management companies in the U. K. Section 1.3.2 has addressed a few 
justifications for this point of selection. At the individual product level, this 
thesis only tracks unit trusts categorised into the All UK companies sector for the 
following reason. A key enquiry of the individual product analysis is whether 
ultimate organisational form of a unit trust company affects the performance of 
their managed unit trusts. To this end, as the most popular and the largest 
category, the U. K all companies sector provides the large number of the unit 
trusts managed by companies whose ultimate ownership vary. The year selected 
for the observation is 2000. After the heavy demutualisation activity in the past 
decade, this time period provides far more stable platform by which to analyse 
the available data. 
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1.7.2 The research issue 
The primary objective of this thesis is to examine whether mutual and stock 
owned organisations (i) pursue different risk-taking strategies on the basis of 
their investment products and (ii) exhibit different efficiency. This thesis does 
not, however, address the effects of the demutualisation, by exploring the 
causality of the shift of efficiency if there is such a change after the 
demutualisation. Limited time-series data do not allow for the causality test. It 
should be also noted that such limited data availability does not allow for a test 
of performance persistency at the individual unit trust level, which has been a 
traditional research topic in financial literature. 
1.7.3 Control variables 
As with most empirical papers, this thesis may be limited in terms of variable 
selections. There are always possibilities for representing differently for some 
variables, adding more variables to the models. For example, it has been argued 
that the managerial ownership is a determinant of risk-taking and the 
performance of the company. However, this thesis does not investigate explicitly 
whether the degree of the managerial ownership explains any differences in 
terms of risk-taking and efficiency at the company level and the performance of 
unit trusts. The key reason for less attention being given to the managerial 
ownership effect is due to the fact that no directors or employees directly own the 
shares of the unit trust management company that they work for. Rather, they 
sometimes hold the shares of their parent or holding company, which owns the 
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shares of its subsidiaries including the unit trust management company. In light 
of this, no empirical studies have specifically addressed the impact of the 
managerial ownership on the subsidiary company. 
1.8 Conclusion 
Given the agency theory paradigm, this thesis concerns ultimate ownership 
effects in the unit trust management industry within the U. K. To investigate the 
topic from various dimensions, the thesis consists of three empirical studies: (i) 
comparison of risk-taking activities of unit trust companies owned by mutual 
organisations with those owned by stock companies, (ii) comparison of 
management efficiency between the two ownership groups, and (iii) comparison 
of risk and return between unit trusts run by the two groups. 
The key finding is that the degrees of risk-taking and efficiency differ between 
the two ultimate ownership groups, but no difference was found at their product 
level. These primary results have two implications. Firstly, at the company 
management level, the management control seems to fail in disciplining the 
management of mutual organisations, leading to inefficiency of their affiliated 
unit trust companies. The finding is in accordance with agency theory to the 
extent that proprietary companies are more effective in the owner-manager 
conflict. 
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Secondly, the market for the unit trust as a financial product is intense enough to 
eliminate any differences across the management companies. As such the 
finding suggest agency theory does not hold at the product level, as the research 
found no evidence that the mutual form is more effective in controlling the 
owner-policyholder or the owner-accountholder conflict as would be expected. 
These implications from this thesis help resolve the on-going debate regarding 
the demutualisation effect whilst lending support to the pro-demutualisation 
argument. 
1.9 Structure of this thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter II presents the 
literature on which the hypotheses are based. The literature review is composed 
of three sections. Firstly, as the parent discipline, agency theory is briefly 
reviewed. Subsequently, expanding on the agency paradigm, the literature on the 
effects of organisational form is summarised. This can be considered as the 
immediate discipline. The second part of Chapter II addresses the existing 
literature on fund performance. Such a review is essential because the third 
empirical analysis deals with performance of unit trusts. The rest of Chapter II 
focuses on the principal-agent problem in the fund management industry. 
Specifically, several sections shed more light on incentive factors in terms of the 
risk-taking of individual fund managers. Finally, these reviews identify a 
number of research gaps within the existing literature. Note that in addition to 
25 
the literature in Chapter II, the literature directly related to each empirical 
analysis is reviewed in a subsequent chapter. 
Chapter III describes the UK unit trust industry. In addition to the general 
description of the industry, Chapter III analyses characteristics of the industry by 
following the industry economics framework such as barriers to entry. The 
analysis helps understand how the companies compete each other in the industry. 
Chapters IV and V investigate whether differences of ultimate organisational 
form explain any differences in terms of risk-taking (Chapter IV) and efficiency 
(Chapter V) of the unit trust management company. The evidence in common 
with the two chapters is that there are differences between the mutual ownership 
group and the proprietary ownership group with regard to the risk-taking and 
efficiency measures. 
Adopting a slightly different angle, Chapter VI develops a performance measure 
that computes return, risk and fees simultaneously by DEA. The results show no 
significant difference in the unit trust performance by ultimate organisational 
form. 
It should be noted that chapters from IV to VI have similar structures. To begin 
with each chapter reviews the relevant literature, leading to the hypothesis 
development. Subsequently three empirical chapters address methods used to 
test the hypotheses. Each chapter summarises the results of the hypothesis tests 
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in its analysis section, followed 
conclusions and implications. 
by the conclusion. Chapter VII outlines 
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Chapter II: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The fundamental objective of this thesis is to explore relationships between 
ultimate ownership and performance / risk-taking of affiliated companies. To 
carry out this task, the thesis looks at ultimate ownership effects in the UK unit 
trust industry. For purpose of the analysis, this industry is fertile ground because 
a number of subsidiaries of mutual and stock owned companies co-exist, 
competing with each other. 
The main goal of this chapter is to review the financial literature, highlighting the 
main issues relevant to both the research filed and the research objective. 
Further, in the course of the literature review, Chapter II identifies a few gaps in 
prior studies, leading us to the hypothesis development in subsequent empirical 
chapters. 
To this end, Chapter II is comprised of three sections. As a starting point, the 
first part of the literature review grounds the present research in the prior 
literature, paying particular attention to agency theory and the application to 
modern corporations. 
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The second section deals with collective investment schemes. The collective 
investment schemes refer to mutual funds in the US and unit trusts in the UK. 
The traditional research enquiry on the investment schemes is whether or not 
fund performance persists. Reviewing this topic is relevant to the current thesis 
for the following reason. Chapter VI investigates whether or not performance 
persistence is attributable to certain organisational factors. Such an enquiry 
would be illogical if no persistence of fund performance exists, reflecting a 
perfectly efficient market. Hence, the second section seeks for empirical 
evidence for and against performance persistence whilst discussing some 
methodological issues. 
Finally, by combining agency theory with characteristics of fund management 
business, the third section summarises early studies on agency problems in the 
fund management industry. The review is of help in two ways. First, the review 
establishes theoretical rationales so as to explain potential agency problems in 
the fund management business. Second, the review ensures that the current 
thesis can make a contribution to the existing literature, rather than repeat it. The 
third section reveals that most of the prior literature in this research area is 
concerned with the individual fund as a unit of analysis. In contrast, until very 
recently, little interest has been shown in agency problems at the company level. 
To fill the void in the literature, the subsequent empirical chapters analyse the 
company's risk-taking (Chapter IV) and efficiency (Chapter V). 
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2.2 The agency literature 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Since the writings of Berle and Means (1932), a great deal of research has gone 
into the issue of ownership and control of modern corporations. The dominant 
paradigm among the prior studies is agency theory, helping explain why 
ownership matters in term of performance and risk-taking of a company. The 
current thesis is no exception, building on the agency paradigm in an attempt to 
explore the ownership effect in the unit trust industry. 
In this regard, the first review section consists of background, relevant and very 
relevant literature groups. Section 2.1.2 starts with an outline of the basic idea of 
the agency theory. Then, in section 2.1.3, a few early studies are presented as 
applications of the agency theory in business studies. Further, as a few scholars 
have extended the agency paradigm to the study of organisational forms and their 
characteristics, section 2.1.4 outlines their basic arguments, which are also 
reviewed in detail in subsequent empirical chapters. To this end, the final 
section, 2.1.5, shows the theoretical linkage between the present thesis and prior 
agency literature. 
2.2.2 Background: basic agency framework 
In general, the agency theory used for the legal literature is associated with the 
term, respondeat superior. The basic idea is that the principal is responsible for 
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the acts of his agent when the agent is acting within the scope of his employment. 
(Crockett and Gilmere, 1999) 
However, agency theory in the economics literature differs from that of the legal 
literature. More precisely, the term of `principal agent relationship' used in the 
economics literature refers to a situation in which one individual (the agent) acts 
on behalf of another (the principal) and is supposed to advance the principal 's 
goals. (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992. p 170). However, there is good reason to 
believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principals. 
(Jensen 1998, p 54). More specifically, problems can be observed when the 
principal cannot easily recognise whether the agent's actions are for the 
principal's goal or for the agent's own interest. Hence, such principal-agent 
problems are attributable to asymmetric information that one party has some 
information that the other party does not. Typical examples that arise in this type 
of world are moral hazard and adverse selection. 
By and large, there are three conditions when an agency problem arises. There 
must be (1) some divergence of interests between people; (2) some basis for 
gainful ex-ante exchange between individuals, and (3) difficulties to see whether 
the individual follows terms of the contract between the individuals, in a sense 
that monitoring activities are costly (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). 
In order to control the agency problem, several remedies are suggested. First, it 
is of help to increase monitoring activities despite the fact extra monitoring 
makes for additional costs. Second, designing effective incentive schemes is also 
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useful to mitigate the moral hazard problem. The third way to eliminate the 
agency problem is to penalise the agent if the agent would engage in self-interest 
activity at the expense of the principal's welfare. 
2.2.3 The principal-agency perspective on modern corporations 
A starting point 
Berle and Means (1932) were the first to draw the attention to the relationship 
between corporate ownership and performance. It can be seen that their line of 
reasoning had much in common with the principal-agent perspective. Focusing 
on more diffused ownership in modern firms, Berle and Means predicted 
managerial problems as a consequence of the dispersed equity ownership 
structure, which leads to property without power for the equity shareholders to 
power without property for the incumbent executive management. Their 
intuitive argument relied on the idea that the managers will not always place the 
owners' interest above their own if "the desire for personal profit is the prime 
force in motivating control (Berle and Means, p 123)1 ". Anchored by their 
logic, agency based studies have been developed as described in the subsequent 
sub-sections. 
Theory of the firm 
In a similar vein, Jensen and Meckling (1976) advanced the agency theory from 
the following three standpoints: (a) a clear explanation of agency problems in 
I Berle A. A and Means G. C, (1932), "The modern corporation and private property". Macmillan. This 
quotation is taken out from T. J. Gough's the economics of building societies. (1982, p5), the Macmillan 
Press Limited. 
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firm, (b) ownership as an incentive, and (c) asset substitution problem between 
shareholders and debt-holders. 
(a) Explanation: To begin with, the authors demonstrated that whenever 
managers have less than 100% stake in the firm, it is inevitable to see conflicts of 
interest between shareholders and non-owner managers. To take a simple 
example, the managers take excess consumption of perquisites for their own 
benefit. Jensen and Meckling's illustration in this point is summarised as 
follows: Consider that the manager owns only 5 percent of the company's shares. 
Each pound of unnecessary expenditures which the manager personally obtained 
benefits from, costs the manager only 5 pence whereas other shareholders incur 
the other 95 pence (Grinblatt and Titman, 1998). 
Defined as agency problems, such conflicts of interest can be seen to the extent 
that the managers, as decision-makers of the firm, can affect any business 
functions, and ultimately corporate value, whilst their decisions may not be the 
optimal ones for owners. 
(b) Ownership as an incentive: Under the circumstance presented above, Jensen 
and Meckling suggested that to provide the managers with shares of the firm is 
one of the devices to mitigate the problem. In this way, the managers become 
"inside" or "managerial" owners of firm. To put it another way, the agency 
problems are reduced by establishing linkages between the managers' rewards 
and firm performance. 
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Viewed from this perspective, a great deal of attention has been paid to the 
design of incentive contracts with optimal risk sharing properties on the theory 
side, and to the connection between ownership and firm performance on the 
empirical side. For a detail discussion of the manager-owner conflict, see Byrd, 
Parrino, and Pritsch (1998), who provide an excellent review of the literature 
concerning manager-owner agency problems. 
(c) Shareholder versus debt-holder: Moreover, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
also revealed the risk-shifting effect of debt due to different residual claims 
between shareholders and debt-holders. Shareholders have incentives to 
maximise the value of their shares by investing riskier projects at the expense of 
debt-holders' interest. On the other hand, debt-holders are only entitled to claim 
their original lending and the interest2. To avoid risk shifting by shareholders, 
the debt-holders need to set up a monitoring or bonding mechanism. In other 
words, one can consider monitoring by the debt holders as a device to reduce the 
agency problems. 
Defined as costs of debt or equity, this line of thinking provided considerable 
importance to financial researchers because the notion of cost of debt/equity 
contradicts the Modigliani and Miller proposition (1958) that the actual capital 
structure is irrelevant to the value of a firm in a perfect capital market. The 
debates on capital structure (which is often called debt policy) appear in standard 
corporate finance textbooks (See, for example, Brealey and Myers, 1996). 
2 Brealey and Myers (1996) described such different residual claims as saying that when a firm gets into 
trouble, limited liability allows stockholders simply walk away from it, leaving all its troubles to its 
creditors. (p 485) 
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Nonetheless, to argue this point would carry us too far away from the purpose of 
this thesis. It is enough to summarise that because the capital markets are not 
100 percent perfect, capital structure does matter. Conflicts of interest, and 
incentive problems between shareholders and debt-holders are costly, leading to 
financial distress. 
In essence, stimulating a substantial body of financial economic researches, the 
preceding scholars' contributions to the agency literature are twofold: The first 
point is that ownership matters. The second is that the principal-agent 
relationship can be seen in a variety of setting in a modern corporation. From the 
scope of the present thesis, the two strands are preludes to theory of 
organisational form, which are directly connected with the present topic. 
2.2.4 Analysis of organisational forms 
Carrying Jensen and Meckling's paradigm one step further, Fama and Jensen 
(1983a, and 1983b) stated that the controlling agency problems is a key factor in 
explaining the survival of various organisational forms. Their discussion has an 
explicit linkage to the present research. In this respect, the following Fama and 
Jensen's argument serves as the immediate discipline whereas the preceding 
agency literature refers to the parent discipline. It is essential for the purpose of 
the present thesis to enter into Fama and Jensen's discussion. 
There are three concepts grounded in Fama and Jensen's seminal papers. First, 
an organisation is the nexus of contracts that specify the rights of each agent in 
35 
the organisation, performance criteria on which the agents are evaluated and the 
payoff function they face. However, agency problems arise because such 
contracts are imperfect in a way that the contracts are not costlessly written and 
enforced (Fama and Jensen, 1983a: p1533). In other words, it is costly to draw a 
set of contracts that specify course of action for each stakeholder in all 
conceivable future circumstances (Drake and Llywellyn, 2001). 
Second, residual claims are important. The residual claim refers to the right to 
net cash flows generating the difference between stochastic inflows of resources 
and promised payments to agents (Jensen, 1998, p176). Focusing on different 
type of the residual claim, Fama and Jensen classified various organisation 
forms. For example, a mutual institution is characterised by the fact that the 
customers are themselves the residual owners. In contrast, customers and 
residual claimers, i. e. shareholders are separated in stock owned companies. 
Lastly, given the viewpoints above, Fama and Jensen built up an important 
hypothesis that different organisational forms have their own mechanisms to 
control agency problems. Such control mechanisms reflect the unique 
organisational characteristics defined by a set of various contracts among 
stakeholders. Thus, organisational form is a key factor, helping explain the 
survival of organisational forms in specific activities. 
' This quotation is taken out from Michael Jensen (1998) "Foundations of Organisational Strategy" Harvard 
University press. 
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Table 2.1 summarises their hypothesised relationship between organisational 
archetypes and their business activities where a particular organisation archetype 
is likely to survive. 
Table 2.1: Fama and Jensen's organisation analysis (Fama and Jensen, 1983 a) 
Organisation Circumstances in which they are more likely to survive Key implications 
Form 
Listed " The greater the benefits of unrestricted risk sharing. Economies of scale 
Company " The greater the benefits of specialised management. are essential 
" The greater the amount of organisation-specific assets 
to be purchased. 
" The greater the wealth required to bond contractual 
payoffs 
" The lower the costs of separating decision 
management from decision control. 
Private " The costs of separating decision management from Economies of scale 
Company / decision control are high are not important. 
Partnership 
Mutual " The lower costs of expanding and contracting assets. Financial 
" The lower costs of obtaining accurate indices of organisations where 
assets' values. assets are primarily 
the securities of 
other organisations. 
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Mutual has a control mechanism against agency problems by liquidating residual 
claims on demand at a price set out by their rules. To take advantage of such a 
device, the mutual association is likely to survive in business that deals with 
other companies' securities, which prices are easily obtainable. 
In the case of an exchange-listed company, nature of residual claimants such as 
limited liability and free transferability of shares allows the quoted company to 
raise a large amount of capital. Moreover, from the shareholders' view, they 
diversify their own wealth by their investments in various companies whilst 
letting their invested companies to engage in uncertain business projects. 
Arguably, these conditions are critical in pursuing economies of scale. 
Further, to a private company, what distinguishes the private company from the 
quoted counterpart is that the residual claimants in the private company are 
largely restricted to important decision makers. For this reason, the privately 
held company is likely to survive in business activities where the benefit from 
restriction of residual claimants is larger than that from separation of decision 
makers and risk-bearers. Typical business activities are law, accounting, 
medicine and business consulting. Such business fields do not require economies 
of scales, which work well with separation and specialisation between decision 
making and risk-bearing functions (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Obviously. the 
prediction noted above will provide foundations for a number of testable 
hypotheses in the subsequent empirical analyses in the present thesis. 
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One final point is worth commenting on with regard to Fama and Jensen's 
discussion. Their line of reasoning suggested that in examining organisational 
form, there is need to consider the circumstances in which companies are doing 
business. Nonetheless, as discussed later, early empirical studies of stock versus 
mutual companies failed to account for the nature of the industry where 
companies with the two different organisational forms coexist. In this light, 
Chapter III is intended to provide the brief industry analysis concerning the unit 
trust industry in the U. K. 
2.2.5 Section summary 
This section briefly reviewed the basic notion of agency theory and its 
application to modern companies. In particular, two issues are more applicable 
to the objective of the present thesis: Ownership matters and organisational form 
also matters. The former topic is of use when considering the difference between 
private owned and public owned stock company. The latter issue is 
indispensable for the stock versus mutual debate in this thesis. In an attempt to 
develop testable hypotheses from these two points of view, the current thesis will 
turn back to the issues made as the introductory remarks in subsequent empirical 
chapters. 
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2.3 Literature on fund performance 
A task of the current thesis is to explore the linkage between performance/risk- 
taking of fund managers (or management companies) and their incentives. 
associated with their ultimate ownership form. As the review of background 
literature, the first section addressed potential effects of ownership and 
organisational form on performance. 
Now the second section goes through the literature of collective investment 
schemes. As described in the next chapter, the schemes are usually referred to as 
mutual funds in the U. S. and unit trusts and investment trusts in the U. K. Thus, 
the review in this section is around mutual fund / unit trust literature. 
One of the research strands within the fund management literature is 
performance persistence. This topic is key in analysing performance of 
individual fund products. If there is no performance consistency among funds, 
the effort in Chapter VI that connects a fund's performance with its company's 
ultimate ownership form would be flawed. 
The above enquiry is based on the efficient market hypothesis (EMH)4 and there 
are many of mutual fund studies on the topic of performance persistence. 
Because of its relevance and the controversy, a review of previous literature on 
performance persistence must not be dismissed. 
4 See the next section for details. 
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2.3.1. Performance Persistence 
This subsection provides several indications of the research findings with regard 
to fund performance in the U. S and the U. K. The focuses of existing studies on 
mutual funds are twofold: Whether or not these professionally managed funds 
yield higher returns and, if this is the case, whether or not such performance 
persists. In plain English, the former can be thought of as "beat the market" 
whilst the latter means "can winners repeat? " Note that based on recent 
empirical studies (Carhart, 1997 and Blake and Timmermann, 2003), the latter 
question can be rephrased as "why losers persist? " 
Background 
There are two motives for such performance studies. The first and foremost is to 
test out the EMH as noted above. Basically, what the EMH asserts is that 
security prices reflect all available information (Fama 1970). If the EMH holds, 
it is of no use to analyse information in order to achieve excess returns5 because 
numerous rational investors react quickly to the just-released information (Reilly 
and Brown, 2000). 
The next motive to study performance persistence in mutual funds is that an 
implication from findings of such studies has a large economic impact on 
investors' strategy. If there is performance consistency, investors should benefit 
from investing in the constantly superior funds whilst avoiding the continuously 
poorly performing funds. Undoubtedly, the notion above results in the on-going 
5 Excess return refers to excess from the equilibrium or required rate of return. 
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debate about active versus passive investment strategy in the investment 
community. 
Besides the two motives, examining mutual funds offers more realistic and 
widely applicable merits in testing the EMH. The first advantage is that mutual 
funds are managed by a group of investors who are considered as highly trained 
professionals working full time at investment management. At the same time, 
however, the fund managers as well as ordinary investors are usually not in the 
position to have exclusive access to critical new information6. The motives 
described above can be best summarised in the following quote: "Studies of 
money managers' performance are the bottom line test of market efficiency" 
(Quigley and Sinquefield, 2000, p 72). 
The second favourable condition is that in conducting empirical tests for the 
EMH, obtaining reliable data is a fundamental requirement. In this respect, 
historical records of mutual funds are more easily obtainable than those of other 
investment schemes such as pension funds. Clearly there is a practical advantage 
in studying mutual funds7. 
Given the motives above, numerous studies have been made as to whether or not 
performance persistence of mutual funds exists. Notably, a great deal of the 
most advanced work has been completed in the U. S. (reviewed in the next 
6 Insider dealing is a criminal offence defined by the Company Act 1980. According to the FSA 
(www. fsa. gov. uk), It is a process where individuals use, or encourage others to use, information regarding 
a company which is not generally available, to deal 
for their own financial advantage (other than in the 
proper performance of their job). " 
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section). More recently, there are also studies of funds in Europe including the 
UK (Otten and Barns, 2002) and in Asian countries such as Hong Kong (Cheng 
et al 1999) and Japan (Cai et al, 1997; Brown et al 2001). However, these non- 
US studies are limited in comparison to those of U. S mutual funds. 
In spite of Herculean efforts, history of these studies shows that empirical 
evidence is mixed. It is argued that a few methodological problems such as 
choice of performance measures and the possibility of survivorship bias can 
partially explain why evidence is divergent on the persistence (Elton et al, 1996; 
Allen and Tan, 1999). As these two issues will be addressed again in the 
subsequent chapter that investigates individual unit trusts, for the moment, let us 
concentrate on the main findings of widely referred studies of this research issue. 
To begin with, the following subsection goes through several prominent papers in 
the U. S mutual fund literature. 
U. S Studies 
Evidence from early U. S. works (Sharpe, 1966; Jensen, 1968; and Treynor 1966) 
indicated that there was little information in the historical performance record of 
mutual funds. For example, Jensen (1968) examined 114 mutual funds over the 
1945-1964 period, finding that the majority of funds (72 out of 114 funds) in his 
sample showed negative risk-adjusted returns after controlling for various fees. 
Hence, he drew the conclusion that there is no persistence of superior 
performance in mutual funds. 
7 Examples are Standard & Poor's (titwwfunds-sp. com) FT Fund Ratings (www. funds. ft. com) and 
Morningstar (wtiiw. morningstar. co. uk).. 
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In more recent studies that directly investigate consistency of mutual fund 
performance, some controversy still remains. Studies that presented some 
evidence for the persistence include those by Grinblatt and Titman (1992), 
Hendricks, Patel and Zechhauser (1993), Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), 
Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1996) and Gruber 
(1996). 
By contrast, researches that reported no or conditional evidence for persistence 
include those by Malkiel (1995), Carhart(1997), Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and 
Wermers (1997), Phelps and Detzel (1998), Jain and Wu (2000), and Droms and 
Walker (2001). 
Evidence for persistency 
The impetus for the renewed interest in performance persistence can be traced 
largely to the findings of Hendricks et al (1993). Their paper was able to show 
positive but short-term persistence in mutual fund returns. Such positive 
performance persistence is referred to as "hot-hands" in the literature. Using 
quarterly returns of 165 growth equity funds over the period 1974-1988, the 
authors conducted cross-sectional regression analyses where the dependent 
variable was fund i's residual from the market equilibriums, e. g. the expected 
return in the quarter. The independent variable consisted of lags of one to eight 
of the dependent variables (See Equation 2.2. a in Table 2.2). 
8 Horst and Verbeek (2000) emphasised that a choice of the market equilibrium is crucial because results 
from persistence studies highly depend on the estimation of the market equilibrium. 
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The results from the regressions showed that the coefficients for the first four 
lags were all positive and statistically significant whereas those from five to eight 
lags were less clearly significant. The degree of the positive performance 
relative to conventional measures was 3-4% per year with a four-quarter 
evaluation period when the impact of the hot hands' effect reaches a maximum. 
Therefore, their conclusion was that there was performance persistence of mutual 
funds from one quarter to the next Nonetheless, such persistence fades away 
beyond a year. 
By using two-way contingency tables, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994) also 
found evidence for performance persistence, which is referred to as the repeat 
winner hypothesis (Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 1994). As their methodology 
becomes a dominant model in studies of performance persistence, it is worth 
describing not only their findings but also their methodology. Their method 
consisted of three stages. The starting point was to compute each fund's return 
over time. The next step was to classify each fund as winners or losers based on 
whether or not the fund's return was above (winners) or below (losers) the 
median return in each period. The final stage was to create a 2x2 table to which 
each fund was assigned, following the winners/losers of the previous period t and 
those of the subsequent period t+ 1, then to count the number of funds in each 
cell. If more funds are found in the diagonal cells than in the off-diagonal cells 
and the distribution is statistically significant, then persistence exists (Hallahan 
and Faff, 2001). 
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In terms of the sample size, Goetzmann and Ibbotson used a relatively large 
sample with monthly total returns of 728 funds for the period of 1976 through 
1988. Further, there were two performance measures used in their work; a raw 
return and a Jensen's alpha. The results with both measures indicated that by 
using the previous performance, the ratio of selecting a winner fund over a loser 
fund was about 60/40, and significant at the 5% confidence level. Hence, they 
concluded that the repeat winner pattern is present. 
Whilst stating strongly that past performance is of use for predicting future 
performance in mutual funds, Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996) extended the line 
of research in two ways: by creating a data set with no survivorship bias and by 
taking into account the performance of growth versus value stocks. By tracking 
funds individually, the authors created the sample set including 188 funds that 
survived over the 1977-1993 period. The authors used the four-factor model 
where the intercept a is defined as a risk-adjusted performance (See Equation 
2.2. b in Table 2.2). Note that the authors used this intercept to compute both a 
one year alpha and a three year alpha subject to the period they examined 
. 
Grouping the funds into 10 deciles on the basis of the alphas, Elton et al studied 
how the ranking in year (t) has a relationship to their subsequent rankings, i. e. 
year (t+1), (t+3). Results form the rank correlation showed that there were 
significant correlations. 
Moreover, as an additional test, the authors created two portfolios; (a) the top 
portfolio that consisted of funds taken from the top deciles group and optimally 
weighted, (b) the bottom portfolio created in a similar manner but with funds 
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taken from the bottom deciles. The performance comparison between the two 
portfolios in the subsequent period was significant. For example, when the two 
portfolios were constructed on the basis of a three-year alpha, the difference 
between the two portfolios' alphas in the subsequent three year period was 
0.446% per month or 5.4% per annum. These results led them to conclude that 
"there is definite information about future performance conveyed by past 
performance " (Elton, Gruber and Blake, 1996; p. 156). From a slightly different 
research interest, Gruber (1996), who studied the survival of poor performing 
funds, presented similar evidence for the persistence of mutual funds during the 
1985-1994 period. 
Evidence against persistence 
By contrast, there are some studies that challenge the preceding evidence of 
persistence. Malkiel (1995) is a good illustration of a paper showing performance 
persistence with some reservations. His main point is that performance 
persistence reported in prior literature depends on the year and duration of the 
performance measured. Using equity mutual funds over a twenty-year period 
between 1971 and 1991, Malkiel constructed contingency tables similar to those 
in the Goetzmann and Ibbotson's (1994) work. Based on quarterly total returns 
of funds, the tables showed funds with successful performance in year t over the 
successive period, i. e. year (t+1). His key results were as follows: The 
persistence appeared to be present in the 1970's when winners, e. g. funds with 
high return than the average, were likely to repeat almost two third of the time. 
However, in contrast to the 1970's, winners tended to repeat just over half of the 
time over the whole period of the 1980's. Hence, Malkiel concluded that 
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considerable performance persistence existed during the 1970's, but such a 
pattern disappeared during the 1980s9. 
In a similar vein, Phelps and Detzel (1998) supported Malkiel (1995), by 
presenting additional evidence that performance persistence was a temporal 
phenomenon. The basic method of Phelps and Detzel's work was the same as 
that of Goetzman and Ibbotson (1994). However, the point to observe is that 
Phelps and Detzel's data, covering the period of 1975-1996, was much longer 
and more recent than that used in Goetzman and Ibbtoson's work, i. e. the period 
of 1976-1988. Their analysis indicated that there was positive and statistically 
significant persistence pattern during the period of 1985-1988. The finding is 
consistent with that of prior studies (Hendricks et al, 1993 and Goetzman and 
Ibbotson, 1994). Nevertheless, such positive persistence patterns were not 
observed in the later period, e. g. from 1989 to 1994. Given the findings, Phelps 
and Detzel had taken a position against performance persistence. 
In reviewing the recent performance literature, Carhart's study (1997) deserves 
emphasis because his factor model approach explained considerable variation in 
funds' returns, eliminating almost all patterns in performance persistence. Whilst 
developing a 31-year data sample without survivorship biases, Carhart estimated 
funds' performance by using a single (CAPM), three, and four factor alpha 
models (Equation 2.2. c in Table 2.2. ). For each alpha model, he created 10 
portfolios that were formed from the ranking of funds' alphas in year t and 
observed the alpha of the 10 portfolios in the successive year, t+1. His primary 
9 Rhodes (2000) presented a similar phenomenon in U. K. unit trusts. 
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result indicated that the difference between the top and bottom portfolios was 
significant, showing 0.67% per month or 8% per annum. The results supported 
the short run persistence of performance. 
However, a close inspection of the coefficients in the four-factor model revealed 
that the difference was explained by size and momentum effects (4.6% out of the 
8% difference) of stocks held in the portfolios, by expense ratios (0.7%) and by 
transaction costs (1 %). The observation led him to conclude that most of the 
persistence is explained by common factor sensitivities, expenses, and 
transaction costs, leaving less room for superior skill or information of fund 
managers. 
Furthermore, there is one interesting finding. When focusing on the subsequent 
return of the bottom portfolio that consisted of funds with the previous year's 
worst return, the four-factor model had a lower explanatory power. In other 
words, the four-factor model alone could not explain the subsequent poor 
performance of the bottom portfolio. 
Finally, from a slightly different research angle, Jain and Wu (2000) were 
interested in fund advertisements that often took advantage of their records with 
superior performance. In terms of the performance persistence, their enquiry 
concerned whether or not advertised funds exhibiting above-normal performance 
can maintain their superior performance after the advertisement. Focusing on 
funds advertised in Barrons' or Money Magazine between 1994 and 1996. Jain 
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and Wu evaluated performance of the funds' with four different models 1 °. Their 
overall finding was that on average, advertised funds had higher returns than 
their peer fund groups in the pre-advertising year(s). However, returns of the 
advertised funds in the following years were not as good as before the funds were 
advertised. Therefore, Jain and Wu concluded that there is no performance 
persistence. 
Evidence from the UK unit trusts 
Many of the results from the US mutual fund studies show that a clear-cut 
answer to performance persistence is proving elusive. In order to cross-check the 
U. S findings, the next task is to review the U. K. literature comparable to that of 
the U. S. mutual funds. As the third research issue in the current thesis is to do 
with individual unit trusts, the review of these studies is the most direct relevant 
to the thesis. However, in comparison with the U. S. studies on this research 
topic, less attention has been paid to the U. K unit trusts. Among the few recent 
studies are those by Blake and Timmerman (1998 and 2003), Quigley and 
Sinquefield (2000), Rhodes (2000), and more recently, Fletcher and Forbes 
(2002). 
Blake and Timmerman (1998) presented evidence of performance persistence by 
using 1402 unit trusts that were in existence between 1972 and 1995. Their first 
step was to form the top and bottom quartile portfolios on the basis of a three 
factor model over the previous 24 months. In a manner similar to Fama and 
to The first measure is the average return on all the mutual funds. The second benchmark is the S&P 500 
index. The third measure is the one factor alpha computed from the standard CAPM: R,, - Rf, = a,, + ß, (R,,,, 
-Rf, ) + error,, The forth measure is the four 
factor alpha (See Equation 2.2-c in Table 2.2) 
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French (1993)' model (See 2.2-d in Table 2.2), their three factor model design 
was a regression of the trust's excess returns on (i) a constant, e. g. an abnormal 
return, (ii) excess returns on the stock market index, (iii) excess returns on small- 
cap stocks over the market index, and (iv) excess returns on a five year UK 
government bonds. The comparison of time-series of returns between the two 
portfolio was their second step. The key results were that: the top quartile 
portfolio generated significantly positive abnormal returns whereas the bottom 
quarter portfolio showed significant negative abnormal returns. Hence, they 
concluded that there is persistence in abnormal returns. 
Similar to Blake and Timmermann (1998), Quigley and Sinquefield (2000) 
created the top and bottom portfolios on the basis of non-risk adjusted returns of 
U. K unit trusts in time t during the period from 1978 to 1997, then compared the 
performance between the two portfolios in time t+1. The result revealed that the 
difference was 3.54% on average from 1981 to 1997, suggesting performance 
persistence. 
An additional test was conducted in a similar way to the first test, but this time, 
the top and bottom portfolios were created on the basis of risk-adjusted return, 
i. e. alpha derived from Fama and French' three factor model. Results of the 
regression analyses showed that: For the top portfolio that consisted of unit 
trusts with the highest alpha in time t, the alpha in the subsequent period (t+l) 
was positive but not statistically significant. In contrast to the top portfolio, the 
comparable alpha in the bottom portfolio was negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Therefore, Quigley and Sinquefield concluded by 
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saying "does performance persist? Yes, but only poor performance does (p. 72). '' 
This conclusion is consistent with one of Carhart (1997)' findings. 
From a practical point of view, however, Quigley and Sinquefield discovered 
that an investment strategy using this method did not work in reality because the 
strategy requires high turnover" in order to re-form the portfolios each year. 
Resulting in return reduction, the high cost of portfolio rearrangement arises 
from the bid-offer spread practice (see Chapter III for more details), which 
should be incurred as the transaction cost. This remark calls into the question of 
Blake and Timmerman's finding (1998) from the viewpoint of practical 
relevance. 
From a regulatory viewpoint, a member of staff of the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA), Rhodes (2000) published an occasional paper on performance 
persistence. Rhodes created five portfolios consisting of UK equity unit trusts 
that were grouped on the basis of quartile rankings of monthly returns over the 
years 1980 to 1998. Then, by using 5x5 contingency tables, he studied how the 
five portfolios in an initial period performed in the subsequent period. 
The point he examined was whether or not the distribution of the numbers in 
each cell is normal. If there is no pattern in performance, the number will be 
II According to the authors, every year, on average, 80% of the underlying unit trusts in the top portfolio is 
replaced with unit trusts with higher return in the subsequent period. 
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normally distributed 12. His results indicated that the distribution pattern was not 
significantly different from the normal one. Thus, he drew the conclusion that 
there was a lack of evidence to support the claim that past performance 
information is of use to retail investors. Instead, from the regulatory standpoint, 
his conclusion implies that marketing activities relied on past performance of 
unit trusts are potentially misleading to retail investors. In fact, subsequent to 
Rhodes' paper, the FSA proposed that use of past performance in marketing 
materials be restricted (the FSA, 2001). 
As a response to Rhodes' paper (2000), a report from Charles River Associates 
(hereafter, CRA), which was sponsored by Association of Unit Trust and 
Investment Funds (AUTIF), was immediately published (CRA, 2002). By way 
of contrast, this counter-attack from the industry is worth a mention in passing. 
Taking the form of a literature review, CRA's main criticism was that Rhodes 
failed to represent prior studies' full conclusions whilst omitting a significant 
amount of the existing research. For instance, Rhodes quoted a following 
passage from Carhart (1997). "The mundane explanations of strategy and 
investment costs account for almost all the predictability in mutual fund returns. " 
Nonetheless, CRA pointed out that the passage is followed by "important rules of 
thumb for wealth maximizing mutual fund investors: (1) Avoid funds with 
persistently poor performance; (2) Funds with higher returns have higher than 
expected returns next year, but not in years thereafter. " Hence, it seemed to 
12 As he emphasised investors' interests, the numbers in the cells were weighted to allow for investors' 
utilities that were characterised by risk aversion, and a diminishing return toward higher performance. To 
illustrate this, suppose that Fund X has a ranking giving a constant performance of 4 across each of two 
periods (t and t+l). This gives a unit holder utility of 80 in each period. By contrast, assume that Fund Y 
that has a ranking with a performance of 6 in time t and a ranking with a performance of 2 in time t+ 1. The 
average performance of is 4 on average, but the average utility is lower. e. g. 73. 
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CRA that Rhodes ignored the latter paragraph that suggested performance 
persistence. 
A recent report prepared for the FSA by Blake and Timmermann (2003) attempts 
to clarify and condense the debate between the FSA and Charles River 
Associates (hereafter the CRA) on persistence of fund performance. Whilst the 
CRA report (2002) found evidence of performance persistence in raw return data, 
Blake and Timmermann (2003) raised doubts about the methodologies that the 
CRA employed. The main methodological problems that Blake and 
Timmermann highlighted are the use of non-risk adjusted return, lack of 
robustness of the statistical analysis, the exclusion of fee charge effects and the 
exclusion of index tracker funds. 
Blake and Timmermann's summary is more noteworthy. After reviewing 
previous empirical literature including the CRA, Blake and Timmermann 
summarised that losers generally repeat whilst winners do not necessarily repeat. 
As an important policy implication, Blake and Timmermann emphasised the 
importance of the performance league table that includes not only superior 
performing funds but also poorly performing funds over several investment 
horizons. 
More recently, Fletcher and Forbes (2002) used 2x2 contingency tables 
(Goetzman and Ibbotson, 1994; Brown and Goetzman, 1995) and Carhart's four 
factor model (1997) in order to test the U. K unit trusts' performance persistence 
between 1982 and 1996. What distinguishes one approach from the other is that 
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the contingency table approach is based on relative rankings whilst the Carhart 
model is formed on the basis of excess return compared to stock market 
benchmarks. 
The results from the contingency table approach were consistent with those of 
the prior studied in the U. S, suggesting that there is a significant persistence in 
repeated winners and losers for 8 out of 14 evaluation periods. Of particular to 
note is that the repeated losers mainly accounted for the persistence. The number 
of repeated losers is over the three times higher than that of repeated winners in 
11 out of 14 evaluation periods. 
The results from the Carhart' model contrasted with those of the contingency 
table approach. The performance persistence disappeared when unit trust 
performance was evaluated with the Carhart model. The observations were 
generally consistent with those of Carhart's original work (1997). 
Based on these findings, the implications from Fletcher and Forbes (2002) are 
worth summarising: Performance persistence is subject to a relative 
measurement. Further, if there is persistence of a unit trust's return, such 
performance can be explained by factor models such as Fama and French (1993) 
and Carhart (1997). 
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2.3.2 Section Summary 
From the viewpoint of performance persistence, this subsection provides a brief 
mention of some recent studies on the U. S mutual funds as well as the U. K. unit 
trust. Overall, early literature is indecisive as to whether fund performance 
persists period after period. Nonetheless, recent studies reported an interesting 
observation that inferior performance of a fund is more likely to persist than 
superior performance of a fund. (Carhart, 1997, and Blake and Timmermann 
2003). The number of issues emerged from the literature review on the 
persistence of fund return and these issues are likely to account for the 
inconclusive evidence presented in this sub section. 
The first point is that various measurement criteria tend to have impact on 
performance persistence. For example, performance can be clustered in time for 
U. S mutual funds (Malkiel, 1995), and in the early 1980's for the U. K. unit trusts 
(Rhodes, 2000). Further, performance persistence can be sensitive to 
survivorship bias (Elton et al, 1996). Moreover, performance persistence often 
depends on whether the performance is evaluated by a peer comparison or by a 
market index comparison (Fletcher and Forbes, 2002). 
The second point to note is that if performance persistence holds, then factor 
model approaches can explain why certain fund performance persisted, leaving 
little room for fund managers' unique skills (Carhart, 1997). 
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Finally, in addition to the investment factors, a fund's costs and charges should be 
considered as parts of the fund's net performance. This is an important issue, 
and specifically relevant to funds with poor performance records because 
"under performing funds are exactly those funds that do not have any fund 
manager ability, but do have higher charges and costs (Blake and Timmermann, 
2003, p. 40)" 
Given the mixed picture on persistence and the methodological issues, it is still 
worthwhile to blend the line of fund performance research with the rhetoric of 
agency theory. The enquiry is whether or not a company's ultimate ownership 
form is linked to better (or worse) performance of unit trusts that the company 
offers. Specifically, as risk and charges are important determinants of a unit 
trust's net performance, the two elements can be good proxies for the degree of 
agency problems. This is the main goal of Chapter VI where the relationship 
between performance of individual unit trusts and their management company's 
ownership is empirically investigated. 
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Table 2.2 Models in the previous literature (using the authors' notations) 
Hendricks et al R., = k, + ajrrir-j i ll,,, I=I,...., N (2.2-a) (1993) , J=1 
where R,, =a measure of the "residual" performance of fund i in the quarter. R ;, = lags of j (I to 8) quarter of the dependent variables 
Elton, Gruber R,, = a; + ß, SP RSP, + I3ISL RSLI + ßiGV RGV, ß1B RBI + Eit 
and Blake (2.2-b) (1996) where: 
R,, = the excess return on fund I in month t (the return on the fund minus the 30 day Treasury-bill rate) 
Rsp, = the excess return on the S&P 500 index in month t 
RsL, = the difference in return between a small-cap and a large cap stock 
portfolio based on Prudential Bache indexes in month t. 
Rev, = the difference in return between a growth and a value stock portfolio 
based on Prudential Bache indexes in month t. 
RB, = the excess return on a bond index in month t measured by combination 
of the Lehman Brothers Aggregate Bond Index and the Blumer/Keim High- 
Yield Bond Index. 
ß; k= the sensitivity of excesss return on fund Ito excess return on index k (k 
= SP, SL, GV, B) 
£;, = the random error in month t 
Carhart (1997) R1, 
-Rfi = a4; + ß'; (R, nr-Rft) + P21 SMB, + ß. 31 HML, +041 
and Jain and Wu momentum 1+ error it (2.2-c) (2000) 
where 
R;, = the return on fund i in month t 
Rj1= the risk-free rate in month t 
R,,,, = the return on a market portfolio in month t 
SMB, 
= the return on portfolios of small minus large firms in month t 
HML, = the return on portfolios of high minus low book-to-market stocks in 
month t 
momentum, = the rate of return on portfolios of high minus low momentum 
(prior one year return) in month t 
Note: a momentum factor is constructed as follows: Beginning in the sample 
period, all securities are ranked on the basis of their cumulative return over 
the past 11 months and grouped into the top and bottom third of companies. 
Over the next month, a portfolio is formed which is the difference between 
the mean return of the top 1/3 and the mean return of the bottom 1/3. This is 
repeated each month to generate a time-series of return observations. 
Fama and Rlt-Rf, = a; + (3 j, (R,,, g-Rfi) + (321 SMB, + 031 HML, +error it 
French (1993) (2.2-d) 
where 
R;, = the return on asset i in month t 
Raj = the risk-free rate in month t 
R,,,, = the return on a market portfolio in month t 
SMB, = the return on the mimiking portfolio for the size factor in month t 
HML, = the return on the mimiking portfolio for the book-to-market stocks 
in month t 
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2.4 Agency problems in the fund management industry. 
The basic objective of the current thesis is to examine UK unit trust management 
companies and their products from an agency theory perspective. As the initial 
work for the objective, the prior literature review dealt with two bodies of 
"parent" disciplines. The first discipline is concerned with agency theory applied 
to modern corporations. The second discipline is about studies of fund 
performance, which provide key foundations for mutual fund analysis. 
Combining the two "parent" disciplines together, the next review section 
concentrates on agency literature applied to the UK unit trust industry and by 
extension, the fund management industry. 
There are three strands of agency-based literature that are related to the fund 
management industry: the first relevant literature is on incentive fee 
arrangements, using the normative models; next and even more relevant is the 
recent empirical literature on implicit / explicit incentive effects on a fund 
manager' s behaviour; and finally most relevant of all is the latest literature on 
the relationship between ownership and fund performance in the mutual fund 
industry. 
However, before moving on to the review of the literature that serves as the 
immediate discipline, there is a quick inquiry to ponder: It is whether or not the 
setting of the fund management industry meets certain circumstances from which 
agency problems arise. This "reality-check" is important because papers in this 
section are commonly built on the view that the conflict of interests between 
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fund investors and mutual fund managers/companies can be interpreted as an 
agency problem. Hence, a good starting point for this section is to describe the 
relationship between fund investors and their fund managers within the scope of 
agency theory. In addition to the description, recent business episodes are 
presented so as to enhance the notion that agency problems exist in the industry. 
2.4.1 Three conditions 
Viewed from the perspective of agency theory addressed in the preceding 
literature review section 2.1, three essential elements are found in the fund 
management industry. These viewpoints are often addressed in literature on fund 
managers' behaviour. 
The principal and its agent 
First of all, it is evident that the investor as the principal hires the investment 
manager as the principal's agent who is expected to maximise welfare of the 
principal by managing the principal's wealth (Golec, 1992). 
Unobservable skills or costly to monitor their effort 
Next, arguably, the agent is a professional who has superior investment skill or 
information. Yet, their skills and luck are hard to distinguish due to the random 
nature of capital markets (Starks, 1987). 
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For example, according to Kritzman(1986), it requires quite long historical 
records to evaluate fund managers' investment skills by using statistical 
confidence measures 13 
Further, "it is prohibitively costly for the investor (Golec, 1992, p. 82)" to monitor 
the agent's ex-ante activities. Moreover, in an attempt to reduce agency 
problems, the threat of ex-post settling is costly too, because it may require some 
kind of legal action (Starks, 1987; Cohen and Starks, 1988). In reality, the 
number of lawsuits against fund management firms both in the Unites States and 
the U. K has increased14. The following cases support this point of view. In the 
U. S, one financial professional went to court, claiming that the legendary fund 
manager, Mark Mobius, failed to invest his Vietnam Opportunities fund's assets 
in Vietnamese/ Vietnam oriented companies by October 199715. In the U. K, 
there was a negligence lawsuit of 130 million pounds between one of the leading 
British fund management companies, Merrill Lynch Investment Managers, 
trading as Mercury Asset Management, and the Unilever Pension Fund. The 
heart of the allegation against Merrill Lynch Investment Managers is that Merrill 
Lynch took inappropriate risks with the Unilever pension holders' savings16 
Self-interested agent 
The final and foremost element to note is that investors appoint investment 
managers to optimise the investors' assets subject to a predetermined investment 
13 If active return is 1% whilst its risk is 2%, 15 years of evidence are needed 
in order to have 95° o 
confidence that the active return was causally achieved. 
14 For instance, lawsuits against mutual funds jump 25% in the U. S, Financial Times weekly review of the 
investment industry, 2 June, 2003 
" 
"Franklin Resources to settle holder suit, " Wall Street Journal, 21 November, 2001, page, C19 
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policy. On the other hand, the investment managers are self-interested agents 
who aim to maximise their own profits. Although the income structure in the 
industry will be taken up a little more fully in subsequent chapters, the point to 
remember concerning income structure is that management fees are based on 
assets under management, accounting for a major income source to fund 
management firms. 
Further, their profits are also generated from the front-end fees when the fund 
managers receive new money inflow. An article, "A mutual fund morality tale" 
from The Economist 17 illustrated this point of view. During 1994, a number of 
money market funds were using risky derivatives, attempting to boost their 
returns. The article pointed out that in an attempt to attract new money from 
investors, the money markets funds took unnecessary higher risk at the expense 
of their existing unit holders' interests. 
The following recent study provides another example to show how fund 
managers pursue their profit. Khorana and Servaes (1999) examined when 
mutual fund companies in the U. S launched their new funds. By analysing a 
sample of more than one thousand fund openings over the 1979-1992 period, the 
authors found that when the potential size of the underlying investment (such as 
the latest high tech funds) was large, more funds were launched. Likewise, when 
large fund companies established a new fund with a particular investment 
objective, other fund companies were likely to follow suite. The following 
16 
, Unilever pension holders take on Mercury in court, " The Guardian, 15 October 2001, page22 
17 
"A mutual fund morality tale" The Economist, 21 
October 1995, page 76 
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comment from the industry expert reflected the principal findings of the Khorana 
and Servaes study. Namely, "the industry will keep introducing whatever has 
been working well lately. 181, 
Arguably, such a practice in the industry is not without problems, accelerating 
booms and busts in the stock market. Take recent sharp declines of high tech 
shares for example. In May 2000, UK technology funds fell by an average of 
about 40% since early March 2000, wiping out more than one billion pounds off 
small investors' savings. In particular, funds launched in March so as not to miss 
the "dot-com" euphoria were victims due to the current sharp declines of high 
tech stocks. Prices of funds like Gartmore UK Tectornado and Framlington 
Netnet have halved since they received large cash inflows from investors. 19 
These two recent incidents illustrate how the fund managers' risk decisions hurt 
their fund holders' interests, whereas the fund managers purse their own 
interests. Evidently, under the conditions described above, financial researchers 
have justified their notion that a fundamental conflict of interest exits between 
fund investors and fund managers so that the agency theory can be applicable to 
the fund management industry. 
18 Money Magazine, July 1996, p. 96 
19 Hunter, Teresa (2000) Have you dotcom investments gone down to the drain ?" The Sunday Telegraph, 
London 28 May 2000 
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2.4.2. The normative models 
Sketching out the principal-agent setting in the fund management industry, the 
section overviews a few normative models. The common rational behind the 
normative approach is that designing incentive arrangements is one of the key 
mechanisms to mitigate agency problems, as the previous literature on agency 
theory suggests. As a result, traditionally, a great deal of the normative agency 
literature has gone into the subject of explicit incentive contracts between the 
principal and the agent (Beatty and Zajac, 1994). Early normative literature on 
the relationship between investor and fund manager relationship are no 
exception20. Hence, the common feature among the conceptual models was to 
explore the connection between the risk decisions of fund mangers and various 
fee settings. 
Two broad approaches can be found among early normative models from the 
standpoint of model specifications: To deal with the agency problem, the first 
group employed the expected utility approach (Starks, 1987; Cohen and Starks, 
1988; and Golec, 1992) The second group used an option pricing framework to 
tackle the problem (Glinblatt and Titman, 1989; Ferguson and Leistikow, 1997; 
and Elton, Gruber, and Blake; 2003). To follow the classification, several 
theoretical models are described briefly in the following sub-section. 
20 For the latest arguments for normative models, see Sciubba Emanuela, "Relative performance and 
herding in financial markets" in Performance Measurement in Finance, ed. John Knight and 
Stephen 
Satchell, Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford (2002), p. 290-292 
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However, note that there seems to be no need to go into the minor details of the 
models for the main scope of the current thesis, because the ability of abstract 
models to analyse real world situations of the UK unit trust industry is limited. 
The limitations of the normative approach are elaborated at the end of this sub- 
section. 
Expected utility model 
Starks' first model 
Starks (1987) is among those who developed abstract analysis concerning 
incentive contracts and their effects on the risk taking of fund managers. The 
intention of her study was to evaluate the following two incentive contracts so 
that her work helped clarify the policy debate regarding the fee charging 
practices in the US asset management industry during the late 1980's. The two 
incentive arrangements are: the incentive fee with symmetric performance (SP) 
where fund managers receive a fixed management fee plus a variable fee 
depending on the difference between return of the managed fund and that of a 
market index. 
On the other hand, the incentive fee with bonus performance (BP) where a fund 
manager receives not only a fixed fee but also a bonus fee if the rerun exceeds 
the corresponding benchmark. Her models were developed under a few 
assumptions that the model is on a single-period basis; the investor (the 
principal) and the fund manager (the agent) are supposed to maximise their own 
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expected utility of wealth and both parties are strictly risk averse; CAPM is 
applied in terms of asset pricing21 
Investigating fund managers' risk taking behaviour under the two different 
incentive schemes, Starks developed theorems that the SP scheme equates the 
manager's optimal risk level and the investor's optimal risk whereas the BP 
allows the manager to take higher risk than the investor requires. Thus, Starks 
concluded that from the manager's risk taking viewpoint, the SP is preferable to 
the BP. 
Manager's effort 
In a subsequent study, Cohen and Starks (1988) carried the Starks' model one 
step further by taking into account nature of the portfolio beta. They argued that 
it is impossible to estimate and manipulate the portfolio beta, which was defined 
as the portfolio risk in the Starks' paper. Instead, by making effort, fund 
managers can minimise the residual between the estimated beta and the true beta 
of the portfolio. Considering the manager's effort for the beta estimation, and 
building on the specific assumptions similar to the Starks work, Cohen and 
Starks' work suggested a different implication from the Starks work; Regardless 
of whether a bonus fee is provided or not, agency problems exist in a way that 
the fund manager provide less effort and /or taking higher risk that the investor 
prefers. 
21 The Capital Asset Pricing Model refers to E(R) = Rf+p; [E(Rm)-Rf] where pi =p; R, 6, /am, 
66 
Supply of superior information 
A further complex model was presented by Golec (1992). Golec put forward the 
prior conceptual models by assuming that there are two different factors that 
affect fund returns: The first factor is a fund beta in the manner which the 
preceding articles assumed (Starks, 1987; Cohen and Starks, 1989). The second 
factor is associated with superior information with which the fund manager is 
provided. In this regard, it is possible to say that the notion of the superior 
information is similar to Jensen's alpha in terms of performance measures. 
One of the important suggestions from Golec's approach is that the incentive fee 
portion is positively related to a fund beta, and supply of superior information 
whereas the base fee is negatively associated with the beta. Hence, Golec's work 
implied that one could reduce the agency problem by providing fund managers 
with a carefully-designed fee scheme that balances well between the base fee and 
the incentive fee. 
Option pricing approach 
By the same token, Grinblatt and Titman (1989) and Ferguson and Leistikow 
(1997) also investigated the agency problems in the investor-fund manager 
relationship. Nonetheless, the investigations by Grinblatt and Titman (1989) and 
Ferguson and Leistikow (1997) differed from the prior literature to the extent that 
these four scholars applied option pricing methodology. 
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Single period approach 
Using a performance based contract similar to the bonus incentive scheme used 
in Starks' paper (1987), Grinblatt and Titman (1989) considered the bonus fee 
portion as a call option that gives the fund manager rewards if his/her return 
exceeds the corresponding benchmark, i. e. the stock market index such as the 
S&P 500. Whilst applying Black-Scholes option pricing in order to evaluate the 
manager's fee, the authors presented the following interesting propositions. 
First, the value of the performance-based fee is increasing if there is no 
maximum limitation for the fee along with the increasing beta of the managed 
fund. Second, establishing the cap point and the threshold point seems to deter 
the excess risk taking of the manager. Note that this type of fee structure is 
referred to as the Bull-Spread Performance Fee in the following article by 
Ferguson and Leistikow (1997). 
Multi-period fee schemes 
More recently, Ferguson and Leistikow (1997) contributed to the research field 
by extending Grinblatt and Titman's one period call option contract to the 
multiple-period option contract. It is of use to describe implications from 
Ferguson and Leistikow's model because their long run fee schedules appeared 
more realistic than the preceding study by Grinblatt and Titman. 
In their model, performance volatility was referred to as risk of the managed 
portfolio, and the threshold level for the performance fee became two crucial 
parameters in considering the incentive effect of fund managers. In practice, 
focusing on combinations of the two parameters, Ferguson and Leistikow 
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elaborated three different incentive fee schemes: The Call Performance Fee that 
is paid when the portfolio performance is above the threshold level, e. g. the 
excess performance. The Bull-Spread Performance Fee is a variant of the Call 
Performance Fee in the sense that the Bull Spread Performance Fee has the upper 
limit of the payment when the performance is over a certain target level. The Flat 
Performance Fee gives the fund manager a fixed percentage of the asset under 
management of the portfolio, regardless of the portfolio performance. 
The authors' main points are summarised as follows: Regarding the Call 
Performance Fees, there is a positive association between the value of the call 
performance fees and performance volatility. Therefore, fund managers attempt 
to increase values of their fees by raising the volatility of their fund performance. 
Naturally, such a higher volatility is hardly acceptable to investors. In contrast, if 
certain conditions are met22, the Bull Spread Performance fees discipline the fund 
managers to control the performance volatility. In the same way, if the threshold 
performance is sufficiently restricted, the Flat fees also provide the fund 
managers with incentives to take reasonable risk, i. e. the volatility of 
performance. 
Concluding comment and some caveats 
The mathematical models in this section demonstrated how incentive fees can 
influence fund managers' investment decisions. Of particular relevance for the 
present thesis is that most of the conceptual models above predict that there is 
room for moral hazard, regardless of their theoretical frameworks, e. g. the 
maximising-utility function or the option pricing theory. That is, fund managers 
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are apt to "game" the incentive fees by the changing the portfolio risk. 
Nonetheless, some models indicated that it is possible to mitigate such a 
principal-agent problem if the fee contracts are carefully designed with certain 
conditions. 
However, there are a number of limitations when the theoretical models are put 
into practice, especially in the context of the current thesis. First and most 
obviously, individual fund investors are not in the position to negotiate for fund 
fees in the real world. At most, US retail fund investors can select mutual funds 
with performance incentive fees (See Golec, 1988, and Elton et al, 2003 in the 
next sub-section). In contrast to the US mutual funds with incentive fees, no unit 
trust with such incentive fees is not allowed under the current FSA rules23. 
For this reason, conceptual incentive models seem to be more applicable to the 
situation between fund management companies and institutional investors such 
as pension funds that have bargaining power over fee setting. This is not 
surprising on the grounds that the underlying motive of several papers is to 
provide foundations for policy debate for the U. S pension fund industry and the 
US government (Starks, 1987). Alternatively, one can find the normative 
approach valuable in analysing the employment relationship between a fund 
management company (as an employer and principal) and an individual portfolio 
manager (as an employee and agent). 
22 For instance, the threshold performance to renew the contract should be sufficiently negative. 
23 See the FSA Handbook, Collective Investment Schemes Sourcebook September 2002. See also "Unit 
Trust: the Law and Practice" release 8, Longman 1998, p. A4.2330. It is also reported that the FSA will lift 
its ban on authorised unit trusts charging performance fee ("News regime to broaden choice for investors". 
Financial Times, 24/25 May 2003). 
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A second and somewhat more serious limitation is that most of the models 
cannot account for the full spectrum of variables that determine fund managers' 
incentives, and consequently, their risk-taking behaviour. For example, Brown, 
Harlow, and Starks (1996) pointed out that fund managers are incentivised by the 
industry's tournament mechanism. The tournament mechanism refers to the 
industry practice that rewards the managers for their annual performance 
rankings in the format of a peer-group league table. Their analysis presented 
evidence that fund managers below (above) the average peers' return at the half 
year evaluation period are apt to alter their portfolio risk so as to make up (lock 
in) their interim inferior (superior) fund return. The study illustrated how fund 
managers react to the implicit incentive mechanism and pursue their own interest 
whilst putting aside their clients' risk-tolerance or investment objectives. 
The final limitation is related to the definition of risk that the fund manager 
manipulates. Most of the models assumed that beta and return variance of the 
portfolio are the ways that fund managers play the game. However, as 
Khorana's study (1996) demonstrated, there is a case that fund managers 
manipulate their portfolios by increasing stock-turnovers held in the portfolios. 
Similar to Brown et al (1996), Khorana stated that as a consequence of the 
tournament mechanism in the industry, the job security of a fund manager is 
often at stake. Hence, threat of dismissal serves as an implicit but strong 
incentive in reality. He presented evidence that fund managers with poor 
performance records are more likely to trade equities very often, incurring 
trading fees to their portfolios, than those with superior performance records. 
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Overall, despite the fact that the normative models provide some guidance as to 
the effect of incentive fees in the fund management industry, reflection on the 
limitations makes it clear that the real world is not simple as the models assume. 
This point directs our attention to the empirical agency literature concerning 
incentive effects on a fund manager's behaviour. 
2.4.3 Empirical studies 
Reviewing the immediate disciplines, this sub-section starts with two empirical 
research initiatives. Golec (1988) and Elton, Gruber and Blake (2003) explicitly 
analysed the incentive fee effect on performance in the U. S mutual fund industry, 
where a number of mutual funds with incentive fees existed. Note that their 
main interest was not in the excess risk-taking but in fund performance. But, in 
the context of the present thesis, results from both studies are informative, 
implying the possibility of agency problems in the industry, as predicted by 
normative models. Therefore, the following brief review of the two studies is 
noteworthy. 
Golec (1988) was an early researcher examining the incentive fee effect on fund 
performance. His data set covered 387 equity mutual funds including 27 funds 
with incentive fees for the period 1982 -1987. Employing a CAPM approach in 
order to measure fund performance, Golec analysed the differences between 
incentive funds and non-incentive funds. His main findings are that alpha, beta 
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and standard deviation of monthly return of funds with incentive fees are higher24 
than those without incentive fees. Hence, his evidence suggested that mutual 
funds with incentive fees showed not only better performance but also higher risk 
than those without incentive fees. 
In a similar study, Elton, Gruber and Blake (2003) examined mutual funds with 
incentive fees for the period 1990-1999. They employed the average of their 
multi index model alpha25 as fund performance. Their observation generally 
supported Golec's findings. On average, the fee-adjusted performance of funds 
with incentive fees was higher than that without incentive fees. However, the 
magnitude of the excess performance was close to zero. As a result, fund 
managers using incentive fees receive only marginal bonuses in reality. 
More importantly results are that funds with incentive fees showed higher risk 
propensity. There are two risk measures that the authors used. The first risk 
measure is a deviation from the fund's benchmark, i. e. R2 derived from the 
regression of a fund return against the fund's benchmark return. Under the risk 
measurement, the higher R2 a fund shows, the less risky the fund is, because the 
fund tracks their benchmark more closely. In this light, the authors' finding is 
that R2 (= 0.79) for incentive funds is lower than that of the total fund sample 
documented in previous studies with the similar multiple factor index26. 
24 The differences are 1.62,0.11 and 0.64 respectively. 
25 The multi-index model uses (1) the excess return on the S&P 500, (2) a bond index, (3) a small-cap minus 
large-cap index, and (4) a growth minus \ aloe index (Elton, Gruber and Blake, 1999, p. 57) 
-6 For instance, Brown. and Goetzmann (1995) showed that R''s are 0.90, and 0.92 for a single index model 
and a three index model, respectiv elf 
. 
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The second risk refers to standard deviation of monthly fund return. Often 
referred to as total risk in fund management literature, this is a conventional risk 
measure so that only the authors' finding is mentioned. That is, the standard 
deviation of monthly return for incentive funds is 4.63, which is higher than that 
of their comparable index, i. e. 4.22. 
In sum, given the findings of the two empirical studies, incentive fees seem to 
attract skilful fund managers or encourage fund managers to make more effort, 
resulting in better fund performance. Nevertheless, such better performance does 
not occur without costs. Consistent with the CAPM's notion of the risk-return 
payoff, funds with better performance carry a high level of risk-taking. Hence, it 
should be the case that high risk investments, which may or may not lead to a 
superior fund return, are not always optimal for certain investors. In this regard, 
the possibility of agency problems is present. 
2.5 Other determinants of agency 
industry. 
problems in the 
The preceding empirical research stated that agency problems are partly 
attributable to the industry's tournament practice. More recently, several 
scholars have extended the tournament effect to the individual stock selection 
level (Lakonishok, Shliefer and Vishny, 1992; Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 
1995; Falkenstein, 1996; and Wermers, 1999). Their common argument is that 
the tournament mechanism or the relative performance evaluation practice leads 
fund managers to flock together in trading securities for their portfolios 
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(Wermers, 1999). The rationale behind such herding behaviour is that fund 
managers want to retain their position in the peer comparison league table 
(Devenow and Welch, 1996) or to share the blame when their investments turned 
out to be disastrous (Khorana, 1996). 
Notwithstanding the principal-agent relationship grounded in these herding 
studies, to inquire further into these studies is not the point in question. The 
main reason for no further inquiry is that studies on herding behaviour of fund 
managers often shift their emphasis away from the incentive effect on fund 
managers. Instead, herding studies focus on the investment preferences of fund 
managers. Such a point of view would bring us back the issue of investment 
style, e. g. one of the branches in fund performance literature. 
Apart from the tournament mechanism, there are two significant factors that lead 
to agency problems in the fund industry. Those include the year-end evaluation 
practice, leading to window dressing (Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny, 
1991) and asset-based fees, that are the norm in the fund management industry 
(Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998). 
The former element refers to selling poor performing shares toward the end of 
the year when the fund manager discloses his/her portfolio holdings. It is said 
that in an attempt to maintain his/her client account or ultimately his/her own job, 
the manager has to get rid of "embarrassments" from the portfolio, impressing 
the clients with superior stock holdings. However, the empirical results were 
inconclusive. Analysing quarterly trading patterns of 769 pension funds during 
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the period 1985-1989, Lakonishok et al (1991) reported that the sales of large 
loss-making shares become evident. But they found no clear tendency with 
regard to purchasing stocks toward the end of the year. 
The latter incentive element is more important, contributing to the research topic 
of this thesis on the following grounds. First of all, the asset-based fee is the 
norm within the fund management industry. By and large, the fee is based on the 
amount of assets under management. Under the fee scheme, fund management 
companies deduct the fee from their managed portfolio at a small percentage 
rate. Often defined as the annual management fee, the fee become a major 
earning source for fund management companies (Pozen, 1998 and Walter 1999). 
Hence, the analysis together with the current fee scheme, provides us with a 
more accurate picture of the fund management industry. 
Next, under present industry practice, the asset-based fee can be said to be an 
effective incentive. The explanations are twofold. At the outset, higher returns 
on the managed fund and subsequent asset growth under management generate 
higher fee revenues to the fund managers. 
In addition to the asset growth by investment, another route to increase the asset- 
based fee is available for fund management companies. That is by attracting new 
money from investors. If a fund and its management company are successful in 
raising more money, the amount received by the fund management company will 
increase. Likewise, if investors of the fund redeem their holdings for a variety of 
reasons, then the size of the fund shrinks, generating less fee revenues. 
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In this respect, there is a conventional view among practitioners that funds with 
good performance records attract more money from investors than those with 
poor performance records. Therefore, given the two paths to increase the asset- 
based fee, it is possible to say the current scheme already works as an incentive 
fee. 
Finally, the incentive effect stemming from the present asset-based fee should 
provide empirical foundations for the first and second analysis in the present 
thesis. The subsequent empirical chapters develop performance / risk-taking 
measures, by focusing on the impact of existing asset based fees. Hence, the 
subject deserves more than a passing glance. 
2.5.1 Managers' response to the 
relationship 
performance-money flow 
As the next chapter describes in detail, the assets under management is a key 
revenue factor for fund management companies. Building on this point, many 
scholars have enquired into whether or not funds with good performance are 
accountable for increases in the assets under management by attracting new 
money from investors. In other words, a number of papers have investigated the 
performance-money flow linkage as a potential determinant of a fund manager's 
revenue. 
However, only a few researchers have evaluated the implications of the 
performance-money flow linkage from an agency perspective. One of the often- 
referred-to studies is Chevalier and Ellison' work (1997), addressing the agency 
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problem between the fund manager and their investors. Chevalier and Ellison 
demonstrated the way fund managers manipulated their portfolio risk at the 
expense of their investors' interests, as a response to the performance-money 
flow pattern. Certainly, if there is no connection between performance and 
money flow of a fund, it is worthless to explain the fund manager's behaviour as 
a reaction to the performance-money flow connection. For this reason, the 
following section devotes some space to the issue of the relationship between 
performance and money flow. Then, findings from Chevalier and Ellison' study 
are presented. 
2.5.2. The relationship between performance and money flow 
A starting point 
As one of the early researchers, Ippolito (1992) stimulated a great deal of 
research on the relationship between performance and subsequent money flow a 
fund. He defined the excess return from the CAPM formula as the fund 
performance and used 143 mutual funds over the period 1965-1984. Ippolito 
regressed the growth rate of a fund in time (t) on the fund performance in time (t- 
1), (t-2) and (t-3). His model showed that the coefficients of the fund 
performance were positive and statistically significant; 0.003,0.023, and 0.002 
for the performance coefficient of (t-1), (t-2, ) and (t-3) respectively. The results 
above illustrated the positive relationship between performance and money flow 
of a fund. 
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In a similar manner to Ippolito's single determinant model, some scholars 
expanded the performance-flow study by adding a few extra explanatory 
variables: Patel, Zeckhauser, and Hendricks (1994) included prior money flow 
and fund size in their model; Sirri and Tufano (1998) used fund size, and fund 
fee; Chevalier and Ellison (1997) considered the fund age as a potential effect on 
the relationship. 
Size effect 
Patel, Zeckhauser, and Hendricks (1994) justified the use of prior money flow as 
a determinant of the subsequent money flow, by stating that "investors tend to 
stick with strategies because of a fondness for the status quo " (Patel et al 1994; 
page 55). Further, the authors took a view that elements such as advertising level 
and marketing effort should be linked with fund size. Hence, the fund size could 
have a potential impact on the performance-flow relationship. This view is 
consistent with Sirri and Tufano's work (1998) that focused on media influence 
on investors' choice of mutual fund. 
Whilst prior money flow, and size of fund were added to the explanatory 
variables, the main explanatory variable, fund performance was computed on the 
basis of the fund return ranking in Patel, Zeckhauser, and Hendricks' model. The 
result of their regression model revealed that all of the three explanatory 
variables had positive and statistically significant effects on subsequent money 
flows of the fund. The coefficients of past performance, prior money flow and 
fund size were 0.75,0.20, and 0.05 accordingly. Certainly their finding serves as 
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another piece of supporting evidence for the positive relationship between 
performance and money flow of a fund. 
Non-linear relationship 
More recent studies advanced the study on the performance-money flow 
relationship not only by adding extra explanatory variables, but also by finding a 
non-linear relationship between performance and money flow of a fund. Gruber 
(1996) employed an alpha of his four-index model as a basis for forming 10 
deciles' portfolios, e. g. from the worst fund group portfolio to the best fund 
group portfolio. Then, he examined the correlation between the ranked 
portfolios and their subsequent money movements in the following year. 
His findings were that significant rank correlations were reported across the one 
and three year periods. Further, all the differences between these deciles' 
portfolios were significant at the 1 percent level. More importantly the 
magnitude of change of money flow differed between the worst decile's portfolio 
and the best decile's portfolio. In the subsequent year, on average, the portfolio 
consisting of worst performing funds lost 15 percent of the asset as the investors' 
redemption. On the other hand, that of best performing funds increased assets by 
29% because of new money inflow. 
Fund age 
In a related study, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) employed a sophisticated semi- 
parametric model so as to measure the performance-flow relationship. 
In their 
model, the dependent variable refers to money 
flow of fund i in time t+ 1 whereas 
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the independent variables include the fund i's performance in the prior time 
periods, the industry growth, the fund age, and the fund asset size. The reason 
for including the fund age variable is that the degree of attracting money may 
differ by age of fund. 
Their overall finding was in accordance with prior studies on the performance- 
flow relationship: As an excess return of a fund increases (decreases) money 
flow into the fund is likely to increase (decrease) in the following period. More 
noticeably, by drawing a non-linear relationship, their graphs showed that funds 
with significantly poor returns, e. g. 15 or more points below the benchmark, 
experienced substantial large redemption. In contrast to the funds with the worst 
return, funds with modestly poor returns, e. g. 8 to 15 pints below the benchmark, 
had marginal redemption. In the case of the top ranked funds, they received a 
considerably large money flow. This asymmetric pattern between performance 
and money flow agrees with that of Gruber's work. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that there was a difference between new and 
old funds in terms of sensitivity to prior period performance. New funds had 
higher coefficients of prior performance, e. g. 1.86 for one-year lag performance, 
0.73 for two-year lag performance, than those of old funds, 1.00 and 0.29 
respectively. 
Media coverage 
Finally, Sirri and Tufano (1998) provided a comprehensive study on 
determinants of new investment into mutual funds in the United States. The 
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researchers referred to past performance, risk and fees as determinants of new 
money flow into mutual funds. In particular, Sirri and Tufano's contribution to 
this research area was that: fund size, marketing expenses and media coverage 
were expected to influence on the performance-flow relationship. 
With regard to the performance-money flow connection, Sirri and Tufano's 
finding was largely consistent with those of previous papers (Gruber 1996. 
Chevalier and Ellison 1997), showing such a non-linear pattern between returns 
of funds and subsequent new money flow into funds. When the performance 
variables were sorted into three groups on the basis of relative return ranking; 
low, middle and high rank groups, the coefficients of the subsequent money flow 
differed across the three groups. The coefficient of the low performance group 
was 
-0.035 with an insignificant p-value, suggesting no clear relationship 
between the past ranking and subsequent money flow. On the other hand, the 
coefficients of the middle and top ranking groups are 0.17, and 1.633 
respectively and both had significant p-values at 1% level. Sirri and Tufano 
interpreted these results as showing the asymmetric relationship between 
performance and flow. 
There are additional findings derived from Sirri and Tufano's model where 
money flow of a fund was regressed on various factors including the fund's size, 
fees, risk, marketing expenses and media coverage work. For example, the 
coefficients of fees and risk variables were negative, suggesting that investors 
prefer lower fees and lower risk. The next interesting finding was that an 
individual fund's flow was significantly related to flows into the sector to which 
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the fund belongs. The sector refers to the investment objective group such as the 
international equity growth sector. This observation is in line with Khorana and 
Servaes (1999) who studied determinants of mutual fund starts. More 
importantly, this point of view becomes an empirical foundation when creating 
risk measures for unit trust management companies in the present thesis. Finally, 
Sirri and Tufano reported mixed evidence of the size and media coverage effects 
on the performance-flow relationship27. 
2.5.3. Summary and other issues 
In essence, a number of empirical studies in this section documented some 
degree of support for the conventional view that funds with good performance 
attract new money. Some scholars extended the line of research by adding 
several determinant factors of the performance-flow relationship. These 
determinants include the fund size, age, risk and the sector into which the fund is 
categorised. 
The most noteworthy finding is that an asymmetric flow pattern exists in the 
mutual fund industry, i. e. fund investors put their money into winning funds 
more rapidly than they take their money out from their losing funds. In fact, the 
latest industry data from The Financial Times28 reports a similar money flow 
pattern: In the U. S, some 97 per cent of net new money has been channelled into 
funds ranked in the top third by Morningstar, according to Cerulli Associates, the 
27 More recently, Jain and Wu (2000) examined the advertising effect of mutual funds on new money flows 
into the funds, reporting that money floe's to the advertised fund group were larger than those to the non- 
advertised i fund group. 
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US consultancy. In the UK, 65 per cent of net new money has been channelled 
into funds rated in the top third 
- 
up from 60 per cent last year. In Germany, the 
figure is 60 per cent 
- 
up from 50 per cent last year. 
Two interesting issues may be raised about the asymmetric pattern. The first 
issue is why investors invest a disproportionately large amount of their money 
into over-performing funds whereas relatively slowly cashing in their investment 
from under-performing funds. The second issue is the effect of the asymmetric 
flow pattern on risk-taking of fund managers. Possible explanations are (1) 
behavioural finance (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991), (2) investors' naive 
knowledge (Capon et al 1996), and (3) advertising practices (Blake and 
Timmermann, 2003) 
1) Behavioural finance 
A branch of behavioural finance has posited several explanations for the first 
issue. Prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) predicts people fear 
losses more than they value gains. As a consequence, investors are apt to hold 
their loss-making shares too long. In related research, Odean (1998) explained 
the investors' disposition or behaviour by a rational or irrational belief in mean 
reversion that today's losers will soon outperform today's winners. 
(2) Investors' naive knowledge 
Similarly, according to a random telephone survey, the tendency to hold loss- 
making shares too long can be attributable to investor's indifferent attitude 
28 FT Fund Management 12 August 2000, p1 
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toward their fund investment (Capon et al 1996). Capon et al revealed that 72 
per cent of mutual fund investors do not know whether their funds are investing 
in domestic or international shares. Equally, 75 percent of the investors do not 
know whether their funds are investing in stocks or bonds. 
(3) Advertising practices 
A recent report by Blake and Timmermann (2003) pointed out that there is an 
asymmetric pattern in current advertising practice with regard to unit trust 
performance. Unit trusts with superior performance records are heavily 
advertised, whilst poorly performing trusts are not actively publicised. This 
asymmetric advertising practice does not increase awareness that investors' unit 
trusts are poorly performing, preventing the investors from the withdrawing their 
money from the poorly performing trusts. These arguments are interesting, but 
to discuss this issue will carry us too far way from the purpose of this thesis. 
Inducing agency problems 
Critical to the objective of the present thesis, the second topic provides some 
insights in addressing agency problems in the mutual fund industry. As the 
following chapter of industry description outlines, a fund management fee is a 
fixed percentage of the fund asset under management. Hence, in ignoring the 
asset growth by new money flow, the current management fee can be viewed as a 
symmetric or linear fee scheme. In this regard, it is interesting to recall Starks' 
(1987) conceptual model, illustrating the way a symmetric performance fee 
equates a fund manager's optimal risk level to that of his/her investors. 
However, when taking into account the asymmetric pattern of money flow, the 
reward for the fund manager roughly resemble a call option on the expected 
money flow. A simple description of this point is that the fund manager receives 
his/her bonus fee automatically when her fund performance is either mediocre or 
superior but does not pay any penalties when her fund under-perform against the 
benchmark. Arguably, the preceding normative models suggest that agency 
problems in the fund management industry are attributable to such a quasi-call 
option scheme (See for example Grinblatt and Titman, 1989 in section 2.4.2). 
Building on the non-linear relationship between performance and money flow, 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) conjectured that such an asymmetric pattern leads 
fund managers to take excess or little risk. Their argument is as follows: 
Imagine a fund that is ranked above the peer average but just below the top 
group. Given the asymmetric relationship, a slight improvement in performance 
raises the fund rank, resulting in a large amount of money. If the fund's 
investment does not work, ending up at the mediocre rank, the fund will not 
suffer from a substantial redemption. Thus, the fund manager will tend to 
"gamble" with her fund by taking excess risk. By the same token, the bottom 
ranked fund manager is also inclined to take excess risk so as to avoid a 
substantial money outflow. Further assume a fund that is ranked as the best fund. 
In order to keep the top position, the fund manager is likely to invest 
conservatively until the end of the evaluation period. Such fund managers 
behaviour does not match up with the fund investors' best interests. 
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To test whether fund managers alter their portfolio holdings as a response to the 
money flow pattern, Chevalier and Ellison regressed fund risk on the expected 
flow incentive. The result of the regression supports their notion on the ground 
that the coefficient of the expected money flow is positive (=0.87) and significant 
at the I% level. 
2.6 The 
behaviour. 
organisational factor on fund managers' 
The prior studies are concerned with the implicit incentive effect of the 
performance-money flow relationship on fund managers' behaviour. Recent 
papers by Frey (2001) and Berkowitz and Qiu (2003) illustrate the value in 
examining the organisational effect on fund managers' behaviour. Frey (2001) 
compares bank-managed mutual funds with non-bank-managed ones. Berkowitz 
and Qiu (2003) investigate differences between Canadian mutual funds run by 
private companies and those run by quoted companies. As the two studies 
attempt to relate fund managers' behaviour to an organisational factor, their 
approaches are closest to that of the current thesis. 
2.6.1 Mutual funds provided by banks 
Frey (2001) and Berkowitz and Qiu (2003) have different emphases on why 
organisation elements matter in terms of the individual funds that they offer. 
Frey proposed a few explanations for the potential difference between bank- 
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managed funds and non-bank-managed funds. Her first explanation is that banks 
may attract investors who are different from those attracted to non-bank mutual 
funds because it is convenient for many retail investors who have already had 
accounts with a bank to invest money in the bank funds. In a similar way, it is 
said that novice investors are attracted to bank mutual funds because they believe 
banks are trustworthy. From the bank's viewpoint, banks are afraid of losing 
their fund investors as banking customers on the grounds that many investors in 
the banks' proprietary funds also buy other financial services from the banks. 
2.6.2 Effect of ownership structure on fund performance 
A latest paper by Berkowitz and Qiu (2003) has taken the agency rhetoric 
approach. Building on the agency perspective, their ultimate enquiry is how 
diffusion of ownership affects the performance of funds the company manages. 
The sample companies consist of the six largest publicly traded management 
companies and the six largest privately owned management companies whose 
asset sizes match their quoted company counterparts in Canada. As a result of 
the selection criteria, the sample includes 446 Canadian equity mutual funds run 
by the 12 management companies. The total assets of these funds account for 
more than 60% of the Canadian mutual fund industry. 
As their agency perspective is the central concern in the current thesis, it is worth 
summarising their work as follows. 
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For the purpose of evaluating the performance across funds with different 
ownership companies, both a single index model and a three index model are 
used (Equations 2.3-a and 2.3-b respectively in Table 2.3) 
Table 2.3 Models in the recent literature (using the authors' notations) 
Berkowitz and The single index model is: 
Qiu (2003) R; t -Rf =a+ ßi (Rmt-Rf) +E ; i, (2.3-a) 
The three index model is: 
R; t -Rf = a; + I3im (Rmt-Rf) + Pis SMBt + (3ih HMLt + Fit (2.3-b) 
where 
R; t -Rf is the excess return on the fund (R,,, 
-Rf) is the market risk premium 
SMB, = return on the small minus large stocks in terms of stock size. 
HMLt = return on the small minus large stocks in terms of book-to market 
ratio. 
The regression for return comparison 
RtQuo 
- 
RrP"' 
=a1+ß3m (Rm, t - Rf ,I )+83, SMBr +8hhHMLr +et (2.3-c) 
where 
R, QUO_R, PRI= the difference in returns of the equity funds run by the quoted 
company group and those by the privately owned company group 
Further, in an effort to identify any performance difference between funds 
managed by quoted companies and those by privately owed companies, the 
authors created equally weighted portfolios of the Canadian mutual funds for 
each type of management company. 
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Their main findings were: excess returns of funds run by quoted companies are 
lower than those managed by privately owned companies29. As for the S'. %MMB and 
HML variables, there are similar investment styles between the quoted company 
group and the privately owned group. 
Ensuring the difference in returns of the equity funds run by the quoted company 
group and those by the privately owned company group, the authors conduct the 
regression analysis described in Equation 2.3-c in Table 2.3 
Berkowitz and Qiu reported that the regression coefficient for the size factor 
(SMB) was positive and statistically significant at the 5% level whereas other 
factor loadings were not significant. In essence, compared with funds run by 
privately owned companies, equity funds managed by listed companies had 
lower risk-adjusted returns and tend to invest in risky assets in terms of stock 
size. 
Berkowitz and Qiu concluded that compared with mutual funds run by privately 
owned companies, mutual funds managed by their quoted rivals tend to invest in 
riskier securities, generating lower risk-adjusted returns. Such higher risk-taking 
tendency of the funds run by the quoted companies can be explained by the 
following risk-reduction argument. Berkowitz and Qiu argued that the major 
shareholders in a typical private company tend to have undiversified personal 
wealth, because their shareholdings account for a significant proportion of their 
29 Alphas from CAPM model were 
-0.0028 (t = -3.40) for the quoted company group, and -0.0012 (t =- 
1.19) for the private company group. Alphas from the three factor model were -0.0032 (t = -4.17) for the 
quoted company group, and 15 (t= -2.02) for the private company group. 
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personal wealth. Such undiversified wealth portfolios of the large shareholders 
may result in a lower risk-taking strategy for their company. On the other hand. 
it is argued that shareholders in a listed company such as individual and 
institutional investors can pursue optimal diversification of their own wealth 
portfolios by encouraging greater risk-taking of their invested companies. The 
underlying assumption of the view is that as the shareholders' wealth portfolios 
are well-diversified by investing in a number of companies, they are willing to 
promote risk-taking activities via each of their invested companies. Such risk- 
taking activities across their invested companies result in the diversification 
effect that maximises their total investment wealth whilst reducing the total risk 
of their wealth portfolio. 
2.7 The effect of the 
performance. 
company strategy on fund 
2.7.1 Two recent studies closely related to this thesis 
Until very recently, little research has been conducted addressing the effect of the 
corporate strategy not only on the company performance but also on their 
managed fund performance. Massa (2003) and Sigglekow (2003) are recent 
examples. Massa emphasises the corporate strategy as a response of the 
competitive market structure. Sigglekow focuses on the relationship 
between the 
degree of the diversification and the performance of the company 
from the 
industrial economics perspective. As for the theoretical motivation, there are 
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some disparities between the recent works and this thesis that concerns the 
agency problem in the fund management industry. 
Nonetheless, the review of the two recent papers provides a valuable addition to 
the literature review in three respects. Firstly, Massa and Siggelkow elaborate 
the performance of the fund management companies, drawing a line between the 
performances of the company and of their fund products. Despite the fact that 
the two latest papers do not explicitly address the potential agency problem in the 
fund management industry, the notion to establish the company performance 
corresponds that of this thesis. 
Secondly, in practice, taking a similar view that the cash inflows into the 
company is a key profit driver, the two authors consider the cash inflow as the 
performance proxy for the company. In this light, the efficiency measure used in 
this thesis is supported by the latest literature. 
Finally, other valuable specifications in Massa and Siggelkow papers can also 
serve as useful references for this thesis. For example, a useful variable that the 
two researchers employ is the company's product comprised of a set of funds 
with various categories. The logic is that funds are distinguishable according to 
the type of underlying equities in the funds. Such common characteristics among 
the underlying investments are often referred to as the fund categories or sectors. 
Massa and Siggelkow consider the product set as the company's strategy, 
arguing that each company's choice consists of the decision to set up a fund with 
specific characteristic (Massa, p. 252). In this point, this thesis shares the view 
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with the two recent papers, regarding the product mix as the reflection 
managerial decisions. 
2.7.2 The differentiation strategy 
Massa's intuition is that the degree of differentiation in the industry affects the 
company's incentive to generate better fund performance. The reason for his 
argument is that fund investors differ in terms of their investment needs. For 
example, their needs vary with regard to their investment time horizon and their 
plans to switch one type of fund to another. This is where the fund 
heterogeneity, i. e. fees and investment objectives, or the company's 
heterogeneity, i. e. the numbers of funds and the numbers of fund categories can 
capture the investors' unique needs. Accordingly, the investors select the fund 
that best suits their needs. Such a line of reasoning invokes his proposition that 
maximization of fund performance is not necessarily to the optimal strategy. 
Collecting the US mutual fund data in the period between 1992 and 2000, Massa 
investigates whether the company's category coverage and their funds' fees 
affect the volatility of the money flow into the funds. The money flow is referred 
to as the proxy of the company's performance. To test this inquiry, he estimates 
the following the models in Table 2.4 
The key results are that the coefficients of the average initial fee are negative (= 
-3.20 for 2.4-a and -2.03 for 2.4-b) and significant (t = -15.52, and t= -9.18 
respectively), suggesting that funds belonging to the companies with high initial 
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fees are likely to have more stable investors. Another important observation in 
Model 2.4-a is that the coefficient of the number of funds is positive (0.02) and 
significant (t = 4.63). Likewise, in Model 2.4-b, the coefficient of the company's 
market coverage is positive (0.29) and significant (t = 2.05). These results 
suggest that investors with more volatile investment prospect prefer the fund 
management companies offering a large number of funds with various 
investment objectives. 
These findings also imply the effective fees for an investor will rebalance his or 
her fund portfolio. That is, the more funds the company offers, the greater 
likelihood of switching from one fund to other funds at no cost because moving 
money in and out funds within the same fund management company costs little 
or no switching fees (Massa, 2003, p. 251). In essence, after controlling for the 
fund performance, the company strategy affects the key determinant of the 
company profitability, i. e. the cash flow into the funds. 
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Table 2.4 Massa's (2003) models 
Massa (2003) 
Model for the impact of the total number of funds the company 
provides, 
Flow, 
m,;, t =a+ ß(Fee1, t) +-y(Fund;, t) +b(Controls, m,;,, ) +em.;, t (2.4-a) 
Model for the impact of the number of fund categories the 
company offers. 
F1ow, 
m, i, t =a+ ß(Fee,, t) +y(Category,, t) +b(Controls, m,,, t) +e,,,,,. r (2.4-b) 
where 
he subscripts, m, i and t, refer, respectively to the m th fund, belonging to the 
ith company at time t. 
Flow,,;,, = the standard deviation of the flows in the fund over the 12 months 
in the respective year. 
Fee;,, =the total load fees charged by the ith company at time t 
Fund;,, 
= the number of funds that the company I manages 
Category,,, 
= the number of fund categories that the company I offers 
Controls, 
r, ,, =a vector of control variables such as net assets of the company i, the average performance, risk and expense ratio of all the funds run by the 
company I 
e,,,,;,, = Error term 
Model for the impact of product differentiation 
Return,, t =a+ ß(Dispersion,, t) +y(Control,,, ) +b(Return Lag,;,, 
_, 
) 
+ei, 
r 
(2.4-c) 
Where the subscripts, i and t, refer, respectively to the I th company at time t. 
Returni, t = the average performance of all the funds the company i manages 
at time t 
Dispersioni, t = the index that proxies for the average degree of product 
dispersion of all the categories the company has funds in at time t. 
Controls, i, t =a vector of control variables such as net assets of the company 
i, the average performance, risk and expense ratio of all the funds run by the 
company I 
Return Lag, i, t-1 = the (lag) average performance of all the funds the 
company i manages at time t-1 
em, i, t = Error term 
Sifting from the corporate performance to the fund performance, Massa's second 
focus is on the relationship between the funds' returns and the company's 
differentiation strategy. Massa tests for the relationship by regressing the 
average performance of the company's all funds on the index of the company's 
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differentiation strategy, plus several control variables. The differentiation 
strategy is based on all the categories where the company has funds and defined 
in three ways: (i) the non-performance factor, i. e. the fees across the categories to 
which the company's funds belong, (ii) the performance factor, i. e. the returns of 
across the categories to which the company's funds belong, and (iii) the mixture 
of (i) and (ii), plus the distribution income factor. Massa runs a regression model 
for each differentiation index. His basic model is summarised in Equation 2.4-c 
in Table 2.4. 
The results of the three regression models show that the coefficient of the 
differentiation index in all the models is negative and significant (-0.31, t=-2.73; 
-0.02, t=-2.21 and -0.19 t= -2.70 for the index i, ii, iii, respectively). Hence, 
Massa concludes that the differentiation strategy of the company affects the level 
of their managed funds. 
2.7.3 The focus strategy 
Viewed from the industrial economics perspective, Siggelkow (2003) considers 
the way which corporate focus is advantageous, exploring the relationship 
between the company's product set and performance of (i) the company and (ii) 
the product in the fund management industry. 
Siggelkow' recent work consists of two research topics: at the performance 
levels of (i) the company and (ii) the their managed funds. At the corporate 
level, Siggelkow investigates the effect of the company's diversification or focus 
on money inflows into the company. At the product 
level, he question is whether 
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a mutual fund run by a company with limited products, i. e. the "focus" company. 
exhibits a higher return than similar funds run by a company with a broader 
product range. Clearly, these research issues are not primary research objectives 
of this thesis, focusing on the effect of the organisational form on (i) the risk- 
taking activities of the company (Chapter IV), (ii) the management efficiency of 
the company (Chapter V), and performance of unit trusts the company manages 
(Chapter VI). Nevertheless, Siggelkow's inquiries are still valuable because the 
empirical analyses in the subsequent chapters employ variables similar to those 
in Siggelkow's paper. For example, Siggelkow refers to a set of funds that the 
company offers as the diversification index. In a similar vain, models in Chapter 
IV of this thesis use such a set of unit trusts as the dependent variable of the 
company's risk-taking decision. Chapters V and VI of this thesis also employ 
the product mix as an important control variable. 
As his first analysis, Siggelkow tests the effect of the product diversity on the 
company's cash inflow, which largely determines the company profitability. To 
this end, his basic regression model includes the company's aggregated cash flow 
as the dependent variable and the number of the fund categories the company 
offers at time t-1 as the explanatory variable. His interpretation is that the larger 
the number of the fund categories, the boarder product mix the company 
manages. In addition to these key variables, several control variables are 
included. They are the company's averaged fund return at time t-1 as the quality 
of their product, the total size of the company's managed funds at time t, the 
average age of the funds within the company's product set at time t, and the 
growth of the money flow into each category. Based on the sample consisting of 
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the U. S mutual funds in the period from 1986 to 1996, the key result is that the 
product diversity has a positive effect on the cash inflows. It is noteworthy that 
with and without the variable for the average performance of their funds, the 
coefficient of the diversification index remains positive and largely unchanged. 
In sum, by increasing the diversity of the product set, the fund management 
company can boost the money inflows into the company, improving the higher 
profitability. 
Sigglekow's second analysis has uncovered a vital role of the corporate focus on 
performance of their managed funds. The regression framework is similar to that 
in his first analysis. He estimates three regressions because there is no perfect 
performance measure. Hence, each model has a different performance measure 
used as the key independent variable. The first focus proxy is the difference 
between the fee-adjusted return of the company's funds and averaged return of 
funds within the corresponding category. The second measure incorporates the 
risk factor in a manner that: the difference between a fund's return and the 
averaged return of all funds in the category is divided by the standard deviation 
of the averaged return of all funds within the fund category. The third measure is 
a fund's gross return divided by the standard deviation of the averaged gross 
return of funds in the category. 
An index of the overall company focus is defined as 
2 
assets 
_ 
of 
_ 
companyk 
_ 
in 
_ 
category 
_ 
at 
_ 
time, 
Focus kt 
total assets 
- 
of 
_ 
companyk 
_ 
at 
_ 
time, 
where the sum is taken over all categories j of company k at time t. 
(4.5) 
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In addition to the focus proxy, the regression models include a range of control 
variables for the fund characteristics such as the portfolio turnover, expense ratio, 
initial fees and size of each fund. As for the company's characteristics, the size 
of the total managed asset and the invested asset in each category are included. 
The most important observation is that the coefficients of the (lagged) focus 
variable in the three models are positive and significant ( 0.969, t=2.53; 0.123, t 
= 2.69; and 0.112, t=2.49, for the first, second, and third performance measures 
respectively). Given the findings, Siggelkow concludes that the company focus 
has a positive impact on their managed fund performance. This finding is 
consistent with Massa's (2003) main result to the extent that a company with a 
large number of funds can differentiate itself in terms of its product set whilst 
reducing the competitive pressure for better fund performance. Such a product 
diversification strategy provides the company with less incentive to achieve 
superior fund returns. 
The next sub-section attempts to identify gaps in the literature by summarising 
the prior studies with the immediate discipline of the current thesis. 
2.8 Gaps in literature 
Starting with an inquiry of whether or not conflict of interests exists in the fund 
management industry, this section explored the literature addressing the agency 
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problem in the fund management industry. It is found that there is the common 
view that a conflict of interests is present between fund managers and their fund 
investors. Derived from this view, three strands in the literature are reviewed; (i) 
an incentive fee issue including normative models and empirical findings, (ii) the 
performance-money flow connection and its effect as an implicit incentive, and 
(iii) organisational effects on fund management. Going through the literature 
above, one can spot unexploited issues as follows. 
2.8.1 Gap (1) 
It is evident that the preceding studies focused on individual funds. As an 
extension from the classic fund management literature that examines risk and 
performance of funds, the research motive among the prior researches can be 
understood. Nonetheless, the growing presence of fund management companies 
is too big to ignore in the global capital market. Furthermore, practitioners have 
been more interested in winning formulae from their company's managerial 
perspectives (See for instance, the Association for Investment Management and 
Research, 199130). Notwithstanding these growing phenomena, there has been 
little research on fund management companies. Recent but a few exceptions 
include; Khorana and Serves (1999) who are interested in when and why fund 
management companies set up new funds; Massa (2003) who also investigates 
the effect of the industry structure on the strategies of fund management 
companies. However, these studies are exclusively the U. S. based. Hence, to 
30 Association for Investment Management and Research, 1991 "Managing the 
Investment Firms". New 
York, The U. S. 
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look at fund management companies in the U. K as a unit of analysis should be 
promising. 
2.8.2. Gap (2) 
As the first literature review indicated, agency theory has been extended to 
analyse organisational effects in modern corporations. Anchored by Fama and 
Jensen's work (1983a and 1983b), the issue of organisational form has been a 
topic of empirical literature. By and large, empirical researches in this area have 
examined the insurance and banking industries. A key reason to investigate such 
industries is that mutual institutions and stock owned companies co-exist, these 
industries, providing fertile grounds for testing agency related hypotheses. 
Nonetheless, the line of research has not been extended to the U. K unit trust 
industry where various forms of ultimate ownership co-exist. 
From the viewpoint of agency literature, the lack of research on unit trust 
management companies appears odd given the fact that the ultimate ownership 
for several unit trust management companies was demutualized in the 1990's. 
Most of the UK literature addressing the demutualization effect has limited itself 
to studying the insurance and mortgage businesses. 
2.8.3 Gap (3) 
Massa (2003) and Siggelkow (2003) studies on the U. S. mutual fund industry are 
also informative as their research perspective 
is closely related to this thesis. 
However, their revenue-driven performance measures are problematic 
because 
101 
their performance proxies lack controls for the cost elements. This is mainly due 
to the absence of relevant data relating to corporate performance. To overcome 
the data limitation, and justify their revenue-driven performance measures, the 
authors make an assumption that the economies of scale are present in the 
industry. Siggelkow points out that economies of scale potentially exist at levels 
of funds, and companies. Ultimately Massa's position may be summarised by 
stating that the fixed costs incurred to set up an additional fund are zero (Massa, 
2003, p. 255). 
However, as will be argued in Chapter III, this position is contentious given that 
the magnitude of the economies of scale may be less significant than researchers 
expect. More crucially, according to Collins and Mack (1997), economies of 
scale begin to vanish when a company's managed asset exceeds $20 billion. 
Given this evidence, it is necessary to establish the performance measure for the 
unit trust companies whilst including the cost factors. 
In this regard, an important original contribution of this thesis is to develop the 
efficiency measure by including the financial statement components associated 
with costs or expenses. Similar to other U. K companies, the unit trust companies 
are required to file their annual financial reports for the Companies House, the 
U. K regulatory body. Downloaded from the Companies House web site after 
payment of the appropriate fees, these reports are valuable data source, allowing 
for the estimation of the efficiency score based on a few but critical financial 
statement items. 
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Viewed from these respects, this thesis attempts to close these gaps by analysing 
U. K unit trust companies in an elaboration of agency theory. The first and 
second empirical chapters respectively look at risk and performance of unit trust 
companies with various forms of ultimate ownership. The third empirical 
chapter examines the ultimate ownership influence on individual unit trusts, 
taking into account risk, return and fees of the unit trusts simultaneously. 
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Chapter III: 
The U. K unit trust industry 
Before going forward to the enquiry of the ownership effect on performance/risk 
taking, it is indispensable to understand the UK unit trust industry. To this end, 
Chapter III consists of three sections, outlining dimensions of unit trusts; (1) 
products, customers, and operating companies, (2) the fee structures, and (3) the 
present industry environment. 
The aim of the first section is to define what a unit trust is and to describe who 
buys, sells, and manages them. The regulations covering unit trusts and the 
related parties are also discussed. This is fundamental information used 
throughout the rest of this thesis. 
The ultimate aim of the second section is to identify and assess the revenue 
structure of the unit trust company. As the revenue is dependent of the level of 
fees the company charges, the second sector also explore various fees in the 
industry. The second section is indispensable for the purpose of the 
operationalization of risk-taking measures and efficiency measures used in the 
subsequent chapters. For the estimation of the company's efficiency, and their 
risk taking proxy, the revenue structure of the company must be clarified. 
The final sector examines the prevailing industry characteristics. Fama and 
Jensen (1 983b) argue that the industry characteristics such as the efficiency scale, 
market concentration is worthy of consideration because these elements may 
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provide one particular organisational form with a competitive advantage 
compared to other organisational forms. If this is the case, empirical models 
must include these industry elements as the variables, capturing the reality of the 
industry. Hence, it is essential to summarise the industry characteristics. 
It should be noted that as for the regulatory framework, the Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) was passed in June 2000. In accordance with the 
FSMA, the Financial Service Authority, the successors of the Securities 
Investment Board (SIB), works as a single regulator, replacing the previous 
divisional regulators such as IMRO and SFA. 
However, unless specified, the regulations in this chapter refer to the Financial 
Service Act 1986 for three reasons. First, it is said that the regulatory regime for 
unit trusts has been carried forward largely unchanged from the Financial Service 
Act 1986 to the FSMA (Millar, 2002; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2002). Second, 
the full implementation of the FSMA is from 30 November 2001 so that the 
effect of the new ACT is relatively new. Third, data collected for empirical 
analyses are based on the pre-FSMA period. 
3.1 Products, Customers and Operating companies 
3.1.1 Overview 
A unit trust is an investment collective scheme to which individuals and 
companies may contribute in order to obtain a share in the income and capital 
gains generated by the trust's assets (Cowdell, 2000). The portfolio of securities 
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owned by a unit trust is divided into a number of equal portions. These 
proportions are called "units" and held by investors (unit holders). 
In contrast with other popular collective investment schemes, investment trusts', 
unit trusts are sometime referred to as open-end funds. This description is worth 
noting because in theory the size of unit trusts is unrestricted. If cash comes in 
from fund investors, the unit certificates are issued and more assets are bought. 
Conversely, if the redemption is requested from the unit holders, the unit trust 
management company is obliged to repurchase the unit at trading prices. Hence, 
cash goes out and assets of the unit trusts are sold. Note that as the unit trust 
management companies have obligations to buy back their units, there is no need 
for a secondary market in units and they are not traded in the stock exchange. 
The trading prices of unit trusts are based on the net asset values of the trusts 
(NAV). The management company calculates the trading prices on a daily basis. 
Based on the NAV, there are three important prices: bid, offer, and cancellation. 
The bid price is applied when the units are redeemed whilst the offer price comes 
into effect when new units are issued to investors. The cancellation price is the 
lowest permitted bid price2, considering the full costs of buying and selling. 
Most unit trusts employ the bid-offer pricing practice. The gap between the two 
prices is often called the bid-offer spread, being of the order of 5 or 6%. Various 
I Unlike a unit trust, an investment trust is a company quoted on the London Stock Exchange and has its 
own independent board of directors. As a limited liabilty company, an investment trust is subject to the 
Compnay Act 1985. Shares of investment trusts can be bought and sold on the stock market. Traded on a 
discount or at premium basis, the share prices do not necessary reflect the undelying value of assets the trust 
invests. Similar to other ordinary shares, prices of investemnt trusts' shares depend on demand-supply 
situations. 
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elements such as security trading fees, stamp duties, and the manager's front-end 
fees account for the price spread. Notably, the latter fee becomes revenue in the 
hands of the unit trust management company. This fee issue will be taken up in 
the next section because the fees have an effect on the companies' revenues. 
Comparison to the US mutual fund 
A great deal of research concerning pooled funds has gone into the US mutual 
funds. Therefore, in reviewing fund literature, it is worthwhile to describe the 
US mutual fund briefly. The term "mutual fund" refers to the diversified open- 
end company, as described under the Investment Company Act 1940 (Baumol et 
al, 1989). The mutual funds are created by investment advisors, which are often 
part of a large financial group. 
By and large, the mutual funds issue and redeem their shares at net asset values 
whenever investors request. In this respect, the US mutual funds are close to 
OEICs in the UK (see section 3.1.3). Shares of mutual funds are directly 
promoted to the public or via distribution networks. The distribution channels 
include brokers, financial planners, insurance agents, and special task forces 
sponsored by the fund. These sales forces receive compensations based on a 
sales charge or so-called "load" which is a fraction of the mutual fund's NAV. 
3.1.2 Constitutional structure 
As its name implies, unit trusts are legal trusts governed by a trust deed. The 
trust deed is an agreement between the unit trust management company and the 
trustee, who are two independent companies in charge of each unit trust 
2 The cancellation price is calculated on the basis of a formula laid down by the FSA. 
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operation. The trust deed covers the main aspect of the operation of the unit trust 
such as the fee charges, investment restrictions, and remunerations to the fund 
management company and the trustee. 
When unit trusts are advertised and promoted to the public, the trusts must be 
authorised in accordance with the Financial Services and Market Act 2000. The 
Financial Service Authority draws the following authorisation criteria as 
minimum safeguards for readily realised investments. It is said that the main 
objective of these requirements is to ensure that the investments are readily 
realizable. (Cowdell, 2000, p 239). Examples of the authorisation criteria are; 
" Investment must be in securities that are quoted on a recognised stock 
exchange, of which 10% may be held in unlisted securities or non-British 
recognised stock exchanges. 
" No single share holding can be acquired that, at the time of its purchase, 
would represent more than 5% of the value of the whole of the trust's 
portfolio. 
9A unit trust may not hold more than 10% of the share capital of one particular 
company. 
" No direct investment in commodities is permitted (Investment in shares of 
companies dealing commodities is allowed). 
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3.1.3 Product development 
Assets under management 
The latest industry statistics reports that the UK unit trust industry has the assets 
of £201 billion under management as of April 2003 (Investment Management 
Association, 20033). Table 3.1 also details the UK unit trust management 
industry over 15 years. 
Type of Assets 
In order to assist investors with their evaluation of the different unit trusts, the 
industry association, Association of the Unit Trusts and Investment Funds 
(AUTIF), categorises into several classes, depending on their stated investment 
objectives. 
One of the key features of the UK unit trust industry is that most unit trusts invest 
exclusively in equities as Table 4.3 in Chapter IV shows. By fund sectors, the 
largest asset class is the UKAII Companies which accounts for 30.7% of the total 
assets in the industry at the end of 1999. Further, in response to the European 
Union integration, the European equity (excluding the UK) collects over £28 
billion under management, becoming the second most popular fund sector. This 
subject will be discussed further in the next empirical chapter. 
See wNN7N%,. investmentf inds. org. uk/industry_data/ukbusiness/default. htm 
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Unit linked products 
Financial service companies have broadened their product lines by linking with 
unit trust investments. For example, a unit linked insurance carries a minimum 
life cover with the large part of the premium balance invested in unit trusts. 
Similarly, a unit linked personal pension plan is invested in a variety of unit 
trusts. Returns of such products is linked to the performance of the underlying 
unit trusts. Hence, some unit trusts are set up and employed for the linked 
products. 
Open Ended Investment Company 
In January 1999, a hybrid product, Open Ended Investment Company (thereafter 
OEICs) was introduced into the UK unit trust industry. With a variable number 
of certificates like unit trusts, OEICs issue shares and have a board of directors 
like investment trust companies. Existing unit trusts are allowed to convert into 
OEICs. 
There are two reasons for launching the OEICs. The first reason is that compiled 
with the European Directives, e. g. Undertakings for Collective Investments in 
Transferable Securities (UCITS), OEICs are easily promoted into continental 
European markets where an OEIC is a popular form of pooled investment 
scheme. Next, some unit trust management companies believe that as opposed to 
the dual pricing practice of unit trusts, OEICs with the single pricing system are 
better understood by investors, unlocking a new investor segment. 
Nonetheless, OEICs have not gained a large market share in the UK. The slow 
penetration is partly due to (a) the reactive strategy which fund operators are 
pursuing in order to assess customer and media reaction to OEICs and (b) the 
expensive conversion cost from existing unit trusts (Sahakien, 1998). In those 
respects, this thesis does not distinguish OEICs from conventional unit trusts. 
3.1.4 Types of unit holders 
Unit holders can be divided into two groups: retail and institutional. The 
institutional unit holders include insurance companies, public and private pension 
funds, who seek to finance their liabilities through investment4. 
Recently, thanks to the tax efficient saving schemes such as ISA (Individual 
Savings Account), retail investors have put money into unit trusts much larger 
than their institutional counterparts. The sales proportion of the retail unit 
holders to the institutional unit holders are 1.5 in 1996,2.7 in 1997,2.2 in 1998 
and 4 in 1999. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that retail sales outside an 
ISA or PEP was accounting for 41% of the total unit trust sales in 2000, in 
addition to those through the tax saving accounts. Unfortunately, no data is 
available concerning the split between retail and institutional unit holders by 
fund assets under management. 
4 Note that whilst some institutional unit holders purchase unit trusts via their own accounts, their end- 
investors are member of the public via unitised products. 
112 
3.1.5 Operating Companies 
Management company 
The management company is responsible for the fund start-ups, the investment 
decisions, and the administrations of the sales and redemption of the units. In 
many instances, these management companies are subsidiaries of banking or 
insurance groups. Further, investment companies such as Exeter and Invesco 
offer a number of unit trusts with their own brand names. Under the Financial 
Service Act 19865, the management company of an authorised unit trust must 
meet the following requirements: 
" It must be a corporate body, incorporated in the UK or other EU member 
state. 
" Its affairs must be administered in the country of incorporation. 
0 It must have a place of business in the UK. 
" It must be a person authorised under the Financial Service Act 1986 to carry 
out investment business in the UK. 
In addition to these requirements above, what is important particularly from my 
research point of view is that the activities of the unit trust management 
companies are limited to unit trust management and related business6. The 
management company of an authorised unit trust will not be allowed to engage in 
any other type of investment business. Therefore, it is fair to say that revenues of 
the unit trust companies are generated only from their management business. 
5 Section 78(3) of the Finacial Act 1986. 
6 Ibid. Section 78(4). 
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By the end of 2000, there were 155 separate management companies forming the 
UK unit trust industry. Their sizes vary in terms of their managed assets. 
Further analysis will be presented in the third section of the current chapter. 
Trustee 
The trustee company acts as the protector of the trust's assets and income on 
behalf of the unit holders. Hence, the trustee's duty is to monitor the 
management company's activities, ensuring that the management company 
complies with the trust deed. The trust deed defines numerous terms and 
conditions concerning the operation of the unit trust. In general, the trustee 
company belongs to a bank or an insurance group. From the regulatory point of 
view, similarly in many ways to the management company, the trustee must be a 
corporate body incorporated in the UK or in another EU member State. Further 
the trustee must meet certain financial requirements. 
Shown in Table 3.2, there were 10 companies who kept the assets of the UK unit 
trusts by the end of 1998. 
TABLE 3.2. Number of funds and total fund value at 31 December 1995-1998 
Totalfund Total fund 
Number of value 1998 Number of value 1998 
Trustee funds 1998 £ million Trustee funds 1998 £ million 
Bankers Trustee 42 4,233 Lloyds Bank 268 26,311 
Bank of New York 42 2,165 Midland Bank 182 16,319 
Chase Manhattan 228 28,595 Royal Bank of Scotland 454 43,321 
Citicorp 170 26,222 Royal Exchange 52 6,350 
Clydesdale Bank 90 19,061 State street Trustees 72 7,653 
Source: FT Yearbook Unit Trust & OEICS 1999/2000 
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3.1.6 Distribution channels 
As Figure 3.1 indicates, the UK unit trusts are predominantly distributed by sales 
agents, who are divided into tied agents and independent financial advisors 
(IFAs). Despite the fact that the sales agents are paid on commission, it is 
important to draw a distinction between the two agents. That is, the tied agents 
are bound to one particular financial company whilst the IFA are allowed to sell 
all companies' financial products. However, it is noteworthy that direct sales via 
telephone and internet are developing trends in the industry. A further point to 
note is that some unit trusts are associated with insurance polices and referred to 
as unit-linked insurance. 
Figure 3.1. Distribution channels in the UK unit trust industry 
3.1.7 Regulators 
Similar to other financial institutions in the UK, any business parties involving 
unit trust operations are regulated by the Financial Service Authorities, formally 
named the Security Investment Board (SIB). In addition to the legal 
115 
requirements of the Financial Service Act 1986, any authorised unit trusts are 
subject to regulation under the Financial Services (Regulated Schemes) 
Regulations 1991. The regulations deal with detailed business practices such as 
pricing and dealing in unit trusts. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the 
regulations have been carried into the Financial Services and Market Act 2000 
with little change. 
3.2 Revenue sources of unit trust management companies 
In studying the unit trust industry, one should not ignore the revenue structure of 
the industry. Specifically, in the context the current thesis, the description of the 
current income stream at the level of unit trust management companies is 
essential, by providing validity of the risk taking measures used in the 
subsequent empirical. Hence, as the first step of the analysis, this section 
concentrates on current fee schedules that are commonly used in the UK. 
Further, similar fee schemes in the US mutual fund industry are also discussed 
because a lot of previous studies on mutual funds concerned the US mutual 
funds. 
3.2.1 Current fee structures 
Broadly speaking. one can find two different fees in funds, depending on when 
fees are charged. Transaction fees are paid directly by investors when they buy / 
sell funds whilst annual fees are deducted from fund assets, bit by bit rather than 
in one lump sum. 
116 
Figure 3.2: Type of Fees 
Fees 
(A) Transaction related fees (B) Annual fees 
(a-1) Initial fees (a-2) Exist fee (b-1) Management fee (b2) Other 
Transaction related fees 
There are two types of transaction fees; (a) initial charges and (b) exist fees. 
(a) Initial charges (or so called load fees): Initial charges are one-off charges 
payable to fund distributors or financial advisors as their remuneration for the 
fund sales. 
U. K unit trusts 
The initial fee in the U. K can range from 0 to 6 percent of the offer price of the 
unit and upwards. However, most unit trust companies will deduct between 5% 
and 6% from the initial amount of investment money. According to Lipper 
Analytical Services, a fund data provider, the average initial charge to retail 
investors in U. K. equity funds is 4.7 per cent. In addition to the initial fee, there 
are "other bit" initial fees in the U. K fund industry, due to the market practice of 
the bit and offer (McWilliams 1997). The bit-offer spread varies among funds, 
which are presented in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3. Ten largest bid/offer spreads in most popular sectors 
(Source: McWilliams, 1997, p. 108) 
12-month 
Initial performance after 
Fund charge + Other bit = Spread charges 
Growth & Income 
Barclays Unicorn 500 5.3% 3.3% 8.6% 3.3% 
Halifax Accumulation 7.5% 0.2% 7.7% New fund 
MAMPI Income 6.0% 0.9% 6.9% 10.0% 
London & Manchester General 6.0% 0.8% 6.8% 8.9% 
Barclays Unicorn General 5.3% 1.4% 6.6% 9.0% 
Garter UK Equity Income 5.3% 1.4% 6.6% 6.8% 
Edinburgh UK Income & Growth 5.0% 1.6% 6.6% 6.1% 
Barclasy Unicorn Trustee 5.3% 1.3% 6.5% 8.3% 
Cazenove UK Equity 5.0% 1.5% 6.5% 13.2% 
Dolphin UK & General 5.5% 1.0% 6.5% 3.4% 
Average in sector 8.3% 
Equity Income 
London & Manchester Income 6.0% 0.8% 6.8% 4.9% 
Exeter High Income 6.0% 0.7% 6.7% 
-4.3% 
Clerical Med. Equity High Income 5.3% 1.4% 6.6% 0.5% 
Baring Equity Income 5.0% 1.5% 6.5% 8.7% 
Sun Alliance Equity Income 6.0% 0.5% 6.5% 9.3% 
Barclays Unicorn Extra Income 5.3% 1.3% 6.5% 5.6% 
GT Income 5.0% 1.5% 6.5% 15.4% 
Refuge Equity Income 6.0% 0.5% 6.5% 8.7% 
Abbey High Income Equity 6.0% 0.5% 6.5% 3.6% 
Abtrust Extra Income 3.5% 3.0% 6.5% 
-6.7% 
Average in sector 5.9% 
Equity Growth 
Cavendish Opportunities 3.5% 3.6% 7.1% 9.6% 
Mercury Asset Income Portfolio 6.0% 0.8% 6.8% 8.3% 
Morgan Grenfell UK Growth 5.3% 1.5% 6.8% 10.0% 
Baring UK Growth 5.0% 1.8% 6.8% 16.5% 
Exeter Capital Growth 6.0% 0.8% 6.8% 
-1.7% 
Barclays Unicorn Spec. Situations 5.3% 1.5% 6.7% 15.8% 
Sovereign Ethical 5.3% 1.5% 6.7% 16.7% 
Old Mutual CAM British Growth 5.3% 1.4% 6.6% 1.9% 
Barclays Unicorn Capital 5.0% 1.6% 6.6% 8.1% 
Tilney UK Equity 5.0% 1.6% 6.6% New fund 
Average in sector 10.7% 
U. S mutual fund 
The range of the initial fees in the U. S mutual fund industry is from 0 to 6 
percent, which is similar to those in the U. K unit trust industry. The average 
front-end charges are around 4-5 percent. Furthermore, bulk discounts are 
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available if the investment amount exceeds 50,000 or 100,000 dollars. (Fredman 
and Wiles 1998). It is interesting to note that in earlier decades, the front fees 
were set up at a much higher level, such as 8.5 percent, which is still acceptable 
as the maximum load charge ruled by the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD), the US governing body for fund sales practices. But the front- 
end fees have been declining due to competitive pressure in the industry and 
because of increasing awareness that investors' returns are affected by various 
sales charges. Another explanation for the declining load fees is that the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) allowed fund management 
companies to pass on marketing and advertising costs to fund holders in 1980. 
The new fee is called 12b-1 fees, named after the applicable SEC rule. From the 
management companies' viewpoint, the load fee reduction can be offset by the 
12b-1 fees. 
(b) Exist fees (also known as back-end charge / contingent deferred sales 
charge): This is a fee when fund investors redeem their fund holdings. The fee 
is dependent on how long the investors hold the funds. In general, a sliding fee 
scale applies, 5 per cent, 4 per cent and so on, depending on the duration of the 
fund holding by the investor. The purpose of the exit fee is to encourage fund 
investors to keep their funds. At the same time, from the standpoint of fund 
managers, investors' money is locked in as the managers' revenue resource. The 
exit fee is used along with the 12b-1 fee in the U. S. On the other hand, the exit 
fee is rather new in the U. K as a change in regulations in 1994 allows the unit 
trust manger to take a redemption charge in addition to the initial charge. 
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Annual fees 
The annual fees are also divided into the management fees and other recurring 
fees. The management fees are more important as they are paid to fund 
management companies for their investment analysis / management whilst other 
fees are associated with administrative functions such as trustees' fees and 
auditing fees, which are less relevant to this analysis. 
The management fees 
The fund management companies deduct the management fees bit by bit from 
their funds' assets. The annual fee scales are common to the UK unit trust 
industry and the US mutual fund industry, typically ranging from 0.4 percent for 
money market funds to more than 1.0 percent for international stock funds. The 
estimated average funds' management fees in the UK was 1.2 percent (James, 
2000) or 1.3 percent (McWilliams, 1997). In the U. S market, the directly 
- 
marketed funds charged 0.84 per cent on average whilst funds distributed via 
financial advisors charged 1.24 percent of assets on average (Walter, 1999). 
In order to get a sense of the present revenue structure of a typical unit trust 
management company, an example is taken out from the audited annual 
statement of Newton unit trust manager. Table 3.4 is a summary of the income 
statement and its corresponding note. 
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Table 3.4 The extract from Newton Fund Managers' financial statement. 
Newton Fund Managers Limited 
Year to Year to 
31 Decmeber 31 Decmeber 
2000 1999 
Revenue** 34292 24180 
Administartive expenses 
-22996 -18511 
Operating profit 11296 5669 
Interest receeivable 632 410 
Interest payable 
-152 -10 
Other income 16 5 
Profit on ordinary activities before tax 11792 6074 
Taxation 
-3602 -1932 
Profit on ordinary activities after tax 8190 4142 
Dividents 
-2000 
Retained earnings for the year 6190 4142 
Retained profit/(deficit) brought forward 2300 -1842 
Retained profit carried forward 8490 2300 
**Note on Revenue Year to Year to 
31 Decmeber 31 Decmeber 
2000 1999 
Management fees 51,830 35,661 
Gross sale of units and shares 1,714,996 1,234,634 
Total Turnover 1,766,826 1,270,295 
Cost of units and shares 
Discounts, commissions, stamp duty and other cost 
Total cost of sales 
Revenue 
1,661,045 1,186,375 
71,489 59,740 
1,732,534 1,246,115 
34,292 24,180 
The extract from the Newton Fund Managers limited points fairly clearly to the 
revenue structure of an unit trust company in the U. K. A key point to remember 
is that there are two revenue generators: Asset under management and gross 
sales. This point deserves explicit emphasis. The reason to stress 
is that offering 
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validity of the asset-based approach, the two revenue factors are foundations in 
developing risk-taking and efficiency measures used in this thesis. 
3.2.2 Considerations for fee setting 
Before moving on to the industry's current situation, there are a few issues to be 
noted concerning the management fees. First, it is a debatable question that 
because of potential economies of scale (see the following section in detail), the 
management fees should decrease as their fund assets increase beyond specified 
levels (often called breakpoints). The practice of reducing the fees is 'far from 
universal", (Fredman and Wiles 1998, p47) or the breakpoints are set up at 
significantly higher levels (McWilliams 1997). The high profitability in the unit 
trust industry7 can be attributable to the non-discount practice of management 
fees. 
Pricing power 
The first issue leads to the next question; whether price competition is in effect. 
Another way of saying this is whether unit trust management companies in the 
U. K have pricing power for their fee setting. Opinions are divergent on this 
point as the following paragraphs suggest. 
On the one hand, McWilliams (1997) points out that some companies are capable 
of charging more for their funds. He explains that "there is a public perception 
that a Mercedes or a Bentley or Rolls is a great performing car; hence, the 
manufacture charges a premium over and above other cars. And that's what we 
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see with unit trusts. " (McWilliams (1997, p. 31). His statement is based on the 
implicit assumption that it is possible to charge more for high performance. 
There are additional likely factors to account for the managers' pricing power. 
The first possible explanation is that investors especially retail unit holders lack 
reliable ex-ante information about the quality of investment products. The 
second factor is that retail investors heavily rely on advice from intermediaries 
who are financially rewarded by unit trust providers. In addition to the incentive 
factor, retail investors are naive, failing to understand the fee effect on their 
investment return. According to AUTIF's annual survey, some 10% of unit 
holders cited a "reasonable charge" to explain why they bought unit trusts. (See 
Table 3.5) 
Table 3.5: Reasons for choice of particular company 
Reasons: Total Sample (%) 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 
Past performance / Good record 33 44 33 35 44 
Press recommendation / review 31 15 25 22 21 
Reputable / reliable 18 20 19 19 18 
Wide range / choice of funds 15 10 12 11 8 
Company advertising 11 
Professional advice 9 6 7 8 7 
Reasonable charges 8 11 7 14 10 
Well known 5 8 6 9 9 
General recommendation 3 4 4 5 6 
Don't know 2 1 1 6 5 
Source: Unit trust Information Service 
Market research survey, and report 
by A UTIF 2001 March 
7 The City Resaerch Project (1994, p 20) cited from the PriceWaterhouse annual servey that the 
profitability defined by profits before interest and tax over revenue was nearly 14% on avaerage from 1988 
to 1992. 
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The view above is disputable for a number of reasons. First, it is reported that 
the investment performance of unit trusts bears no relationship to their charges. 
(Sandler, 2002, forward page 3) Second, unit trust managers who pursue the 
higher fees must outperform their target market by more than their charges just to 
stay even with the average. Nonetheless, according to the literature of fund 
performance in the previous chapter, in reality, it is extremely difficult for fund 
managers to achieve and maintain superior performance, reflecting the nearly 
efficient markets. Third, it is the fact that a fund with less fees will generate 
higher return, other things being equal. In other words, on average, the more you 
pay the less you get. Recall the empirical evidence from Carhart's work (1997) 
that high fees account for poor performance. Hooks (1996) and Droms and 
Walker (1995) also present similar evidence in this point. Finally, both in the 
U. S and U. K, financial regulators and news media have put considerable pressure 
on the mutual fund management companies to clarify their fee charges and to 
reduce their fees8. Under such increasing pressure for fee reduction, it is not easy 
for unit trust companies to set out higher fees. 
In view of such controversy, the current research does not take the explicit view 
that unit trust management companies have pricing power in the industry. 
Rather, it is fair to assume that although the fee level is important, market forces 
have tended to bring most fees into line9. In order to explore the issue from a 
micro economical standpoint, the next sub-section provides empirical 
information of the degree of concentration in the U. K. unit trust industry. 
8 For instance, see "Feeling the squeeze until squeakky clean", The Guradian, 24 May 2003. 
9 Nanda et al (2000) recently illustrated this point with their recent model. 
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Performance fee 
The second issue is about the performance based fee. The issue has promoted 
research interest in risk-taking of individual funds as summarised in section 
2.3.2. However, as noted in section 2.3.2, the performance fees are not permitted 
under the current UK regulations (See footnote 11 in section 2.3.2). Therefore, 
this has little connection with the current empirical analysis. 
3.3 The current business environment 
The goal of this section is to draw further business conditions of the UK unit 
trust industry. As the first part of the literature review suggested that the survival 
of an organisation is dependent on how well the organisation copes with agency 
problems given the particular industry conditions (Fama and Jensen, 1983a), the 
review of the industry is necessary. It is important to recall the underlying logic 
of Fama and Jensen's work that the industry structure makes companies with 
certain ownership forms more (or less) competitive over those with different 
forms of ownership. Therefore, in order to highlight certain features of the UK 
unit trust industry, this subsection follows the analytical framework based on the 
degree of concentration and entry barriers (Samuelson and Marks, 2002). 
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Figure 3.3 Comparing Market Structure 
Entry Barriers 
High Moderate None 
One Monopoly 
Number of Few Oligopoly 71 Firms 
Very Many Not Applicable Perfect Competition 
Source: Sar7ael son and Nkr ks ( 2002, Table 8.1 p. 321 ) 
3.3.1. The degree of competition 
As Figure 3.3 shows, a traditional economics textbook displays the spectrum of 
the market structure by dividing the market into three segments, e. g. perfect 
competition, oligopoly, and monopoly. In this respect, the number of companies 
in the industry, i. e. the degree of concentration is a key variable. In addition to 
the concentration in the industry, economists address the degree of entry barrier 
as a important determinant of the competition of the industry. Thus, building on 
the conventional economics framework, this section examines the industry 
concentration by two measures. Then, the next subsection describes entry 
barriers in the unit trust industry. Specifically, the entry barriers are considered 
in terms of (i) economies of scale, (ii) product differentiation (iii) capital 
requirement, (iv) access to distribution channels and (v) the government policies. 
3.3.2. The degree of concentration 
In studying features of a certain industry, economists often use the market 
concentration ratio and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. The market 
concentration ratio is defined as the percentage of market share (sales) accounted 
126 
for by the industry's four or five largest companies. (Mansfiled, 1993). For 
example, the four company concentration ratio is the sum of the market share of 
the top four companies, divided by the total market size: = (S 1+S2+S3+S4)/St 
where Sn= the company N's market share in size and, St = the total market size. 
If the industry consists of a large number of small companies, the ratio is close to 
zero. By contrast, fewer companies dominate the market, the ratio is close to 
one. In other words, the closer the ratio is to zero (one), the less (more) 
concentrated is the industry. 
It can be said that the four company concentration ratio is a rough measure 
because the ratio is based on the market shares of only the four largest companies 
in an industry (Barney, 2001, p243). In this light, there is another measure of 
concentration, taken into account the market shares of all companies: The 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (thereafter the Herfindahl index for short). The 
Herfindahl index is obtained by squaring the market share of the companies in 
the industry and then summing these square. That is : 
n 
The Herfindahl Index 
= 
(%MarketShare) 2X 10,000 (3.1) 
i=1 
The value of the index ranges from 0 to 10,000. Given the range, there is a 
conventional interpretation concerning the Herfindahl index. For instance, using 
the Herfindahl Index as the merger guideline, the US Justice Department 
considers that range of 10,000-1,800,1,800-1,000, and 1,000-0 represent a 
highly concentrated, moderately concentrated and a low concentrated market 
respectively (Griffithus and Wall, 1999). In this respect, the concentration ratio 
is supplemented with the Herfindahl index. 
127 
Figure 3.4: Concentration measures in the U. K unit trust industry from 1989 to 
2000 (Source: UK Fund Industry 2001 Review and Directory) 
35% 
30% 
25% 
20% 
1Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
15% -ý-the top 
four largest companies (%) 
10% 
5% 
0% 
0 
Table 3.6 Concentration measures in the U. K unit trust industry from 1989 to 
2000 (Source: UK Fund Industry 2001 Review and Directory) 
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
the top four largest companies (9,,, o) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
32.79° ö 
453.2 
32.68% 
446.1 
29.49% ö 
399.8 
29.80% 
398.6 
28.59% 
361 
25.20% 
312.5 
Year 1995 1996 1997 
25.52% 25.19'o 2'). 71'C 
304.3 303.3 279.3 
1998 1999 2000 
0.86° ö 20.62°, 0 19.66% 240.5 246.4 238 
the top tour largest companies 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
By applying the two measures to the UK unit trust industry, Table 3.6 reports the 
degree of concentration of the industry. According to the concentration ratio, 
the largest four unit trust management companies accounted for 19.66 % of the 
market share at the end of 2000. In the 12 year duration from 1989 to 2000, the 
ratio declined from 32.79 to 19.66. The decrease of the ratio suggests that the 
industry's concentration has weakened. What is more, recall that there is no 
standard interpretation with respect to the four company concentration ratio. 
Nonetheless, given the fact that the European fund markets are dominated by 
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subsidiaries of large banks and insurance groups1°, the ratio indicates a relatively 
low concentration concerning the UK unit trust industry. 
Table 3.6 also includes the Herfindahl index figures. Over a 12 year period from 
1989 to 2000, the index fell almost constantly from 453 to 238. Apparently, in 
accordance with the U. S Justice department's guideline, the absolute level of the 
Herfindahl index is low in the UK unit trust industry. More importantly, the 
declining trend suggests that competition in the unit trust industry has become 
more fierce in recent years. 
3.3.3. Barriers to entry 
The potential barrier for entry into an industry is the next variable which helps 
highlight the industry characteristics. Certainly, various features are considered 
as potential barriers to entry. However, in the context of a financial service 
industry, Bateson (2002) views the following factors as barriers to entry into the 
industry: Economies of scale, Product differentiation, Capital requirement, 
Access to distribution channels and Government policies. Consistent with 
Bateson's approach, this section briefly examines these potential entry barriers 
which may exist in the unit trust industry. 
Economies of scale: Informally, bigger is better where the economies of scale 
occur. More precisely, the average cost of, i. e. cost per unit of output, declines 
as the output increases. The basic explanation for the decline in the average cost 
10 For example, top 10 companies accounted for 65% of the French fund industry 
(PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 2000a) whilst six groups held 70% of the German fund market 
(PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 2000b). 
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is the spread of fixed costs over (Besanko et al, 2000). The economies of scale 
may confer a cost advantage where a large infrastructure is needed. For 
example, if the new company is set up at too small a scale, the new company is 
unable to lower the cost, which matches those of existing producers. 
Despite the fact that the fund management industry expand significantly over the 
last decade, few academic studies examine the issue of economies of scale in the 
industry. Exceptions are Baucool, Goldfeld, Gordon, and Koehn (1990) and 
Collins and Mack (1997) who studied the U. S mutual fund companies: Dermine 
and Roller (1992) who investigated the French mutual fund' 1 companies: And 
more recently, Latzko (1999) who examined economies of scales in terms of 
administration costs. 
The common methodology among these studies relies on the well known trans- 
log cost function. For example, the trans-log cost function takes the following 
form in the Latzko's work. 
In COST = ao + al In ASSETS +'/2 a2 (In ASSETS) 2+ Ejaj Xj +e (3.2) 
where COST = the fund's total operating expenses 
ASSETS = total fund assets 
Xj =a vector of fund characteristics that may affect costs12 
e=a random error term 
II French mutual funds refer to Societe d'Investissement a Capital Variable, which is often called as 
SICAV. 
12 The average expense ratio for funds with the same investment objective as the fund in question, the 
fund's annualised five year return (%), the fund's front / back end fees and the total amount of fund assets 
managed by the fund family group to which the fund belongs. 
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Based on the form above, the measure of economies of scales is given by taking 
the first derivative of the cost function. That is written as SCALE =a (in COST) 
/ä (In ASSET). If SCALE is less than one, the cost increases less than 
proportionately with their fund asset, indicating that economies of scale is 
present. On the other hand, if SCALE is more than one, diseconomies of scale 
exists. 
The common factor within these studies is that economies of scale are present. 
In the case of the U. S, Barmol et al reported that the ratio of scale is 0.855 whilst 
the corresponding figure from Collins and Mack study is 0.775. In terms of total 
asset size in the French fund industry, Dermine and Roller found that economies 
of scale exists for companies whose asset is between 100 million and 2.9 billion 
French Franc. Similarly, Latzko found economies of scale at the individual fund 
level. 
Interestingly, it is also reported that diseconomies of scale emerge if the asset 
size exceeds a certain size. The thresholds are over 20 billion dollars in the U. S 
mutual fund industry (Collins and Mack, 1997) and over 2.9 billion French Franc 
in France (Dermine and Roller, 1992). 
UK evidence: in the case of the U. K unit trust industry, only two less-academic 
reports have been examined economies of scale within the industry. The first 
report is from PricewaterhouseCoopers, conducting an annual survey concerning 
the asset management business in the U. K since 1988. The survey covers 
various financial service groups such as UK institutional business, non UK 
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institutional business, main insurance, pooled insurance, and retail funds. One of 
the analyses addresses economies of scale for each product segment (See Figure 
3.4). 
Figure 3.5 Cost on fund under management (basis points) across different 
business segments in 1997 (Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1998) 
Costs on fund under management (Left Axis: Basis Points) 
Making a distinction between the top five companies and the rest of the sample 
in terms of their funds under management (FUM), the analysis presents three 
ratios; revenue over FUM, costs over FUM, and operating profit over revenue. 
Table 3.7 indicates the presence of economies of scale in the retail fund business. 
The results are consistent with the preceding findings concerning the U. S and 
French fund industries. However, it is worth noting that the degree of the 
economies of scale is not substantial between the top five companies and the 
remaining companies. 
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0.7 
Source Investment Management Survey 
Table 3.7 Analysis of product leaders' results 
Top 5 The rest 
Retail funds (unit trusts/OEIC) 
Revenue/FUM (basis point) 97 81 
Costs/FUM (basis point) 67 59 
Margin/revenue (%) 31% 28% 
Investment trusts 
Revenue/FUM (basis point) 62 76 
Costs/FUM (basis point) 34 33 
Margin/revenue (%) 45% 56% 
Source: Investment Management Survey (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1998, p13) 
The next report; the competitive advantage of the fund management industry in 
the city of London (Laslett, et al, 1994) is made by the city of London as a part of 
their City Research Projects. The report suggested that some economies of scale 
are present in the case of unit trusts. The reason for this view is that the fund 
management task is essentially a fixed cost, and profits depends on the amount of 
funds attracted (Laslett, et al, 1994, p 21). Nevertheless, the report also pointed 
out that overall at the company level, there are no substantial economies or 
diseconomies of scale related to the total volume of funds under management. 
As clear evidence for this notion, the report stated that large and small companies 
survive, achieving high profitability. 
Notwithstanding the lack of academic studies on the scale economies in the U. K 
unit trust industry, the balance of evidence from the preceding works indicates 
that the economies of scale seems to exist in the industry but the magnitude of 
the scale is not so substantial. Chapter V will be informative in this point as the 
chapter investigates the relationship between efficiency and assets under 
management of the unit trust companies. 
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Product differentiation: The product differentiation is embodied in the physical 
or the perceived features of the product, working as a barrier to entry that 
existing companies own brand identifications and customer loyalty. If potential 
new entrants do not have such brand recognitions, it takes substantial costs not 
only to establish their new brands, but also to overcome competition against the 
existing brands (Barney, 2001, p72). 
In the case of unit trusts, to differentiate one unit trust from those of competitors 
is not easy task because a unit trust with one management company appears to be 
almost identical to those with any other management companies. However, as 
summarised in section 2.7.1 in Chapter II, a recent work by Massa (2003) 
demonstrates how the U. S mutual fund management company can differentiate 
themselves from other rival companies in term of their fund fees, the fund 
investment objective, and the company's total product mix. 
To the extent that the majority of unit trusts have been commoditised, it is argued 
that this is where a strong brand plays an important role in the UK unit trust 
industry. In other words, brand is to de-commoditise products given the current 
financial service market (Sahakien, 1998). Massa (2003) takes a similar view 
that investors perceive two funds in the same category run by different 
companies more different than two funds in the different category run by the 
same company. 
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As a matter of fact, there is evidence that branding is successful in the unit trust 
industry. Companies such as Virgin group, Marks & Spencers and Tesco have 
successfully entered the unit trust market, attracting new customers. Table 3.8 
reports their market shares from 0.45% in 1995 to 1.38% in 1999 showing that 
companies with strong brands have an advantage in entering the unit trust 
industry. 
Table 3.8: Market shares of new companies with strong brands 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Virgin Direct: Assets (million) 137 
Market Share % 0.12% 
456 
0.35% 
1,146 
0.73% 
1,720 
0.94% 
2,381 
0.94% 
2,364 
0.91% 
darks & Spencer: Assets (millior 373 476 694 1,003 1,185 1,122 
Market Share % 0.33% 0.36% 0.44% 0.55% 0.47% 0.43% 
Tesco: Assets (million) 
---- 
98.77 104 
Market Share % 0.04% 0.04% 
Source: UK Fund Industry Review & Directory 2000,2001 
Capital requirement: Bateson (2002) simply described that a new venture in a 
financial service requires large amounts of capital to start because an investment 
will be substantial. If this is the case, the capital requirement can work as a 
barrier to entry. The reason is that larger incumbent companies have easy access 
to a lower cost of capital than new entrants. (Mata and Portugal, 2002). As a 
result of the relatively high cost of capital for the new entrants, the potentially 
positive NPV project turns to be the negative NPV one for the new companies. 
However, the sheer size of capital requirement as a barrier to entry is irrelevant 
here for two reasons. The first principal reason is based on the Investment 
Management Regulatory Organisation (IMRO)' s regulation. The IMRO 
imposes the following requirement on their members of fund management 
companies (Laslett, et al 1994). 
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" Those executing transactions and holding customers' assets must have 
liquid capital worth 13 weeks of their expenditure; 
" Those executing transactions, but not holding customers' assets, must 
have liquid capital worth 6 weeks expenditure; and 
" Those neither executing transactions nor holding customers' assets 
must have gross capital worth £5000. 
Certainly, it is debatable whether the amount of capital matching with 13 week or 
6 week of the company's expenditure is a tough constraint. However, recall the 
quotation from the City Research Project (Laslett et al, 1994, p12) that the fund 
management task is essentially a fixed cost. If this notion holds, and further 
assume that the management company has more power to control their 
expenditure than to control their revenue that fluctuates along with capital 
markets, the current capital requirement may not be so severe. 
The next reason is related to financial theory. That is, if the capital markets are 
efficient, a new company can obtain capital to invest in any positive net present 
value (NPV) projects. Therefore, on balance, it appears that there is no severe 
requirement for capital in the unit trust industry. On the empirical side, Table 3.9 
summarises sizes of capital for unit trust management companies. The size of 
capital significantly varies, suggesting that there is no clearer evidence of capital 
requirement being a barrier to entry. 
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Table 3.9: Descriptive statistics for shareholders' funds of unit trust management 
companies 
Shareholders' Funds £ 
Mean 6,722,840 
Standard Deviation 12,038,320 
Minimum 11,429 
Maximum 75,756,000 
Shareholders Funds (£: 1,000)Number of Companies 
50 4 
100 7 
500 22 
1000 14 
5000 52 
10000 17 
50000 24 
More 2 
Figure 3.6 Distribution for shareholders' funds of unit trust management 
companies 
Distribution for shareholders' funds of unit trust companies 
(Left Axis = Numbers of companies, Right Axis = £: 1,000) 
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Access to distribution channels: If there are distribution networks established 
by incumbent companies and used exclusively for themselves, it is difficult for 
new entrants to break into the industry, and costly to create new distribution 
channels. In this sense, many existing financial service organisations have an 
advantage over new entrants because of their large branch network. Such 
dominant distribution systems are in common across the global retail fund 
industry (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Investment Management Industry Profile: 
United Kingdom, 2002, p. 17). 
However, the UK unit trust industry is said to be relatively open in terms of the 
distribution system for three reasons. Primarily, as the preceding section points 
out, independent financial advisors (IFAs) are major distributors in the UK 
financial service industry, accounting for 60% of net sales in 2000 (Investment 
Management Association, 200313). Recall the fact that the IFAs have 
occupational obligation to recommend investments from a wide range of 
providers, by identifying more than one product provider so that the customer 
has a choice. This suggests that there is a room for new entrants with regard to 
the distribution channel. 
Furthermore, one could argue that direct sales via telephone and Internet have 
potential for the popular distribution channel despite the fact that the current 
sales portion remains low. Finally and less importantly, one must keep in mind 
that a number of branch closure programmes have been introduced recently due 
to the high overhead. This is an interesting trend from a theoretical perspective 
13 Avaiabale at: <URL: http: //\\, w\\'. im'estmentfunds. org. uk/industry_data> 
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that a joint distribution of bank, insurance and investment services enables the 
company to spread costs by using the branch network more intensively (See 
section 7.5.1 in Chapter VII. for bancassures). 
Government policy: The City Research Project (Laslett et al, 1994; p 33) 
argued that the U. K has been a relatively free environment for financial 
transactions, compared with most European financial centres. No exchange 
control or controls on capital flows has been made since 1979. Further, the 
Financial Service Act 1986, followed by the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000, has changed the financial business environment more competitive. The 
change results in the development of the fund management business in the U. K. 
3.3.4. Section Summary 
The final section highlights characteristics of the U. K. unit trust industry. Given 
the industrial economics framework, a few interesting features become evident. 
For example, the lack of any dominant players, together with the slow but 
continuous increase in the number of management companies indicates entry 
barriers to the U. K unit trust industry are relatively low. It is also noteworthy 
that a few new entrants with their strong brands increase their market shares. 
The evidence suggests the possibility that differentiation strategies such as the 
branding have positive impacts on the market share in the unit trust industry (See 
Massa 2003 and Sigglekow 2003, for the similar evidence). 
Fama and Jensen (1983 b) list several industrial elements serving as comparative 
advantages that one type of organisational form has over other types. One of the 
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areas where public companies have a comparative advantage is the business that 
requires a large capital, taking advantage of the economies of scale. 
The final section provides some evidence that the scale economies exist in the 
industry. However, the presence of the economies of scale must be interpreted 
with caution because the degree of the scale economies is relatively small. 
Notably, one must not ignore the fact that the diseconomies of scale emerge 
when the managed asset of the company exceeds a certain amount. Related to 
the issue of economies of scales, the capital requirement is subject to the size of 
the business expenditure so that the companies may be able to manage. Such 
evidence suggest that the large amount of capital may be favourable but not 
absolutely necessary to run the unit trust business in the U. K. 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
The U. K unit trust industry has expanded significantly in the past decade. The 
total fund asset under management increases from 20.3 billion in 1985 to 260.6 
billion pounds in 2000. The first section outlined the structure of unit trusts, their 
investors and their operating companies behind such a phenomenal growth of the 
industry. 
Next, crucial for the development of risk and performance measures used in the 
empirical chapters in the present thesis, the second section depicted the typical 
income structure of a unit trust management company. Under the current fee 
scheme, assets under management as well as new sales are viewed as key income 
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drivers. Notwithstanding, a management company appears to have less pricing 
power over the fee settings. 
Finally, the U. K unit trust industry is characterised by (i) the economies of scale 
is present but the magnitude is smaller than expected, (ii) the market structure's 
movement toward the perfect competition, and (iii) the use of branding and 
product differentiation to help capture the market share. Given the mixed 
features of the industry, Fama and Jensen's implication that a stock company has 
an advantage in business where economies of scale are present, requiring a large 
capital is not beyond contention. 
Nonetheless, the basic analysis of the industry is indispensable because these 
industry characteristics should be included in the empirical models in the 
subsequent chapters as a form of variables. For example, models in Chapter IV 
develop the efficiency ratio based on revenue, capital employed, and 
administration expenses. Other examples are that most of the models in the 
empirical chapters incorporate the size of the company' managed asset, 
controlling for the potential effect of the scale economies. This controlling 
variable is used to assess the robustness of the models. 
The subsequent empirical chapters attempt to formulate a number of hypotheses 
by taking into account the industry characteristics. 
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Chapter IV 
Analysis of Corporate Risk-Taking 
4.1 Introduction 
The agency theory and its applications to financial studies are outlined in the 
literature review chapter. In essence, the theory explores the relationship 
between principals and agents who act on their behalf. The assumption is that 
interests among stakeholders in modern corporations e. g. managers, 
shareholders, and debt-holders vary because the nature of their residual claims 
are different. In this set-up, it is argued that without proper controlling 
mechanisms, such a divergence of interests can affect any business activity, and 
ultimately the value of the company. 
The line of research with regard to the controlling mechanisms has progressed 
from the standpoint of organisational forms. Along with the agency paradigm, 
several researchers have focused on the effects of the organisational form on the 
level of risk that a company takes. Those who investigated the relationship 
between organisational form and the risk taking of a firm include Fama and 
Jensen (1983a and b), Mayers and Smith (1988,1994), Knopf and Teall (1996), 
and Esty (1997a and b). 
By comparing the risk-taking activities of stock-owned companies with those of 
mutual institutions, the aftermentioned developed their hypotheses on the 
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organisational effect. Fama and Jensen (1983a and b) and Mayers and Smith 
(1988,1994) addressed comparative advantages in dealing with the agency 
problems whilst Knopf and Teall (1996) and Esty (1997a and b) emphasised the 
nature of the residual claims in stock owned companies, using an option-pricing 
framework. 
Building on the foundation of the financial literature, the aim of the first 
empirical analysis is to explore the connection between risk-taking activities and 
ultimate ownership, e. g. the organisational form of a holding company in the UK 
unit trust industry. To this end, this chapter employs three different risk proxies 
because a study by Regan and Tzeng (1999) suggested that the relationship 
between organisational form and risk bearing activities is dependent on a choice 
of the risk proxy. 
For the purpose of the analysis regarding the effect of organisational form on 
risk-taking activities of unit trust companies, Chapter IV consists of several 
sections. In section 4.2 a closer examination of several scholars' arguments is 
presented. Subsequently, based on the preceding discussion points, the set of 
hypotheses is developed. The research methodology is discussed in section 4.3. 
Included in the methodology section are variable formation, data collection, and 
selection of statistical models. In conclusion section 4.4 provides the results 
from the statistical analyses. 
143 
4.2. Review and formation of hypotheses 
4.2.1. Overview of background hypotheses 
In order to establish a set of testable hypotheses, this section provides reviews of 
the agency theoretic literature on the relationship between organisational form 
and risk-taking. Specifically the review in this section focuses on the three 
important hypotheses in this area: Cash flow uncertainty hypothesis (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983b), Residual incentive hypothesis (Rasmusen, 1988 and Esty, 
1997a), and Managerial discretion hypothesis (Mayers and Smith, 1988 and 
1994, and Lamm-Tennant and Starks, 1993). 
4.2.2 Cash flow uncertainty hypothesis 
Focusing on residual claims, which can distinguish organisational forms from 
one another, Fama and Jensen (1983a and b) stated that the diversity of residual 
claimants within these organisational forms can lead to comparative advantages 
of various organisational forms over the others. In the context of this research 
subject, the most important difference between mutuals and corporations is that 
the residual claims are redeemable on demand in mutual institutions. This is not 
the case for stock companies' equities. Due to the non-redeemable nature of the 
residual claims in the stock owned company, demands for a secondary market 
emerge. In the secondary market where the stock company's shares are 
exchanged, the residual claims against uncertain cash flow business are priced 
more efficiently than would be the case with redeemable residual claims for 
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which there would be no secondary market (Fama and Jensen, 1983a and b). 
This view leads to the following implication: compared with mutual institutions, 
corporate organisations should be more involved in activities where future cash 
flow is less certain because the capital market mechanism comes into play for 
evaluating such risk projects. 
To enrich their argument, Fama and Jensen examined revenues of the banking 
and insurance industries where different organisational forms co-exist. Making a 
distinction between revenue from business activities' and that from financial 
activities, the authors considered the business revenue as a less stable cash flow 
resource than the financial related revenues. Hence, they expected that corporate 
financial organisations were likely to have product portfolios that make for a less 
certain cash flow, i. e. more business receipts as a percentage of total receipts. 
Based on the cross sectional data, Fama and Jensen found that as their hypothesis 
predicted corporate banks had more business receipts than mutual banks. 
However, the data for casual insurance showed a mixed result as the mutual 
insurers had a higher ratio of business receipts to total receipts. 
Note that studying Fama and Jensen' work, Lamm-Tennant and Starks (1993) 
interpret that uncertainty of future net cash flow is referred to as the risk proxy 
for the insurance business. By borrowing the Lamm-Tennant and Starks' view 
and extending the cash flow hypothesis to the U. K unit trust industry, the 
I Business revenue is referred to as revenues other than interest, dividends. and capital gains. 
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following hypothesis can be established. Unit trust management companies 
owed by proprietary companies should partake in riskier activities than those 
owned by mutual institutions. 
4.2.3 Residual incentive hypothesis 
Building on the option-pricing paradigm (Black and Scholes, 1973), Esty (1997a 
and b) asserted that compared with mutual ownership, stock ownership is likely 
to adopt a higher risk strategy, aiming at large pay-outs which belongs to stock 
owners. 
Esty's basic framework from the option-pricing theory is that the pay-off to 
leveraged equity resembles a call option on the company assets and the value of 
the option is a function of the company's volatility. Clearly, the idea above leads 
to the classic conflict of interests between shareholders and debt-holders, often 
referred to as the wealth transfer effect. 
Esty (1997a and b) presented the following reasons for such a conflict. The 
primary reason is that members in a mutual institution are not only residual 
claimants but also fixed claimants. In such a situation, where the level of risk 
rises, the increasing value of the residual claim is offset by the decreasing value 
of the fixed claims. By contrast, in a stock-owned company where the fixed 
claimants and residual claimants are separated, the residual claimants do not 
necessarily lose their residual value when the risk increases. Rather, the value of 
their residual claims increases as the risk increases so that a strong incentive 
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exists for the residual claimants; i. e. shareholders in the company, to take higher 
risk. 
As long as the mutual is solvent, members in the mutual institution are less 
interested in monitoring their mutual organisation than shareholders in the stock 
owned company. It is not practical for the mutual members to sell their residual 
claims so that the gains with the residual claims are limited. On the contrary, 
shareholders of the stock owned company can trade the shares more easily and 
more quickly, making capital gains. Finally, it is possible to issue additional 
equity shares to make up for losses which the risky project incurs. In a sense, by 
issuing new shares the existing shareholders can extend the maturity of their call- 
option type wealth. On the other hand, mutual institutions are not allowed to 
increase their capital in the same manner. These factors drive shareholders to 
take risk whereas the mutual members are becoming indifferent to their mutual 
institution's activities. 
Esty (1997a) used the quarterly financial reports of more than 3000 thrifts from 
1982 to 1988. Viewing profit variability (one cross sectional and one time- 
series) as risk measures, Esty regressed the risk measures on organisation form 
and a number of control variables. His results showed that stock oriented saving 
and loans companies (S&Ls) exhibited significantly higher profit variability 
during the period in question. Based on the results, Esty concluded that 
ownership was a determinant to the risk taking of the S&Ls. 
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Esty (1997b) also conducted a striking case study, showing how different forms 
of organisation affected risk-taking activities. Esty studied two different S&Ls, a 
stock based S&L, Twin City and a mutual institution, Minden, on the basis that in 
terms of size, location, asset composition, and capitalisation, both S&Ls shared 
quite a similar business background aside from their different organisation form, 
i. e. stock converted ownership versus mutuals. The evidence provided in the 
cases of Twin City and Minden supports Esty's hypothesise. Following their 
conversion into a stock S&L, Twin City pursued an unsustainable level of 
expansion by investing non-mortgage loans business whilst paying a large 
amount of dividend and salary to shareholders and their directors. As a result of 
the excessive expansion, Twin city became bankrupt whereas Minden stuck to 
their traditional home mortgage activities and survived. 
For the objective of this chapter, the residual incentive hypothesis, therefore 
gives rise to the following hypothesis: Proprietary companies engage in higher 
risk activities than comparable mutuals. 
4.2.4 The first hypothesis 
Both hypotheses summarised above have suggested the common implication, 
which is defined as the first testable hypothesis. 
H (1): Risk Taking. Unit trust management companies whose ultimate owners 
are stock (mutual) owned companies should engage in more (less) risky activities 
given the permitted asset management business. 
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The next important task is to define the risk-taking measures and to make them 
operationalised in order to reflect the risk dimensions discussed in this section. 
This issue is addressed in section 4.3. Before turning to the methodology 
section, it is desirable to review the following managerial discretion hypothesis 
that helps shed additional light on risk-bearing activities of the unit trust 
management companies. 
4.2.5 Managerial discretion hypothesis 
Whilst Fama and Jensen (1983a and b) viewed the capital market as the assessor 
of uncertain cash flow projects, Mayers and Smith (1988 and 1994) emphasised 
disciplinary mechanisms of the capital markets and shareholder meetings against 
managers. Mayers and Smith argued that agency problems are inevitable in both 
stock-owned corporations and mutual institutions. Nonetheless, controlling and 
monitoring managerial activities is more efficient and less costly in stock-owned 
companies than in mutual organisations for the following reason: Opportunistic 
managers working for stock owned companies are often removed either by 
annual general meetings or by a course of action of merger and acquisitions. In 
contrast, such managers in mutuals are only removed through a proxy fight, 
which is rarely held, by widely diffused small policyholders. This observation 
leads to the underlying notion of the managerial discretion hypothesis. In 
essence, because giving discretionary power to managers is more expensive in 
mutual associations than in stock-owned companies, the mutual organisations 
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should be more prevalent in business activities where less managerial discretion 
is required. 
However, the following two remarks should be considered in testing the 
managerial discretionary hypothesis. Primarily, it is rather problematic to 
measure the managerial discretion. Secondly, the managerial discretion 
hypothesis offers little clear explanation for the linkage between organisational 
forms and their risk taking. 
With regard to the first issue, Mayers and Smith admitted to the difficulty of 
measuring managerial discretion. Nevertheless, as an alternative solution, the 
authors examined the line of business, taking a view that the actual lines of 
business mirror the degree of managerial discretion. More specifically, an 
analysis of the line of business is useful in two respects. Primarily, such an 
analysis should provide some indications of whether different ownership 
structures should dominant in particular lines of business (business 
specialisation). Secondly, the analysis reveals the business concentration, which 
should be representative of the degree of managerial discretion. The rationale is 
that a concentration in a few lines of business can curb managerial discretion. 
With regard to the association between organisational forms and risk-taking, it is 
worth considering the research of Lamm-Tennant and Starks (1993), who refined 
the managerial discretion hypothesis in the following manner. Assuming that the 
need of managerial discretion is reflective of the degree of business risk, Lamm- 
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Tennant and Starks indicated that mutual organisation are likely to pursue less 
risky business than stock-owned counterparts. 
From an empirical perspective, Mayers and Smith (1988,1994) conducted the 
following two researches. In their first research, Mayers and Smith (1988) 
applied their theory to the US insurance market where four different 
organisational forms co-exist, i. e. common stock companies, mutual companies, 
reciprocal associations, and Lloyds associations. Investigating "line of business 
specialisation", "line of business concentration" and "geographic concentration" 
in the data sample of 1479 insurance firms for 1981, the authors attempted to 
identify any cross sectional difference among these different organisations as the 
influence of ownership form on business risk. Based on the data from the A. M 
Best Company2 for 1981, the cross sectional analysis indicated that mutual and 
stock owned insurers have their own preferences for insurance products although 
it was hard to pinpoint where their competitiveness lay. However, it is not clear 
if business concentration significantly differs between mutual insurers and stock 
owned insurers. These observations presented mixed evidence concerning the 
managerial discretion hypothesis. 
In their subsequent study, Mayers and Smith (1994) focused on the U. S common 
stock insurers. The main reason for selecting common stock insurers was that 
the potential effects of taxes and regulation on ownership could be reduced by 
studying ultimate ownership variations among common stock firms. In their 
2 The data sample consisted of 1058 common stock insurance companies, 319 mutual insurers, sixt\ 
reciprocal associations, and forty-two Lloyds associations. 
151 
study, the stock insurance companies were grouped into widely held, closely 
held, mutual owned and association owned stock companies. Their data sample 
included the U. S 1216 insurance firms in 1981. Based on the 26 lines of 
insurance business, Mayers and Smith investigated the production allocation3 
among the insurers. Their analysis showed that the production allocations of 
mutual owned stock insurers were more similar to those of mutual insurers than 
those of widely held stock companies. Furthermore, according to their logistic 
regression results, ownership was significantly related to the degree of 
managerial discretion, measured by the allocation of business, line-of-business 
specialisation, and geographic concentration. This evidence formed empirical 
support for the managerial discretion hypothesis. 
Lamm-Tennant and Starks (1993) empirically examined the U. S property 
liability insurance industry. With data covering 95% of the U. S property liability 
industry over an eight-year period, 1980-1987, the authors employed a logistic 
regression model to analyse the relationship between organisation form and risk 
taking. It is important to note that in their model, the variance of firm loss ratio 
was computed as risk proxy of an insurance firm. 
Their analysis presented a few significant results: (i) As an overall result, stock 
corporate insurers tended to have higher variance of loss ratio than mutual 
insurers. (ii) In order to examine lines of business closer, the stock corporation 
insurers engaged in more lines of business with higher risk than mutual insurers. 
"Production allocation" refers to the percentage of total business allocated by company to the 
particular line of insurance activities. 
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(iii) With regard to geographic breakdown of their business activities, stock 
corporate insurers were inclined to concentrate in states which had higher 
variance of the loss ratio. Their observations were consistence with the 
implications of the managerial discretion hypothesis of Mayers and Smith. 
4.2.6 The second and third hypotheses 
According to Mayers and Smith (1988 and 1994), the cost of monitoring 
managers is higher in a mutual organisation, the managers are limited in their 
decision making authority. As a result, mutual organisations concentrate on 
business where the need for such authority, e. g. the managerial discretion, is 
lower. Applying the Mayers and Smith's logic to the U. K unit trust industry, the 
managerial discretion hypothesis can be testable by splitting into two sub- 
hypotheses. 
H (2): Line of Business Specialisation. There should be a difference between 
mutual and stock owned unit trust management companies in terms of particular 
lines of fund business, which account for the degree of managerial discretion. 
H (3): Line of Business Concentration. The number of funds or different fund 
types should be smaller in mutual owned unit trust management companies than 
stock owned counterparts. 
One can argue that the two hypotheses may not fit the bill for the scope of this 
chapter because of no explicit linkage between the managerial discretion and the 
15 33 
risk bearing activities. Nonetheless, testing hypotheses (H2) and (H3) is valuable 
for two reasons. Firstly, following the Lamm-Tennant and Starks (1993)' view, 
it is possible to relate hypotheses (H2) and (H3) to the context of this chapter. 
As noted briefly, Lamm-Tennant and Starks make an assumption that 
"managerial discretion requirements are reflected by the riskiness of the 
business income. Then, Mayers and Smith's managerial discretion hypothesis 
also implies that mutual insurer should be involved in the less risky activities on 
either a by-line or totalfirm basis" (p. 33). 
Second, because no single and perfect risk measure for the company exists, a 
number of different risk measures should be used for the cross-examination 
purpose. By sorting each fund category into the high and low risk groups, the 
hypothesis (1) computes the risk-taking index on the basis of the two fund 
categories and uses the index as the risk proxy. In contrast, by testing hypotheses 
(H2) and (H3), it is possible to distinguish patterns across the different 
organisational forms at the individual category level. For these reasons, 
hypotheses (H2) and (H3) should provide additional insights on the risk-bearing 
activities across the three types of ultimate ownership. 
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4.3 Methodology 
In order to test the set of hypotheses in section 4.2, the following methodology 
section is divided into several sub-sections. Section 4.3.1 outlines the research 
design. Section 4.3.2 addresses how variables are defined and operationalised. 
Section 4.3.3 discusses measurement validity. Coupled with the variables, 
section 4.3.4 describes data collection and sample of the data set. The last sub- 
section of 4.3.5 describes statistic models whilst providing explanations and 
justifications for the use of particular specific models. 
4.3.1 Research design 
The underlying research design through out the empirical chapters is a cross 
sectional research format for the following reasons (Bryman, 2001): 
More than one case: the current research is ultimately interested in variations in 
respect of ultimate ownership in the UK unit trust industry where more than one 
type of ultimate ownership exist; mutual organisation, exchange listed company 
and privately owned company. 
Non-manipulable variables and Patterns of associations: Related to the first 
point, the research focus is not on the causality but on the relationship between 
variables. This may create a problem if one is interested in a causal relationship 
between the variables. 
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In order to have certain ideas about causality, it is necessary to manipulate the 
ultimate ownership variable and examine changes of a dependent variable. 
However, as the ultimate ownership variable simply cannot be manipulated, this 
is not feasible. The point to emphasise is that because the features of an 
experiment design are not present (Bryman, 2001, p. 40), it is not possible to be 
certain whether the relationship is causal or otherwise. 
One of the possible methods is to examine risk taking and performance for a 
number of unit trust management companies whose ultimate ownership has been 
converted from mutual to stock owned company. This type of causality analysis 
should compare the risk-taking and performance of these companies before the 
ownership change with those after the change. However, it is not feasible to 
adopt such a research method primarily because the demutualisation boom has 
occurred in the U. K since the mid 1990's. As a result, a very small amount of 
time series data is available for unit trust companies that experienced the 
demutualisation via their ultimate ownership in conducting analyses on the basis 
of audited financial statements. 
A single point in time: Finally and similarly to the issue of availability of annual 
financial information, the empirical investigations scrutinise a single point in 
time, in that data on the variables such as risk taking, performance, and ultimate 
ownership form of the unit trust management companies are collected 
simultaneously. It is also noteworthy that this cross-sectional approach 
corresponds to that of Mayers and Smith's study (1988). The main reason for the 
cross-sectional or "snap shot approach" are twofold. The first and foremost, the 
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analysis of companies in a rapidly changing financial industry is a demanding 
task. Specifically, to identify certain characteristics common to one type of 
organisational form can be problematic. As several companies have gone though 
the organisational changes, it is hard to maintain the consistency with regard to a 
set of the companies in the data. For this reason, the sample year used in this 
chapter is 1999-2000, which is the most stabilised year as less frequent 
demutualisation occurred in the U. K financial industry after the mid-1990's 
demutualisation wave. 
Secondly, the product mix as a unit of risk taking proxy of a unit trust 
management company may change slowly in the long run but will not change 
completely overnight. For instance, it is very unlikely that a unit trust company 
would wind up all the existing unit trusts whilst establishing new ones in each 
year. Such a complete change would be unfavourable not only for unit holders 
who invest in the existing unit trusts for a long term perspective, but also for the 
company itself that often makes use of their long term performance as a means of 
advertisement. In a related manner, it is not possible for unit trust management 
companies to ignore the current practice of performance evaluation. Fund 
performance agencies such as S&P Micropal, MorningStar, and FT fund service, 
providing influential fund valuation data4, always take into account the three- 
year or longer performance when evaluating unit trust performance. 
4 An article of Financial Times pointed out that 65° ö of net new money has been channelled into funds rated 
in the top third 
-up from 60% last year (James Mawson, "Managers call for rating reform", Financial Times, 
12 August, 2002 
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4.3.2 Variable formation 
Section 2 presented several risk-taking measures within the research area of the 
risk-organisation relationship. In studying the risk of the unit trust management 
business, a question of interest is how risk is measured. There are a few possible 
risk measures. For example, from the practitioner's perspective, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000) categorised various risk across the fund 
management organisation into the following types; organisational and systematic 
risk, market and credit risk, compliance and regulatory risk, human resource risk, 
strategic risk, third party and e-business risk. This is a cause for concern because 
the linkage between organisational form and risk-taking depends on a choice of 
the risk-taking measure (Regan and Tzeng, 1999). 
Connection to company's income source 
Chapter III reveals the way in which unit trust management companies generate 
their revenue, suggesting the importance of the size of the fund assets under 
management. Thus, the definition of risk in this research context should be 
linked to the fund assets generating the income of the unit trust management 
company. Such an approach can be justified in two ways. 
Firstly, building on the literature that reveals fund assets under management are 
directly related to management fee income (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997, Massa, 
2003 and Siggelkow, 2003) it seems plausible to define fluctuation of the fund 
assets under management as a risk for the unit trust management company. The 
158 
implicit view for this is that business risk is linked to the company's operating 
income. 
On the empirical side, a number of periodical articles point out that the business 
closure of the fund management company may occur when the company fails to 
raise and keep sufficient amounts of funds' assets, which are the principal 
revenue generators. The following serves as a good example. According to the 
Barrons'(1998), the U. S money magazine, United Asset Management shut down 
their mutual fund subsidiary, HMH, because HMH did not have the critical mass 
to continue their business after they were informed of a large withdrawal from 
their fund by a major fund investors. This point of view echoed the Economist's 
article (1994), describing "the industry's worst nightmare" as "a mass 
redemption of mutual funds , 6. The U. K financial magazine, Money Management 
(2001) also reported that "business risk for an investment management firm is, 
quite simply the risk of losing the mandate to manage a fund? ". These articles 
provide some justification for the line of reasoning that; in terms of the 
company's revenue, the total assets of the managed funds can be used as a 
business risk factor of the unit trust company. 
Focus on product mix 
Given these justifications, the next task is to develop a risk proxy that is closely 
linked to the managed assets for a unit trust company in the UK. The key 
5 Barry Henderson "Mutual Funds: Another member whacked", Barron's II May 1998, Vol 78, issue 19 
6 Anonymous, "Running out of stream" Economists. 24 December 1994, Vol 333. Issue 7895 
7 Sir Mark Weinberg "Business risk before performance" Money Management June ? 001, p80 
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solution for this task falls on the company's set of fund products. The main logic 
behind this view is that the product mix should reflect the company's risk 
decision because the company can choose types of assets and objectives in which 
to invest when launching their new funds. This line of argument is supported by 
a recent study by Massa (2003, p252), stating that each company's choice 
consists of the decision to set up a fund with specific characteristics. 
There are further benefits for focusing on the product mix of a unit trust 
management company. One must recall that the total asset of the unit trust 
company is comprised of a set of individual unit trusts. Unit trusts are 
distinguishable according to their investment objectives defined by the primary 
type of securities in which the funds invest. Such fund categories are often 
referred to as the fund sector. As various fund categories are present, it is 
possible to assert that the company's product mix can have a portfolio effect or 
diversification effect on the total asset under management, parallel to the 
conventional investment portfolio. It is intuitively obvious that risk is greater if 
the company relies on the single product than on multiple fund products. 
Furthermore, different fund assets have different levels of risk. In other words, 
some fund sectors are more risky than others because of the investment 
objective. Using a simple test the topic is further examined from a validity 
perspective, at the end of this section. 
In addition to the principal reasons above, two recent papers by Massa (2003) 
and Siggelkow (2003) provide strong support for the product mix approach, 
reporting evidence that the company's product set accounts for the uncertainty of 
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cash flow into the company. It should be also noted that a similar risk proxy was 
employed in other financial literature. Lee et al (1997) demonstrated that the 
insurers' portfolio component, which consists of stocks, bonds, and other assets 
was analysed as the risk measure for the property liability insurance industry. 
From a slightly different angle, Mayers and Smith (1988,1994) considered the 
line of business specialisation and concentration as risk measures in their 
insurance studies. Following these empirical studies, the fund mix analysis 
should reveal the line of business in the fund management companies, enhancing 
the present risk analysis of the company. 
As for the current business practice, the diversity of a product range is often used 
as a risk proxy by industry consultants. One example is PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(1998) who conduct the annual survey for the UK asset management industries: 
PricewaterhouseCoopers states that "a recurrent finding in our surveys over the 
past decades has been the correlation between the diversity of product range and 
profitability. Focused, specialist businesses has been consistently more 
profitable on average than those active in a wide range of products " (Investment 
Management Survey, 1998, p 19). Of course, in the light of the risk-return 
connection, their finding may not necessarily hold to the unit trust business 
because their annual survey includes not only retail fund business but also 
institutional businesses such as insurance and pension fund management 
businesses. Nonetheless, PricewaterhouseCoopers should be regarded as 
valuable support for the product based approach as the risk proxy for an asset 
management company in general. 
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In essence, the examples from both academic literature and a consultant's 
practice support the product mix approach, which is used as the risk proxy for a 
unit trust management company. 
Alternatively, one can argue that the volatility of the stock price can be a proxy 
of the stock owned unit trust companies. But, all unit trust management 
companies themselves are not traded in stock exchanges. The more important 
remark is from Knopf and Teall (1996) who studied the risk-taking behaviour of 
the U. S thrifts. The researchers pointed out that "(stock) return variability in the 
thrift may not have been intended by management (p 13 31)". 
As a solution, Esty (1997a) demonstrates in his empirical work that the profit 
variability can be used as the risk proxy for non-listed financial institutions. 
However, a close examination of financial statements of the UK unit trust 
companies in Chapter III and IV reveals that accounting based measures such as 
return on asset, debt-equity ratio and operating margins are subject to the 
company's transfer pricing policy within their financial group. It is up to the 
group policy about the capital allocation to their unit trust management 
subsidiary. Moreover, it is the group internal accounting rule that determines 
how much the unit trust company pay to their associated group companies in 
order to cover the cost of advisory or marketing fees. Therefore, the group 
accounting policies are very likely to distort the reality of their business 
operations. This is an important factor to emphasise when measuring 
performance of individual unit trust management companies. Hence, this issue 
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will be further addressed in the next chapter where the relationship between 
efficiency and ultimate ownership is examined. 
Common Framework 
The proceeding sections justify the use of the fund mix as a basis of the risk- 
taking of the unit trust management company. It is now necessary to compute 
the risk related measures for a set of the hypotheses; risk activity (HI), business 
specialisation (H2), and business concentration (H3). Certainly, each hypothesis 
requires different risk measures. However, the underlying and common factor 
across the risk measures is the unit trust's investment objective. More precisely, 
as a measure of the product mix analysis, this chapter focuses not on individual 
unit trusts but on the investment objective, i. e. the fund sector classification into 
which each unit trust is sorted. The reasons are threefold. Firstly, the nature of 
an individual fund's risk is well portrayed in the fund sector into which the 
individual fund is categorised. Massa (2003) notes that segmentation (i. e. a fund 
category) reduces the scope and range of activity of the manager and forces him 
to invest only in the assets specific to the fund's category" (p. 250). Another way 
of saying this is that given the well-defined investment objective for each sector, 
risk and return of funds within the fund sector are unlikely to vary widely. 
Appendix 4-b shows some lists descriptions of the fund sector objectives. 
Secondly, evidence from Khorana and Servaes (1999), Massa (2003) and 
Siggelkow (2003) suggests that the fund's investment objective is one of the 
most important factors from the fund management companies' perspective. 
Thirdly, this sector-basis approach is advantageous in the way that sector 
information is publicly available from several data resources. 
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Computation of risky business activities (Hl) 
The variable formation for testing hypothesis (HI) is a complex task. There are 
two fundamental ideas leading to the variable development. 
Standard deviation as risk: Despite the fact that there is a general lack of 
agreement concerning the notion of risk, almost all investment textbooks define 
risk to be its volatility of returns measured by the standard deviation. In other 
word, the term risk is defined as the dispersal of actual outcomes from expected 
(or averaged) results. Given the notion of risk in the investment literature, the 
first hypothesis testing relies on the standard deviation framework for computing 
the risk proxy. 
Investment return and money flow: It is of some interest to say that the 
aggregated size of assets under management is affected by numerous factors. 
The value of the underlying investment is one factor which affects the size of the 
assets under management. Furthermore, money that flows into the unit trust 
industry as well as into the individual unit trusts is an important element, 
affecting the asset size of the company. Building on the above point, this study 
focuses on two characteristics of individual fund sectors as risk factors affecting 
the company's asset size. The first element is the return generated by the sectors. 
The second factor is the level of actual net money that flows from the unit 
holders into the sectors. 
Based on the two concepts summarised above, the risk measures involve the 
following computation phases. The first is to calculate the standard deviation of 
164 
each sector on the basis of (i) the averaged monthly return of all the unit trusts in 
the sector and (ii) net money flow of the unit trusts in the sector. Each fund 
sector is ranked according to the standard deviations of (i) and (ii). At the 
second stage, the sector rankings are split into the top half and the bottom half by 
ascending order of (i) and (ii). The top (or bottom) half group is referred to as 
the high (or low) risk sector. Subsequently, the proportion of the top half sectors 
over the total asset of each company is calculated. The range is from 0 to 100 
percent. 
Computation in detail: Every month, Money Management publishes the 
standard deviation of return for each sector. The standard deviation of sector j's 
return is computed as 
36 
2 ýrj_ 
i=1 
35 
where 
(4-1) 
ß, = the standard deviation of the averaged return of all the unit trusts in sector j over the 36 
month period. 
ry = averaged monthly return of all the unit trusts in the sector j during month i 
rj = sector j's average monthly return over the 36 month period (from January 1996 to December 
1999). 
On the other hand, calculation of the standard deviation of money flow over the 
36 month period is problematic due to changes of the AUTIF fund categories 
which often occurred over the last decade. For this reason, the 32 sector 
classification needs to be adjusted in order to compute the standard deviation of 
the sectors' money flows. As a solution, the 32 sectors classified in June 1999 
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were regrouped to 16 sectors, by the sectors' geographic orientations and by the 
sectors' capital or income growth orientations. A note in Table 4.1 shows the 
detail for this regrouping. It should be noted that the adjustment process keeps 
the 16 sector classification closely matched up with the prior sector classification 
systems used before June 1999. 
In addition to the regrouping procedure, this analysis excluded two particular 
months, August 1998 and June 1999 when the classification systems were 
updated. The reason for excluding the two periods is to ensure the consistency of 
money flow changes. In a manner similar to Sirri and Tufano (1998), net asset 
flow is calculated as 
Net Asset Flow it= [Asset ;, t - Asset ;, t_I x (l+R;, t )] 
where 
Asset j,, = the industry's total asset in fund sector i at the end of month t 
R= the return of fund sector i during the month t 
Thus, the monthly net asset flow ratio is computed as follows; 
(4-2) 
Net Asset Flow Ratiol, t (NAFRI, t) = (Net Asset Flow ;, t) / (Asset ;, t_1) (4-3) 
Based on the computation above, the standard deviation of the ratio is calculated 
as follows. 
34 2 
(NAFR, 1- NAFR; ) 
t=I 
33 
(4-4) 
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The results of (4-1) and (4-4) are ranked and split into the top half and the bottom 
half by ascending order. Table 4.1 presents these rankings. For each sample 
company, the proportion of the top half sectors over the total asset of each 
company is calculated. The range is from 0 to 100 percent. 
167 
Table 4.1 Fund sectors with low/high standard deviation of returns (1-a) 
and Money flow (1-b) 
Table 1-a 
Sectors Return SD 
Far East Specialist 13.47 
Global Emerging Markets 10.18 
Far East Excluding Japan 9.85 
Japanese Specialist 9.63 
Far East Including Japan 8.17 
Japan 7.32 
European Specialist 6.89 
North America Specialist 6.76 
Global Specialist 6.71 
Europe Excluding UK 6.2 
UK Smaller Companies 5.75 
North America 5.24 
Europe Including UK 5.2 
Global Growth 4.96 
UK All Companies 4.34 
Active Managed 4.21 
Index Bear Funds 4.14 
UK Equity Income 3.88 
Global Equity Income 3.82 
UK Specialist 3.77 
Balanced Managed 3.72 
Global Equity & Bond 3.59 
UK Equity & Bond 2.96 
UK Equity & Bond Income 2.91 
Managed Income 2.79 
Cautious Managed 2.72 
Property 2.02 
Global Bonds 1.78 
I IlK Gcncral Bonds 1.55 
UK Gilt 1.53 
Guaranteed/Protected Funds 1.44 
UK Money Market 0.08 
Tablel-b 
Sectors STDEV(34months) 
Emerging 0.154 
Index Bear 0.112 
Property 0.112 
Asia 0.111 
UK_Small 0.102 
Global Equity Income 0.077 
North America 0.075 
Global Growh 0.075 
Europe 0.074 
UK_Equity Income 0.074 
Japan 0.070 
Global Bonds 0.066 
UK_All Companies 0.048 
Managed 0.047 
UK_Bonds 0.040 
Money Market 0.031 
There are 32 fiend sectors classified by the Association of' Unit Trusts and Investment 
Funds. Table (1-a) shows the sector's standard deviation of monthly returns over 36 
months (from 1997 to 1999). The data is taken from the Money Management February 
2000. Sectors in the top half are defined as the high risk sectors 
Table (1-b) shows the sector's standard deviation of monthly net flows over 34 months 
(from 1997 to 1999). The data is taken from the AUTIF web site. Sectors in the top half 
are aggregated and defined as the high risk. 
Note for Table I 
-b 
"UK Bonds" includes UK General Bonds, UK Gilts 
"Managed" includes Managed Income, UK Equity & Bond Income, Cautious 
Managed, Balanced Managed, and Active Managed 
"UK All Companies" includes UK All Companies and UK Specialist 
"Japan" includes Japan and Japanese Specialist 
"Asia" includes of Far East Including Japan, Far East Excluding Japan and Far East 
Specialist 
"Europe" includes Europe Including UK, Europe Excluding UK and European 
Specialist 
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"North America" includes North America and North America Specialist 
Computation of line of business specialisation (H2) 
The aim of the hypothesis (H2) is to compare the ultimate ownership groups in 
terms of their asset distribution across the 32 fund sectors. For this purpose, a 
measure of business specialisation is a simple asset weight (%) of each fund 
sector within a unit trust management company. 
Computation of line of business concentration (H3) 
Two Herfindahi indices are computed to test out the hypothesis (H3). The first 
index is based on the number of funds within a unit trust management company 
and written as : 
n 
The fund based Herfindahl index 
= 
1] (FundAsset%)2 x 10,000 (4-5) 
i=1 
The second index is based on the number of fund sectors within a unit trust 
management company and written as: 
n 
The sector based Herfindahl index =Y (SectorAsset%) 2x 10,000 (4-6) 
Used in recent research papers by Khorana and Servaes (2000), Massa (2003) 
and Siggelkow (2003), the first index captures the breadth of concentration at the 
fund level whilst the second represents the degree of concentration at the 
investment objective level. 
Ownership variables 
Based on the fact that unit trust companies are usually subsidiaries of financial 
groups, this research divides the ultimate ownership characteristics of the groups 
into the three forms; mutual, quoted and private group. This classification is 
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meaningful from two perspectives. From the standpoint of external control 
mechanisms such as stock markets, the split between quoted companies and 
privately owned companies is essential because the stock market monitoring 
mechanism helps mitigate the agency problem between a listed company's 
owners and its managers. In contrast, such an external control mechanism is not 
applicable for a privately owned company. 
Additionally, in the context of ownership concentration, it is reasonable to 
suppose that the stock owned companies have dispersed ownership whereas the 
private owned companies have concentrated ownership. At this point, stakes of 
quoted company shareholders can account for small portions of their well- 
diversified wealth. On the other hand, shareholders' interest of the privately 
owned companies are relatively under-diversified. To the extent that the value of 
the business represents a major part of the owners' wealth in private owned 
business entities, under-diversified owners are more risk averse than stock 
company owners whose wealth can be diversified (Zhang, 1998). From the 
viewpoint of testing the hypothesis, it is expected that the degree of risk taking of 
unit trust management companies owed by private companies should range 
between those of mutual owners and quoted company owners. 
In the U. K, it is relatively easy to make a distinction between public and 
privately owned companies by referring to the London Stock Exchange rules. 
The London Stock Exchange sets out the listing criteria for a public limited 
company (The London Stock Exchange, 2002). These criteria, for example, 
include incorporation under the relevant laws, audited accounts, track records 
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covering a three-year period, directors with appropriate collective experience and 
expertise to run all areas of the business. In addition to these general 
requirements, there are other conditions that are more important to the purpose of 
the analyses in this thesis. As for the financial requirements, 
" Working capital should be large enough to cover not only its current needs 
but also at least the next 12 months. 
" At least, 25% of the listed company's shares should be in public hand. 
"A total market capitalisation should not be less than £700,000 and would 
normally be expected to be much larger. 
With regard to the relationship with large shareholders, the company must be 
able to carry out its business independently, at arms' length from any 
shareholders with a controlling interests. 
To a certain extent, the directors of a private company may deem such an arm's 
length relationship to be a loss of their managerial control. Furthermore, due to 
the greater level of accountability owned to external shareholders, the directors 
are likely to lose much of the privacy and autonomy that they may have enjoyed 
when running a private company. 
On the mutual side, the constitutions of financial mutual organisations vary 
(Armitage and Kirk, 1994). For example, building societies are governed by the 
8 The controlling interest refers to anyone with control of more than 30% of the shares, or who can influence 
the appointment of directors 
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Building Societies Act whereas Co-operative associations are established under 
the Industrial and Provident Societies Act. The sample companies are classified 
by ultimate ownership type in Appendix 4-a. 
4.3.2 Measurement Validity 
The issue of validity is of some importance. Consequently, the present thesis 
uses measures which have been utilised in the research papers previously 
described. Arguably this provides a certain validity to the present research. To 
begin with, it can be said at the very minimum level the risk variable on the basis 
of the company's product mix is satisfied with face validity. The face validity 
refers to professional agreement that a scale logically appears to accurately 
measure what it is intended to measure (Zikmund, 2003, p302). The way in 
which the product mix approach provides the face validity is that the measure is 
created with a format of standard deviation, which is viewed as a conventional 
risk framework among standard investment textbooks. 
Criterion validity can be observed in the sense that in criterion related validity, 
an indicator is compared with another measure of the same construct in which 
the researcher has confidence (Punch, 1998, p 101). An element of such criterion 
validity arises from paragraphs in 3.1.2, noting that the product mix approach is 
compatible to the portfolio analysis of diversification. 
A criterion at this point is a diversification effect, leading to risk reduction. This 
is relevant to the concept of risk-taking in question. In the context of standard 
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portfolio management (Strong, 2000), such a diversification effect means that the 
variance of return, e. g. total return of a portfolio, declines as the number of 
securities included in the portfolio increases. 
For the purpose of comparison, the risk measure in the current empirical analysis 
can be validated by checking whether or not the criterion variable, a 
diversification effect is present in the product mix of a unit trust management 
company. In practice, a simple concurrent-criterion validation can be tested by 
correlating the variance of a company's product mix with the number of product 
mix components, e. g. individual unit trusts run by the company. 
For simplicity, one can imagine a unit trust management running one unit trust 
that exactly replicates the FT 100 index. Over the last three years, the standard 
deviation of the index's monthly return is 4.64% (See Appendix 4-c). Let us see 
what would have happened if the company decides to expand the business by 
introducing one Japanese equity index trust that perfectly follows the Nikkei 225 
index over the same time period. The corresponding standard deviation for the 
Nikkei index is 5.94%. Provided the asset size of the Japan index trust is the 
same as that of the UK index trust, the standard deviation of the monthly return 
the company's product mix reduces from 4.64% to 4.39% as showed in 
Appendix 4-c. In spite of the simple assumption such as no transaction fees or 
money flow effects, this observation corresponds to the standard diversification 
effect of a stock portfolio, providing certain criterion validity for the product mix 
based risk measure. 
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Based on the validation points as well as a number of reasons described in 
preceding paragraphs of sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3, the product mix based variables 
in the current analysis appear to be valid measures for risk-taking activities in the 
UK unit trust industry. 
4.3.3 Data Collection 
The sample data on the UK unit trusts and their management companies is 
mainly collected from four resources; The Financial Times Unit Trust & OEICs 
Year book 1999/2000, The UK Fund Industry Review and Directory 2000, 
monthly magazine Money Management and The Association of Unit Trust and 
Investment Funds (A UTIF) website. With the Financial Times Unit Trust & 
OEICs Year book and the UK Fund Industry Review and Directory, each 
company's ultimate ownership is verified. These industry directories also 
provide individual fund information which contains the sector classification, size 
of the fund and various fee charges. 
The data sample of the year 1999 included all UK unit trust companies whose 
ownership type was confirmed from the two industry directories. Furthermore, 
observations with pension sector funds are eliminated because the sector data 
was not available from Money Management. The selection criteria is not a major 
problem as the overall sample asset size is 253,443 million pounds, accounting 
for 99.8% of the industry's assets at the end of 1999. The final sample consists 
of 142 unit trust management companies and 1678 authorised unit trusts, 
representing 89.3 % of the companies, 91.6 % of the unit trusts in the UK unit 
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trust industry, respectively. With regard to the ownership characteristics of the 
financial groups, the sample data on the UK unit trust management companies 
includes 87 quoted company owned, 31 private company owned and 24 mutual 
owned. Appendix 4-a lists names of companies by ultimate ownership group. 
As for the fund sectors, fund performance companies like Morningstar, S&P 
Micropal, and Reuters provide their own classification systems in order to assist 
investors with their evaluation of the different unit trusts. However, as these 
classifications share a great deal in common with AUTIF's sector categories, this 
study follows the association's classification which had 32 fund sectors at the 
end of 1999, depending on the investment objectives. 
It should be noted that as new funds with distinctive objectives like dot-com or 
telecom funds increase AUTIF review the classification from time to time, 
reflecting such new products. Indeed, AUTIF introduced a new managed sector 
in early 1998, revising the classification in June 1999. The reason for the change 
is to comply with the pan European trade associations to which AUTIF belongs. 
More recently, as from April 2000, AUTIF are modifying several sector 
classifications that are associated with ethical funds, small-capital company 
funds, and UK bond funds. Despite the changes of the sector categorisation, the 
mainstream sectors remain the same in terms of geographic orientation and by 
capital or income growth orientation. For these reasons, this study employs the 
AUTIF's classification set out in June 1999. 
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4.3.4 Statistical Models 
Statistical Tests for the first hypothesis 
The goal of the first hypothesis test is to determine whether the proportion of 
assets invested in high-risk sectors differs significantly among the different 
ownership models, such as mutual, public and private company. To compare the 
three ownership groups, the difference tests used for the initial analysis include 
not only a one way analysis of variance (ANOVA) but also a Kruskal-Wallis test. 
Despite the fact that the distribution of the aggregated asset weights of the high 
risk categories appears to be non-normal, the reason for using the parametric and 
non-parametric tests is that: one of the unsolved issues in data analysis is the 
question of when parametric rather than non parametric tests should be used 
(Bryman and Cramer, 1999, p. 117). From this viewpoint, rather than relying on a 
specific assumption, the analysis employed the two tests. 
The next test for the first hypothesis is to assess the strength of the relationship 
between risk proxy and ownership type, whilst controlling potential influential 
factors. The independent variables include not only nominal ones, e. g. dummy 
variables for the ultimate ownership form, but also a few potential influential 
factors of risky activities in the form of continuous level of measurements. The 
previous literature suggests that the control variables are size and age of the 
company (Esty, 1997a, and Siggelkow, 2003). For this reason, it is important to 
include these factors in the model. Taking into account these points, the multiple 
regression model will achieve the objective of testing the hypothesis. 
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It is debatable whether parametric models such as Tobit multiple regression are 
routinely applicable to the testing the first hypothesis. One justification is that 
studies where the values of the statistics used to analyse samples drawn from 
populations which have been artificially set up to violate the normal distribution 
and the homogeneous variances have been found not to differ greatly from those 
for samples which have been drawn from populations which do not violate these 
conditions (Bryman and Cramer, 1999, p. 119). 
From this point of view, benefits from controlling influential factors by 
employing the Tobit model seem to outweigh costs arising from the potential 
mis-specification of the sample distribution. 
Justification for interaction variables 
It is noteworthy that in employing the multiple regression approach, there are 
several miscellaneous issues to consider. Firstly, one can say that by using 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), the explanatory power of the multiple 
regression model will increase. This is because ANCOVA can remove 
extraneous influences for the dependent variable (Hair et al 1999, page 346). In 
the case of the current analysis, it is intuitively argued that the total size of assets 
under management of a unit trust company can be a key factor to affect the 
degree of its risk taking activities. For example, from the company's 
management perspective, the large size of asset under management generates 
more fee incomes whilst lowering the risk of financial distress. If this is the case, 
the size of assets under management can be treated as a covariate. 
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However, one must keep in mind that there is one important assumption for using 
ANCOVA that: the covariate has an equal effect on the dependent variable 
across the groups. This assumption is often referred to as "the homogeneity of 
regression effect". This is a strong assumption and not suitable for the current 
hypothesis testing because the effect of a company's managed asset size on their 
risk-taking activities may differ across the different ownership groups. 
Justification for Tobit regression 
Instead of the ANCOVA, it is helpful to make use of interaction variables. 
Given the research context, an interaction variable is formed as the product of 
two variables; managed asset size and organisational dummy variable for a 
company. The rationale for including such an interaction variable is that the 
change in risky activities with respect to the asset size depends on the type of 
ultimate ownership. The multiple regression allows us to use such interaction 
variables easily. 
The next justification is concerned with a limited dependent variable, which is 
bounded by a certain cut-off. In this research context, one must recall that the 
observed value of the risk-taking measure based on the asset proportion of the 
risky sectors should be 0% to 100%. Furthermore, the risk proxy based on the 
Herfindahl index should range between 312 (this is the case of the most 
diversified company whose assets are evenly spread across the 32 fund sectors) 
and 10,000 (the company has a single fund product). Such limited dependent 
variables do not conform to the requirements of the conventional liner regression 
mode where the dependent variable must range from minus infinity to plus 
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infinity. Hence, it is vital to employ a regression model for a limited dependent 
variable. 
From the viewpoint of the limited dependent variable, several models have been 
developed (see, for instance, Maddala, 1999). For binary responses, probit 
model and logit models are often used. The former is based on the standard 
normal cumulative distribution function whereas the latter is dependent on the 
logit function. For another non negative limited dependent variable, typical 
regression models are the Tobit, truncated, and Poisson. In particular, the former 
two models are used with a continuous dependent variable and often referred to 
as censored models. The latter model is used with a count dependent variable. 
Nevertheless, among the models for a limited dependent variable, the empirical 
analyses in the current thesis employ the Tobit model because the truncation 
model is for the sample data drawn from a subset of a large population of 
interests (Greene, 2003, p. 756). The general formulation is usually given in 
terms of an index function (Greene, 2003, p. 754) 
Yý = X; ß+E; y; =o ify. * <<05 
yi=y* if y, * >O, (4-7) 
As a main reason for the Tobit regression approach, the nature of the dependent 
variable used in the empirical analyses is essentially continuous and strictly 
positive in value. However, one potential limitation can be found from classic 
econometric books. Maddala (1992) stated that "the Tobit model is, strictly 
speaking, applicable in only those situations where the latent variable can, in 
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principal, take negative values, but these negative values are not observed 
because of censoring. Where the zero observations are a consequence of 
individual decisions, these decisions should be modelled appropriately and the 
Tobit model should not be used mechanically. " (Maddala, 1992, p 345). To 
rephrase Maddala's point, the traditional censoring of data is an issue of data 
observability whist the consequence of individual decisions is an observable 
"choice" or "outcome". Often referred to as the corner solution response, one 
example for the observable outcome is the amount of alcohol consumption by an 
individual. In the population of people, this variable takes on a wide range of 
values. For some significant fraction, the amount to spend on alcohol is zero. 
To dispute Maddala's claim, two possible justifications can be made: on the 
methodological side, a few authors of recent econometric text books dispute that 
the Tobit model is convenient not only for the censored data, but also for the 
corner solution outcome. Specifically, with regard to a problem of the corner 
solution outcome, Wooldridge (2003) argues that the Tobit is applicable to non- 
negative outcomes that pile up at zero but also take on a broad range of positive 
value 9(Wooldridge 2003, page 592). 
From a literature perspective, there have been a number of empirical studies that 
have taken advantage of the Tobit model with regard to the mutual versus stock 
ownership debate. For example, studying the U. S demutualised Saving & Loans 
9 His explanation is that, for the purpose censoring data, E(y' I x) =x ß is of interest and the vector ß provides 
with information. For the corner solution outcome, one is not interested in the conditional expectation. e. g. 
E(), ` I x) but in E(y I x) or E(y I x, y>O). Arguably, given the expressions above, Wooldridge states that the 
Tobit model allows us to estimate the values of x and ß that determine yy given x- either conditional on y>O 
or unconditional. 
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companies (S&L's), Kroszner and Strahan (1996) used the Tobit regression 
model where the company's dividends as the non-negative regressand and the 
income factors were regressors. A further example is Esty's (1997a) work, 
which is often referred to in the current thesis. By using the Tobit model, Esty 
regressed the proportion of the stock owned S&L's companies in each state of 
the U. S on the macro economics conditions for the state, finding no relationship 
between local risk-taking opportunities and the formation or presence of stock 
owned S&L; s. 
For these grounds, one must keep in mind that the current thesis employs the 
Tobit model not only for the present chapter but also for the subsequent chapters. 
The common objective throughout the thesis is to assess the ultimate ownership 
effect on risk-taking (Chapter IV) and efficiency (Chapter V) of a unit trust 
management company, and on the performance of their unit trusts that the 
company offers (Chapter VI). 
Estimation of the Tobit regression is computed not through the ordinary least 
squared estimation, but through the maximum likelihood estimation. The 
obvious reason for this is that the ordinary least squared estimation of the 
parameters obtained from the subset of the latent dependent variable, y* will be 
biased. The bias arises from the fact that in using the latent y*, there is no 
guarantee that E(c; ) will be necessarily zero. Without E(ci) = 0, it is impossible 
to keep the ordinary least squared estimation unbiased (See, Wooldridge, 2003, 
section 17.2). 
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The Tobit model is set up in the following format; 
Risky =a+ (31 (Log_Assetj) +132 (Company Age, ) 
+ (32 (Quoted Ownership_Dummy1) 
+ (33 (Private Ownership_Dummy1) + Ej, 
where 
Risk; = Companyj's risk taking measure 
Log_Assetj = the logarithm of Companyj's total asset. 
Company Age = the age of company j 
Quoted Ownership =1 if company j is a quoted company ownership, otherwise 0. 
Private Ownership =1 if company j is owned by a private company, otherwise 0. 
E;, = the random error term 
(4-8) 
In order to get further insight concerning the size effect, the basic model is 
modified by including the interaction variables, i. e. (the ownership dummy 
variable) x (company size). The preceding model (3-1) is now described as 
Risk kj=a+ 13, (Log_Assett) +ß2 (Company Age) 
+ P2 (Quoted Ownership_Dummy, ) 
+ (33 (Private Ownership_Dummyj) 
+ ß4 (Interaction of Quoted Ownership with the Log Asset) 
+ ß5 (Interaction of Private Ownership with the Log Asset) 
+ cj, (4-9) 
where 
Risk k,, = Companyj's risk taking measure 
Log_Assetj = the logarithm of Companyj's total asset. 
Company Age = the age of company j 
Quoted Ownership =1 if company j is a quoted company ownership, otherwise 0. 
Private Ownership =1 if company j is owned by a private company, otherwise 0. 
Interaction of Quoted Ownership with the Log Asset = the log asset of the company if the 
company j is owned by a quoted company group, otherwise 0. 
Interaction of Private Ownership with the Log Asset = the log asset of the company if the 
company j is owned by a quoted company group, otherwise 0. 
ej, = the random error term 
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Statistical Tests for the hypothesis (H2) and (H3) 
Examining the ownership effect, the first hypothesis (HI) concentrates on risky 
activities across unit trust management companies with different ultimate 
owners. Shifting from the approach based on the two broad classifications, i. e. 
the high and low fund sectors, the next set of hypotheses focuses on the number 
of fund categories, and the weighted asset (%) of each fund' category within the 
companies. In essence, the aim of hypotheses (H2) and (H3) is to test whether 
companies with mutual ownership and with stock ownership differ in terms of 
their line of business specification and line of concentration. 
There are a relatively large number of independence tests that include the Chi- 
square test for goodness of fit, T-test for comparing two means, Z-test for 
comparing two proportions and analysis of variance (hereafter ANOVA). 
However, for the present hypothesis testing, the Kruskal-Wallis test is used, 
because the ultimate analysis is to compare the continuous dependent variable, 
e. g. the proportion of a fund with a given investment objective, on a ultimate 
ownership variable of more than two independent groups, e. g. mutual, listed and 
privately owned groups. Therefore, it is clear that any binary approaches such as 
T-test are not appropriate. 
It is evident that ANOVA is closest in sprit to the Kruskal-Wallis test. However, 
there is a critical distinction between ANOVA and the Kruskal-Wallis test in 
terms of their assumptions. Whilst ANOVA is used on the basis of parametric 
data sample, the Kruskal-Wallis test is suitable for non-parametric data sample. 
In this regard, Table 4.9 indicates that the distribution of asset weight for each 
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section is unlikely to be normal across the ownership groups. For this reason, the 
Kruskal-Wallis test is employed as the main method for the second and third 
hypothesis testing. Nonetheless, it is interesting to quote from Bayan and Crane 
(1997, p 119) that: the value of the statistics used to analyse samples drawn from 
populations which have been artificially set up to violate these conditions, e. g. 
the normal distribution, have been found not to differ greatly from those for 
samples which have drawn from populations which do not violate these 
conditions. On this basis and as a supplement to the Kruskal Wallis test, it is also 
worth using ANOVA for the current analysis. An additional benefit in using 
ANOVA is that the post-ANOVA tests, which are often referred to as posteriors 
or post-hoc tests allows us to specifically differentiate between certain types of 
groups. Hence, if it is necessary, such post-hoc tests can be used on the basis of 
the results of ANOVA. 
In summary, hypothesis (H2) considers the line of business specialisation which 
is proxied by the asset size of each fund category for all three types of ownership. 
To test the hypothesis, this study compares the means (medians) of each category 
weight across the three ultimate ownership types, using both analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) and the Kruskal Wallis test. In a similar manner, hypothesis (H3) 
examines whether the line of business concentration differs among the three 
ownership types. In addition to the tests on the individual fund category (H2), 
hypothesis (H3) calculates the Herfindahl index based on fund categories, then 
comparing the means of the Herfindahl index with ANOVA and the Kruskal 
Wallis test. 
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4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Overall data sample 
Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics for the overall unit trust industry, 
separating the sample companies into mutual, quoted and private owned groups. 
Several features are apparent. Firstly, the quoted company group holds 74.3% 
market share in terms of asset size (Table 4.2-a), 72% in terms of total funds to 
offer (Table 4.2-c). Secondly, a considerable gap between mean and median 
(Table 4.2-a) suggests that there are a few extremely large companies in the 
sample whereas nearly half of the sample companies have less than 500 million 
assets to manage. This is particularly true in the case of the privately owned 
company group. 
Supporting this tendency, Table 4.2-b shows the distribution of the sample 
companies according to the size and ownership classifications. The mutual 
owned group and the privately owned group have size distribution that are tilted 
toward small companies, showing that half of the mutual sample companies and 
two third of the privately owned sample companies have less than 500 million 
assets to manage. 
Table 4.2-b also reveals that a significant gap exists between the top tier and the 
bottom tier in terms of the asset under management. On average, the asset size 
of the large company group is more than twenty times bigger than that of the 
small company group. 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the sample of 142 unit trust management companies in the UK. 
Data are obtained from Financial Times Unit Trust & OEICs Year Book. All pound 
values are expressed in millions. Data is based on year end of 1999. 
Mutual Quoted Private Total 
4.2-a ASSETS (Million) n=24 n=87 n=31 N=142 
Asset by ownership 38,204 188,450 26,788 253,443 
Mean 1,592 2,166 864 1,785 
Median 553 1,062 102 533 
Std. Deviation 2,120 3,003 2,781 2,857 
Minimum 2 2 4 2 
Maximum 8,371 14,581 14,975 14,975 
Asset Distribution 
4.2-b By size (Million) Mutual Quoted Private Total 
Over 10,000 0 3 1 4 
5,000-10,000 2 7 1 10 
1,000-5,000 9 37 1 47 
500-1,000 1 7 4 12 
less than 500 12 33 24 69 
4.2-c Number of Funds Mutual Quoted Private Total 
Total funds by ownership 204 1,221 255 1,680 
Mean 9 14 8 12 
Median 6 11 3 9 
Std. Deviation 9 11 10 10 
Minimum 1 1 1 1 
Maximum 35 50 36 50 
Number of Funds 
4.2-d (distribution) 
Over 40 0 4 0 4 
30-39 1 2 2 5 
20-29 2 18 2 22 
10-19 4 27 6 37 
less than 9 17 36 21 74 
4.2-e Number of Sectors Mutual Quoted Private Total 
Mean 6.3 9.7 5.2 8.2 
Median 5.0 10.0 2.0 7.0 
Std. Deviation 5.5 5.9 4.8 5.9 
Minimum 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Maximum 21.0 22.0 18.0 22.0 
Number of sectors 
(distribution) Mutual Quoted Private Total 
4.2-f Over 29 1 5 0 6 
15-29 1 18 1 20 
10-14 4 21 6 31 
5-9 8 20 6 34 
1-4 10 23 18 51 
4.2-g Company's age Mutual Quoted Private Total 
Mean 14 16 11 15 
Median 13 13 5 12 
Std. Deviation 10 13 13 13 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 39 68 65 68 
Mutual Quoted Private Total 
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Tables 4.3 provides the unit trust sector information. Clearly, there is one large 
sector, the UK all companies which accounts for (a) 30% in terms the total assets 
invested in the UK, and (b) 17% in terms of the total numbers of unit trusts in the 
UK. After the UK all companies sector, the major sectors are Global Growth 
and European excluding U. K. The former accounts for 9% and 11 % of the total 
fund assets and the total numbers of unit trusts in the UK respectively whilst the 
latter accounts for 11% of the total fund assets and 6.5% of the total unit trusts, 
reflecting the growing importance of Europe as an investment sector. 
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Table 4.3 Fund sectors in the UK unit trust industry. 
The sample consists of 32 fund sectors at year end 1999. 
The classification was defined by the Association of Unit Trusts and Investment Funds 
in 1999. Data are obtained from Financial Times Unit Trust & OEICs Year Book. 
Sector Name Size (£ Million) % # of funds % 
I UK All Companies 77,877.8 30.7% 291 17.3% 
2 UK Equity Income 23,747.3 9.4% 92 5.5% 
3 UK Smaller Companies 12,504.5 4.9% 74 4.4% 
4 UK General Bonds 13,691.4 5.4% 92 5.5% 
5 UK Gilt 1,877.0 0.7% 42 2.5% 
6 UK Equity & Bond 452.2 0.2% 3 0.2% 
7 UK Equity & Bond Income 6,262.6 2.5% 45 2.7% 
8 UK Specialist 1,317.6 0.5% 18 1.1% 
9 Active Managed 5,251.5 2.1% 55 3.3% 
10 Balanced Managed 10,616.1 4.2% 71 4.2% 
11 Cautious Managed 491.4 0.2% 9 0.5% 
12 Managed Income 780.1 0.3% 16 1.0% 
13 Global Growth 22,539.9 8.9% 184 10.9% 
14 Global Equity Income 530.9 0.2% 10 0.6% 
15 Global Equity & Bond 1,445.6 0.6% 28 1.7% 
16 Global Bonds 2,527.1 1.0% 56 3.3% 
17 UK Money Market 921.7 0.4% 46 2.7% 
18 Global Emerging Markets 2,512.6 1.0% 35 2.1% 
19 Global Specialist 3,824.7 1.5% 38 2.3% 
20 Europe Excluding UK 28,148.7 11.1% 109 6.5% 
21 Europe Including UK 1,090.8 0.4% 14 0.8% 
22 European Specialist 2,192.6 0.9% 22 1.3% 
23 Far East Excluding Japan 6,539.9 2.6% 73 4.3% 
24 Far East Including Japan 2,007.4 0.8% 22 1.3% 
25 Far East Specialist 310.4 0.1% 11 0.7% 
26 Japan 8,266.0 3.3% 77 4.6% 
27 Japanese Specialist 1,148.4 0.5% 12 0.7% 
28 North America 12,031.1 4.7% 90 5.3% 
29 North America Specialist 1,129.6 0.4% 21 1.2% 
30 Guaranteed/Protected Funds 1,002.3 0.4% 18 1.1% 
31 Index Bear Funds 16.8 0.0% 1 0.1% 
32 Property 386.6 0.2% 3 0.2% 
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4.4.2 Testing Hypothesis (1) with risk-taking measures 
Summary statistics 
From the discussion in the literature review section, there are several ways to 
measure the risk-taking of unit trust management companies. As discussed, 
focusing on the product set or the aggregated asset allocation for each company, 
the test for hypothesis (HI) uses the percentage of products invested in high risk 
fund categories as the risk proxy. Specifically, two risk proxies are employed 
based on (i) fluctuation of averaged return of all unit trusts in the category and 
(ii) fluctuation of net money flow of all unit trusts in the category over the total 
asset size of the all unit trusts in the category. 
The summary statistics for the two risk measures are provided in Table 4.4. It is 
clear from Table 4.4-a that more than 70% of the all companies' assets (mean = 
73%, median = 79%) are invested in sectors with high volatility of return. 
Described in the methodology section, the sectors with high volatility of return 
refer to top half sectors (out 32 fund sectors) ranked by standard deviation of the 
monthly return over the 36-month period. (See Table 4.1 for the sector 
information. ) Surprisingly, the mean (70%) and the median (74%) of the quoted 
company group are smaller than those of the mutual group (mean = 78%, median 
= 82%) and the private company group (mean = 79%, median = 96%). A 
possible explanation is that the high risk category used here includes popular 
fund sectors such as UK all companies and Global Growth. It is important to 
realise that the risk variables do not follow the shape of a normal distribution as 
their mean and median do not coincide. 
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Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics of risky sector weights and 
Independence Tests by ownership type 
4.4-a shows proportion (%) of fund sectors with high standard deviation of returns. 
Descriptives Statistics (%) Mutual Quoted Private Total 
Mean 78 70 79 73 
Median 82 74 96 79 
Std. Deviation 26 22 29 25 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 100 100 100 100 
ANOVA 
1' value = 2.257 
Significance >5% (=0.108) 
Kruskal Wallis Test 
Chi-Square = 11.020*** 
Significance <I% (=0.004) 
4.4-b indicates the distribution of the sample companies 
by proportion of fund sectors with high standard deviation of returns. 
Distribution (No. of Companies) Mutual Quoted Private Total 
0-19% 1 3 2 6 
20-39% 1 4 2 7 
40-59% 2 23 3 28 
60-79% 7 24 3 34 
80-100% 13 33 21 67 
4.4-c shows proportion (%) of fund sectors with high ratio of money flow. 
Descriptives Statistics (%) Mutual Quoted Private Total 
Mean 21 26 41 29 
Median 15 23 33 25 
Std. Deviation 23 24 34 27 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 100 100 100 100 
ANOVA 
F value = 5.124*** 
Significance <1%(0.007) 
Kruskal Wallis Test 
Chi-Square = 7.296*** 
Significance <I% (=0.026) 
4.4-d indicates the distribution of the sample companies 
by proportion of fund sectors with high money flow ratio 
Distribution (No-of Companies) Mutual Quoted Private Total 
0-19% 15 39 8 62 
20-39% 5 31 11 47 
40-59% 1 11 5 17 
60-79% 3115 
80-100% 056 11 190 
Table 4.5 Correlation matrix between the risk variables and other features of 
the product mix of the unit trust management company. 
Table 4.5 (a): Pearson' r 
Correlations 
# of Sectors # of Funds Lo Asset Index units Index sectors Hi h SD Hi h Flow 
# of Sectors Pearson Correlation 1.000 
. 
927* 
. 
771* 
-. 
739* 
-. 
758' 
-. 
089 
-. 
035 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
292 
. 
677 
N 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
# of Funds Pearson Correlation 
. 
927* 1.000 
. 
731* 
-. 
677* 
-. 
654* 
-. 
058 
-. 
043 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
490 
. 
614 
N 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
Log_Asset Pearson Correlation 
. 
771* 
. 
731* 1.000 
-. 
655* 
-. 
656* 
-. 
019 
-. 
225* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
818 
. 
007 
N 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
Index units Pearson Correlation 
-. 
739* 
-. 
677* 
-. 
655* 1.000 
. 
962* 
. 
220* 
-. 
093 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
009 
. 
273 
N 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
Index-sectors Pearson Correlation 
-. 
758* 
-. 
654* 
-. 
656* 
. 
962' 1.000 
. 
231* 
-. 
054 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
006 
. 
526 
N 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
High_SD Pearson Correlation 
-. 
089 
-. 
058 
-. 
019 
. 
220* 
. 
231* 1.000 
. 
265* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
292 
. 
490 
. 
818 
. 
009 
. 
006 
. 
001 
N 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
High_Flow Pearson Correlation 
-. 
035 
-. 
043 
-. 
225* 
-. 
093 
-. 
054 
. 
265* 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
677 
. 
614 
. 
007 
. 
273 
. 
526 
. 
001 
N 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 4.5 (b): Spearman's rho 
Correlations 
# of Sectors # of Funds Log_Asset Index units Index-sectors High_SD High Flow 
Spearman's rho # of Sectors Correlation Coefficient 1.000 
. 
969* 
. 
808* 
-. 
857* 
-. 
857* 
-. 
286* 
. 
190* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
001 
. 
024 
N 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
# of Funds Correlation Coefficient 
. 
969* 1.000 
. 
801 `  
-. 
897* 
-. 
827` 
-. 
281 
. 
184* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
001 
. 
028 
N 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
Log_Asset Correlation Coefficient 
. 
808* 
. 
801 1.000 
-. 
659* 
-. 
620* 
-. 
157 
-. 
032 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
062 
. 
705 
N 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
Index-units Correlation Coefficient 
-. 
857* 
-. 
897` 
-. 
659 1.000 
. 
923 
. 
304 
-. 
337` 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
N 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
Index-sectors Correlation Coefficient 
-. 
857* 
-. 
827* 
-. 
620` 
. 
923 1.000 
. 
328* 
-. 
365` 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 
N 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
High_SD Correlation Coefficient 
-. 
286* 
-. 
281 
-. 
157 
. 
304 
. 
328 1.000 
. 
160 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
001 
. 
001 
. 
062 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
057 
N 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
High_Flow Correlation Coefficient 
. 
190* 
. 
184* 
-. 
032 
-. 
337 
-. 
365 
. 
160 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
024 
. 
028 
. 
705 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
057 
N 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
Correlation is significant at the 
. 
01 level (2-tailed). 
`" Correlation is significant at the 
. 
05 level (2-tailed). 
where 
Index-units = the Herfindahl index based on the number of unit trusts in a company 
Index-sectors = the Herfindahl index based on the number of unit trust sectors in a company 
hSD = proportion (%) of fund sectors with high standard deviation of returns. Hig  
_ High_Flow = proportion (%) of fund sectors with high ratio of money flow. 
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As no single measure of difference is best for all situations (Norusis, 2000, 
p. 365) Pearson's r in Table 4.5 (a) and Sprearman' p in Table 4.5 (b) are used. 
Table 4.5 (a) and (b) show a correlation matrix between the risk variable and 
other features of the product mix of the unit trust management company. 
However, given the non-normal distribution of the variables, it is better to 
summarise the results of Spearman's correlation coefficient. 
It is notable that because the sum of the high risk proxy (%) and the 
corresponding low risk proxy (%) is one, the correlation coefficients of these 
with other variables are identical with an opposite direction. Two noteworthy 
features are the correlation coefficients of high risk variables; (i) high risk 
variable based on return volatility, and (ii) high risk variable based on money 
flow volatility. As for (i), the high risk variable based on return volatility, the 
associations with the two Herfindahl indices are positive and moderate ( 
p=0.304, p<0.01 for the fund based Herfindahl index 
, 
p=0.328, p<0.01 for the 
sector based Herfindahl index). This suggests that when a company expands its 
product range, it is likely to set up a unit trust, which is sorted into the fund 
sector with low volatility of return. 
By contrast, the high risk variable with high volatility of money flow shows 
significant associations with the two Herfindahl indices; (p=-0.337, p<0.01 for 
the fund based Herfindahl index, p=0.365, p<0.01 for the sector based 
Herfindahl index). This suggests that when a company expands its product range, 
it is likely to set up a unit trust, which is sorted into the fund sector with high 
volatility of money flow. 
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The association between the two high risk variables is also noteworthy. The 
correlation coefficient between the two variables is positive but insignificant. 
The closeness of relationship is 0.160. In an attempt to capture different 
dimensions of the corporate risk-taking activities, such a weak association 
between the two risk measures seems to justify the current approach with 
multiple measures. 
Independent Tests 
Notably, because such popular fund segments are grouped into the risky sector 
with a high fluctuation of return, it is difficult to identify distinctive patterns 
among the different ownership concerning their asset allocation (%) for the high 
risk sector. In this respect, the results of ANOVA in 4.4-a in Table 4.4 reinforces 
the weak distinction, showing that differences amongst the different ultimate 
ownership are likely to have arisen by sampling error (F=2.257, p=0.108). 
Nonetheless, a result of the Kruskal-Wallis test indicate chi-square is 11.02 at the 
significant level (p = 0.04), implying that the allocation of fund products differs 
across companies with different ultimate owners. 
Results in 4.4-c in Table 4.4 show that the differences among the alternative 
ownership groups are becoming apparent when the risk proxy is based on the 
fluctuation of money flow. The mean (41%) and median (33%) of the privately 
owned group are much higher than those of other two groups (mean = 26%, 
median = 15% for mutual, mean = 26%, median = 23% for quoted company 
ownership). 
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Of further note is the fact that the mutual owned group has the smallest asset 
proportion in the sectors with the high money flow ratio. This is consistent with 
the implication from the primary proposition: mutual institutions are more risk- 
averse than stock owned companies. Furthermore, results form ANOVA and a 
Kruskal-Wallis test in 4.4-c in Table 4.4 help ensure that significant differences 
exist among the ultimate ownership groups, providing F=5.124, p= 0.07 for 
ANOVA and chi-square = 7.29, p=0.026 for the Kruskal-Wallis test. 
Tests by Tobit model 
Models (1) and (2): Risk based on return volatili 
The Tobit regression analyses are employed so as to ensure that the results above 
are not driven by size and age effects of a company. Clearly, results in Table 4.6 
verify the preceding observations. The results of model (1) in Table 4.6 shows 
that the estimate model (1) is insignificant at the 5% level (p=0.064) and no 
coefficient is significant either. However, including variables that interact 
ownership class with the size of the company, model (2) increases the goodness- 
of-fit with a chi-square of 16.69 at the 1% significant level (p=0.01) as shown in 
model (2) in Table 4.6. 
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Table 4.6 Tobit regressions relating asset weights of risky sector to ownership 
type 
(risk is based on fund return volatility) 
The following tables present the results from Tobit regressions on the relationship 
between risk taking measures to ownership type. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
**, * represent the 5% and the 10% significant levels respectively. 
Assets in sectors with high volatility of returns 
Model 1 Model 2 
Without Interaction With Interaction 
Constant 0.848 (8.53)** 0.55 (3.17)** 
Log_Asset 
-0.017 (-0.53) 0.93 (1.45) 
Company Age 0.00 (0.35) 0.001 (0.65) 
Quoted Dummy 
-0.105 (-1.54) 0.175 (0.84) 
Private Dummy 0.06 (0.73) 0.66 (2.8)** 
(Asset)*(Quoted) 
-0.109 (-1.48) (Asset)*(Private) 
-0.255 (-2.76)** 
Censored <=0 3 3 
Censored >=1 25 25 
Log Likelihood 
-47.52 -43.61 
Chi^2 8.89 16.69 
Probability > Chi^2 0.064 0.01 
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.16 
Regression model (I ) 
Risk =a+ ßi (Log_Asset; ) + (32 (Company Age) 
+ ß3 (Quoted 
_Dummy) +P4 
(Private_Dummy) + Ej, 
Regression model (2) 
Risk =a+ (3, (Log_Assetj) (32 (Company Age) +P3 (Quoted 
_Dummy) + P4 (Private_Dummy) + (35 [(Log_Assett) x (Quoted 
_Dummy)] + (36 [(Log_Assets) x (Private_Dummy)] + ej, 
where 
Risk 
,; 
= Companyj's asset proportion invested in the risky sectors 
Log_Assetj = the logarithm of Companyj's total asset. 
Company Age = the number of years that the company has been established 
Quoted 
=1 if company j is owned by an exchange listed company, otherwise 0. 
Private =I if company j is owned by a privately owned company, otherwise 0. 
Log_Assetj x Quoted 
_Dummy 
= the interaction variable of the log asset with quoted ownership 
Log_Assetj x Private_Dummy = the interaction variable of the log asset with private ownership 
£j, = the random error term 
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Moreover, the coefficient of the dummy variable of the private ownership is 
positive (0.66) and significant (t= 2.8) and the interaction variable of the private 
ownership with the asset size is negative (-0.256) and significant (t= 
-2.76). This 
implies that in comparison with other ultimate ownership groups, unit trust 
management companies with private ownership are likely to have more fund 
assets invested in the sectors where the returns are highly fluctuating. By 
contrast, no significant difference is found between two other classes, i. e. mutual 
and quoted company ownership, indicating that hypothesis (1) is not supported. 
In short, the results provide mixed support to hypothesis (1) whereas verifying 
that companies with private ownership pursue high risk by managing relatively 
large assets with high return volatility. 
Models (3) and (4): Risk based on money flow 
When the risk taking proxy is defined as the asset proportion invested in sectors 
where the money flows are highly fluctuating, both models without (model 3) 
and with the interaction variables (model 4) are significant at the 5% level. 
Model (3) in Table 4.7 shows the results without the interaction variables, 
indicating a similar pattern to model (1). That is, the goodness-of-fit of the 
model is significant (p=0.012) and the coefficient of the privately owned group is 
positive (0.24) and significant (t= 2.61). Thus, fund assets of unit trust 
management companies with private ownership are invested in the sectors where 
the money flows are highly unstable. 
Significant and more interesting results from model (4) are also found in Table 
4.7. The coefficients of size and age of the company are positively related to the 
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asset proportion of the risky sector (size = 0.183, and age = 0.004). The former 
significant level is 5% (t= 2.26) whilst the latter is 10% (t= 1.76). This means 
that if the company's asset or the company's age increases, the company is likely 
to have more assets invested in funds where money flows are erratic. In other 
words, accumulating experience over time helps the company to expand their 
funds into the high-risk areas. 
More importantly, the coefficients associated with quoted and private company 
ownership are positive (0.917 and 1.07, respectively) and significant (t = 3.46, 
and t=3.86, respectively), providing evidence that companies with stock 
ownership are taking a higher risk than those with mutual ownership. 
Furthermore, the coefficients of the interaction variables are negative (-0.296 for 
quoted ownership and 
-0.327 for private ownership) and significant (t =-3.28 and 
t =-3.13, respectively), suggesting that stock owners' preference for the risky 
sectors decreases as their asset size increase. Viewed collectively, the evidence 
is consistent with the primary hypothesis that stock ownership companies take 
higher risks than their mutual ownership counterparts. 
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Table 4.7 Tobit regressions relating asset weights of risky sector to ownership 
type 
(risk is based on money flow volatility) 
The following tables present the results from Tobit regressions on the relationship 
between risk taking measures to ownership type. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
* *, * represent the 5% and the 10% significant levels respectively. 
Assets in sectors with high volatility of money flow 
Model 3 Model 4 
Without Interaction With Interaction 
Constant 0.247 (2.21)** 
-0.42 (-1.79)* 
Log_Asset 
-0.061 (-1.66)* 0.183 (2.26)** 
Company Age 0.003 (1.59) 0.004 (1.76)* 
Quoted Dummy 0.104 (1.37) 0.917 (3.46)** 
Private Dummy 0.24 (2.61)** 1.07 (3.86)** 
(Asset)* (Quoted) 
-0.296 (-3.28)** (Asset)*(Private) 
-0.327 (-3.13)** 
Censored <=0 26 26 
Censored >=1 7 7 
Log Likelihood 
-65.2 -58.51 
Chi^2 12.74 26.11 
Probability > Chi^2 0.012 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.0089 0.182 
Regression model (3) 
Risk =a+ (3, (Log_Assetj) + ß2 (Company Age) 
+ 13 (Quoted 
_Dummy) + 
ß4 (Private_Dummy) + E), 
Regression model (4) 
Risk =a+ X31 (Log_Assetj) 02 (Company Age) + 03 (Quoted 
_Dummy) 
+ 
(34 (Private_Dummy) + ß5 [(Log_Assets) x (Quoted 
_Dummy)] + ß6 [(Log_Assetj) x (Private_Dummy)] + Ej, 
where 
Risk,, = Companyj's asset proportion invested in the risky sectors 
Log Asse; = the logarithm of Companyj's total asset. 
Company Age = the number of years that the company has been established 
Quoted =I if company j is owned by an exchange listed company, otherwise 0. 
Private =I if company j is owned by a privately owned company, otherwise 0. 
Log Assets x Quoted 
_Dummy = 
the interaction variable of the log asset with quoted 
ownership 
Log Asse; x Private_Dummy = the interaction variable of the log asset with private 
ownership 
F; = the random error term 
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4.4.3 Testing Hypothesis (2): Line of business specialisation 
Table 4.8 depicts popular fund sectors by the different ultimate ownership 
groups, 1 showing distributions of sample companies offering funds across the 32 
sectors. Similar to Table 4.3,120 unit trust management companies or 84% of 
the sample companies have fund assets categorised into the UK all companies 
sector. However, as hypothesis (2) predicts, there seem to be variations in fund 
product allocation across the three ultimate ownership groups. For example, 
Global Equity and Bond funds are offered by 12 companies (13%) of the sample 
companies with the quoted company ownership and 5 companies (16%) of the 
sample companies. with the private ownership. In contrast to these stock owned 
groups, no unit trust management companies owned by mutual institutions offer 
the Global Equity and Bond sector fund. These variations appear to support 
hypothesis (2) of the line of business specialisation. 
In order to gain further insight, Table 4.9 shows results for both ANOVA and 
Kruskal and Wallis tests. The ANOVA results indicate that asset proportions of 
fund sector 2,8,13 and 15 over the total asset size are significantly different 
among mutual, quoted and private ownership groups. In the same way, the 
results of Kruskal and Wallis tests indicate that the asset fractions of sector 
2,3,4,5,8, and 20 exhibit significant variations among the three ultimate 
ownership groups. 
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Table 4.9 Asset differences across 32 fund sector. 
Asset weight for an individual sector is measured by the fraction (%) of each ownership group's 
asset invested in the individual sector. Significance of differences is accessed using a F-test for 
means and the non-parametric Kruskal Wallis ranks test. 
Sector I Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.33 0.43 0.32 0.29 1.715 0.184 5 431 007 
Std. Deviation 031 0,32 0.27 0.38 
Median 0.25 0.34 0.27 0.10 
Sector 2 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.07 0.02 0.10 0.00 12.218 0.00 33.548 0.00 
Std. Deviation 0.12 0.03 0.14 0.01 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 
Sector 3 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig, Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.05 0.02 0.06 0 05 1.085 0.341 7.36 0.03 
Std. Deviation 0.111 0.05 0.13 0.11 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Sector 4 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.02 2 513 0.085 16.405 0.00 
Std. Deviation 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.05 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Sector 5 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.013 0.366 7.759 0,02 
Std Deviation 0.10 1 0.00 0.13 0,01 
Median 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sector 6 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.226 0.297 1.191 0.55 
Std. Deviation 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sector 7 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.841 0.433 1.029 0.60 
Std. Deviation 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.04 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sector 8 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 6.386 0.002 6.944 0.03 
Std. Deviation 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.00 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sector 9 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.627 0.536 2.058 0.36 
Std. Deviation 0.10 0.20 0.07 0.05 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sector 10 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.03 1.812 0.167 3314 0.19 
Std Deviation 0.14 0.24 0.11 0.11 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sector 11 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.163 0.316 2.929 0.23 
Std. Deviation 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sector 12 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.573 0.211 2.775 0.25 
Std Deviation 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sector 13 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.14 0.13 0.10 0 27 6.4 0.002 5.696 0.06 
Std. Deviation 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.33 
Median 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.16 
Sector 14 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.416 0.661 0.271 0.87 
Std Deviation 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.07 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sector 15 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.020.00 0.00 0.09 7.454 0.001 4.254 0.12 
Std. Deviation 0 12 0.00 0.01 0.24 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sector 16 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.953 0.388 3.397 0.18 
Sid Deviation 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.10 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
sector 1 UK All Companies 
sector 2 UK Equity Income 
sector 3 UK Smaller Companies 
sector 4 UK General Bonds 
sector 5 UK Gilt 
sector 6 UK Equity & Bond 
sector 7 UK Equity & Bond Incom 
sector 8 UK Specialist 
sector 9 Active Managed 
sector 10 Balanced Managed 
sector 11 Cautious Managed 
sector 12 Managed Income 
sector 13 Global Growth 
sector 14 Global Equity Income 
sector 15 Global Equity & Bond 
sector 16 Global Bonds 
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Table 4.9 (continued) Asset differences across 32 fund sector. 
Asset weight for an individual sector is measured by the fraction (%) of each ownership group's 
asset invested in the individual sector. Significance of differences is accessed using a F-test for 
means and the non-parametric Kruskal Wallis ranks test. 
Sector 17 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.00 0001 0.00 0.00 0.888 0 414 5 47 0.07 
Std. Deviation 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sector 18 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 2.637 0.075 2.348 0.31 
Std Deviation 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sector 19 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 1.457 0,236 1.121 0.57 
Std. Deviation 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.03 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sector 20 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.04 2.297 0.104 8.315 0.02 
Std. Deviation 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 
Median 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00 
Sector 21 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig, Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.026 0.974 0.946 0.62 
Std, Deviation 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sector 22 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.092 0.338 2.407 0.30 
Std. Deviation 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sector 23 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.02 0.01 002 0.02 0.644 0.527 6.428 0.04 
Std. Deviation 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.06 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sector 24 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.328 0.721 1.05 0.59 
Std. Deviation 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sector 25 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.798 0.452 1.137 0.57 
Std. Deviation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sector 26 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.02 0.01 0102 0.03 1.433 0.242 4.139 0.13 
Std. Deviation 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.08 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Sector 27 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.449 0.238 4.729 0.09 
Std. Deviation 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sector 28 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 1.288 0.279 5.686 0.06 
Std Deviation 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 
Sector 29 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.997 0.372 3.278 0.19 
Std. Deviation 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sector 30 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig, 
Mean 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.594 0.553 2.664 0.26 
Std. Deviation 0.05 0.02 0 06 0.00 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sector 31 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.313 0.732 0.632 0.73 
Std. Deviation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sector 32 Total Mutual Quoted Private ANOVA (F value) Sig. Kruskal Wallis Sig. 
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.535 0.587 1.924 0.38 
Std. Deviation 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.001 , 0.00 
sector 17 UK Money Market 
sector 18 Global Emerging 
sector 19 Global Specialist 
sector 20 Europe Ex. UK 
sector 21 Europe Inc-UK 
sector 22 European Specialist 
sector 23 Far East Exc. Japan 
sector 24 Far East Inc Japan 
sector 25 F? r East Specialist 
sector 26 Japan 
sector 27 Japanese Specialist 
sector 28 North America 
sector 29 N-America Specialist 
sector 30 Guaranteed Funds 
sector 31 Index Bear Funds 
sector 32 Property 
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In particular, both the statistical analyses agree that the asset weights of sector 2. 
UK Equity Income and sector 8, UK Specialists show noticeable differences by 
ultimate ownership type. A close inspection reveals that companies owned by 
quoted company groups show a higher preference for sector 2 (mean 10% and 
median 5%) than companies owned by mutuals (mean 2%, median 0%) and by 
private owners (mean 0% and median 0%). With regard to sector 8 where a 
number of ethical funds are present1°, mutual owned companies show their 
higher preference for the fund sector (mean 2%, median 0%) than those of the 
two counterparts. 
The above analysis provides evidence that companies with different ultimate 
ownership have favoured certain sectors of unit trusts, supporting hypothesis 
(H2). At this stage, it may be interesting to consider why some fund sectors are 
preferable for a certain ownership type, by examining the nature of the fund 
sectors from the risk-taking perspective. For this reason, Tables 4.1 (1-a) and (1- 
b) provide two dimensions of risk, sectors' return and sectors' money flow 
fluctuation. Nonetheless, it is difficult to identify any particular characteristics 
derived from Table 4.1 (1-a) as the difference of returns between fund sectors 2 
and 8 is marginal. In addition, the money flow ratio of sector 8 is not available 
due to the fact that the sector 8 is rather new branched off from the U. K equity 
category. 
10 A list of unit trusts in this sector is presented in Appendix 4. b. 
203 
4.4.4 Testing Hypothesis (3): Line of business concentration 
Independent tests 
As a proxy for the business concentration or the business diversification in 
reverse, the test of hypothesis (H3) requires the Herfindahl indices based on (i) 
number of unit trusts and on (ii) number of fund sectors which an individual 
company offers. Table 4.10 summarises, by ultimate ownership category, the 
Herfindahl indices per company. In panel 10-a, the means (=3678) and the 
medians (=2358) show that overall the unit trust companies have diversified 
product mixes. Specifically, unit trust management companies with the quoted 
company ownership have the lower Herfindahl indices (mean =2952, median = 
2006 for the unit trust based Herfindahl index, mean =3567, median =2731, for 
the fund sector based Herfindahl index). To provide additional evidence, 
significance of the differences among the ultimate ownership groups is assessed 
with a F-statistics and the non parametric Kruskal Wallis test. The results in 
Table 4.11 confirm that the difference of the business concentration is significant 
at the 1% level. For the unit trust based Herfindahl index, and the fund sector 
based Herfindahl index, F values are 7.1, and 6.4, chi-square are 9.6 and 10.1 
respectively. Hence, the product concentration differs by ultimate ownership. 
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Table 4.10 Herfindahl Index (A measure of the level of concentration) 
Based on the sample companies at year end 1999, the tables below present the risk 
measures based on the Herfindahi index 
Two Herfindahl indices are measured for each company in terms of (10-a, b) number of individual unit trusts and (10-c, d) number of fund categories 
The Herfindahl index is obtained by squaring the asset weight of the various unit trusts (sectors), and then summing those squares. That is defined as 
H= E (m; k)2 x 10,000 where mj k is the percentage holding of J'" unit trust (fund sector) for company k 
A single unit trust / fund sector would take the value of 10,000. 
Herfindahl index based on number of unit trusts 
10-a: Descriptive Statistics 
Mutual 
n= 24 
Quoted 
n= 87 
Private 
n= 31 
Total 
N= 142 
Mean 4,697 2,952 4,927 3,678 
Median 4,189 2,006 3,795 2,358 
Std. Deviation 3,282 2,443 3,668 3,017 
Minimum 972 564 467 467 
Maximum 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 
10-b: Distribution Mutual Quoted Private Total 
1-1999 Least Concentrated 7 43 9 59 
2000-3999 5 27 8 40 
4000-5999 4 6 3 13 
6000-7999 3 4 2 9 
8000-10000 Most Concentrated 5 7 9 21 
Number of Companies 
Herfindahl index based on number of categories 
24 87 31 142 
10-c: Descriptive Statistics Mutual Quoted Private Total 
Mean 5,036 3,567 5,467 4,230 
Median 4,493 2,732 5,012 3,111 
Std. Deviation 3,033 2,452 3,444 2,900 
Minimum 1,434 1,130 1,276 1,130 
Maximum 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 
10-d: Distribution Mutual Quoted Private Total 
1-1999 Least Concentrated 3 31 8 42 
2000-3999 9 32 7 48 
4000-5999 3 10 3 16 
6000-7999 4 6 3 13 
8000-10000 Most Concentrated 5 8 10 23 
Number of Companies 24 87 31 142 
Data Source: FT Unit Trust & OEICs Year book (year 2000/2001) 
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Table 4.11 Mean Tests for two Herfindahl Indices (A measure of the level of 
concentration in funds/fund sectors) 
The null hypothesis is that all ownership types means are equal in terms of 
Herfindahl index 
(11-a) based on the number of funds which a company offers 
(11-b) based on the number of fund sectors which a company offers 
11-a: Herfindahi index based on number of unit trusts F value Chi-Square Significance 
ANOVA 7.109 0.001 
Kruskal Wallis Test 9.661 0.008 
11-b: Herfindahl index based on number of fund categories F value Chi-Square Significance 
ANOVA 6.487 0.002 
Kruskal Wallis Test 10.134 0.006 
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Tests by Tobit model 
To control factors that might affect the ownership-risk-relationship, this study 
estimates the Tobit regressions. The model attempts to relate the score of the 
Herfindahl index to the ownership category as well as to other factors such as 
size and age of the company. Furthermore, by exploiting the potential size effect 
of the company on their risk-taking, model 2 includes the interaction variables. 
i. e. (company size) x (the ownership dummy variable). 
Table 4.12 shows the regression results, confirming the higher diversified 
product mixes of the quoted company ownership. The coefficient on the dummy 
variable denoting the quoted company ownership is negative (-1263) and 
significant (t=-2.18). Similarly, the coefficient of the privately owned group is 
also negative (-919) but insignificant (t=-1.32). Nonetheless, when the 
interaction variables are added in model (2), no new evidence emerges as the 
coefficients of the interaction variables are insignificant whereas the quoted 
company ownership dummy variable is 
-3,330.5 and significant at the 10% level 
(t=-1.78). Hence, the concentration hypothesis (H3) is supported to the extent 
that compared with the quoted company ownership, the number of funds is 
smaller in mutual ownership. 
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Table 4.12 Tobit regressions relating diversification to ownership type 
The following tables present the results from Tobit regressions on the relationship 
between diversification to ownership type. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. **, 
* represent the 5% and the 10% significant levels respectively. 
Herfindahl Index based on number of unit trusts 
Model 1 Model 2 
Without Interaction With Interaction 
Constant 10939.28 (t=12.8)** 12023 (t=7.54)** 
Log_Asset 
-2165 (t=-7.54)** -2588.4 (t=-4.47)** 
Company Age 
-29.75 (t=-1.6) -27.0 (t=-1.45) 
Quoted Dummy 
-1263 (t=-2.18)** -3330.5 (t=-1.78)* 
Private Dummy 
-919.84 (t=-1.32) -949.63 (t=-0.48) 
(Asset)*(Quoted) 749 (t=1.14) 
(Asset)*(Private) 
-99 (t=-0.13) 
Censored >=10000 17 17 
Log Likelihood 
-1173 -1171.7 
Chi^2 86.12 88.57 
Probability > Chi^2 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.0354 0.0364 
Regression model (1) 
H-Index,; =a+ (31 (Log_Assetj) + P2 (Company Age) 
+ (33 (Quoted 
_Dummy) + 
(34 (Private_Dummy) + Ej 
Regression model (2) 
H_index 
,; =a+ 
01 (Log_Asset; ) ß2 (Company Age) +P3 (Quoted 
_Dummy) + (34 (Private_Dummy) +P5 [(Log_Assett) x (Quoted 
_Dummy)] 
+ (36 [(Log_Assetj) x (Private_Dummy)] + Ej, 
where 
H_index = Companyj's Herfindahl Index based on funds / sectors 
Log_Assett = the logarithm of Companyj's total asset. 
Company Age = the number of years that the company has been established 
Quoted =I if company j is owned by an exchange listed company, otherwise 0. 
Private =I if company j is owned by a privately owned company, otherwise 0. 
Log_Assetj x Quoted 
_Dummy 
= the interaction variable of the log asset with quoted 
ownership 
Log_Assetj x Private_Dummy = the interaction variable of the log asset with private 
ownership 
c/, = the random error term 
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Models (3) and (4) in Table 4.13 test whether the product diversification defined 
by the fund sector segments differs across the three ultimate ownership groups. 
The results indicate that there is a less significant linkage between the ownership 
types and their product diversification after controlling the size effect, as the 
coefficient of the quoted ownership is negative (-1003) and significant at the 
10% level (t=-1.8). 
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Table 4.13 Tobit regressions relating diversification to ownership type 
The following tables present the results from Tobit regressions on the relationship 
between diversification to ownership type. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. **, 
* represent the 5% and the 10% significant levels respectively. 
Herfindahl Index based on numberof fund categories 
Model 3 Model 4 
Without Interaction With Interaction 
Constant 11094.17 (t=13.43)** 11822.29 (t=7.7)** 
Log_Asset 
-2101 (t=-7.57)** -2390.9 (t= -4.29)** 
Company Age 
-28.5 (t=-1.59) -25.72 (t= -1.43) 
Quoted Dummy 
-1003.97 (t=-1.8)* -2617.05 (t= -1.45) 
Private Dummy 
-671.12 (t=-0.99) -264.41 (t= -0.14) 
(Asset)*(Quoted) 581.28 (t=0.92) 
(Asset)*(Private) t= 
-0.36) -271.09( 
Censored >=10000 17 17 
Log Likelihood 
-1167.5 -1166.39 
Chi^2 85.9 88.14 
Probability > Chi^2 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.0355 0.0364 
Regression model (3) 
H-Index =a+ (3, (Log_Assets) + (32 (Company Age) 
+ ß3 (Quoted 
_Dummy) 
+ (34 (Private_Dummy) + ei. 
Regression model (4) 
H_index =a+ (3i (Log_Assetj) P2 (Company Age) + ß3 (Quoted 
_Dummy) 
+ 
(34 (Private_Dummy) + ßs [(Log_Assetj) x (Quoted 
_Dummy)] 
+ 06 [(Log_Assetj) x (Private_Dummy)] + Ej. 
where 
H_index,; = Companyj's Herfindahl Index based on funds / sectors 
Log_Assetj = the logarithm of Companyj's total asset. 
Company Age = the number of years that the company has been established 
Quoted =I if company j is owned by an exchange listed company, otherwise 0. 
Private =I if company j is owned by a privately owned company, otherwise 0. 
Log Assets x Quoted 
_Dummy 
= the interaction variable of the log asset with quoted 
ownership 
Log_Assetj x Private_Dummy = the interaction variable of the log asset with private 
ownership 
ýj, = the random error term 
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Overall, the evidence in Tables 4.12 and 13 suggest that the hypothesis of the 
line of business concentration is partially supported when the concentration is 
measured by the Herfindahl index on the basis of the number of funds. However, 
such an association is weak when the Herfindahl index on the basis of the 
number of fund categories is used as the concentration proxy. 
A recent research by Massa (2003) provides a potential explanation for these 
observations. According to Massa, the proliferation strategy for the fund 
management company can be made in two ways. The first fund proliferation 
strategy is based on the number of funds being offered by the company. The 
second proliferation strategy is based on the number of fund categories in which 
the company is simultaneously operating. Borrowing Massa's notion on the 
proliferation strategy, it can be said that the three types of organisational forms 
differ in terms of the first proliferation strategy but not in terms of the second 
proliferation strategy. Given the observations, the company's implicit 
assumption behind the strategy may be that investors are paying more attention 
to the fund specific characteristics such as performance to the category to which 
the fund belongs. 
What is more, the difference exists between mutual and quoted ownership but 
there is no clear distinction between mutual and private owned companies. This 
is a far removed from what was expected, indicating the current method is 
limited for further analysis. In this regard, factor analysis can be a useful tool for 
this purpose as the factor analysis can identify factors underlying a set of 
variables, e. g. fund categories (Kachigan, 1991). By clustering a large number of 
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variables such as return variance, money flow variance, fees, total size, and the 
number of accounts into a few number of homogeneous sets and creating a new 
variable, e. g. a factor. Then, it is possible to distinguish one fund category from 
others. Nevertheless, such factor analysis is not feasible for the current analysis 
because sector 8 is rather a new category so that sufficient data for computing the 
money flow ratio is not available. 
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4.5 Summary and Conclusion 
The ultimate ownership effect has not been investigated in the UK unit trust 
industry to the same degree as in the insurance and banking industries. This 
chapter employs agency paradigm to examine hypotheses regarding the risk 
taking behaviour of mutual versus stock owned companies in the UK unit trust 
industry. The theoretical argument exploits various mechanisms to control 
conflicts of interest between owners and managers. In an attempt to identify 
such control mechanisms, prior studies presented empirical results using various 
risk-taking measures. In this light, focusing on a set of unit trusts that a company 
offers, this chapter analyses assets invested in high risk fund categories (HI), the 
line of business specialisation (H2), and the line of business concentration (H3) 
. 
The risk-taking hypothesis (Hl) is supported but subject to the choice of a risk 
proxy. When the risk is measured by stability of money flows into a fund 
category, companies with stock ownership have more assets in such risky 
categories than the comparable mutual group. Hence, the finding is consistent 
with hypothesis (1). One possible interpretation of the above finding above is 
that stock owned companies are taking more business risk, which is represented 
by money flow instability. 
Interestingly, when the risk is defined as asset proportions for sectors with high 
volatility of return, there is no difference between mutual and quoted ownership 
group but the private ownership group has more unit trusts categorised into the 
high risk sector than the former two groups. The private owned company's 
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propensity for unit trusts with higher risk can be explained by their unique 
characteristics. According to Megginson (1997), the private company is 
characterised by non-alienable shares, a very tight ownership structure 
consisting of a relative handful of major shareholders (Megginson, 1997, p59). 
Given these characteristics, Megginson points out that the comparative 
advantages of the private company lie in "principally focus, flexibility, and unity 
of will" (p. 60). It can be said that because of the tight ownership structure, 
important decision making can be made and executed quickly by managers who 
have significant ownership stakes in the company. If this is the case, there is no 
doubt that such a quick decision making and implementation is beneficial in 
investing high risk equity markets where shares change rapidly and constantly 
and the liquidity of shares is limited. Another possible explanation is that 
because the private companies are relatively small in general, they almost have to 
adopt a niche strategy, developing a contestable expertise in the industry. To 
sum up, the results partially support the risk-taking hypothesis (HI) and the 
support is not overwhelming and subject to the risk proxy. 
As for hypothesis (H2), the independent tests for the business specialisation (H2) 
confirm some differences across mutual, quoted and private ownership groups. 
For example, on average, unit trust management companies owned by quoted 
companies show a relatively strong preference for UK Equity Income sector 
whilst mutual owned unit trust management companies have more assets in the 
UK Specialists sector than the other two ownership groups. 
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Regarding the hypothesis of business concentration (H3) where the degree of 
concentration was based on the number of different funds per company, unit trust 
companies with quoted company ownership have a more diversified product set 
than the other two ownership types. Nonetheless, such a pattern is not found 
when the magnitude of concentration is based on the number of fund sectors per 
company. Thus, the line of business concentration is also partially supported, 
depending on the way of measuring the concentration. It is possible to argue that 
the way of diversification that the quoted company group pursues is to increase 
the number of funds, but it is not necessary to spread new funds across different 
fund segments. 
By testing the three hypotheses empirically, Chapter IV has explored the 
relationship between ownership and risk-taking. In accordance with agency 
paradigm, the overall evidence indicate that companies with different ultimate 
ownership behave differently in terms of risk-taking activities. However, this 
depends on the choice of risk proxies, affecting the relationship between 
ownership and risk-taking. 
Shifting the focus from risk-taking to the performance of unit trust management 
companies, Chapter V investigates the efficiency - ultimate ownership 
connection in the UK unit trust industry. 
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Chapter V 
Analysis of Corporate Efficiency 
5.1 Introduction 
As corporate risk-taking is a critical factor to company performance (Bromiley, 
1991), the previous chapter explored the relationship between ultimate 
organisational form and risk-taking of UK unit trust management companies. 
Chapter V continues the line of enquiry into effects of organisational form, by 
shifting the focus from risk-taking to performance of unit trust management 
companies. The ultimate goal of this chapter is to compare performance of 
companies with mutual ownership and those with proprietary ownership. 
In order to achieve this task, there is one question to be answered; how 
"performance" of unit trust management companies is defined and measured? 
As "measuring firm performance has been a major challenge for researchers 
(Mingfang and Simerly, 1998, p173)", a formation of performance variable is 
crucial but also difficult. For this ground, a substantial part of this chapter has 
addressed such variable formations and models with the variables. 
The plan of Chapter V is as follows: Section 5.2 begins with a review of existing 
literature on performance-ownership relationship, leading to a central hypothesis 
in section 5.3. Section 5.4 highlights measurement issues. The emphasis in the 
section is on variable formation of performance. Section 5.5 introduces a model 
development of a multiple stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
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accompanied with Tobit regression, whilst addressing key model design issues. 
Section 5.6 provides detailed sample data. Finally, section 5.7 brings together 
the key empirical results found in the preceding research methods. 
5.2 Literature Review 
In Chapter II agency studies such as Jensen and Meckling (1976) began with the 
premise that owners and managers have divergent interests. Based on such an 
assumption, the authors demonstrated that because ownership and control in 
modern corporations is separated, it is inevitable to see agency problems between 
the owners and the managers of a company. Observed as an example of the 
opportunistic behaviours of managers, typical agency problems include 
managers' lower effort levels, value-reducing growth or diversification 
strategies, and excess consumption of fringe benefits. Undoubtedly, such 
behaviour leads to lower operating efficiency, resulting in a reduction of the 
company's performance. 
Based on the agency perspective, a number of researchers have studied corporate 
performance. The recurring area of research is the relationship between 
corporate performance as an indicator of underlying agency problems and 
potential control mechanisms for the agency problems. A typical controlling 
mechanism is the concentration of ownership, managerial ownership, and large 
shareholders' effect. By reviewing early literature that addresses these control 
mechanisms, the following literature section attempts to establish a few 
hypotheses regarding the performance-ownership relationship. 
217 
5.2.1 Concentration of ownership 
In general, the financial literature distinguishes companies with stocks that are 
closely held, i. e. concentrated ownership, from those stocks that are widely held, 
i. e. dispersed ownership (Chaganti and Damanpour, 1991). In this respect, an 
early study pointed out that the diffusion of ownership is to weaken the owners' 
control over professional managers (Berle and Means, 1932), to the extent that 
ownership concentration represents the power of shareholders (Thomsen and 
Pedersen, 2000). The above notion suggests that the more concentrated 
ownership a company has, the smaller agency problems the company faces. To 
follow this logic, a positive relationship should be expected between the 
concentration of ownership and performance of a company. 
However, opinions vary as to the positive association between concentration of 
ownership and performance of company. Demsetz (1983), for example, states 
that ownership structure is an endogenous outcome of competitive selection in 
which various cost advantages and disadvantages are balanced to arrive at an 
equilibrium organisation of the firm (Demsetz, 1983, page 384). From a slightly 
different angle, Leech and Leahy (1991) also argue that higher concentration of 
ownership indicates less shares available in the market, resulting in weak market 
based disciplines over managers of the company. Hence, the debate becomes an 
empirical question. 
On the empirical side, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) estimated a linear relationship 
between ownership concentration and accounting based performance of 
company. Their sample data consisted of 511 U. S companies in 1980. After 
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controlling the firm size, business uncertainty' and regulated industries2, the 
authors found no positive correlation between concentration of ownership and 
performance of company. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) and Leech and Leahy 
(1991) also report the similar observations that concentration of ownership dose 
not automatically award superior performance of company. Given the no 
significant relationship between ownership concentration and company 
performance, a simple numerical measure of ownership concentration may be 
naive. The problem is that early analyses of the concentration effect gave no 
consideration to elements of ownership concentration, e. g. the identity of owners. 
In order to fill the void, the following review of literature examines the 
managerial ownership effect (section 5.2.2) and the large block-holders' effect on 
corporate performance (section 5.2.3). 
5.2.2 Expense preference hypothesis 
The line of ownership concentration is extended to the control over managers' 
rent-seeking behaviour. The argument is that managers who are not the owners 
or shareholders of their company pursue strategies that increase their personal 
benefits at the expense of the company's owners (Williamson 1963). Viewed 
from the conflict of interests between owners and managers, it is often argued 
that mutual organisations pose serious control problems over such owner- 
manager conflicts because mechanisms for controlling owner-manager conflicts 
are less available or more costly in mutual organisations than in market listed 
companies (Fraser and Zardkoohi, 1996; Cummins et al, 1999). As for the 
I Instability of a company environment is computed by the non-systematic risk of the company's stock 
2 Dummy variables are used for a regulated utility, regulated financial institution, or media company. 
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market listed companies such mechanisms refer to the market for corporate 
control. The examples are mergers, tender offers, leverage buy-outs, proxy 
offerings and voting rights. Except the voting for de-mutualisation, subsequent 
to the merger and acquisition deal, none of these mechanisms is present for the 
mutual organisations. This means that mutual policy holders and mutual 
depositors can not easily dismiss manager nor can they compensate them for 
acting in the owners' interests by providing ownership e. g. stock options. As a 
result of the relatively weak control mechanisms in the mutual organisations, it is 
argued that the mutual organisations are likely to suffer more from the manager's 
rent-seeking behaviour than the quoted company counterparts. 
5.2.3 Managerial ownership effect 
Arguably, the most direct method to mitigate the agency problem is to provide 
the manager with a share of the company (Byrd, et al 1998). Through acquiring 
some of the company's shares, the managers are becoming "insider" or 
"managerial" owners. As a result, the managers' interests are more closely 
aligned to those of the owners. This "convergence-of-interest" hypothesis 
suggests that ceteris paribus, managers' incentives to maximise owners' wealth 
increase as the managers' shareholdings increase. As the hypothesis predicts, a 
number of empirical studies present a positive relationship between managerial 
ownership and company performance. 
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Nonetheless, as the following research found, the relationship is non- 
monotonous. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) analysed the linkage between 
Tobin's Q3 and managerial holdings, using a sample of 371 companies from the 
U. S Fortune500 group. Morck et al regressed Tobin's Q on the three 
explanatory variables of managerial ownership, depending on the degree of the 
managerial ownership level; (i) less than 5%, (ii) between 5-25% and (iii) over 
25% of the managerial ownership concentration. The results of their piecewise 
regression show that coefficients of (i) and (iii) are positive whilst a coefficient 
of (ii) is negative. The results suggest that as the managers' holdings reach a 
certain degree the managerial ownership can adversely affect corporate 
performance, possibly because managers with large shareholdings become more 
risk averse. In a similar study, McConnell and Servaes (1990) provide evidence 
with substantially large sample data consisting of more than 1000 U. S 
corporations for 1976 and for 1986. The authors found that Tobin's Q increases 
with managerial ownership up to 40% of the total outstanding shares and 
decreases after that. 
The explanation for the non-linear association is that as managers' shareholdings 
become large enough to secure their positions, the managers become entrenched, 
allowing them more freedom to pursue non-value-maximising activities. This 
refers to the entrenchment hypothesis. The results of the empirical studies noted 
above appear to support the hypothesis. 
3 Tobin's Q is the ratio of the market value of the stock to the replacement value of the company's assets. 
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5.2.4 Large shareholder effect 
By extending the notion of concentration of ownership further, the existing 
literature suggest that corporate performance may be related to large ownership 
groups, like institutional investors and corporate or individual block 
shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that the presence of large 
shareholders should increase the likelihood of monitoring, which should 
subsequently decrease agency costs and increase the company value. There are a 
number of ways in which block shareholders can bring significant pressure on 
managerial decisions. These include negotiating with management, exercising a 
proxy contest, and participating in the choice of board members. 
There are a number of reasons that account for the positive impact of the block 
holders on corporate performance. Firstly, as benefits brought by monitoring 
actions are shared amongst all shareholders on a pro rata basis, a large block 
holder gains a large proportion of the benefits whereas owners with small 
shareholdings gain more than their fair shares of the benefit at little or no cost. 
The latter is referred to as the "free riders". As small shareholders have little 
incentive to monitor their company, this becomes a serious problem for a 
company with such dispersed ownership, leading to decreased efficiency. In this 
respect, it is argued that block holder ownership such as institutional investors 
provides a partial solution to the free-rider problem, by enhancing their own 
monitoring activities (Gillan and Starks, 2000). Secondly, block holders are 
often professional investors such as pension fund managers. These professional 
shareholders are believed to have special capabilities in evaluating business 
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activities. In this light, their costs of analysing management proposals are less 
than those of ordinary shareholders. Finally, in recent years large shareholder 
activism has occurred. For instance, Gillan and Starks (2000) reported that there 
were 2042 proposals by large shareholders over the period of 1987-1994 in the 
U. S. Possible backgrounds of the shareholder activism are (i) market controls 
such as hostile take-overs become rare whilst large investors are encouraged by 
their regulatory bodies to be active on behalf of their clients4 (The Economist, 
1992; Solomon and Solomon, 1999). (ii) Selling large shareholdings without 
creating downward price pressure is difficult (Byrd et al 1998), (iii) As passive 
investment becomes popular, institutions following an index investment strategy 
are locking their large shareholdings into long-term stakes. (The Economist, 
1992). The latter two situations in particular drive institutional investors to look 
for a vote, rather than to "disinvest". This issue is taken up in the next section. 
4 The Cadbury Report of the U. K explained that institutional investors should use their voting rights to 
effect changes, rather than to exit. The Security Exchange Committee in the U. S encourages useful contacts 
between managers and shareholders ( "Arise, the Active Shareholder" The Economist, Jul), 4.1992). 
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Empirical evidence of the relationship between block-holders and performance 
of company is mixed. McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a positive linkage 
between Tobin's Q ratio and institutional ownership, but no significant 
relationship between Tobin's Q and undifferentiated block holders. Certainly, 
their results indicate the importance of the identity of large block holders. 
Mikkelson and Ruback (1991) posit that, as a proxy of corporate performance, 
the stock price increases as a response to the accumulation of shares and the 
announcement of block holdings. Consistent with the findings of Mikkelson and 
Ruback, Shome and Singh (1995) report positive stock price reactions to block 
investments made by corporate and institutional investment shareholders. 
Nonetheless, the authors find weak evidence, of the monitoring on a daily 
operational level on the ground that, changes in a company's cash flow and 
capital expenditure do not differ between companies with and without block 
holdings. 
Overall, in analysing the impact of ownership on corporate performance, the 
existing literature suggests that not only the degree of ownership concentration 
but also the type of ownership are important. However, there is mixed evidence 
on the question of whether various owners and their concentration levels can be 
effective as a disciplining mechanism. 
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5.3 Building Hypotheses 
5.3.1 Hypothesized effects of the severe free rider problem 
These arguments help distinguish characteristics of ultimate ownership used in 
the present research. Namely, from the standpoint of the concentration of 
ownership, mutual institutions and quoted companies fall under the dispersed 
ownership category whereas privately owned companies belong to the 
concentrated ownership group. It is important to recall the idea of the 
ownership-control literature by Berle and Means (1932) and more recently by 
Jensen (1989), who note that if ownership is widely dispersed, there is no 
individual (or group) with either voting power or indeed the incentive to exercise 
control in order to pursue profit maximisation. As a result, professional 
managers, rather than the owners, have effective power to influence the owners 
operating more at arms length. 
Conversely, as briefly reviewed in the prior section, there are conflicting 
arguments as to the relationship between ownership concentration and company 
performance. Demsetz (1983) predicts no significant relationship between 
ownership concentration and performance of company because the positive and 
negative effects of the ownership concentration will usually balance out. 
Leech and Leahy (1991) suggest a negative relationship between degree of 
ownership concentration and company performance. Given the academic debate 
and results of empirical research, it is not straightforward to establish the 
hypothesis. Nonetheless, focusing on the weak incentive of a large number of 
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small shareholders as a consequence of dispersed ownership, it seems plausible 
that mutual institutions are less likely to be subject to owner-pressure than other 
organisational forms. The rationale is that each owner, e. g. account holder or 
policyholder, holds only a small percentage of ownership of their mutual 
institution. Moreover, such mutual institutions do not have any block 
shareholders with sufficiently strong incentives to monitor the management of 
the mutual organisation. In other words, no one in the mutual organisation has a 
sufficient interest to bear the costs of maintaining and increasing the value of 
their mutual institution. Therefore, the primary hypothesis regarding the 
ownership-performance relationship is: Performance of unit trust management 
companies owned by stock companies is better than that of those owned by 
mutual institutions. 
5.3.2 Hypothesized effects of institutional investors 
As for the type of ultimate owners, this analysis assumes that the identity of large 
block holders is of importance, drawing on a few recent works such as Porta et al 
(1999), Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) and Gillan and Starks (2000). These 
authors emphasise that a lot of large owners such as pension funds, banks, 
corporations and governments work as agents for their ultimate owners and that 
objective and risk preference differ among a set of categories of final owners. In 
this account, one should bear in mind that mutual institutions have no large block 
holders due to the fact that owners of mutual institutions are individuals who use 
their mutual institution's services like insurance, savings and mortgages. By 
contrast, shareholders of market-listed companies are not only individuals but 
also large block holders such as institutional investors and other corporations. 
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Similarly, shareholders of privately owned companies consist of large block 
holders. However, in contrast to those of quoted companies, large block holders 
in private owned companies are often entrepreneur or founding families5. 
Following Thomsen and Pederson's classification, large block holders are sorted 
into several groups, e. g. institutional investors, family owners, and non-financial 
corporate owners. 
Institutional investors 
Institutional investors refer to public and private pension funds, collective 
investment schemes like mutual funds in the U. S and unit trusts in the U. K, and 
foundations such as university endowments. Their corporate governance 
activism is a matter of both law and economics. 
On the legal side, the institutional investors have fiduciary duty because money 
invested by the institutional investors is ultimately "other peoples' money. " 
(Parthiban and Pahul, 1996). It is argued that the principle of trust law requires 
these fiduciaries not only to protect the value of investments, but also to enhance 
them when possible (Sherman, 1990). Hence, in order to avoid a breach of their 
legal obligations, institutional investors are expected to utilise their shareowners' 
rights including voting on proxies. 
5 Shome and Singh (1995) reveal that individuals hold the largest block shareholdings of the small size 
companies. 
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In terms of economic gains to the institutional investors, increased shareholding 
of their portfolio companies makes it more difficult for them to sell their 
shareholdings without adversely affecting the stock prices (see also Chapter VI). 
Moreover, institutional investors with a passive strategy, i. e. a market index 
based investment, have little room to change shareholding of an index 
component. Therefore, it seems old-fashioned to follow "the Wall Street Rule " 
that institutional investors vote with the management of their portfolio companies 
or sell their shares, rather than opposing the management (Monks and Minow, 
1995). 
For these reasons, it is worth noting that performance of institutional investors is 
often measured in terms of financial success and their objective can therefore be 
described as "shareholder-value" and liquidity (Thomsen and Pederson, 2000, 
page 693). 
Individual or family owners 
Entrepreneur or family owners play a double role in the company, concerned not 
only with the survival of their company (as owners'), but also the control over 
the company (as the company's managers). Further, the entrepreneur or family 
owners with significant shareholdings may derive private benefit from running 
their company at the expense of minority shareholders (See, for example, 
Holderness and Sheehan, 1985). 
Corporate owners 
The term "corporate owners" refers to stock owned non-financial business 
entities. At the extreme, the Japanese Keiretsu groups provide good examples 
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when considering the effects of corporate block holdings on corporate 
performance. There are pros and cons of such corporate block holders. On the 
positive side, corporate block holders take an active monitoring roll in a manner 
similar that of institutional investors. For instance, Holderness and Sheehan's 
(1988) indicate that corporate block holders send their representatives for their 
invested companies, placing them in senior managerial positions. Furthermore, 
if the corporate block holders have business connections with their invested 
companies, the block-holding companies can reduce various transaction costs 
whilst the invested companies expect synergy gains (Shome and Singh, 1995). 
On the other hand, the potential benefits accompany some costs. The most 
negative impact would be that corporate block holders may reduce the value of 
the invested company by expropriating wealth from the company. To a lesser 
extent, evidence from Brickley et al (1988), suggests that block shareholders 
with business connections to the company may be less effective at monitoring 
than those without business ties. 
Overall, the objectives of institutional investors can be distinguished from those 
of family block holders and corporate block holders. In essence, the latter are 
likely to pursue non-shareholder value maximisation whilst the former has a 
fiduciary duty to protect their clients' wealth. In light of this, by extending 
Thomsen and Pedersen's (2000) conjecture that ceteris paribus, there is a positive 
ownership effect of institutional investor on shareholder value, the second 
hypothesis for this chapter is as follows: Unit trust companies owned by quoted 
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companies perform better than those owned by private companies or by mutual 
organisations. 
5.4 Efficiency as a performance variable 
5.4.1 Background 
To test out the two hypotheses noted in the preceding sections, it is necessary to 
specify the variable of company performance. However, an underlying difficulty 
in developing the performance variable is that data concerning individual unit 
trust management companies is limited and complicated in several respects. For 
example, as briefly noted in the early chapters, shares of unit trust management 
companies are not listed in exchanges. Consequently, conventional market- 
based performance measures such as Tobin's Q and relative return to market 
indexes are not obtainable. 
Further limitation and complexity exists in making use of the financial statement. 
One must recall section 3.1.5 in Chapter III, which briefly stated that a unit trust 
management company often serves as a quasi-nominee within the group by 
outsourcing its investment management business to the fellow specialist 
companies. On this premise, transactions are a normal feature of business 
between the unit trust management company and its affiliates such as 
administration services and portfolio management companies. In studying the 
financial statement of a unit trust company, such group transactions lead to 
complicated information in two ways. 
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The first of these complications is associated with an abbreviated format. The 
profit and loss account of an individual unit trust management company is often 
abbreviated in a manner that Financial Reporting Standards 8, Related Party 
Disclosures (FRS 8)6, allows group companies to present minimum information 
regarding the inter-group transactions. The Aberdeen group, for example, 
employs this accounting policy. A note taken out from the annual financial 
statement of Aberdeen Unit Trust Managers reads that the Company has taken 
advantage of the exemption contained in FRS 8 and has not to disclose 
transactions or balances with entities which form part of the group (Aberdeen 
Unit trust annual financial statement, p7, Note 1). As a result of this practice, it 
is not clear exactly how much the Aberdeen Unit Trust manager limited pays for 
the investment advice from the Aberdeen Asset Management, an investment arm 
of the Aberdeen group. This example demonstrates that because of such an 
accounting standard, there is not always comprehensive information provided in 
audited financial statements of individual unit trust management companies. 
Related to the first point, the next point is that a potential transfer pricing is 
present where a portfolio management company sells its advice to a unit trust 
management company within the group. This practice is likely to distort the true 
picture of the profitability of the unit trust management company because the 
price at which services are exchanged takes on a significance (Watts, 1996, 
p740). In the context of a financial service group, the higher the investment 
advisory fee, the portfolio management company providing the investment 
6 This is issued in November 1995. 
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advice will appear more profitable. The unit trust management company using 
the advice for running their unit trusts will appear less profitable. 
The following paragraph explicitly points out that such a transfer pricing practice 
is present. All staff performing work for the Company are employees of and have 
contracts with State Street Global Advisors United Kingdom limited. Full 
reimbursement of staff costs is made by State Street Unit Trust Management 
Limited under the world wide transfer pricing system adopted by State Street 
Corporation. (Taken out from Note 3 to the accounts in Report and Accounts of 
State Street Unit Trust Management Limited, December, 2000) 
In summary, at the financial statement level, a related party relationship between 
a unit trust management company (a subsidiary) and its associated or parent 
companies result in abbreviated profit and loss accounts and potential transfer 
pricing practice. These practices are problematic in computing conventional 
business ratio such as return on equity and net margin ratio. 
As an alternative approach, the subsequent empirical analysis applies the notion 
of efficiency to the performance measurement. More specifically, a ratio is 
constructed by a set of input and output variables that are less affected by the 
transfer pricing practice or by the abbreviated format. Subsequently, the multiple 
inputs and outputs form is processed by Data Envelopment Analysis (hereafter 
DEA). Before moving onto the next section describing DEA in depth, let us 
summarise a number of justifications for taking the efficiency approach. 
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On the conceptual side, efficiency can be viewed as a variant of performance 
measures. According to the directory of UK Industrial Performance Analysis, 
"performance is usually measured through a series of business rations (UK 
Industrial Performance Analysis 1997/1998, p. 8). " In short, a performance 
measure is defined with a ratio format. From this point of view, the format of 
efficiency, which is usually expressed as outputs over inputs (or inputs over 
outputs) can be seen as an extension of performance measures. 
There is another justification to use efficiency as the performance proxy in this 
chapter. It is debatable whether the conventional profitability ratios such as 
return on equity should be used as the performance proxy for the current 
analysis. The reason is that mutuals can be expected to exhibit lower 
profitability than the comparable stock companies because the mutuals' primary 
goal is to provide low-cost coverage to members, not to earn high profits (Swiss 
Re, 1999). If this is the case, it makes sense to compare the efficiency, e. g. 
revenue over costs between the mutuals and stock owned companies. 
From the agency theory paradigm, the dimension of efficiency can fit the bill for 
testing the performance-ownership relationship. Agency theory and efficiency is 
connected in a way that the impact of agency costs on a corporate performance is 
central to agency theory. In the realm of efficiency literature, such costs can be 
treated as inputs in efficiency studies. 
A typical agency cost emerges from a manager's short-term rent seeking 
behaviour. Referred to as expense preference behaviour in section 5.2.2. 
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managers engage in activities that enhance their non-salary income or provide 
the forms of on the job consumption. Examples of this are unnecessarily 
expensive offices, business lunches, and travel expenses. This type of behaviour 
reduces corporate performance by increasing costs, leading to inefficiency of the 
company. 
Given the agency theory perspective, the situation above can be summarised that 
inefficiency is caused by conflict of interest (Habib and Ljungquvist, 2000, p 2). 
Agency theory predicts that such conflicts of interest can be mitigated via 
incentive or monitoring schemes. Viewed in this way, it is evident that 
efficiency framework is suitable for studies based on agency theory. 
From the perspective of empirical literature, studying demutualisation in the U. S, 
Masulis (1987) predicted that organisational change occurs when economic 
efficiencies are to be gained. In a similar vein, Cummins et al (1999) studied 
relative efficiency of mutual and stock organisational forms in the U. S property- 
liability insurance industry. Hence, in studying the UK unit trust industry where 
different ultimate ownership, e. g. mutual association and stock company co- 
exist, it is worth following Masulis and Cummins et al's approach. 
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5.4.2 Testable hypotheses 
By taking into account the data constraints and the efficiency framework, the two 
general hypotheses in section 5.2 should be developed. Thus, the two broad 
hypotheses are rephrased as follows; 
(H4) Higher efficiency of stock owned companies. 
Unit trust management companies owned by stock companies show 
higher efficiency than those owned by mutual institutions. 
(H5) Higher efficiency of market listed companies. 
Unit trust companies owned by quoted companies show better 
efficiency than those owned by private companies or by mutual 
organisations. 
5.5. Methodology 
5.5.1 Measuring Efficiency 
Efficiency is a function of inputs and outputs, broadly defined as the production 
of the most outputs using the least inputs. Let us define input and output 
variables that are suitable for the analysis in the current chapter. 
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On the output side, Chapter III revealed that the revenue is generated from 
annual management and initial fees in the U. K unit trust industry. The 
management fee increases as returns of invested assets are up whilst retaining the 
existing unit holders. The initial fee increases as the sales of new or existing unit 
trusts increase. 
Based on the two different types of fee income, the company can have two 
strategic objectives, e. g. asset expansion by organic growth and by sales driven 
growth. For this reason, it is ideal to make a distinction between the two fee 
incomes. Nonetheless, the careful inspection of the audited financial accounts of 
the sample companies uncovered that not all of the companies disclose the 
income by fee segments. This is primary due to Generally Accepted Accounting 
Practice in the United Kingdom (UK GAPP). More specifically, Statement of 
Standard Accounting Practice 25 (SSAP 25) seems to account for such 
aggregated revenue information. Private company entities within certain 
business scales? are not subject to the full segmental requirement (Ernst & 
Young, 1999, p 1247). Due to the limited segment information, the aggregated 
revenue after sales commissions and discounts is used as the output variable. 
On the input side, two items based on the audited accounting statement are used 
as the input variables: (i) Capital employed including shareholders' fund, short 
and long term debt from the group undertakings and (ii) Administration 
expenses. The key emphasis is on the view from the parent or group company's 
7 In order to take advantage of the disclosure exemption, a company should not have any two of the 
following conditions. Turnover exceeding ¬112 million, total assets exceeding ¬56 million and average 
number of employees exceeding 2,5000. 
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interest in selecting the input variables that are essential to run the unit trust 
management business within the group. 
Capital Employed 
The basic situation is that a unit trust management company needs capital 
whereas the parent or group company provides their affiliated unit trust company 
with capital. Consistent with the standard investment appraisal framework (for 
example, Stead, 1995, p17), such a parent-subsidiary relationship can be 
evaluated with respect to the investment return that the unit trust management 
company achieves on the parent's capital involvement. Hence, capital should be 
treated as the primary choice for an input variable. 
In certain circumstances 8, a parent company may decide to finance a unit trust 
management subsidiary with short or long term loan capital rather than equity 
share capital in providing financial support for the unit trust management 
subsidiary (Ernst & Young, 1999 p. 614). Therefore, as the input variable, capital 
must include short and long term debts from the parent or group company. For 
this reason, the input variable should be referred to as capital employed. 
From a pragmatic point of view, there are further justifications for using capital 
employed as the input variable. For instance, figures concerning capital 
employed are unlikely to be distorted by the inter-group accounting practice 
because shareholder fund is a requirement for the balance sheet. With regard to 
inter-company balances, the Company Act 1985 requires the financial statements 
8 For example, there may be tax advantages, restrictions not on interest payments but on dividend payments. 
Further, it may be easier to collect money from loans than from equity in the event of nationalisation of the 
subsidiary. 
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to contain loans and amounts owed to and by group undertakings (the Company 
Act 1985, Schedules 4 and 5). Viewed in this light, information of capital 
employed should be straightforward and reliable. 
The focus on capital employed should be informative in light of the 
demutualisation boom in the U. K. During the recent mutual-conversion boom in 
the U. K, it has often been argued that mutual organisations have limited 
flexibility in accessing to additional sources of capital. By contrast, quoted 
companies have more opportunities to raise their capital by issuing new shares or 
fixed interest corporate bonds. On the basis of the capital constraint, the 
argument for demutualisation is that aiming at business expansion and competing 
against the quoted company counterpart, mutual associations should be converted 
into public limited companies. 
Moreover, it is worth asking which type of organisations are good at capital 
utilisation. One can argue that because of easy access to capital, quoted 
companies are likely to be overcapitalised. In the same spirit, mutuals may be 
good at managing capital because capital is a scarce resource for them. The 
completely opposite view can be also supported. Quoted companies can show 
efficient capital management because of monitoring activities by shareholders 
and debt holders providing their money for the company. On the other hand, 
mutuals have little pressure from external forces so that their capital management 
is loosely. All in all, capital employed should be an indispensable input item in 
the current efficiency analysis. 
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Administration expense 
Administration expense is likely to be sensitive to transfer pricing practice within 
a financial group, however the key arguments for using the administration 
expense as the next input variable are twofold. Primarily, regardless of which 
group company pays, the administration expense is a necessary cost incurred to 
the group in running their unit trust business. Second and more importantly, 
administration expense can be a good proxy of agency costs in that managers 
generate unnecessary costs through non-salary consumption as described in the 
previous section 5.2. It is believed that the benefits of using the administration 
expense as the input variable appear to outweigh the potential transfer pricing 
problem, which can not be completely eliminated. For these practical reasons, 
the present empirical analysis adds the administration expense to the input factor 
in the form of efficiency. 
5.5.2 Overview of the hypothesis testing procedure 
Similar to the first empirical analysis in Chapter IV, the objective of this 
empirical analysis is to contrast efficiency levels across different ultimate 
ownership of unit trust management companies. The first hypothesis testing is to 
compare efficiency between mutual and stock owned unit trust companies. The 
second hypothesis tests whether unit trust management companies owned by 
listed company groups are more efficient than those owned by non-listed 
company groups. In order to achieve this, the research design is based in a cross- 
sectional comparison in a similar fashion to the previous empirical analysis. 
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Another important factor to employ the cross-sectional design is the cost of data 
collection9. 
The procedure for the current chapter is generally consistent with that of the 
previous chapter. The statistical tests used are independence tests and Tobit 
regression models where a performance variable is regressed on ultimate 
ownership variables whilst controlling for influential factors. However, one 
important distinction should be noted at the stage of the dependent variable 
formation. This chapter uses Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a linear 
programming technique in order to obtain a score for a company's efficiency 
whilst the preceding analysis simply used the Herfindahl indices and the standard 
deviation framework in computing the risk taking proxies. 
The procedure for the current empirical analysis consists of three stages. The 
first stage involves the estimation of the relative efficiency by conducting DEA. 
Specifically, given the data constraints described in section 5.4, the efficiency 
variable is clarified and operationalised together with DEA. The second stage is 
to explore the difference between the efficiency scores on two ownership groups 
by independence tests. The third stage employs Tobit regression models to 
assess the efficiency-ownership relationship whilst adding several controlling 
variables such as size and the product mix of the sample companies. Finally, as 
the analyses proceed, small credibility checks are conducted, resulting in some 
interesting insights concerning potential causes of the primary results of the 
hypothesis testing. 
9 Purchasing a single annual audited financial statement from the Companies House Direct via online costs 
two pounds. 
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5.5.3 First Stage: Computation of the efficiency score by DEA 
In order to compute efficiency scores for individual companies, this thesis 
employs DEA that was originally developed by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes 
(1978). According to Molinero and Woracker' s definition (1996), DEA is a 
linear programming based on technique for the analysis of efficiency of 
organisation with multiple inputs and outputs (Molinero and Woracker, 
1996, p. 22). The basic mathematical computation is showed in Appendix 5-a 
whilst the following section illustrates the underlying estimation technique. 
An example" 
Figure 5.1 shows the efficient frontier for a sample of four car manufactures (A 
to D) that are assumed to produce a given level of output (a standard amount of 
cars) using two inputs (labour and machines). Companies A, B, and C make up 
the frontier because a linear combination of adjacent pairs generates the shortest 
distance to the origin. Joining points A, B, and C gives rise to the line segments 
AB and BC, which represent combinations of the three best practice 
manufactures and form part of the efficient frontier. 
DEA recognises the possibility of using a different combination of resources to 
achieve the same level of output. The frontier formed by connecting points A, B 
and C indicates such substitution possibilities. The respective partial 
productivitis of labour and machines vary between A, B and C. Labour 
productivity decreases and machine productivity increases from A to B to C. 
Company D is inefficient because it uses more labour and machines than a liner 
10 This illustration is based on Progress in Rail Reform, (the Production Commission, 2000) 
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combination of A and B to produce the same level of output. D is compared with 
a linear combination of companies A and B (D's peer group), denoted D'. The 
input mix of these three companies (that is the ratio of labour to machines) is 
comparatively similar. Company C is in a separate peer group as its input 
structure (high labour intensity) differs from A, B and D. Consequently, it is not 
used to evaluate D. 
Figure 5.1: A Simple Illustration of Efficiency frontier 
Machines 
0 
For each company in a peer group, the DEA score is estimated as a relative 
measure. The efficiency score of A and B is one in this exmple whilst the 
efficiency score of company D is given by the ratio OD'/OD, taking the 
measurement along the radial line connecting the company and origin. The score 
of D' means that it could produce the same level of output using less resources 
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Efficient frontier Labour 
company D currently uses, according to the best practice in the industry, e. g. 
companies A and B. 
In the context of the current analysis, there are several justifications for using 
DEA. 
Multiple inputs and outputs 
Given the efficiency framework with two inputs and one output, the model 
should reflect the multiple input-output dimension where each variable is likely 
to be inter-related. It is vital to take into account the interrelation as a company's 
decision over administration and capital management can be inefficient because 
the company fails to control the administration costs, or because the company is 
wasting capital, or because the company is doing both. 
Standard regression methodologies with one pair of output-input at a time can 
not reflect the multiple dimension of the variable components simultaneously. 
This is where DEA comes into play. DEA can solve the problem by generating a 
comparative ratio of weighted outputs to inputs for each sample company. 
Potential improvements 
A further related advantage is that DEA can show how all inputs could be 
proportionally reduced without reduction in output. In other words, whilst the 
efficiency score ranges between nil and one (=100%), DEA indicates the extent 
to which each input can be reduced to achieve a relative efficiency of one and 
this is usually expressed in percentage terms. Clearly, such indications are 
meaningful in considering the optimal cost management. 
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In the context of this thesis, the analysis with DEA attributes a company's 
relative efficiency to two components associated with agency problems: (i) 
revenue relative to administration expenses that a unit trust management 
company require, and (ii) revenue relative to capital employed that a unit trust 
management company require. DEA has been used in order to estimate such 
input attributes simultaneously. 
No priori functional form 
DEA as a non-parametric method does not require explicit specification 
regarding the form of the functions that are supposed to prescribe how inputs 
used are related to outputs produced (Murthi et al, 1997; Brockett et al 1998; and 
Avkiran 2002). On the other hand, parametric methods such as those based on a 
regression relied on the specified cost or production function. Consequently, the 
parametric technique is likely to suffer from potential specification errors unless 
the true function is known. In this respect, DEA has a considerable advantage in 
conducting efficiency analysis with regard to the UK unit trust management 
companies because the cost function is yet unknown. 
DEA versus SFA 
To the extent that both DEA and stochastic frontier analysis (hereafter SFA) have 
constructed similar frontiers from data, there is on-going debate amongst 
researchers about the appropriate nature and usefulness of the DEA approach 
versus the stochastic frontier approach (for instance, Huang and Wang, 2002). 
Nevertheless, apart from the model specification problem, the SFA approach has 
a few limitations in the context of the current research. The simple model is 
written as follows (Cebenoyan et al 1993). 
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TC=f(Q, PP)+£j (5.1) 
where TC represents total costs; Qj, outputs; Pj, input prices; and Ej a disturbance term: 
£j = Uj + Cj j=1,..., n, (5.2) 
From the computation perspective, although SFA is similar to a traditional 
regression model, the noise is composed of two terms, a one-side (in)efficiency 
term, cj, and a two sided noise term, uj. The common assumptions for the 
distribution are a normal for u. However, it is argued that the selection of these 
distributions for cj and uj is problematic because of the relatively inflexible 
nature, leading to significant error in estimating individual company's efficiency 
(Drake and Hall, 2003). 
Furthermore, from the data collection perspective, it is evident from the model 
specification that the cost function requires data on input prices. In this regard, 
data on the number of employees is not available, however the aggregated 
administration expense is disclosed. This is partially due to the fact that working 
as a quasi nominee company within the group structure, a unit trust management 
company often has no employees, outsourcing as described in preceding section 
5.4.2. Hence, it is difficult to compute an accurate figure of the input prices. For 
these reasons, the current analysis employs the DEA approach. 
5.5.4 Assumptions and drawbacks 
Assumptions 
In contrast to SFA, DEA can handle the model specification problem by 
imposing little restrictions on the assumed model. The minimum assumptions 
required for DEA are monotonicity. convexity, and return to scale. Often 
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defined as free disposability, monotonicity refers to the ability to produce less 
outputs using less inputs. Convexity means that it is possible to make weighted 
averages of production plans. In other words, all inputs and outputs are divisible. 
Finally, there are two return-to-scale models in the DEA approach; constant and 
variable return to scale. The issue of the return to scale is addressed in the next 
section concerning model specifications. 
It is worth commenting on the specific assumptions of DEA with respect to 
measurement of efficiency in this thesis. First, in general, DEA focuses on 
productive efficiency rather than economic efficiency. For the purpose of 
analysis, the DEA model focuses on levels of inputs, e. g. administration 
expenses and the capital employed to levels of outputs, e. g. management and 
initial fees. Accordingly, the type of efficiency to be measured is economic or 
value-based rather than unit based or technological one, which is often used in 
non-financial service studies (Diacon et al, 2003). This is because inputs like the 
capital employed can only exist in value terms. A few of administrative features 
such as the number of employees may be obtainable. However, not all 
companies in the sample provide such details. Moreover, the output of financial 
services is intangible in nature so that no unit of output can be identified (Diacon 
et al, 2003). 
Second, DEA used in this thesis is based on a pooled frontier approach, which 
evaluates the efficiency of each company regardless of their ultimate 
organisational form. The pooled frontier approach may be limited if the 
following efficiency hypothesis holds. Cummins, Weiss and Zi (1999) and 
Cummins, Rubio-Misas and Zi (2003) argue that mutual organisations and stock 
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companies use different production technique that are more efficient for that 
particular organisational form (Cummins et al 1999) or enter market segments 
where they have competitive advantages in production costs (Cummins, et al 
2003). Hence, it is necessary to separate the mutual and stock owned companies 
into two distinct classes and estimate own-group frontier for the mutual and stock 
companies. Nonetheless, given the homogeneity of the U. K unit trust industry in 
terms of the scope of the company' activity, and the regulations, it seems 
acceptable to assume that production technology, costs and revenue structures 
are identical across the industry. For this reason, the present thesis employs the 
pooled frontier approach. 
Some Caveats 
Despite the fact that DEA has advantages for assessing efficiency, DEA is not a 
panacea. The most serious limitation for using the DEA is that data 
measurement error can distort the estimated efficient frontier, affecting the 
accuracy of the DEA scores. Unlike SFA that deals with measurement errors by 
containing a random error term (see the previous section ), DEA is an extreme 
point technique, not allowing for any random errors. As a result, observations 
with very unique input and output combinations, which may be due to 
measurement errors or variable misspecifications, are likely to be put on the 
efficient frontier. At the same time, any deviation from the (inaccurate) frontier 
is forced to be attributed to inefficiency. Hence, it is vital to involve careful data 
collection in conducting DEA. In the current empirical analysis, a degree of data 
erroneous is minimised on the ground that the data is collected from the audited 
financial statements, which are filed to the government agency for their record. 
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The next drawback is "slacks". The problem of slack arises when efficient 
frontier runs parallel to the axes. To illustrate the problem, look at several points 
in Figure 5.2, showing one input-one output universe. It is debatable whether the 
point E' is an efficient point because there is more input than what is needed in 
maximising the output. Another way of saying this is the input of E does not 
contribute to the efficiency score. 
Figure 5.2 DEA Scores and input slack 
Machines 
0 Labour 
Notwithstanding, from the DEA modelling viewpoint, Coelli et al (1998) point 
out that the importance of slacks can be overstated. Their core argument is that 
the slack is just as a modelling issue or "an artefact (p. 176)" arising from a 
limited sample. If an infinite sample size were available, the slack issue would 
disappear because of a smooth function surface. 
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The final limitation is that the efficiency measure generated from DEA does not 
take account into any risk factors. In an attempt to consider the risk factor. the 
Tobit regression models used in this thesis include a risk-related factor, e. g. the 
company's product mix consisting of unit trusts with various investment 
objectives. Nonetheless, the fundamental limitation still remains regarding the 
distribution of investment and business risk associated the various investment 
categories, which are used as the risk proxy. This is mainly due to the frequent 
changes of product categories in the unit trust industry. As a consequence, there 
is no sufficient data available to estimate the precise risk distribution for each 
fund investment category. This thesis uses only the return and money flow data 
for each category over the three year period (1996 to 1999) when no major 
category changes occurred. 
5.5.5 The first stage of analysis 
In conducting DEA as the first analysis, there are two modelling issues to 
consider: Input or output orientation and return of scale. 
Input and Output orientation 
DEA can evaluate efficiency from two perspectives: Input contraction and 
Output expansion. Input contraction models provide us with information on how 
much the sample company can reduce its inputs without any output reductions. 
The input oriented approaches can be referred to as "input execution" models. 
Output expansion models inform us of how much output could be produced with 
a given amount of inputs. Hence, results from the output oriented model can be 
viewed as "output-deficient" models. 
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The choice of which types of model should be employed depends on "which 
quantities (inputs or outputs) the managers have most control over (Coelli, 1998, 
p158). " The current empirical analysis selects the input contraction because the 
primary focus of this thesis is on agency problems in the form of excess costs 
incurred by a company and ultimately their owners. Another reason is that the 
output variable that comprises annual management and initial fees is largely 
subject to underlying equity markets where the company's unit trusts invest. The 
following sentence justifies the point of this reasoning: "As revenue are highly 
correlated with market performance and hence difficult for the manager to 
control (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1998, p. 4)" 
Return to Scale 
In view of returns to scale, there are two efficiency measures derived from 
different rescale models: Constant Return to Scale (CRS) in Appendix 5. a and 
Variable Return to Scale (VRS) in Appendix 5. b. The efficiency score based on 
the CRS reflects technical efficiency" that measures inefficiencies not only due 
to the input and output composition but also due to the size of operations. In this 
sense, the efficiency based on the CRS is referred to as the total or overall 
technical efficiency. 
As implied in the paragraph above, it is possible to separate the total technical 
efficiency into measures of technical and scale efficiency. This is where the 
VRS comes into play. The VRS is computed by adding a convexity condition to 
the CRS form. The efficiency based on the VRS is often referred to as the pure 
11 In general, technical efficiency is defined as the efficiency of a production process in converting inputs 
into outputs that is calculated independent of prices and costs. (Avkiran, 2002, p. xii ) 
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technical efficiency because it excludes inefficiencies that occur due to the scale 
factors by allowing variable-return-to-scale. Consequently, the scale efficiency 
is calculated as the ratio of the total technical efficiency (CRS) over the pure 
technical efficiency (VRS). 
Figure 5.3: the total technical efficiency (CRS) and the pure technical efficiency 
(VRS). 
(Note: Total technical efficiency (CRS) of D is given by TDDc/TDD and pure technical 
efficiency (VRS) of D is given by TDDv/TDD and the scale effect is TDDc/TDDV. 
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In brief, the key distinction between the CRS and the VRS is whether or not the 
efficiency is influenced by the scale of a company' operation. Hence, before 
conducting the DEA, the question of constant versus variable returns of scale 
needs to be answered given the research objectives (Avkiran, 2002). 
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Nonetheless, the current analysis is to run the efficiency models under the CRS 
and the VRS and to compute the scale efficiency for the following reasons. 
Firstly, the approach with the multiple efficiency measures has become the norm 
among recent DEA studies. More specifically, the multiple measure approach 
can avoid a lengthy discourse on return to scale in financial service industries. 
As Chapter III described, the topic of scale effects in the fund management 
industries has attracted academic interest in the U. S. However, to date there is 
no academic work on the UK unit trust industry about the scale effects. Only a 
few consultation papers indicated the relatively weak effect of scale (See 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers and City of London Report in section 3.3.3 of Chapter 
III). The comparison of the efficiency score by the CRS with that of the VRS 
should provide some indication of how the return of scale might be in effect in 
the unit trust industry. 
5.5.6 The second stage of analysis 
Using the DEA scores derived from the first stage, the second stage is to detect 
differences across unit trust companies with various ultimate ownership. More 
precisely, the aim of the second stage is to test out the two hypotheses, e. g. the 
hypothesis of mutual versus stock owned groups, and the hypothesis of quoted 
versus non-quoted ownership groups. For this purpose, the non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney test is used. The key reason for the Mann-Whitney test is that 
the DEA scores are not normally distributed. 
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5.5.7 The third stage of analysis 
The final stage is to check the robustness of the preceding results. The check is 
accomplished through the Tobit regressions, taking into account environmental 
factors. In the context of DEA, the environmental factors refer to elements that 
influence efficiency but are uncontrollable by managers. Examples of these 
factors are ownership, location characteristics, labour union power, and 
government regulations. 
In order to accommodate such environmental factors, Coelli et al (1998) and 
others12 recommend that the two-step approach is of use in most cases. 
Advantages that Coelli et al (1998, p. 171) argue are as follows. 
40 It can accommodate more than one variable, which are continuous and 
categorical. 
0 It does not make prior assumptions regarding the direction of the influence 
of the categorical variable. 
" It is convenient to conduct hypothesis tests to see if the variables have a 
significant influence upon efficiencies. 
" It is easy to calculate and the method is simple and subsequently transparent. 
The primary focus of the current chapter is the efficiency of a unit trust 
management company and this efficiency is measured in terms of the 
configuration of a company's net revenue, administrative expenses and capital 
12 See Henry Burley "Dealing with environmental factors-Public Hospitals" Chapter 7, (Avkiran, 2002) 
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employed. However, the following may be important business considerations 
that could affect the company's efficiency. It is debatable whether these 
environmental factors are treated as inputs or outputs and for this reason, the 
following are entered into the Tobit models as control variables: Asset under 
management, age, number of funds, sectors, and the Herfindahl index. 
Asset under management 
The first control variable accounts for the company's size. The size refers to a 
company's assets under management and converted into the logarithm based 
numbers. The heart of the size effect is economies of scale. As Chapter III 
discussed, this subject has received attention with regard to the U. S and French 
fund industries. On the other hand, there has been little research on this issue 
concerning the U. K unit trust industry. Therefore, to get a sense of the size effect 
from the managed assets, the size variable is of use. 
Age 
Age measures the number of years since a company started their unit trust 
management business in the U. K. The age variable can represent economies of 
experience. The economies of experience refers to "cost advantages that result 
from accumulated experience over an extended period of time (Besanko and 
Braeutigam, 2002, p. 334). " Apart from the potential benefits of experience, new 
companies may show inefficiencies for a short period of time. Such a situation 
may occur when the new companies are not yet collecting a sufficient amount of 
assets under management, which generate management fee incomes to cover 
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their fixed costs. For these reasons, it is worthwhile to include the age variable 
in the models. 
Number of funds, sectors, and the Herfindahl index 
These are proxies for a company's product line breadth whilst capturing 
economies of scope. Controlling for the company's product mix is important 
because cost inefficiency may be contaminated by the composition of output. 
One should recall that the output refers to the net revenues in this analysis and 
the revenues are generated from various unit trusts that the company offers. 
Interactions 
The interaction terms such as "(the mutual dummy variable) x (the number of 
unit trusts)" serve to explore the product mix effects that may differ by 
ownership form. Such potential interactions between the type of ultimate 
ownership and their product mix should be valuable in the context of agency 
theory. It is important to note the managerial discretion hypothesis (e. g. Mayers 
and Smith, 1988, see section 4.2.1 of Chapter IV) that stock owned companies 
are more successful in more complex and heterogeneous lines of business. 
Provided that the product mix variables capture such complexity and diversity of 
a company's business line, the interaction terms can pick up any effects of the 
managerial discretion hypothesis. For example, if the hypothesis holds, the 
coefficient of the interaction term, "(the mutual dummy variable) x (the number 
of sectors)" should be negative. The reason for the prediction is that compared 
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with a stock owned company, a mutual owned company requires more money to 
manage such a complex product line, resulting in the reduction of efficiency. 
5.5.8 Data collection 
Data sources for input and output variables are the Companies House Direct 13, 
and Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME). Both of these sources provide 
accounting information of unit trust management companies in the U. K. 
However, there is a key difference between the two sources. The Companies 
House Directs delivers the original annual reports with the PDF file format. On 
the other hand, certain account items in FAME are often refined in order to 
conduct comparative analysis easily. Consequently, the current analysis draws 
the data mainly from the Companies House Direct data whereas the FAME 
serves as a cross-check. 
The period of the current analysis is the accounting year ending in the year 2000, 
covering from the end of 1999 to the end of 200014. There are three reasons for 
looking at the year 2000. First and the foremost, as the analysis in the previous 
chapter focused on risk-taking of the unit trust companies at the end of 1999, it is 
worthwhile to see the impact of the risk-taking in the subsequent year from an 
efficiency perspective. Chapter VII, the last chapter about implications and 
conclusions, will elaborate on the issue of the risk-return connection. 
13 v vw. direct. companieshouse. gov. uk 
14 By and large, most of the sample companies have 12-month accounting periods during the year 2000. If 
there are longer or shorter accounting periods than the 12-month because of change of the accounting year- 
end, inputs and output variables are adjusted by averaging. 
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Secondly, only one de-mutualisation occurred during the year 2000. Thus, 
selection of this period largely avoids problems caused by changes in ultimate 
ownership occurring part way through the analysis period. 
Finally, from an empirical perspective, it is argued that "efficiency estimates are 
fairly stable from year to year, showing persistence " (Berger and Humphrey, 
1997, p. 205). As an empirical example to support the notion, Cummins et al 
(1999, p. 1264) presented evidence that the difference of the relative efficiency 
between mutual and stock owned insurers do not change considerably over time. 
Given the empirical justification, the year-specific factor should not pose a 
serious problem. 
Recall that a set of hypotheses exist concerning the mutual versus stock owned 
groups (H4) and the quoted versus non-quoted company ownership groups (H5). 
For the purpose of testing the hypotheses, a small number of companies which 
ownerships are uncommon15 or not identified were excluded from the sample. 
After deletion of such cases, 131 companies remained in the sample. The sample 
accounts for 99.38 % in terms of the total managed assets and 83.65% in terms of 
the number of companies in the industry. 
Notwithstanding the removal of companies with unknown or uncommon 
ownership, no sample bias arises in terms of the proportion of different 
ownership groups. However, companies excluded from the sample are rather 
small in relation to the average company so that the sample can be size-biased. 
15 For example, ultimate owners are a labour union (TU), investment trusts (Discretionary Unit Trust 
Managers). 
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This problem is hard to avoid because exceptionally small companies often fail 
to provide their background information to industry directories such as the FT 
unit trust & OEIC's directory, resulting in limited data availability and 
ambiguous ownership information. This is one potential limitation regarding the 
sample selection. Nonetheless, for the main purpose of the present analysis, no 
significant bias with regard to ownership types outweighs the potential size bias. 
Furthermore, with hindsight, the small size bias appears less serious on the 
ground that no significant correlation is present between the size and the 
efficiency scores of a company (See Table 5.17). 
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5.6 Results 
5.6.1 Descriptive Statistics for inputs and output variables. 
Table 5.1 provides a simple overview of one output, two inputs, and other control 
variables. Note that the control variables are almost the same as the data in 
Chapter IV, showing the repetitive pattern so that details of the control variables 
are not described in full in this section. 
Other than the control variables, the most striking is that each variable has a 
considerable range, reflecting the fact that small and large companies coexist in 
the U. K unit trust industry. The observation indicates that the degree of 
economies of scale is marginal in the industry. 
Furthermore, from the comparative tabulation in Table 5.1, it is evident that on 
average, the quoted company group is the largest in terms of net revenue, 
administrative expenses, and capital employed. By contrast, the private owned 
company group is the smallest whereas the mutual group lies somewhere 
between the quoted and privately owned company groups concerning the level of 
the input and output variables. 
259 
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics for Output, Inputs and Control variables 
Total Sample Mutual Quoted Private 
n= 131 n=23 n=81 n=27 
Output 
Net revenue 
(unit: £1,000 ) 
Mean 17,154.51 9,866.89 22,863.68 6,234.97 
Std. Deviation 27,375.34 10,231.79 31,878.84 16,098.46 
Minimum 12.50 92.36 12.50 62.51 
Maximum 140,330.00 36,359.00 140,330.00 79,577.00 
Input 
Admin Costs 
(unit: £1,000 ) 
Mean 13,586.53 9,842.72 17,607.50 4,712.78 
Std. Deviation 23,805.40 10,885.71 27,967.14 13,491.74 
Minimum 12.09 112.38 12.09 25.00 
Maximum 135,633.00 35,564.71 135,633.00 70,295.00 
Input 
Capital Employed 
(unit: £1,000 ) 
Mean 10,220.68 6,346.88 13,715.65 3,035.64 
Std. Deviation 18,811.57 8,082.22 22,134.95 10,080.03 
Minimum 14.41 49.83 36.12 14.41 
Maximum 108,585.50 32,063.00 108,585.50 52,563.50 
Control Variable 
Lg Assets_1999 
Mean 2.71 2.69 2.94 2.05 
Std. Deviation 0.88 0.87 0.76 0.90 
Minimum 0.22 0.92 0.22 0.60 
Maximum 4.18 3.92 4.16 4.18 
Control Variable 
Herfindahl Index-] 999 
Mean 3,566.05 4,466.91 2,774.95 5,171.97 
Std. Deviation 3,002.78 3,150.47 2,317.34 3,849.16 
Minimum 467.14 971.52 563.51 467.14 
Maximum 10,000.00 10,000.00 10,000.00 10,000.00 
Control Variable 
Number of Sectors 
Mean 8.47 6.57 10.14 5.11 
Std. Deviation 5.96 5.53 5.77 5.09 
Minimum II11 
Maximum 22 21 22 18 
Control Variable 
Number of Funds 
Mean 12.41 8.83 14.72 8.56 
Std. Deviation 10.60 9.04 10.59 10.19 
Minimum IIII 
Maximum 50 35 50 36 
Control Variable 
Age of Company 
Mean 16.47 15.13 18.22 12.37 
Std. Deviation 12.84 9.88 13.05 13.78 
Minimum 1211 
Maximum 69 40 69 66 
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Table 5.2 indicates the correlation matrix across variables of inputs, output. and 
controlling factors. The matrix shows a strong positive correlation (r = 0.96, 
p<0.01) between revenues (output), and administration expenses (input), 
suggesting that companies with larger revenues tend to have more administration 
expenses. Similarly, the two inputs, e. g. administrative expenses and capital 
employed are moderately correlated (r = 0.76, p<0.01). This implies that the 
input variables can be measuring a similar facility. 
From a technical perspective, McMullen and Strong (1998, p2) stated that such 
high correlations would be problematic in multiple regression or factor analysis. 
However, the authors emphasised that in computing DEA scores, it makes no 
difference because DEA will find the best way to maximise the aggregated utility 
with other input and output variables. 
Table 5.2 also shows that several controlling variables are considerably 
correlated with each other. Therefore, at the third analysis stage where the Tobit 
regression is used with these control variables, the problem of multicollinearity 
needs to be addressed (see section 5.6.4) 
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5.6.2 The DEA scores 
Table 5.3 provides a summary of the DEA scores, categorising the sample 
companies into three ownership groups. Panel Ain Table 5.3 reports the total 
technical efficiency based on the CRS. Panels B and C provide a breakdown of 
the total technical efficiency into the pure technical efficiency derived from the 
VRS and the scale efficiency respectively. 
The first general observation from Panels A and B is that the U. K unit trust 
industry is characterised with a large disproportion between companies 
concerning the efficiencies. Only 2 out of 131 companies for the CRS model 
(1.53%) and 13 out of 131 companies for the VRS (9.92%) were efficient. The 
average level of the total technical efficiency for the unit trust company is 
estimated at 36.87% for the CRS and at 47.28% for the VRS. This means that 
the average unit trust company in the U. K would have needed less than half of 
the inputs currently being used. Such overall inefficiencies may not be 
surprising in the sense that the similar asymmetric patterns have been reported in 
the DEA studies on the banking systems in Japan (Fukuyama, 1995), and in 
Croatia (Jemric and Vujcic, 2002) and on the Canadian health insurance (Paradi, 
2002). 
Another important finding is that the pure technical "inefficiency" accounts for 
52.73% (=1-0.4728) in Panel B whereas the scale "inefficiency" accounts for 
17.52% (= 1-0.8248) in Panel C. A different way of paraphrasing this finding is 
that the major source of the total inefficiency is due to the pure technical 
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inefficiency as opposed to the scale inefficiency. Therefore, if the efficiency of 
the UK unit trust companies is to be improved, betterment in the pure technical 
efficiency is much more important than pursuing the scale efficiency. 
Comparative tabulations of Panel A in Table 5.3 reveal that, on average, the total 
technical efficiency of the mutual owned group (= 28.57%) is smaller than other 
two counterparts; quoted company owner group (=37.97%), and privately owned 
company group (=40.64%). With regard to the pure technical efficiency, the 
situation is the same as the total technical efficiency as shown in the tabulations 
of Panel B in Table 5.3. 
Notwithstanding the total and pure inefficiency of the mutual owned companies, 
the mutual company group seems to be slightly more efficient than the other 
groups in terms of the scale efficiency. The tabulations in Panel C presents such 
a propensity, implying that for the mutual owned group, there is relatively little 
scope for improving the scale efficiency. 
It is of interest to explore the characteristics of the efficient companies because 
there may be certain factors that account for their relative high efficiency. At 
this point, the analysis produces a framework that can be used to help follow the 
narrative details of controlling and environmental variables that are used in the 
Tobit regression models. 
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Table 5.3 Summary Statistics for Efficiency Measures of the sample companies 
Total Sample Mutual Quoted Private 
N=131 n=23 n=81 n=27 
Panel A 
CRS. 
- 
Overall Technical Efficiency Score (%) 
Number of Efficient Companies 2 0 1 
-I 
Mean 36.87 28.57 37.97 40.64 
Std. Deviation 18.34 12.67 18.85 19.30 
Minimum 3.75 6.43 3.75 13.41 
Maximum 100.00 72.83 100.00 100.00 
Panel B 
VRS. " Pure Technical Efficiency Score (%) 
Number of Efficient Companies 13 0 10 3 
Mean 47.28 34.01 50.14 50.00 
Std. Deviation 24.77 15.14 26.49 22.94 
Minimum 3.83 6.61 3.83 20.78 
Maximum 100.00 77.29 100.00 100.00 
Panel C 
Scale Efficiency (%) 
Number of Efficient Companies 2 0 1 1 
Mean 82.48 86.17 81.16 83.30 
Std. Deviation 17.06 12.57 18.14 17.04 
Minimum 22.41 42.61 22.41 34.48 
Maximum 100.00 99.97 100.00 100.00 
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The characteristics of the efficient companies are summarised in Table 5.4 for 
the total technical efficiency (CRS) and in Table 5.5 for the pure technical 
efficiency (VRS). From a quick inspection, it can be noticed that that the 
controlling factors vary considerably within a set of the efficient companies. 
Hence, a causal glance suggests that there is no clear linkage between the DEA 
scores and the controlling variables. 
In contrast to the controlling variables, a clear pattern seems be present for the 
ultimate ownership type. Four out of the bottom ten companies are those 
ultimately owned by mutual organisations both for the total technical efficiency 
and for the pure technical efficiency. On the other hand, there is only one mutual 
owned company, i. e. Reliance ranked in the top-ten company list. The 
observation in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 imply the relative inefficiency for the mutual 
owned companies in comparison with the stock owned counterparts. 
Nonetheless, as these remarks are merely indicative, statistical analyses in the 
subsequent sections try to give a more precise account of the influences of the 
controlling variables. Furthermore, the Mann-Whitney test determines whether 
the differences of the DEA scores between the mutual and stock owned groups 
are statistically significant. 
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5.6.3 Results of the rank tests 
For testing the hypothesis (H4), the sample is portioned into the mutual owned 
company group (n=23) and the stock owned company group (n=108). Table 5.6 
reports the results of the Mann-Whitney test. Supporting the hypothesis (H4), 
the results in the first and second columns confirm that the mutual and the stock 
owned company groups statistically differ in terms of the total and pure technical 
efficiency measures. Both of the significant levels are less than 1 %; p=0.005 
for the total technical efficiency and p=0.003 for the pure technical efficiency. 
Nonetheless, as shown in the third column in Table 5.6, the difference between 
the two groups is not statistically significant for the scale efficiency. The 
interpretation of the results is that the mutual group's inefficiency is attributable 
not to the scale inefficiency, but to the pure technical inefficiency. Hence, the 
results provide some degree of support for hypothesis (H4) that unit trust 
management companies owned by stock companies show higher efficiency than 
those owned by mutual institutions. 
Table 5.6 Rank Tests 
between Efficiency Measures of mutual and stock owned company groups 
Grouping Variable: Mutual Dummy for testing 
Overall Technical Efficiency Pure Technical Efficiency Scale Efficiency (%) 
Mann-Whitney U 777 745 1,111 
Wilcoxon W 1,053 1,021 6,997 
Z 
-2.813 -3.008 -0.793 
Asvmp. Sig. (2-tailed 0.005 0.003 0.428 
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The next hypothesis testing concerns the "quoted" versus "non-quoted" company 
ownership. The sample is grouped into the quoted company ownership (n=8 1) 
and the non-quoted company ownership (n=50), including mutual and privately 
owned companies. 
The result in Table 5.7 cannot reject the null hypothesis that the quoted company 
ownership group is identical to the non-quoted company ownership (p>0.05). 
Combined with the result of the hypothesis test (H4), a consequence of the 
hypothesis test (H5) may be partially driven by no significant difference between 
the quoted company and privately owed company groups. To rule out the 
possibility, the additional rank test is run in the subsequent section. 
Table 5.7 Rank Tests 
between Efficiency Measures of quoted and non-quoted company owned groups 
Grouping Variable: Quoted Dummy for testing 
Overall Technical Efficiency Pure Technical Efficiency Scale Efficiency (%) 
Mann-Whitney U 1,753.5 1,708 1,797.5 
Wilcoxon W 3,028.5 2,983 5,118.5 
Z 
-1.286 -1.503 -1.078 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed 0.198 0.133 0.281 
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5.6.4 Results from the Tobit models 
The final analysis employs a Tobit regression whilst controlling environmental 
factors on which managers have less influential impact. Model 1 refers to the 
basic stage where only the mutual dummy variable is used as an independent 
variable. Model 2 refers to the use of the mutual dummy variable and the size of 
assets under management as the independent variables. Model 3 allows an age 
factor as a proxy of the company's experiences. Model 4 a, b and c include not 
only the mutual dummy variable but also the product mix variables. These 
variables are the Herfindhal Index, the number of funds and the number of 
sectors for Model 4 a, b and c respectively. Each controlling variable is entered 
into the Tobit regression model separately in order to avoid the multicolinearity 
problem discussed in the prior section. 
5.6.5 Hypothesis testing (H4) with controlling factors 
Inspection of Tables 5.8 and 5.9 where the efficiency is based on the total 
technical efficiency, and the pure technical efficiency respectively reveal that the 
coefficients of the mutual dummy valuables in most of the models except 4-a are 
negative and statistically significant at 1% level (p<0.05)16. This means that the 
mutual owned unit trust companies are on average less efficient than the stock 
owned company group after controlling business characteristics. Hence, the 
basic results hold from the preceding tests. 
16 The models with the interaction variables lost explanatory power because of the multicolinearity problem. 
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Table 5.8. Regression results (Tobit model) with a dummy variable of the 
mutual owned company. 
Model 1: Score ;=a+ (3, (Mutual Dummy) + c. 
Model 2: Score a+ß, (Mutual Dummy )+ (32 (Log Asset ;)+E; 
Model 3: Score a+ (3 i (Mutual Dummy )+ (32 (Age ;)+E; 
Model 4: Score a+ (3, (Mutual Dummy )+ (32 (Mix k ;)+E; 
Model 4 (interaction): Score ;=a+ (3, (Mutual Dummy ;)+ (32 (Mix k0 
P3 {(Mix k ;)x (Log Asset ; )} + E; 
where 
Score i= Company i's efficiency score under constant return of scale (CRS) 
Mutual Dummy =I if company I belongs to a mutual group, otherwise 0 
Log Asset ;= Company i's asset under management 
Age i= years since Company i' was established 
Mix k; = Product mix defined by category k 
Model I Model 2 Model 3 
coeff. t-ratio (pt) coeff. t-ratio (pt) coeff. t-ratio (pt) 
Constant 38.662 22.00 (0.000)*** 39.063 7.42 (0.000)*** 37.89 13.87 (0.000)*** 
Mutual Dummy 
-10.098 -2.41 (0.017)** -10.101 -2.41 (0.017)** -10.022 -2.39 (0.018)** 
Assets Under Management (log) 
-0.147 -0.08 (0.936) 
Company's Age 0.046 0.37 (0.712) 
LogLikelihood 
-558.253 
-558.25 -558.186 
Probability > Chi-Square 0.017 0.0583 0.0547 
Model 4a (H-index) Model 4a' (Interactiuon) 
coeff. t-ratio (p>t) coeff t-ratio (p>t) 
Constant 37.129 14.72 (0.000)*** 37 13.85 (0.000)*** 
Mutual Dummy 
-10.596 -2.51 (0.013)** -9.753 -1.35 (0.178) 
Herfindah Index 0.455 0.85 (0.399) 0.493 0.82 (0.412) 
(Herfindah Index) X (Mutual Dummy) 
-0.198 -0.14 (0.885) 
Log Likelihood 
-557.897 -557.886 
Probability > Chi-Square 0.041 0.0932 
Model 4b (Sectors) Model 4b' (interaction) 
coeff. t-ratio (pt) coeff. t-ratio (p>t) 
Constant 40.921 13.75 (0.000)*** 41.614 13.27 (0.000)*** 
Mutual Dummy 
-10.686 -2.53 (0.013)** -14.311 -2.13 (0.036)** 
Number of Sectors 
-0.254 -0.94 (0.35) -0.332 -1.13 (0.259) 
(Number of Sectors) X (Mutual Dummy) 0.525 0.69 (0.491) 
Log Likelihood 
-557.814 -557.576 
Probability > Chi-Square 0.038 0.0709 
Model 4c (Funds ) Model 4c' (Interaction) 
coeff. t-ratio (pt) coeff. t-ratio (p>t) 
Constant 40.094 15.01 (0.000)*** 40.528 14.60 (0.000)*** 
Mutual Dummy 
-10.57 -2.49 (0.014)** -13.008 -2.16 (0.033)** 
Number of Funds 
-0.109 -0.71 (0.479) -0.142 -0.87 (0.388) 
(Number of Funds) X (Mutual Dummy) 0.26 0.57 (0.572) 
Lok Likelihood 
-558.001 -557.842 
Probability > Chi-Square 0.046 0.0896 
* ** *** Significant at 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectively 
272 
Table 5.9: Regression results (Tobit model) with a dummy variable of the 
mutual owned company. 
Model 1: Score a+ ßi (Mutual Dummy) +c 
Model 2: Score a+ (Mutual Dummy ;)+ ß2 (Log Asset ;)+£; 
Model 3: Score a+ß, (Mutual Dummy ;)+ ß2 (Age ;)+c 
Model 4: Score a+ ß' (Mutual Dummy ;)+ ß2 (Mix k ;)+£; 
Model 4 (interaction): Score ;=a+ß1 (Mutual Dummy ;)+ ß2 (Mix k ;) 
P3 {(Mix k ;)x (Log Asset ; )} +c 
where 
Score i= Company i's efficiency score under variable return of scale (VRS) 
Mutual Dummy =1 if company I belongs to a mutual group, otherwise 0 
Log Asset ;= Company i's asset under management 
Age i= years since Company i' was established 
Mix k; = Product mix defined by category k 
Model I Model 2 Model 3 
coeff t-ratio (p>t) coeff. t-ratio (p>t) coeff t-ratio (p>t) 
Constant 51.256 19.92 (0.000)*** 46.833 6.06 (0.000)*** 45.947 11.62 (0.000)*** 
Mutual Dummy 
-17.249 -2.83 (0.005)*** -17.197 -2.83 (0.005)*** -16.716 -2.78 (0.006)*** 
Assets Under Management (log) 1.626 0.61 (0.545) 
Company's Age 0.316 1.74 (0.084)* 
Log Likelihood 
-568.428 -568.244 -566.927 
Probability > Chi-Square 0.0052 0.017 0.005 
Model 4a (H-index) Model 4a' (Interactiuon) 
coeff. t-ratio (p>t) coeff. t-ratio (pt) 
Constant 48.8 13.24 (0.000)*** 48.814 12.5 (0.000)*** 
Mutual Dummy 
-18.052 -2.94 (0.004)*** -18.158 -1.74 (0.085)* 
Herfindah Index 0.73 0.93 (0.356) 0.725 0.83 (0.41) 
(Herfindah Index) X (Mutual Dummy) 0.025 0.01 (0.99) 
Log Likelihood 
-567.1 -568 
Probability > Chi-Square 0.013 0.0343 
Model 4b (Sectors) Model 4b' (interaction) 
coeff. t-ratio (p>t) coeff. t-ratio (pt) 
Constant 46.772 10.78 (0.000)*** 46.25 10.09 (0.000)*** 
Mutual Dummy 
-16.078 2.63 (0.010)*** -13.34 -1.37 (0.172) 
Number of Sectors 0.504 1.27 (0.205) 0.563 1.31 (0.192) 
(Number of Sectors) X (Mutual Dummy ) -0.387 -0.35 (0.726) 
Log Likelihood 
-567.621 -567.56 
Probability > Chi-Square 0.01 0.023 
Model 4c (Funds) Model 4c' (Interaction) 
coeff t-ratio (p>t) coeff. t-ratio (p>t) 
Constant 44.39 1 1.56 (0.000)*** 43.547 10.91 (0.000)*** 
Mutual Dummy 
-14.965 -2.48 (0.014)** -10.621 -1.24 (0.219) 
Number of Funds 0.524 2.36 (0.02)** 0.585 2.46(0.015)** 
(Number of Funds) X (Mutual Dummy) -0.462 -0.71 (0.481) 
Log Likelihood 
-565.683 -565.433 
Probability > Chi-Square 0.001 0.0032 
* **1 *** Significant at 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectively 
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One interesting finding is that the coefficient of the number of funds variable in 
the first column (model 4-c) in Table 5.9 is positive (=0.524) and statistically 
significant at 5% level (p<0.05). This means that unit trust management 
companies are likely to improve their efficiencies by increasing the number of 
unit trusts they offer. In reality a potential situation might be that one fund 
manager looks after several unit trusts concurrently whilst the company does not 
necessarily increase the fund manager's salary in proportion to the number of 
unit trusts he or she looks after. Hence, the potential interpretation of this finding 
is that economies of scope are present. 
By contrast other business characteristics seem to have little impact on the 
efficiency scores. Notably coefficients of the assets under management variables 
are not statistically significant. This finding can be interpreted as evidence of 
weak economies of scale and experience in the industry as the previous section 
addressed (see section 3.3.3 in Chapter III). Moreover, no interaction terms in 
the series of model 4a, b and c have significant coefficients, rejecting the 
managerial discretion hypothesis. 
5.6.6 Hypothesis testing (H5) with controlling factors 
In an attempt to capture controlling mechanisms associated with stock markets, 
the preceding mutual dummy variable is replaced with the quoted company 
dummy variable. The results for the total technical efficiency and the pure 
technical efficiency are shown in Table 5.10 and 5.11 respectively. The 
coefficients of the quoted company dummy variable in most of the models are 
24 
insignificant. Exceptions are model 1 in Table 5.11 where no controlling 
variables are added and model 4-a in Table 5.11 where the concentration 
measure for the product line, the Herfindahl index, is included. According to 
Table 5.11, the coefficients of the quoted company dummy variable appeared to 
be positive, 8.095 for model 1 and 10.067 for model 4-a. Nevertheless, both of 
the significant levels are rather low (p>0.05). Given the results, it is hard to 
accept the tenets of hypothesis H5 that the quoted company owned group differs 
from the non-listed company groups. 
Table 5.10 and 5.11 also indicate that coefficients of the controlling variables, 
except the number of funds, are insignificant, rejecting the effects of economies 
of scale and experience. Furthermore, there exists no evidence for the 
managerial discretion hypothesis because no coefficients of the interaction terms 
were found statistically significant. This may be due to the multicolinearity 
problem. Hence, in terms of the effects of the controlling factors, the preceding 
and current analyses of the hypothesis testing are consistent. 
Summarising the results from the Tobit models, it is possible to conclude that on 
average the mutual owned unit trust management companies have the lowest 
efficiency, supporting hypothesis (H4). On the contrary there is no evidence that 
the unit trust companies with quoted company owners differs from other ultimate 
ownership groups, rejecting the hypothesis (H5). 
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Table 5.10. Regression results (Tobit model) with a dummy variable of the 
quoted company ownership. 
Model 1: Score a+ß, (Quoted Dummy) + E; 
Model 2: Score a+ß, (Quoted Dummy )+ (32 (Log Asset ;)+E; 
Model 3: Score a+ß, (Quoted Dummy )+ (32 (Age ;)+E; 
Model 4: Score a+ß, (Quoted Dummy )+ (32 (Mix k ;)+E; 
Model 4 (interaction): Score ;=a+ (3I (Quoted Dummy ;)+ (32 (Mix k ;) 
P3 {(Mix k ;)x (Log Asset ; )} + E; 
where 
Score i= Company i's efficiency score under constant return of scale (CRS) 
Quoted I Dummy =I if company i belongs to a listed company group, otherwise 0 
Log Asset ;= Company i's asset under management 
Age i= years since Company i' was established 
Mix k; = Product mix defined by category k 
Model I Model 2 Model 3 
coeff. t-ratio (pt) coeff. t-ratio (pt) coeff. t-ratio (pt) 
Constant 35.18 13.36 (0.000)*** 36.77 6.91 (0.000)"'i 34.584 0.75 (0.452) 
Quoted Dummy 2.764 0.83 (0.411) 3.168 089(0.347) 1563 075(0452) 
Assets Under Management (log) 
-0.679 -0.34 (0.731) 
Company's Age 00436 0.34 (0.736) 
Log Likelihood 
-560.752 -560.693 -56067 
Probability > Chi-Square 0.41 0.6712 06727 
Model 4a (11-index) Model 4a' (Interactiuon) 
coef t-ratio (pt) coeff. t-ratio (p>t) 
Constant 32.884 8.57 (0.000)*** 35.4 7.91 (0.000)*** 
Quoted Dummy 3.746 1.06 (0 293) 
-0.829 -0 15 (0.881) 
Herfindah Index 0.474 0.82 (0.413) 
-0.046 -0.06 (0.951) 
(lierfindah Index) X (Quoted Company Dummy) 1.262 1.08 (0.282) 
Lou Likelihood 
-560.416 -559.834 
Probability > Chi-Square 0.5087 04725 
Model 4b (Sectors) Model 4b' (interaction) 
coeff. t-ratio (p>t) coeff. t-ratio (p>t) 
Constant 36.729 11.76 (0.000)*** 36.01 9.21 (0.000)*** 
Quoted Dummy 3.93 1.1 (0.274) 5.298 0.92 (0.357) 
Number of Sectors 
-0.268 -0.92 (0.361) -0.144 -0.29 (0.775) 
(Number of Sectors) X (Quoted Company Dummy) 
-0.188 -0.31 (0.761) 
Log Likelihood 
-560.333 -560.287 
Probability > Chi-Square 0.4684 0.6571 
Model 4c (Funds ) Model 4c' (Interaction) 
coeff. t-ratio (pt) coefff, t-ratio (p>t) 
Constant 35.973 12.09 (0.000)*** 34.519 9.7 (0.000)*** 
Quoted Dummy 3.315 0.95 (0.343) 6.007 1.2 (0.234) 
Number of Funds 
-0.091 -0.57 (0.569) 0,076 0.27 (0.784) 
(Number of Funds) X (Quoted Company Dummy) 
-0.251 -0.74 (0.46) 
Log Likelihood 
-560.59 -560.315 
Probability > Chi-Square 0.6052 0.67 
* ** *** Significant at 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectively 
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Table 5.11. Regression results (Tobit model) with a dummy variable 
of the quoted company ownership. 
Model 1: Score ;=a+ß, (Quoted Dummy) + E; 
Model 2: Score =a+ß, (Quoted Dummy )+ (32 (Log Asset ;) +F, i 
Model 3: Score =a+ß, (Quoted Dummy )+ (32 (Age ;)+E; 
Model 4: Score =a+ (3i (Quoted Dummy )+ (32 (Mix k ;)+E; 
Model 4 (interaction): Score a+ (3i (Quoted Dummy ;)+ 132 (Mix k ;) 
P3 {(Mix k ;)x (Log Asset ; )} + E; 
where 
Score i= Company i's efficiency score under variable return of scale (VRS) 
Quoted I Dummy =1 if company i belongs to a listed company group, otherwise 0 
Log Asset ;= Company i's asset under management 
Age i= years since Company i' was established 
Mix k; = Product mix defined by category k 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
coeff. t-ratio (pt) coeff. t-ratio (pt) coeff. t-ratio (pt) 
Constant 43.232 11.26 (0.000)*** 42.637 5.44 (0.000)*** 39.172 8.54 (0.000)*** 
Quoted Dummy 8.095 1.66 (0.10)* 7.947 1.53 (0.127) 6.758 1.38 (0.171) 
Assets Under Management (log) 0.253 0.09 (0.931) 
Company's Age 0.296 1.57 (0.118) 
Log Likelihood 
-570.967 -570.963 
Probability > Chi-Square 0.0995 0.2565 
Model 4a (H-index) Model 4a' (Interactiuon) 
coeff. t-ratio (pt) coeff. t-ratio (pt) 
Constant 38.606 6.91 (0.000)*** 39.686 6.09 (0.000)*** 
Quoted Dummy 10.067 1.95 (0.054)* 8.074 1.00 (0.319) 
Herfindah Index 0.958 1.13 (0.259) 0.734 0.67 (0.504) 
(Herfindah Index) X (Quoted Company Dummy) 0.554 0.32 (0.748) 
Log Likelihood 
-570.326 -570.273 
Probability > Chi-Square 0.136 0.25 
Model 4b (Sectors) Model 4b' (interaction) 
coeff. t-ratio (pt) coeff. t-ratio (pt) 
Constant 40.413 8.88 (0.000)*** 45.404 8.04 (0.000)*** 
Quoted Dummy 6.01 1.16 (0.25) 
-3.591 -0.43 (0.666) 
Number of Sectors 0.485 1.13 (0.26) -0.376 -0.52 (0.603) 
(Number of Sectors) X (Quoted Company Dummy) 1.326 1.47 (0.143) 
Loa Likelihood 
-570.33 -569.25 
Probability > Chi-Square 0.1361 0.105 
Model 4c (Funds) Model 4c' (Interaction) 
coeff. t-ratio (pt) coeff. t-ratio (p>t) 
Constant 38.421 9.02 (0.000)*** 42.809 8.48 (0.000)*** 
Quoted Dummy 4.849 0.98 (0.331) 
-3.458 -0.48 (0.63) 
Number of Funds 0.549 2.36 (0.02)** 0.045 0.12 (0.908) 
(Number of Funds) X (Quoted Company Dummy) 0.772 1.59 (0.114) 
Log Likelihood 
-568.226 -566.964 
Probability > Chi-Square 0.017 0.0133 
* ** *** Significant at 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectively 
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5.6.7 Additional tests 
The two principal findings raise two intriguing issues. The first issue is the need 
to explore sources of inefficiency that the mutual group shows. The second issue 
is whether the failure to reject the hypothesis (H5) test is attributable to the 
similarity between the quoted and private owned company groups. 
Sources of inefficiency 
One must recall that the efficiency is a ratio of weighted inputs to outputs for 
each company and defined by its position relative to the frontier of best 
performance companies. The distance between one company and the frontier is 
referred to the company' s inefficiency. Correspondingly, the distance between a 
company's original inputs and (weighted) inputs in the efficient frontier is 
defined as a potential improvement or a target in DEA. 
The DEA software conveniently indicates such targets as the inefficiency sources 
whilst computing the DEA scores. Taking advantage of such a software 
function, identification of sources of inefficiency is vital in the agency theoretic 
view as described in sections 2.1 and 5.2. Focusing on diverged interests 
between owners and managers of a company, agency theory often addresses 
excess consumption that results in higher costs and over-diversification that 
requires excess capital employed. Clearly such management lowers the 
efficiency of the company, reducing the value of the company. 
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Table 5.12 and 5.13 provide the summary of statistics for potential improvements 
for the total technical efficiency and for the pure technical efficiency 
respectively. It is obvious that on average the mutual owned group has more 
administrative expenses and more capital employed than other two ownership 
groups. 
Table 5.12 Summary of potencial reductions 
in Overall Technical Efficiency (CRS') 
Mutual Quoted Private Total Sample 
n=23 n=81 n=27 N= 131 
Administration Costs % 
Mean 
-72.57 -62.03 -60.20 -63.5 Std. Deviation 9.24 18.85 19.00 17.99 
Minimum 
-93.6 -96.3 -86.6 -96.3 Maximum 
-53.1 0 0 0 
Capital Employed 
Mean 
-75.23 -70.13 -66.68 -70.32 
Std. Deviation 13.98 19.51 20.65 18.97 
Minimum 
-95.00 -98.20 -97.30 -98.2 
Maximum 
-27.2 0 0 0 
Table 5.13 Summary of potencial reductions 
in Pure Technical Efficiency (VRS) 
Mutual Quoted Private Total Sample 
n=23 n=81 n=27 N= 131 
Administration Costs % 
Mean 
-67.33 -49.97 -51.01 -53.24 
Std. Deviation 12.16 26.38 22.83 24.50 
Minimum 
-93.4 -96.20 -79.2 -96.2 
Maximum 
-45.9 0 0 0 
Capital Employed % 
Mean 
-68.52 -58.43 -52.16 -58.91 
Std. Deviation 15.93 28.33 23.28 25.91 
Minimum 
-93.4 -97.8 -84.9 -97.8 
Maximum 
-22.7 0 0 0 
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Tables 5.14 and 5.15 report the results of the Mann-Whitney test, showing 
whether such differences between the mutual and the stock ownership groups are 
statistically significant. 
Table 5.14 Rank Tests of potencial improvements of overall technical efficiency 
between mutual and stock owned company groups 
Administration Costs % Capital Employed % 
Mann-Whitney U 766.5 993 
Wilcoxon W 1,042.5 1,269 
Z 
-2.877 -1.506 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.004 0.132 
Table 5.15 Rank Tests of potencial improvements of pure technical of iciency 
between mutual and stock owned company groups 
Administration Costs % Capital Employed % 
Mann-Whitney U 73 5.5 935.5 
Wilcoxon W 1,011.5 1,211.5 
Z 
-3.066 -1.855 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 0.064 
The first columns in both of the Tables indicate that administrative expenses 
differ between the mutual and stock owned groups at the 1% significant level 
(0.004 for the total technical efficiency model and 0.002 for the pure technical 
efficiency model). In contrast to the administrative expenses, capital employed 
is not statistically different between the mutual and stock groups at the 5% 
significant level (0.132 for the total technical efficiency model and 0.064 for the 
pure technical efficiency model). Therefore, these additional analyses attribute 
the relative inefficiency of the mutual owned group to excess administrative 
expenses. The finding supports the agency theoretic view that companies owned 
by shareholders face stronger incentive or pressure from the shareholders' 
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monitoring to control costs in comparison with the mutual counterpart where 
depositors and policy holders own the mutuals (Berger and Humphery, 1997) 
Similarity between the quoted and private owned company groups. 
The failure to reject the null hypothesis of the quoted versus non-quoted 
company ownership groups may be attributable to the homogeneity between the 
public and private company groups. To rule out the possibility, the Mann- 
Whitney test is conducted on the two groups with regard to three efficiency 
measures. The results are presented in Table 5.16. It is clear that there are no 
statistical differences between the two groups regardless of the efficiency 
measures, e. g. the total technical, the pure technical and scale efficiency. Thus, 
the lack of support for the hypothesis (H5) is due to the similar degree of the 
efficiencies between public and privately owned company groups. 
Table 5.16 Rank Tests 
between Efficiency Measures of quoted and privately owned company groups 
Overall Technical Efficiency Pure Technical Efficiency Scale Efficiency (%) 
Mann-Whitney U 1,025.5 1,053 987.5 
Wilcoxon W 4,346.5 4,374 4,308.5 
Z 
-0.482 -0.288 -0.752 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.629 0.774 0.452 
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5.7 Chapter Summary 
Based on a comparison of the results between the Mann-Whitney test and the 
Tobit regression estimation, the two analyses are generally united in the 
following findings. A unit trust management company owned by a mutual 
organisation tend to be less efficient than those owned by the stock companies, 
supporting the hypothesis I. Furthermore, a few additional tests revealed that the 
inefficiency of the mutual owner group is attributable to their relatively large 
administrative expenses. This is consistent with agency theory that managers in 
stock owned companies are expected to face stronger cost-control incentives or 
pressures compared to those in mutual owned organisations. 
For testing the hypothesis of the quoted versus non-quoted company ownership, 
no significant difference was found between the two groups, providing scant 
evidence for the hypothesis. This is possibly attributable to the fact that no clear 
distinction exists between the quoted and privately owned company groups. In 
this sense, effects associated with dispersed ownership and with institutional 
ownership are cloudy. 
In addition to the main hypothesis tests noted above, the Tobit regression models 
also analysed how well the relative efficiency scores can be explained by factors 
that are not in the DEA computation. The results from the models indicate that 
most of the controlling variables, except for the number of funds, are not 
associated with the DEA scores. The findings in this light are inconsistent with 
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economies of scale, and experience. Moreover, no significant coefficients of the 
interaction terms cast doubt on the managerial discretion hypothesis. 
It is of fundamental importance that the current chapter focused on the efficiency 
at the company level. Given the approach of this chapter, there is a potential 
concern from the literature on efficiency of financial institutions. It may be the 
case that high-quality producers appear to the cost inefficient due to the extra 
expenses associated with producing the high quality output (Berger and Mester, 
1997; Berger and Humphrey, 1997; and Mandos et al, 2002). Such a problem 
may be ameliorated by analysing the quality of products that the sample 
companies offer. Clearly, in the context of this thesis, the quality of products 
refers to the investment performance of unit trusts that the companies manage. 
The following chapter, the last empirical analysis of the present thesis, will 
explore potential effects of ultimate ownership on their products. 
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Chapter VI 
Analysis of Unit Trust Performance 
6.1 Introduction 
Having dealt with the issues of the risk-taking and the efficiency of unit trust 
management companies in the U. K, Chapter VI, the final chapter will address the 
area of the individual unit trusts that the companies offer. In principle this 
chapter shifts its focus to risk and performance of the companies' products. 
This chapter serves as a supplement to Chapter V where the efficiency of the 
company is investigated for the following reason: The data set used in Chapter V 
does not fully capture the quality of their output, i. e. performance of unit trusts. 
Expanding the line of this reasoning, this chapter starts with a number of 
justifications for why the study of unit trusts is indispensable. 
6.1.1 Supplement to the previous analysis 
The previous chapter elaborated on the corporate efficiency across the unit trust 
management companies with different ultimate ownership. The DEA for 
computing the efficiency scores incorporates administrative expenses and capital 
employed as inputs and revenues as output for a sample company. The 
computation technique for the DEA was based on the input minimisation, 
showing how much the company could reduce its inputs without lowering its 
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output. A key justification for the input minimisation approach is that given the 
nature of the unit trust business described in Chapter III, managers are 
considered to have managerial decision-making not on revenues but on the costs 
of their companies. At its heart such an input orientation is parallel to "cost 
efficiency". The term "cost efficiency" refers to the ratio between the minimum 
cost at which it is possible to attain a given volume of production and the realised 
cost (Maudos et al, 2002, p34). The topic is often addressed in literature on 
efficiency of financial institutions. 
However, researchers have recently raised a concern with the essence of the cost 
efficiency (Berger and Mester, 1997 and Berger and Humphrey, 1997). These 
authors pointed out that it is always dangerous to exclude the quality of some 
financial services that are not captured in the output measures (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997). If this is the case, cost inefficiency might be overstated due to 
differences in service quality. In order to solve such a problem, it is 
indispensable to analyse the quality of individual unit trusts that sample 
companies offer. 
6.1.2 A conflict of interest between owners and customers 
The next motivation for the unit trust analysis stems from prior agency literature 
on financial service institutions. The literature has addressed that a conflict of 
interest exists between company's owners and their clients or customers in stock 
owned companies (Mayers and Smith, 1986 and 1988). Such a conflict of 
interest leads to the claim that stock companies are inclined to charge higher fees 
and take excess risk for the product that they offer. By contrast, the mutual 
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counterparts are unlikely to suffer from such problems because the owners are 
the policyholders or depositors themselves. Hence, financial products that the 
mutual organisations offer are highly competitive with those of the stock 
companies offer. Within the context of the conjecture, the analysis of individual 
unit trusts should provide valuable information. Section 6.2 describes the 
Mayers and Smith' argument in detail and develops the basic hypothesis for this 
chapter. 
6.1.3 A degree of curiosity 
There has been a degree of curiosity about the effects of the recent 
demutualisation on financial products. Industry associations and newspaper 
articles have enquired whether financial products provided by mutual institutions 
or demutualised companies remain competitive with the existing stock owned 
rivals. 
To date, a number of recent statistics seem to support the positive view of 
financial products that mutual organisations offer. For example, the Financial 
Timest reveals that the average difference between mortgage and saving rates is 
2.1 % for stock owned banks and 1% for the building societies. Similarly, twelve 
out of the 15 cheapest lenders over the past 10 years have been building societies 
despite the fact that two-thirds of the financial service sector consists of stock 
owned banks. The same article in the Financial Times also reports that 11 of the 
top 15 Tessa providers have been mutual institutions. 
1 Peter Martin "Our mutual demise" The Financial Times, 29 June 1999 
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Nonetheless, to my knowledge, there is no research on performance difference of 
unit trusts between the mutual and proprietary owned groups. The lack of 
research in this area is rather peculiar given the fact that the UK unit trust 
industry has 17.8 million unit holders whose unit assets totalled 236 billion 
pounds at the end of 2001 (the Investment Management Association, 2001). 
6.1.4 Implication for financial theory 
From a perspective of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), one can ask 
whether unit trusts managed by the mutual owned companies are better than 
those by the stock owned counterparts. To put the argument in perspective, one 
must recall the literature on the EMH cited in Chapter II that persistency of fund 
performance is investigated as a proof of the market inefficiency. Extended from 
such a research interest, various attempts are made to distinguish what factors are 
the sources of the performance with abnormal returns2. The approach is often 
referred to as attribution analysis. Popular tools for the attribution analysis are 
factor models developed by Fama and French (1993) for stock returns and by 
Carhart (1997) for mutual fund returns. These models are briefly noted in 
Chapter II. 
More recently, the attribution analysis is extended by taking up the issue of 
characteristics of fund managers and their companies, which may contribute to 
their fund performance. Initially, it seems at odds to search for managerial or 
2 In general, abnormal returns are defined as 
the intercepts from excess return regressions calculated with a benchmark that is mean-variance efficient. 
(Grinblatt and Titman, 1989, p. 395). 
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corporate factors that could account for differential performance of funds under 
the efficient market hypothesis. The hypothesis states that stock prices already 
reflect all available information so that no one can beat the market continuously 
by using publicly available data. Nonetheless, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and 
Atkinson et al (2003) argue that managers with certain characteristics can 
perform better than others in a world where capital markets are informationally 
efficient. Chevalier and Ellison (p. 897) suggest the following explanation for the 
view: 
If the jobs of a fund manager is to gather and analyse information in a nearly 
efficient market, the claim that some managers are better than others need not 
be any more surprising than a claim that some physicians and economists are 
better than others. 
Viewed from the similar but not the exactly same perspectives, scholars have 
investigated potential attribution factors. Examples are; incentive fees (Golec, 
1988; Elton et al 2003); mangers' gender (Bliss and Potter, 2002; Atkinson et al, 
2003); managers' age, tenure, and educational degree (Golec, 1996; Chevalier 
and Ellison 1999); team management (Prather and Middleton, 2002); and 
company ownership (Frey 2001, Berkowitz and Qiu, 2003). Some studies 
indicate that personal characteristics have impact on the fund performance in a 
manner contrary to the EMH. Extending this line of research to the present 
thesis suggests that it is acceptable to expect ultimate ownership of unit trust 
management companies to account for performance differences across their 
managed unit trusts. With regard to this, the final analysis of the present thesis 
makes a contribution to the literature on performance attribution. 
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Given these reasons, this chapter calls attention to the effect of ultimate 
ownership on risk and performance at the product offering level. To this end, the 
final chapter sets out to contrast performance of unit trusts run by the mutual 
owned groups with those run by their proprietary counterparts. 
The remainder of Chapter VI is as follows. Section 6.2 provides further insight 
into the previous literature, leading to a key conjecture, the validity of which will 
be tested in this chapter. By summarising Mayers and Smith' agency perspective 
(1988 and 1992), the first half of section 6.2 specifically addresses a conflict of 
interest between owners and customers. The second half of section 6.2 provides 
several summaries of attribution studies on mutual fund from managerial 
perspective. The review of these studies ensures that the present research topic 
can make a contribution to the existing literature. 
Section 6.3 outlines the methodology of this chapter. To begin with section 6.3.1 
focuses on conventional measures of fund performance. It is important that one 
should not evaluate fund performance, i. e. return of fund investment without 
considering risk. The argument concerning traditional performance measures 
leads to the recent expansion of the DEA into fund performance. This is the 
subject of section 6.3.4 where advantages of using DEA method over the 
conventional measures of fund performance is highlighted. In concurrence with 
the DEA approach, section 6.3.4 also includes recent studies on fund 
performance with the DEA. Furthermore, section 6.3.5 discusses the model 
specification of the DEA methodology and provides details of the unit trust data. 
Section 6.4 presents results of the empirical investigations. The investigations 
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include descriptive statistics of the DEA scores and statistical methods 
comparing the DEA scores between the mutual and stock owned groups. Section 
6.5 presents summary remarks. 
6.2 Review of literature and hypothesis development 
This section consists of four subsections, the first of which begins by looking at 
the simple debate over the mutual versus stock owned companies from the 
perspective of their financial products. In comparing investment products such 
as unit trusts, the first section suggests that the simple focus on the product fees 
can be erroneous. The second sub-section reviews the most influential argument 
posited by Mayers and Smith (1988,1994), addressing a conflict of interest 
between customers e. g. policyholders and shareholders. The second subsection 
leads to the basic proposition for the current analysis under the efficient market 
hypothesis. As the efficient market hypothesis is evidently controversial, the 
third section looks at studies whose implicit objectives are to challenge the 
hypothesis. To this end, these empirical works examine whether manager's 
characteristics are of great importance in terms of their fund performance. Given 
the second and third sub-sections, the final section attempts to develop the 
testable hypothesis for this chapter. 
6.2.1 Non-dividend advantage 
In considering the mutual versus proprietary ownership debate, Cook et al (2001) 
mentioned that mutuals are in a position to offer better products, i. e. saving 
accounts with higher interest rates, and mortgages with lower interest rates. It is 
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argued that the advantage is derived from the mutual's non-dividend policy as 
opposed to dividend payable to shareholders in the stock owned company. All 
re-distributable profits are returned directly to the mutual members in the form of 
better products. 
If this is the case, such an argument could be applied to the unit trusts in a 
manner that certeris paribus, fees of unit trusts run by mutual owner groups can 
be lower than those run by proprietary owner groups. As a testable hypothesis, 
however, the statement is incomplete because of the absence of quality of fund 
e. g. fund performance. McWilliams, (1997) posits that "we should charge more 
for these high performers" (McWilliams, 1997, p30). This should be particularly 
the case when comparing investment products such as unit trusts and pension 
funds because in general, the range of performance of such investment-linked 
products is far wider than that of saving and borrowing products. Thus for 
testing the hypothesis associated with fees, one should not ignore the importance 
of the quality of the product. 
6.2.2. Risk-taking propensity 
Both Meckling and Jensen (1976) and Mayers and Smith (1986,1988) argue that 
different ownership structures have unique mechanisms to deal with incentive 
conflicts amongst stakeholders in modern organisations. By studying the U. S 
insurance industry where mutual and stock owned companies co-exist, the 
authors distinguish an incentive conflict between owners and managers from that 
between owners and their policyholders. As for the former type of conflict of 
interest, little need be said because the previous two chapters address the 
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connection between ultimate ownership and risk and performance of a company. 
The conflict of interest between policyholders and residual claimants, e. g. 
shareholders in stock owned insurance companies have not yet been investigated. 
An analogy that Mayers and Smith attempt to draw is the transfer effect from 
bond holders to shareholders. Policyholders face a risk of wealth transfer by 
stockholders whose residual claim value increases as the company's risk rises. 
The authors present the following as an example. If the stock owned company 
substitutes high risk for low risk assets, the value of shareholding is up whilst the 
value of policy holder claims decreases on the ground that if the investment in 
the high risk asset pays off, more of the gain goes to the shareholders than they 
lose if the investment fails. 
In brief, Mayers and Smith's concept regarding the conflict of interest between 
owners and policyholders is to consider the payout of shareholders as a call 
option. If the subsequent analysis is to follow this line of reasoning, it is 
indispensable to clarify the following questions before proceeding to the 
empirical analyses. The first and more general question is whether the situation 
of the unit trust industry is applicable for the setting of the agency theory 
paradigm. Building on Mayers and Smith's idea, the second and more specific 
question is whether such an asymmetrical payout setting is present between 
owners of unit trust companies and unit holders, and subsequently increasing the 
owners' incentive to take excess risk. 
The aftermentioned points have already been confirmed through the review of 
prior empirical studies in Chapter II. Section 2.1 in Chapter II revealed that a 
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conflict of interest is likely to arise between owners and unit holders of unit trust 
management companies. Furthermore, studies in Chapter II reported evidence 
that such conflict of interests is more likely to occur because of the asymmetrical 
payoff pattern given the fee structure and fund investors' reactions measured by 
their money flows into funds. Therefore, it is worthwhile to formulate a 
conjecture and validate it whilst assuming that a conflict of interest exists 
between shareholders and customers of a company. 
The primary proposition 
Mayers and Smith's prediction on a conflict of interest between owners and 
customers of a company leads to the following primary suggestion: Unit trusts 
managed by mutual organisations show lower risk-taking than those by stock 
owned companies. 
Nonetheless, to test out the hypothesis is problematic with respect to the risk- 
expected return trade-off, an axiom of modern financial theory. Typically the 
risk-expected return relationship is captured in the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) and the security market line. 
The essence of the CAPM is that the more (systematic) risk a fund carries, the 
greater the fund expected return. For this reason the risk analysis for individual 
funds without a return perspective should not be accepted at face value. 
Furthermore, the positive relationship between risk and return leads to the 
implication that unit trusts with lower risk result in yielding lower returns. As a 
result, the primary proposition should be rephrased thus, unit trusts run by the 
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mutual ownership groups show lower risk tendency, resulting in lower return 
than those by the stock ownership counterparts. In a world of the efficient 
market hypothesis the hypothesis leads to the implication that there should be no 
difference of funds' risk-adjusted returns between the mutual and stock 
ownership groups (See hypothesis H6 in section 6.2.4). 
6.2.3 Managerial effects on fund performance 
A number of studies in Chapter II indicate that the efficient market hypothesis is 
controversial. In this respect, implicitly challenging the efficient market 
hypothesis, a number of recent studies examined the effect of manager's certain 
characteristics on their fund performance. This section provides a quick 
literature review on various factors that may explain differential performance of 
funds. 
The main motivation for this review is to develop the hypothesis regarding the 
organisational effect on their fund product whilst establishing the connection 
between the empirical analysis in this chapter and early studies in the literature. 
More precisely, the review serves as a cross-reference to the primary proposition 
for this chapter noted in the preceding section. 
Incentive fee effect 
One of early studies in this subject is Golec's (1988) incentive effect on returns. 
From the agency theoretical perspective, his enquiry was whether funds with 
incentive fee schemes provide investors with superior returns. Based on monthly 
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return data available over the period from 1982 to 1987, the data sample 
consisted of 3 87 funds. 
Golec's main findings were that the difference between the average Jensen's 
alphas of the incentive fee funds and the full sample was 0.06 (p > 0.05) and 
therefore not statistically significant. On the risk side, the incentive funds 
exhibited significantly higher average betas and standard deviations of returns 
than the full sample whereas the average r-squared is higher for the incentive 
funds. 
The result from the matching sample comparison is more noteworthy. The 
difference of the Jensen's alpha between 27 funds with incentive fees and the 
matching 27 funds without incentive fees was 1.59 (p < 0.05), which is 
statistically significant. On the other hand, the risk proxies such as beta, standard 
deviations showed no significant difference between the two groups. Golec, 
therefor, concludes that incentive fees appear to improve the relative fund 
performance. 
A recent study (Elton et al 2003) with larger fund samples and for a longer period 
(from 1990 to 1999) supported Golec's positive view on the incentive fee effect. 
Their research found that on average the incentive-fee funds have higher risk 
adjusted performance. The authors also pointed out that the incentive fee funds 
were likely to take on more risk than the non-incentive fee funds when the 
averaged r-squared on the relevant benchmark was referred to as the fund risk. It 
is important to note that on average incentive fee funds have a beta less than one. 
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Given the combination of these observations, the authors argue that funds \, 6th 
incentive fees exhibited better stock selection skill than funds without incentive 
fees. 
Based on these studies, it can be said that "incentive fees attract managers who 
are more skilled or exert more effort than those who are attracted to funds 
without incentive fees " (Elton et al, p. 802). 
Effect of age, tenure, and MBA degree 
Using data of fund managers' personal characteristics such as educational 
background, age, and tenure, Golec (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1999) 
examined the impact of a manager's characteristics on his or her fund 
performance. The fundamental reason for their approach is education, age and 
experience, e. g. tenure matter because the nature of their job is data collection 
and analysis like doctors and statisticians. 
By and large, both studies agreed on the positive effect of certain characteristics 
of fund managers on their fund performance despite the fact that there are minor 
discrepancies between the two studies. 
Golec (1996) found that better performance is to be expected from well- 
diversified funds3, managed by younger, long-tenured managers with an MBA 
degree. Further, the systematic risk, e. g. beta was positively related to turnover, 
Measured by a high R-squared (Golec, 1988). 
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fund age, and a possession of an MBA degree whereas the residual risk was 
negatively related to fund age and size. Overall, Golec concludes that a fund 
performance and risk-taking are significantly impacted by the managers' 
characteristics. 
Chevalier and Ellison's study (1999) differed from Golec' study in three ways. 
First and foremost, Chevalier and Ellison included the university quality 
variable4, which turned out positively related to risk-adjusted returns of funds. 
Secondly, and of methodologically importance, Golec's focus on three-year 
returns is likely to suffer from larger survivorship biases than Chevalier and 
Ellison's study (See Chevalier and Ellison, 1999. p. 878, footnote 3). This results 
in stronger prediction power of explanatory variables in Golec' study. For 
instance, the positive effect of the MBA on the risk-adjusted return was 0.943 at 
the 10% significant level. The corresponding coefficient in the Chevalier and 
Ellison model was 0.04 but statistically indistinguishable. 
Finally, by using a four-factor model in a manner similar to Carhart (1997)5' 
Chevalier and Ellison revealed that some characteristics of fund managers were 
not related to fund performance but to investment styles. For example, managers 
with MBAs showed a significant tendency to invest in stocks with low book-to- 
market ratios. Another finding is the positive relationship between managers' 
4 The variable is based on the average student's Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) score for a given college. 
5 The four factors are: (A) The return of the value weighted NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq composite index minus 
the risk free rate (Referred to as the RMRF). (B) A zero investment portfolio constructed by subtracting the 
returns of low book-to market ratio stocks from the returns of high book to market ratio stocks (the HML 
portfolio) (C) A zero investment portfolio constructed by subtracting the stock returns of large market 
capitalisation firms from the stock returns of small market capitalisation firms (the SMB portfolio), and (D) 
A zero investment portfolio constructed as the spread between the performance of stocks that are in the top 
30 % of returns in the prior 12 months and those that are in the bottom 30% (the PR I YR portfolio). 
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age and the momentum variable of the factor model. This means that senior 
managers employ the momentum strategy by buying "hot" stocks, rather than 
taking the contrarian strategy that buy unfashionable stocks. 
Gender effect 
Expanding upon prior research concerning the impact of certain managerial 
characteristics on performance, recent studies by Bliss and Potter (2002) and 
Atkinson et al (2003) investigated the role of fund managers' gender on their 
funds' performance. The main reason for their studies comes from the notion 
that men and women consider money, risk, and investment differently (Bliss and 
Potter, p. 2; Atkinson et al, p. 2). 
Bliss and Potter collected 2571 domestic, e. g. the US, equity mutual funds and 
652 international equity mutual funds finding that female managers run 
approximately 11 % of these funds. According to the descriptive statistics, 
female fund managers seem to take more risk than their male counterparts in 
terms of total risk (standard deviation of returns), market risk (beta), and 
Morningstar's bear market rank index6. However, when the performance is 
measured by the Sharpe ratio, the differences turned out to be indistinct. 
The second analysis that the authors demonstrate is to create the matched sample 
composed of 124 domestic funds and conduct a cross sectional regression. The 
6A bear market is defined as all months in the past five years that the S&P 500 lost more than 3%. 
Morningstar adds up a fund's performance during each bear-market month to reach a total bear-market 
return. Based on these returns, each fund us then assigned a percentile ranking. For example, a fund \v ith a 
bear-market rank of 5% has withstood poor markets well, whilst one with a rank of 95% has not 
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model has the fund return as the dependent variable and various control variables 
such as gender dummy variable, fund size, fund beta and fund manager's tenure. 
According to the result for the cross sectional regression, there were no 
performance differences between male and female fund managers in the matched 
sample. 
Atkinson et al (2003) pursued a similar study by collecting data of fixed income 
funds and then limiting the number of funds in the sample so as to match female 
managed funds with male managed funds. The overall result was consistent with 
that of Bilss and Potter (2002) in that the regression results showed no difference 
between the male and female managed funds in terms of performance and risk. 
Team effect 
According to Prather and Middleton's literature summary (2002), opinions vary 
as to the effectiveness of team decision-making versus individual decision- 
making. Classic decision-making theory suggests no difference between team 
and individual decision-making. By contrast, behavioural decision-making 
theory posits that team decision-making is better than that of an individual. 
Given the conflicting viewpoints, Prather and Middleton (2002) examined 
whether funds managed by teams of fund managers are better than those 
managed by individual fund managers. 
The authors collected 162 mutual funds over a 13-year period. There were 15 
funds managed by teams of fund managers in the sample data. By substituting 
the return index for the individual managed funds the authors directly compared 
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the performance of the individually managed and team-managed funds7. 
The result in the modified CAPM model shows that as the Jensen's alpha is not 
significant, there is no performance difference between the two management 
category groups regardless of their investment styles. This finding supports the 
efficient market hypothesis. 
Summary remarks 
As for the results from prior research, evidence is divergent. A few scholars 
documented evidence for effects of incentive fees and managers' educational 
backgrounds on their fund performance. Other studies reported little evidence on 
particular personal or managerial factors that affect the fund performance. 
Given the literature review in this section, it is evident that the research angle of 
the analysis in Chapter VI is similar in one respect and different in other. The 
similarity is that the central issue of Chapter VI revolves around managerial 
factors that may have an impact on the fund performance. The difference is that 
most of the prior studies analysed attribution factors at the individual fund 
manager level. By contrast, the focus throughout this thesis is on the corporate 
or organisation level. This is a relatively untapped area to date. As Chapter II 
showed, only a few scholars like Frey (2001), and Berkowit and Qiu (2003) 
The modified model is written as follows. R"" 
-Rf=a+, Q(R0, `' -R f) +s 
where R ream 
oy 
is the return on the team managed fund sub-sample for a given investment objective group o 
during period t, Rf is the risk free rate, 
Roll is the return on the individually managed fund sample for the same investment objective group o 
during period t. 
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investigated the organisational or ownership effect of the fund management 
company on their fund performance. Hence, potential contributions of the 
analysis in Chapter VI to the literature can not be overlooked. 
As for the hypothesis development, Chevalier and Ellison's study (1999) is 
informative in a sense that fund management is knowledge intensive, requiring 
the collection of quality data and expert analysis. By putting Chevalier and 
Ellison's view into the organisation theory of Fama and Jensen (1983a and b) in 
Chapter II, it is possible to conjecture that certain organisational form have better 
managerial practice or skilful employees, fitting well into fund management 
business. Specifically, it is possible to make a hypothesis by building on the 
effect of incentive fees on fund performance (Golec 1989, and Elton et al 2003). 
The hypothesis is that as different forms of organisations have developed 
different incentive practices, funds managed by companies with different 
ownership form differ in terms of risk-adjusted performance. 
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6.2.4 Hypothesis development 
Hypotheses (H6) and (H7) 
There are two plausible but conflicting hypotheses that emerge from the review 
of prior studies. Given the Mayers and Smith's argument on the conflict of 
interests between customers and shareholders, the basic hypothesis is that: Funds 
with the mutual ownership groups take less risk than those with the proprietary 
ownership counterparts. However, under the efficient market hypothesis, funds 
with low (high) risk result in lower (higher) return of the funds. Moreover, there 
is a possibility that mutual affiliated companies charge less on their unit trusts 
because of the less conflict of interests between the account holders and owners 
in the mutual group than the comparable stock owned companies. Therefore, the 
implication from the basic hypothesis is that 
(H6) Market efficient hypothesis: There should be no difference between the 
mutual and stock ownership groups in terms of the risk-adjusted performance of 
their funds. (H6) 
Another implication can be derived from the first hypothesis in the context of the 
current thesis. If unit trusts managed by the mutual groups show tendency 
toward the lower risk-expected return investment, the mutuals' relative 
inefficiency reported in Chapter V is hardly attributable to the quality of their 
outputs. 
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An alternative hypothesis 
An alternative hypothesis is formulated not only by applying agency perspective 
more broadly, but also by considering recent empirical studies regarding the 
managerial effects on fund performance. The alternative hypothesis predicts 
that: 
(H7) Organisation effect hypothesis: Risk-adjusted performance of fund differs 
between the mutual and stock ownership groups. 
The idea behind the alternative hypothesis is that as discussed in Chapter II, 
different organisational forms develop their own unique managerial practices, 
including incentives. On can be certain that such managerial practices have an 
impact on their fund management business. It is possible to assume that due to 
the different practices, one organisational form can facilitate a more favourable 
environment for the unit trust management business whereas the other ones do 
not have comparative advantages in the industry. It is important to note that the 
alternative hypothesis does not predict which type of organisational form 
generates better fund performance. The alternative hypothesis, e. g. hypothesis 
(H7) simply suggests the difference of the fund performance by ultimate 
ownership type. 
Similar to hypothesis (H6), the alternative hypothesis has an important relevance 
to the preceding chapter. The analysis for superior fund performance may 
provide insights into why efficiency differs between unit trust management 
companies with the mutual groups and those with the proprietary groups. 
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Moreover, in formulating the hypothesis, the issue of fee setting is an additional 
complication that should not be overlooked (See, for example, section 6.2.1). In 
essence, the issue of whether ultimate ownership matters at the unit trust level is 
an empirical question because the hypotheses are at odds and the fee setting is a 
complex issue. 
In summary, the most important aspect of testing out the hypotheses is to ensure 
that risk, return and fees are considered simultaneously. This is the central 
justification of the DEA approach in the subsequent analysis. To this end, the 
following methodology section concerns traditional risk-adjusted measures for 
mutual fund performance whilst highlighting key caveats of these measures. 
6.3 Methodology and data description 
6.3.1 Performance measures 
Chapter II indicated that accurate performance measure is a principle of fund 
performance persistence that challenges the validity of the efficient market 
hypothesis. For this reason since shortly after the CAPM theory was proposed, 
numerous studies have been concerned with methodologies of performance 
measurement. The task in this section is to review traditional performance 
measures within the two dimensions of risk and return. Furthermore, major 
limitations of these conventional measures are described. In addressing such 
constraints, the next section will highlight several advantages of using the DEA 
method over the standard performance measures. 
3 0> 
Sharpe ratio (1966) 
Sharpe ratio divides fund excess return over the sample duration by the standard 
deviation of return over that duration. The measure shows the trade off between 
reward and total volatility. For this account, this measure is also named as 
reward-to-variability ratio. In choosing between two or more alternative 
investments, investment managers select the investment with a high Sharpe ratio 
because the investment achieved good return for its level of volatility. 
Let us turn to an example of the Sharpe ratio in use. In order to evaluate overall 
performance of fund A, one needs to compute the Sharpe ratio of the relevant 
benchmark, (often the ex-post capital market line is used8) as the corresponding 
Sharpe ratio; 
Sharpe ratio = (Rp 
- 
Rf) / ßp 
where 
(6.1) 
RP = the mean return on portfolio, p, over the interval considered. 
Rf = the averaged risk free rate over the interval considered. 
ßp = the standard deviation of the excess return on portfolio, p over the interval 
considered. 
If the Sharpe ratio of fund A is higher than that of the ex-post market portfolio, 
then one can say that fund A has outperformed the market. 
Note that the precise denominator of Eq. (6.1) can be described as (6p-6f) 
because the Sharpe ratio involves dividing the portfolio's excess return, (Rp - Rf) 
by its standard deviation. In this light, a point to remember is that the Sharpe 
8 The set of portfolio obtainable by combining the market portfolio with risk 
free borrowing or lending. 
(Sharpe et al 1999) 
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ratio should be computed by using the mean and standard deviation of a 
differential return (Sharpe, 1994 and Dowd, 2000). Hence, great care is taken to 
avoid confusing the Sharpe ratio with the information ratio that uses the mean 
and standard deviation of the distribution of the return on a single investment 
such as a fund or benchmark. 
There are further observations to be made regarding the Sharpe ratio. Firstly, 
investment risk with standard deviation of return is not a perfect approach 
because from a viewpoint of ordinary investors, the deviation above the mean is 
rarely considered as a "bad outcome". Based on standard deviation, the Sharpe 
ratio is also the case as the ratio does not distinguishing between upside and 
downside volatility. In other words, the Sharpe ratio penalises the upside 
volatility exactly the same as the downside volatility. Moreover, the Sharpe ratio 
is appropriate only if the distribution of its rate of return is known. Finally, the 
Sharpe ratio does not take account of correlation in choosing between two or 
more alternative investment. Sharpe (1994) noted that "neither incorporates 
information about the correlation of a fund or strategy with other assets, 
liabilities, or previous realizations of its own return (p. 51)" For these reasons, 
the Sharpe ratio may not be a helpful tool for investors who attempt to add a fund 
to their existing portfolios (Strong, 2000). It is said that the Sharpe ratio is of use 
when the overall performances of well-diversified funds are evaluated and 
ranked (Bodie et al, 1996). 
Nonetheless, a recent work by Dowd (2000) presented a solution to the non- 
correlation problem by constructing the Sharpe ratio for each resulting portfolio, 
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combining the existing portfolio with each of the alternative new investment. 
This method automatically adjusts for the correlation between the existing 
portfolio and the potential new investment. 
Treynor measure (1966) 
In a manner similar to the Sharpe ratio, the Treynor measure uses averaged 
portfolio excess returns. However, the excess return is divided not by total risk 
(as measured by its standard deviation), but by systematic risk (as measured by 
beta). Stemmed from the CAPM, the underling assumption of the measure is 
that non-systematic risk is largely diversified way. 
To compute the Treynor measure, one needs to determine the beta of the fund 
based on the ex post Security Market Line (SML). The ex post SML is plotted in 
the diagram where the vertical axis represents return and the horizontal axis 
proxies risk, i. e beta. To put it another way, the ex post SML is going through 
the points (0, the averaged risk free rate) and (1, the averaged market return). 
Under the ex post SML, the expected average return of a fund and its beta can be 
estimated as follows: 
RP 
= 
Rf + ßP( RM 
-Rf) (6.2) 
where 
ßP 
= 
Covariance (rn, rM) / Variance (rM). 
Rf = the averaged risk free rate 
RM 
= the averaged market return 
Rp 
= the expected average return of a portfolio, p. 
Then, the Treynor measure is formulated 
Treynor measure = (Rp 
- 
Rt) / ßp (6.3) 
308 
In practice market indices such as S&P 500 in the U. S and TOPIX in Japan 
substitute for the ex-post markets in case of equity fund valuations. Once the 
beta of the fund is estimated, the excess return of the fund, i. e. the net of the risk 
free rate on the fund, is divided by the beta. As similar to the Sharpe ratio, the 
higher Treynor measure means the more superior risk adjusted return on the 
ground that the two measures refer to return per unit of risk. 
Jensen's alpha 
The third risk-adjusted measure is the Jensen's alpha. This is one of the most 
widely used measures in the empirical performance literature (Farah, 2002, p5). 
Basically, Jensen (1968) created his measure based on the CAPM. To begin 
with, the ex-post alpha measure is defined as the difference between the 
(averaged) expected return of a fund, E(Arp), and the (averaged) realised return of 
the fund given the realised risk of the fund, i. e. the beta. The ex-post Security 
Market Line is used so in order to estimate the expected return of the fund, in a 
similar manner to the Treynor measure. 
That is; E(Rp) = Rf + ßp(RM 
-Rf). (6.4) 
The difference between E(Rp) and Rp is defined as the alpha. Thus, the alpha is 
also written as; 
ap=Rp-E(Rp)=Rp-Rf+ßp(RM-Rf)" (6.5) 
Based on the premise that a fund manager has a superior investment skill, a point 
to note is that the alpha reflects the fund manager's skill, being a positive 
intercept if the manager has superior skill. 
309 
Using a linear regression model with three components; the alpha, the beta and 
the random error term, Jensen (1968) showed the way in which the alpha was 
used in context of performance measure. His equation is defined as follows; 
Rp 
- 
Rf=ap+ ßp(RM 
- 
Rf) + £p (6.6) 
Furthermore, taking advantage of the regression formula, one can interpret the 
parameters under the premise that ap and Pp are constant over time. For 
example, one can consider Ept as an indicator of the model fitness, simply by 
saying that a low cp indicates a well defined relationship among the parameters. 
Similarly, the standard deviation of FP is also proxied for the unique risk of the 
portfolio. 
What is more, the t-values of the coefficients, e. g. ap and (3p, provide their 
statistical significance. For fund managers who do not believe in the efficiency 
market hypothesis, the high alpha with statistical significance reflects superior 
skills of investment managers. On the other hand, such a positive alpha is 
contradictory to the CAPM where no alpha exists. For testing such a conflicting 
view, performance literature on mutual funds has focused on the positive alpha 
derived from the Jensen's measure. In addition to the theoretical perspective 
objective above, the Jensen's measure has an advantage over both the Sharpe and 
Treynor measures. The latter two measures are relative portfolio measures 
without statistical significance indicated. 
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6.3.2 Comparison of performance measures 
Theoretical comparisons 
Based on the formulas described above, the performance measures can be 
grouped in two ways. Firstly, the Sharpe measure and the Treynor measure are 
considered as return per unit of risk whereas Jensen's measure focuses on 
differential returns, i. e. alpha. It is interesting to note that despite the fact that the 
Sharpe ratio and the Treynor ratio are computed in a similar manner, there would 
be a case that their indications differ. For instance, if one is to assume that 
portfolio X has a relatively large degree of non-systematic risk and a low degree 
of market risk. Because the large amount of non-systematic risk is excluded in 
the Treynor measure, the Treynor measure becomes high. On the other hand, 
under the same portfolio, the Sharpe ratio is low as the Shape ratio includes the 
total risk, which incorporated the large amount of non-systematic risk and the 
small amount of market risk. 
Secondly, the Treynor measure and the Jensen measure are theoretically relying 
on the ex-post market model that is derived from the CAPM. In this light, a 
problem of the benchmark error is inevitable. In contrast, the Sharp ratio can be 
computed without reference to benchmarks. Nevertheless it should be noted that 
the Sharpe ratio is not a panacea for performance measurement because the ratio 
excludes any effects of transaction costs The next section also addresses this 
issue. 
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Empirical comparison 
Using a sample of 25 mutual funds in the U. S from 1993 to 1995, Farrell (1997) 
compared three risk adjusted measures, the Sharpe ratio, the Treynor measure 
and the Jensen alpha. He reported that performance evaluation of the individual 
funds is consistent for the Treynor measure and the Jensen alpha. On the other 
hand, evaluations based on the Sharpe ratios, in particular for the less diversified 
funds, did not accord with those of the other two measures9. Reilly and Brown 
(2000, p. 1154) presented similar findings by using the rank correlation 
coefficient matrix. The correlation coefficients between the Sharpe and Treynor 
ratios, and between the Sharpe ratio and the Jensen's alpha were 0.88 and 0.90 
respectively whereas the coefficient between the Treynor ratio and the Jensen's 
alpha was 0.99. 
Overall, as the coefficients across the three measures were high and positively 
correlated, the measures seem to provide a general consistent assessment as a 
whole. As for an individual case, the degree of non-systematic risk is often 
relevant to its performance measure. The paragraph above reminds us how 
important it is to understand the underling logic of these measures. 
9 Overall, Farrell found that based on the Sharpe ratio, 8 out of the 25 funds had higher ratios than that of the 
market benchmark, i. e. the S&P 500. Using the Treynor measure, 14 out of the 
25 funds showed better 
results than that of the market. Further, subject to the Jensen measure, 14 out of the 25 
funds exhibited 
superior performance than that of the index. These findings provide evidence that 
different risk adjusted 
measures exhibit different results. 
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6.3.3 Caveats 
Chapter II indicated that the Jensen's alpha as well as the Sharpe and Treynor 
ratios become conventional risk-adjusted performance measures. Moreover, if it 
is accepted that these measures reflect fund managers' investment skills, a 
number of models with various factors are developed (Elton et al 1996; Carhart, 
1997). However, as the preceding section noted, the measures have been subject 
to considerable criticisms, which remain untouched up to this point. It is worth 
mentioning key caveats and problems. For example, some scholars discussed 
that these conventional measures fail to capture the managers' market timing 
(Treynor and Mazuy, 1966; Grinblatt and Titman, 1989) and the changing nature 
of economy affecting alpha and beta (Ferson and Schadt; 1996, Ferson and 
Warther; 1996, Christopherson et al.; 1999). Among these criticisms, scholars 
such as Farah (2002) and Murthi et al (1997) pointed out that the benchmark 
inefficiencies and the exclusion of transactions fees are the most important ones. 
The benchmark error 
The Jensen alpha and the Treynor measure are sensitive to the choice of the 
benchmark portfolio (Roll 1980). Sparked by Roll, this is defined as a 
benchmark error and this becomes the main criticism made on the use of the 
CAPM. The benchmark error occurs because a non-optimised index is selected 
as the market index. For this reason, there is always a difference between the 
measured beta and the beta which should have been computed using a properly 
optimised index. Note that the optimised index refers to the index as being on 
the mean-variance efficient frontier. 
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A number of studies have elaborated on the benchmark error. For instance. 
Elton, Gruber, Das and Hlavka (1993) and Fletcher and Forbes (2001)10 
documented sensitivity of fund performance to chosen benchmark. Furthermore, 
to reduce the benchmark error, some empirical studies employed several 
benchmarks in measuring fund performance (Hendricks et al, 1993 and Brown 
and Goetzmann, 1997). Hence, it is important to remember that betas and alphas 
depend on the choice of a reference portfolio, e. g. a market portfolio. 
Transaction costs 
The simplest reason to consider the fee effect is that the higher the fee a unit trust 
charges, the lower the net return the unit holder gets (Hooks, 1996; Droms and 
Walker, 1995; Carhart, 1997, Sandler, 2002). The related remark from Chapter II 
is that the investment strategy to pursue superior return by switching one winning 
fund to another" is unlikely to yield economic profits due to the transaction costs 
(Quigley and Sinquefield, 1998). 
Along the line of fee effects on fund performance, Grinbatt and Titman (1989) 
addressed the issue that if a fund manager or their company has superior 
investment skills, they can expropriate the economic rent by charging higher 
fees. What Grinbatt and Titman are implying is that higher fees can be justified 
by high quality, e. g. superior return of the fund. Nonetheless, in reality, there are 
three objections raised against their view. Firstly, as chapter II summarised, 
lo Fletcher and Forbes (2001) "Does the benchmark or the measure matter ?" Conference proceedings, 
"Performance of managed funds", Scottish Institute for research in investment and finance, July 2001 
1 According to the authors, every year. on average, 80% of the underlying unit trusts in the top portfolio is 
replaced with unit trusts with higher return in the subsequent period. 
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much controversy surrounds evidence for performance persistency. Viewed in 
this light, it may be safe to assume that to continuously achieve superior return is 
a difficult task. Therefore, there is no guarantee to charge and maintain high fees 
based on the unit trust return. Secondly, for the sake of argument, let us suppose 
that some managers or companies have real skills to produce superior investment 
return constantly. If they take advantage of their superior returns by charging 
higher fees, the benefit can be cancelled out the cost to obtain their fund 
(Ippolite, 1989). This should be the case specifically when the degree of their 
superior rerun is marginal (Cheng et al, 1999). There seems to be much truth in 
this possibility given some empirical evidence for the performance persistence in 
Chapter II. Over and beyond the evidence in academic literature, the recent 
industry report by Paul Myners 12 found that all the costs of investing in open- 
ended funds were probably more than equity risk-premium of 2.5%. Finally and 
most important of all, no relationship has been found between fee charges and 
performance for the UK unit trust industry (Sandler, 2002) as well as for the U. S 
mutual fund industry (Kahn and Rudd, 1995). 
From these remarks, one general point becomes very clear: "the avoidance of 
high fees is a defensible strategy" (Kahn and Rudd, 1995, p 49). Therefore, the 
fee feature must be included in evaluating unit trust performance. From the 
agency theoretical perspective, this is also crucial as the potential conflict of 
interest exists between unit holders and the company owners in the unit trust 
industry. 
12 Financial Times, 19 May 2003 
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6.3.4 Justification for the DEA approach 
As the preceding section indicated, no measures are immunised against criticism. 
Nonetheless, more recently, a series of papers have employed the DEA to 
measure fund performance, overcoming various limitations of standard 
performance measures. Table 6.1 summarises these works. 
Table 6.1: Recent DEA studies for fund performance 
Authors Objective Function Input Variables Output Variables Sample 
(publish year) (see below) 
Murthi, Choi, Output Augmentation Expense Ratio a Annual Return 731 mutual 
and Desai. Standard Deviation funds for the 
(1997) Loads b 3rd quarter of 
Fund Turnover c 1999 in the 
U. S. 
Morey and Output Augmentation Variance of monthly 3,5, and 10 year 26 mutual 
Morey (1999) and returns mean monthly funds from 
Input Reduction returns 1985 to 1995 
in the U. S. 
McMullen and Output Augmentation Subscription and 1,3, and 5 year 135 common 
Strong (1998) and redemption fees (%) annualised stock mutual 
Input Reduction Standard Deviation of returns funds 
return over three years highlighted in 
Expense Ratio popular 
financial 
magazines in 
1997 
Choi, and Output Augmentation Expense Ratio a Annual Return 731 mutual 
with (1) the same Standard Deviation funds for the Murthi (2001) 
scale and with (2) Loads 3rd quarter of 
different scales Fund Turnover 1999 in the 
U. S. 
Basso and Output Augmentation Risk (Standard Weekly 47 mutual 
Funari (2001) deviation of return, The logarithmic funds in Italy 
semi variance risk returns in the period 
indicator, and Beta) 1997 to 1999 
Subscription and 
redemption fees (%) 
a: Expense ratio refers to the costs incurred by the mutual tuna in operating the pontoiio, inciuuing 
administrative expenses and advisory fees paid to the investment manager, usually expressed as a percent of 
total assets under management. 
b: Laods are sales charge or redemption fees incurred when investors purchase and sell the shares. 
c: Fund Turnover is the less of monthly purchase or sales in the fund during the month divided by average 
net assets value. 
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Despite the fact the DEA methodology is outlined in Chapter V, this section 
attempts to justify the DEA approach in the context of analysing fund 
performance. The first advantage is that because of non-parametric nature, the 
DEA is free from any index, or market equilibriums. This means that as no 
theoretical model such as CAPM or APT is required, no benchmark errors occur. 
The second merit using the DEA for the performance measurement is that the 
DEA considers return and risk simultaneously. The framework is consistent with 
the risk-adjusted performance measures in the modern financial literature. In this 
regard, it can be said that the DEA performance measure is a variant of the 
Sharpe ratio (Murthi et al, 1997). The third is that the DEA can deal with 
multiple inputs and outputs simultaneously. This is important because the DEA 
based measure can capture the fee effect by including the fees into the input of 
the DEA equation. The fourth benefit is that the DEA provides a prescription for 
improvement for each inefficient fund. The improvement is based on the 
distance between the inefficient fund and the efficient frontier that has the same 
risk and fee factor mix (inputs) and the same return (output). Coupled with the 
improvement target, the hypothesis on differences of unit trusts between mutual 
and stock owned company groups can be nicely operationalised. Finally, the 
underlying notion of "relative efficiency" in the DEA fits in the current industry 
practice where individual unit trusts are compared with each other, often in the 
form of a peer league table. Empathising with the importance of the tournament 
mechanism, Brown et al (1996) documented that the peer group comparison has 
an impact on trading patterns of mutual funds. This is why the relative measure 
is the key to study individual unit trust performance. 
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6.3.5 The DEA model specifications 
As already described in Chapter V, there are several issues to be addressed in 
building the DEA model. Whilst minimising repetition, the points which need to 
be considered are (i) choosing input and output factors, (ii) input minimisation or 
output maximisation, (iii) returns to scale. 
Choosing factors 
The main objective of this chapter is to rule out whether return, risk-propensity 
and fees of unit trusts are attributable to test ultimate ownership of the 
management company. From the DEA perspective, the return refers to output 
whereas risk-taking and fees refer to inputs. On the output side, an investment 
return of a unit trust during the investment period is defined as the output. On 
the input side, the input of risk is the standard deviation of the fund price during 
the investment period. The other inputs are an initial fee and an annual 
management fee. 
In computing the return and risk of a unit trust, the choice of the investment 
period is open to consideration as the duration can vary. For example, the UK 
monthly financial magazine, Money Management, which is the data source for 
the present analysis, provides various durations for cumulative returns: one, two, 
three, five and ten year periods. However, for the current DEA, the three-year 
period is selected on the following ground. Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 in Chapter II 
examined the money flows from fund investors, revealing that a performance 
rating system such as Standard Poors has become a popular tool among retail 
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investors when making decisions on fund investment. One important aspect to 
remember is that these ratings are computed on the basis of three-year period. 
Hence, as the three-year return is a key composite of the performance ratings, it 
may be safely assumed that the three-year return is a reasonable choice in 
computing the standard deviation of unit trusts' returns. This is something to 
which investors are likely to pay much attention. 
l13 Input minimisation mode 
In the present DEA model, the input minimisation is used under the following 
premise. Investment return of an individual unit trust is affected not only by the 
capital markets, but also by various factors such as a business economic situation 
and unforeseeable events. Unit trust managers cannot control these market or 
environment driven factors, but rather they can adjust risk propensity of their 
managed unit trusts. For example, the portfolio manager can control the risk of 
his or her fund by adjusting the number of stocks in their unit trusts. By and 
large, the more stocks the unit trust invests, the less volatile the unit trust appears. 
An alternative method to control the fund risk is by outweighing small capital 
company stocks, which are generally highly volatile. Moreover, the management 
companies can increase or reduce their initial and management fees for their unit 
trusts. Within the range of the current fees in the industry, the companies have 
some discretional powers over the fee pricing. 
13 Output Augmentation or Output-Deficient: How much augmentation to the outputs is necessary for a 
specific inefficient fund to become DEA efficient. Input Reduction or Input Excessive: Each input can 
be 
reduced to achieve a relative efficiency. 
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Returns to scale 
It may be worth recalling section 5.5.5 in Chapter V that as for the DEA model, 
there are two basic types of envelopment surfaces, referred to as constant return 
to scale (CRS) and variable return to scale (VRS). The difference between the 
two models is that the pure technical efficiency is estimated under the VRS 
whereas the aggregated efficiency including scale efficiency is obtained by the 
CRS. The choice of a particular surface should be determined by economics and 
other business factors. However, the following analysis does not put forth a 
specific surface. Instead, the two surfaces are computed. The results from each 
model is compared, identifying the scale efficiency. This is the same procedure 
employed in Chapter V. 
6.3.6 The next stage of the analysis 
Before turning into the data collection, the section outlines the next stages of the 
analysis using the DEA scores. Overall, the approach in the current chapter is 
almost identical to that of Chapter V. That is, Tobit regression models are used to 
evaluate the sources of variation in computing efficiency scores for the sample 
companies. Obtained from the first stage of analysis, the efficiency scores 
ranging from 0 to 100 constitutes the dependent variable in the Tobit regression 
models. 
Explanatory variables are divided into three groups. The primary explanatory 
variable is the ultimate ownership status (e. g. mutual = 1; stock owned = 0). 
The second explanatory variable group is associated with the company's product 
mix, including the number of funds, the number of sectors, and the Herfindhal 
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index. The main reason to use these variables is to allow for the potential 
diversification effect. Therefore, the question of interest is that having a wide 
range of products that are not perfectly correlated each other, the company would 
have the benefit of the diversification effect at the company level, by taking 
maximum risk at the individual unit trust level. The third variable is related to 
the size effect of a fund on its return. A few recent papers (Indro et al 1999; 
Beckers and Vaugham, 2001) explicitly addressed this topic, summarising cost 
advantages and disadvantages that affect fund return. The typical benefits for 
large funds are; as the fund grows, brokerage commission rates for large 
transactions usually decrease. Furthermore, various costs such as market 
research, fund administration and general overheads do not rise proportionally 
more than the increase of the fund's asset. Consequently, the average costs 
declines as the fund size increase, generating more room to reduce management 
fees. Such situations are likely to contribute to the return improvement. 
The disadvantages for large funds are; trading costs for large blocks of shares 
which are, in fact, expensive due to the liquidity and asymmetric problem for 
market makers. Moreover, it is difficult for a fund manager with large assets to 
trade without signalling his or her intentions because of the fund size, which 
attracts attention in stock markets. 
Empirical evidence from Indro et al (1999) and Beckers and Vaugham, (2001) 
concurred on the size effect on the fund return. Some small funds suffered from 
trading inefficiency due to their small size whereas larger funds tend to 
overspend in acquiring and trading on information measured by the expense ratio 
321 
and turnover respectively. These studies suggest that fund size matters. 
6.3.7 Data Collection 
The data on individual unit trusts is collected mainly from two sources; The FT 
Unit Trust Year Books, and Money Management magazine. Money Management 
contains individual unit trust information on return, risk, asset size, Standard & 
Poors' fund ranking. The FT Unit Trust Year Books provides detailed 
information on other fund-specific variables such as the fund type, fee charges. 
The information with regard to individual fund managers' characteristics is not 
available and therefore not included in the present analysis. It is also important 
to note that similar to the two preceding chapters, information of ultimate 
ownership is based on the UK Fund Industry Review and Directory. 
6.3.8 Description of Data 
Table 6.2 provides descriptive statistics on the sample of 209 unit trusts classified 
into the ALL UK companies sector as of the end of 1999. The condition to select 
is that a fund should have a three year return record. The total fund sample 
accounts for 94 % in terms of the number of funds in the sector and 95% in terms 
of the size in the sector. 
The upper panel of Table 6.2 (Panel A) reports sample means, standard 
deviations, ranges of the unit trusts across three ownership groups. The lower 
panel of Table 6.2 (Panel B) reports control variables. The control variables 
include not only other unit trust characteristics such as trust size, but also their 
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management company's asset, and product mix. The descriptions in Table 6.2 
are also reported separately for mutual, quoted and privately owned company 
group. 
Several interesting features emerge from Table 6.2. For example, defined as the 
output, average monthly return in the first row indicates no obvious difference 
across the different ownership groups. This may not be surprising viewed from 
the efficient market hypothesis perspective. 
In evaluating the fund return more rigorously, it is indispensable to pay attention 
to the risk accompanied with the return. In this light, the second row in the upper 
panel of Table 6.2 shows the fund volatility on the basis of standard deviation of 
the monthly return. Interestingly, on average, the unit trust with the lowest 
volatility belongs to the mutual group company whereas the unit trust with the 
highest volatility is managed by the listed company group. The observations 
indicate the risk-averse tendency of the mutual ownership group, or to put it 
another way, the relatively strong risk preference of the exchange listed company. 
More notably, it follows from the first and second rows that, on average, the unit 
trust with the mutual (quoted company) group displays the superior (poor) 
performance in terms of the risk-adjusted return measure; the Shape ratio. 
As for the fee levels reported in the third and fourth rows of Table 6.2, the 
observations are more interesting. The average initial fee is the highest for the 
unit trust with mutual group (4.506%) whilst that of the privately owned group is 
the lowest (3.865%). In contrast to the initial fees, the order for the annual 
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management fee is inverse; the private owned company (1.206%), quoted 
company (1.187%) and mutual institution (1.079%). 
The lower part of Table 6.2 (Panel B) also provides interesting features 
concerning characteristics of individual funds across the three ownership groups. 
Specifically, the first row shows that, in terms of the unit trust's size, the unit 
trust of the mutual company group is the largest (379 million) on average whilst 
that of the privately owned company group (164 million) is less than half of the 
mutual counterpart. 
What is more, presented in the second row (Panel B), the fund run by the mutual 
owned group shows the highest proportion of the individual unit trust out of the 
company's total asset size. It can be said that because of the large proportion of a 
unit trust classified into the UK all companies sector, the unit trust is important to 
the mutual group. Other summary statistics in Panel B such as the Herfindahl 
index, the number of funds and their sectors appear to support the statement 
above. 
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Table 6.2: Summary statistics for inputs, output variables (Panel A) regarding 
unit trusts in the UK All Companies sector. 
Panel A Total Mutual (18 mutuals) Stock (61 companies) Private (19 companies) 
Number of funds 209 31 146 32 
Average Monthly Return 
Mean 1.305 1.296 1.307 1.306 
Std. Deviation 0.322 0.206 0.351 
_0.275 
Minimum 0.542 0.945 0.542 0.708 
Maximum 2.758 2.088 2.758 1.920 
Volatility 
Mean 4.339 4.200 4.377 4.297 
Std. Deviation 0.555 0.253 0.612 0.476 
Minimum 3.100 3.400 3.500 3.100 
Maximum 8.100 4.700 8.100 5.200 
Initial Fee% 
Mean 4.115 4.506 4.086 3.865 
Std. Deviation 1.890 1.530 1.894 2.166 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 6.000 6.000 6.000 5.750 
Annual Fee % 
Mean 1.174 1.079 1.187 1.206 
Std. Deviation 0.325 0.313 0.325 0.330 
Minimum 0.250 0.500 0.250 0.500 
Maximum 2.000 1.500 2.000 1.750 
(Source: Money Management February 2000, FT Unit Trust & Year books 1999/2000, and the UK Fund 
Industry Review and Directory 2000) 
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Table 6.2 (continued): Summary statistics for control variables (Panel B) 
regarding unit trusts in the UK All Companies sector. 
Panel B Total Mutual (18 mutuals) Stock (61 companies) Private (19 companies) 
Number of funds 209 31 146 32 
Number of funds in the compan 
Mean 20.02 13.39 21.82 18.28 
Std. Deviation 12.37 10.40 12.28 12.41 
Minimum 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Maximum 50.00 35.00 50.00 
- 
36.00 
SECTORS 
Mean 12.31 9.39 13.51 9.63 
Std. Deviation 5.85 6.11 5.60 4.84 
Minimum 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Maximum 22.00 21.00 22.00 18.00 
1-1-Index 
Mean 2207.73 3200.87 1984.49 2264.17 
Std. Deviation 2056.71 2731.35 1703.32 2523.45 
Minimum 467.14 971.51 563.51 467.14 
Maximum 10000.00 10000.00 10000.00 10000.00 
Fund Size 
Mean 310,347,943 379,290,323 327,584,247 164,919,375 
Std. Deviation 479,868,347 450,582,292 515,726,440 276,643,765 
Minimum 480,000 17,000,000 480,000 2,000,000 
Maximum 3,919,000,000 1,817,000,000 3,919,000,000 1,149,000,000 
Fund's Proportion % 
in the company's total asset 
Mean 15.80 29.21 12.94 15.82 
Std. Deviation 22.88 30.76 18.80 26.91 
Minimum 0.07 0.74 0.07 0.61 
Maximum 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
ComDanv's Total Asset 
Mean 4,016,271,244 2,366,329,032 4,386,500,205 3,925,483,125 
Std. Deviation 4,205,002,243 2,107,003,209 4,030,378,795 5,915,099,697 
Minimum 10,050,000 53,390,000 10,050,000 13,610,000 
Maximum 14,891,200,000 8,371,160,000 14,891,200,000 14,658,810,000 
(Source: Money Management February 2000, FT Unit Trust & Year books 1999/2000, and the UK Fund 
Industry Review and Directory 2000) 
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Table 6.3 presents the correlation coefficients across the variables providing a 
number of interesting dimensions. First and foremost, the first column shows 
that the average monthly return variable has a positive and significant correlation 
(r = 0.518, two tailed p<0.01) with the volatility variable. The result is consistent 
with the risk-expected return axiom of modern financial theory. The correlation 
coefficient between the output and the initial fee is a negative and significant (r = 
-0.191, p<0.01), suggesting the fact that all other things equal, the more you pay 
for the initial fee, the less you get from your investment. On the other hand, the 
management fee is positive but insignificant correlated with the monthly return 
(r=0.08, p>0.05). 
Interestingly, the relationship between the initial and management fees is positive 
and significant (r=0.34, p<0.01), suggesting that funds with higher initial fees 
carry higher annual management fees. Furthermore, such higher fees are hardly 
justified from the viewpoint of risk that the fund pursues, because there is no 
correlation between the volatility and fee variables (r=0.046 for the risk-initial 
fee; r=0.074 for the risk-management fee; both are statistically insignificant). 
These findings indicate the possibility that some funds are exploiting their 
investors' indifference to the fee effect. This is not surprising as Capon et al 
(1996) and the Association of Unit Trusts and Investment Funds (Arber, 2001) 
documented evidence on investors' naive knowledge about their holding 
investment products. 
As for the fund size effect on its return, no significant correlation (r= 0.008, 
p>0.05) was found, suggesting no size advantage or disadvantage. The effects of 
characteristics with a fund management company are also noteworthy. On the 
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return side, the correlation coefficient between the monthly return and the size of 
their management company is negative but insignificant (r= 
-0.075, p>0.05). 
Hence, the size of the unit trust management company is irrelevant to their fund 
returns. The point above provides a partial explanation for the survival of small 
companies in the U. K unit trust industry. 
On the risk side, the volatility variable has a negative and significant correlation 
coefficient with the fund asset proportion within the company's total managed 
asset. In other words, the fund that is relatively small within the fund 
management company is likely to take higher risk. The observation is of interest 
in terms of the marketing strategy of new funds in the industry. According to 
Arteaga et al (1998) many companies incubate funds hoping that some of them 
will generate attractive looking numbers whilst others can be quietly withdrawn. 
Given the line of arguments, it can be said that a fund company may take excess 
risk with their small funds in order to bootstrap their fund performance. 
Emerging from the experimental small funds certain funds succeed, attracting a 
great deal of positive publicity and bringing a lot of new money into the fund. 
This reason explains why the risk and fund proportion variables are negatively 
correlated. 
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6.4 Results of the DEA scores 
6.4.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 6.4 provides the summarised statistics of the DEA scores; overall technical 
efficiency, pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency by ownership group 
type. Basically, a higher score refers to a higher efficiency. For the total 
efficiency score reported in the first column, the mean is 68.98. This means that a 
fund, on average, can reduce the inputs by up to 31 %. 
Furthermore, the total efficiency is composed of the pure technical efficiency and 
the scale efficiency. The pure technical efficiency is estimated at 83.58, whereas 
the scale efficiency is estimated at 81.91. Such mean values imply that the fund 
is moderately inefficient relative to the best practice funds in the sample. 
Moreover, the moderate standard deviations of the efficiency scores suggest that 
the degree of efficiency does not differ substantially. 
The DEA efficient funds are exhibited in Tables 6.5 (a) and 6.5(b). Shown in 
Table 6.5 (a), of the 209 funds analysed, 7 were efficient for the total technical 
efficiency (CRS). Table 6.5 (b) shows that 39 funds were pure technical efficient 
(VRS). These funds have a combination of input attributes that dominate the 
other funds. It is evident that many of the funds with no initial fee are estimated 
as the efficient funds. 
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Table 6.4: Summary statistics for efficiency by ultimate ownership type 
Total Mutual (18 mutuals) Stock (61 companies) Private (19 companies) I 
Number of funds 209 31 146 32 
SCORE CRS 
Mean 68.98 70.28 68.52 69.81 
Std. Deviation 16.33 12.29 17.17 16.18 
Minimum 28.12 46.5 28.12 33.64 
Maximum 100 100 100 100 
SCORE_VRS 
Mean 83.58 83.68 83.49 83.91 
Std. Deviation 10.18 8.32 10.39 11.12 
Minimum 58.69 70.72 58.69 64.42 
Maximum 100 100 100 100 
SCALE 
Mean 81.91 83.56 81.38 82.77 
Std. Deviation 13.37 7.93 14.23 13.70 
Minimum 36.13 65.75 36.13 47.49 
Maximum 100 100 100 100 
where 
SCORE CRS = Overall Technical Efficiency 
SCOREVRS = Pure Technical Efficiency 
SCALE = Scale Efficiency 
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6.4.2 Comparison of the DEA scores by ownership type 
From the second, third, and fourth columns in Table 6.4, there is no noticeable 
difference in the efficiency scores across the ownership groups. To investigate 
the group differences statistically, two non-parametric tests were used: Kruskal- 
Wallis test was for the three groups; the mutual, listed company and privately 
owned company groups. Mann-Whitney test was especially for the mutual 
versus stock owned company hypothesis. 
As reported in Panel A of Table 6.6, the probability levels of the Kruskal-Wallis 
tests for total technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency, and scale efficiency 
were 0.876,0.93 8, and 0.861 respectively, indicating that the differences are 
statistically indistinguishable. Similarly, the results of Mann-Whitney in Panel B 
of Table 6.5 show that the difference between the two ownership group were 
insignificant with the respect to total technical efficiency, pure technical 
efficiency, and scale efficiency (the significant levels are 0.739,0.725, and 0.841 
respectively). 
Table 6.6: Rank tests for efficiency scores 
A: The Kruskal Wallis Test 
for Efficiency Measures across the ownership g roups 
Mean Rank Overall Technical Efficiency Pure Technical Efficiency Scale Efficiency (%) 
Mutual 108.34 108.52 102.98 
Quoted 103.59 104.24 104.27 
Private 108.22 105.05 110.28 
Chi-Square 0.265 0.129 0.300 
Asymp Sig. (2-tailed) 0.876 0.938 0.861 
B: The Mann-Whitney Test for Efficiency Measures 
between the mutual and the stcok owned company groups 
Overall Technical Efficiency Pure Technical Efficiency Scale Efficiency (%) 
Mann-Whitney 2655.5 2650 
2695.5 
Wilcoxan W 18586.5 18581 3192.5 
Z 
-0.333 -0.352 -0.201 
Asymp Sig (2-tailed) 0.739 0.725 0.841 
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All of the results in Table 6.6 confirm no significant difference across the 
ownership groups in terms of all efficiency measures. What is more, as Table 6.7 
shows, this pattern of no difference by ultimate ownership type also holds for the 
input variables; risk and fees. The Mann-Whitney tests failed to support the 
underlying notion for the first hypothesis: risk and fee charges of funds differ 
between the mutual and stock owned company groups. 
Table 6.7: Rank tests for input variables 
A: The Mann-Whitney Test for input variables 
between the mutual and the stcok owned company groups 
under the overall technical efficiency model (CRS) 
Monthly return volatility Initial Fee Annual management fee 
Mann-Whitney 2658.5 2416.5 2536.5 
Wilcoxan W 18589.5 2912.5 18167.5 
Z 
-0.323 -1.102 -0.716 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.746 0.270 0.474 
B: The Mann-Whitney Test for input variables 
between the mutual and the stcok owned company groups 
under the pure technical efficiency model (VRS) 
Monthly return volatility Initial Fee Annual management fee 
Mann-Whitney 2652.5 2324 2627.5 
Wilcoxan W 3148.5 18255 18558.5 
Z 
-0.344 -1.4 -0.424 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.731 0.161 0.671 
6.4.3 Results from Tobit models 
Table 6.8 shows the estimations of the Tobit regression models for explaining the 
variation of the DEA scores, in terms of mutual ownership (Model 1), fund size 
(Model 2) and the company characteristics such as size and their product mix 
(Model 3). It should be noted that, as reported in Table 6.9, the variables 
controlling for the fund size and company characteristics are moderately 
correlated to each other. Therefore, in order to avoid the multicollinearity 
problem, these control variable are separately added to Model 2 and 3 whilst the 
main variable, e. g. the mutual dummy variable was included in all of the models. 
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The most important and common finding across the models is that the coefficient 
of the mutual dummy variable is statistically insignificant. This means that there 
is no impact of the mutual ownership on the efficiencies of their managed unit 
trusts. Hence, after controlling for influential variables, no evidence was found 
to support the alternative hypothesis (H7). In this respect, the implication of the 
primary proposition seems to remain in effect. 
In addition to the insignificant effect of ultimate ownership, there are a few 
interesting features. First and foremost, the proportion of fund size (%) in terms 
of the company's total asset contributes to the fund efficiencies. Shown in the 
third columns in Table 6.8 (a) and (b), the coefficients of the fund proportion are 
positive and significant (r=10.719, p<0.05 for overall technical efficiency; 
r=12.325, p <0.01 for pure technical efficiency). This means that a unit trust 
with the relatively larger asset within the management company has the benefit 
of efficiency. 
A possible explanation for this finding comes from the flagship fund. As its 
name implies, the flagship fund refers to the representative fund with the large 
asset within the unit trust management company. Such a fund often attracts a lot 
of media attention because of its size and proxy nature for the company's 
managed unit trusts. For this reason, it can be said that aiming at superior 
investment performance for the fund, resulting in good publicity, management of 
the company allocates a lot of human and monetary resources into the 
fund. 
Moreover, the management can reduce the fund's fees in the hope of making the 
flagship fund more attractive. It is possible that simply because of 
its size 
management takes more care about the flagship fund than their other 
funds. The 
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positive correlation between the variable of the fund proportion and the 
efficiency scores seems to reflect these management strategies. 
The size of the individual fund seems to have a somewhat positive effect on the 
efficiencies of the fund. Presented in Model 2 of Table 6.8, the coefficients of 
the fund size variable for the total technical efficiency in Table 6.8-(a) and for the 
scale efficiency of in Table 6.8-(c) are 2.98, and 2.348 respectively and both are 
statistically significant at the 10% level. Hence, it can be said that the major 
source of overall technical efficiency is due to scale efficiency, which is 
attributable to the size of fund. One possible explanation for this is as follows. 
Table 6.3 presents the negative correlation between the standard deviation of 
monthly return e. g. risk and the size of fund (-0.219). Due to its size, the small 
fund may not benefit from its diversification effect as much as the larger fund 
does. This results in relatively higher volatility of the small fund. Other things 
equal, the higher risk increases the weighted sum of inputs in the DEA model, 
reducing the efficiency score. 
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6.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has shown that differences of fund performance between the mutual 
and stock ownership companies are much less pronounced than the agency 
theoretic hypothesis supposed. Under the efficient market hypothesis, the 
implication is that there is no difference of risk and fee adjusted performance by 
type of the company's ultimate ownership (H 6). 
The alternative hypothesis (H7) contrasts with the implication of hypothesis 
(H6). By emphasising the different managerial mechanisms are rooted in the 
ownership forms, the hypothesis expects some performance discrepancies of 
fund performance between the mutual and proprietary ownership companies. 
The logic is that risk taking and fees of their unit trusts differ due to conflict of 
interest between policyholders or account holders and owners of these 
companies. 
The results revealed that risk-taking and fee setting are indistinguishable. 
Moreover, the DEA performance measure where return, risk and fees are 
considered simultaneously showed no significant differences by type of the 
company's ultimate ownership. After controlling for various fund and company 
factors, the results did not change. Hence, the finding can be possibly interpreted 
as evidence against the alternative hypothesis (H7), and seemingly in favour of 
the implication of hypothesis (H6). 
Overall, the results of the chapter comes up with some support for the efficient 
market hypothesis. More interesting, with regard to the risk-taking and 
fee 
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setting issues, ownership is irrelevant. It seems to be the case that the degree of 
competition is more powerful than organisational form in terms of influencing 
companies' strategy (Drake and Llewellyn, 2001) The next chapter conclusively 
addresses this point of view further by reviewing a few recent papers. 
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Chapter VII: Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
Building on the insights of agency theory, the central proposition of this thesis is 
that ultimate organisational form is an important factor within the U. K unit trust 
industry. To test out the proposition, the thesis has investigated the relationship 
between ultimate organisational form and (i) risk-taking, and (ii) efficiency at the 
company level, and (iii) performance at the product level. 
A study of the U. K unit trust industry is valuable for two reasons. Firstly, most 
of the agency literature has limited itself to studying either the insurance or the 
banking industries and solely within the U. S. A minimal amount of research has 
so far emanated from financial industries in the U. K (Armitage and Kirk, 1994; 
Genetay, 1999; Letza et al, 2001; and O'Sullivan and Diacon, 1999 and 2003). 
Following the line of investigation, this is the first comprehensive study on the 
subject of U. K unit trust companies. Secondly, there has been a large number of 
studies of individual funds. Until recently, however, the study on the fund 
management company has been strangely neglected by academic researches. 
Arguably this is an oversight given the fact that the fund management companies 
play an important role in the economy particularly as the fund management 
industry experienced spectacular growth in the last decade. 
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There are several advantages to study the U. K unit trust industry. In the first 
place, ultimate organisational form varies in the industry. Some unit trust 
management companies are ultimately owned by mutual organisations whereas 
others are owned by proprietary companies i. e. publicly and privately owned 
companies. A unit trust management company is required by law to be a 
corporate body, irrespective of the company' ultimate organisational form. In 
addition to the legal requirement, the unit trust company is not permitted to 
conduct any other type of business except unit trust business'. On these grounds, 
it is safe to assume that regulatory, taxation and business character are 
homogeneous in the industry. Hence, these legal criteria make it more valid to 
compare risk-taking and efficiency across the sample companies. Finally, basic 
frameworks of risk and performance management are relatively well-established 
in the fund management literature. Various forms of information can be obtained 
both at the corporate and product levels. 
7.2 Conclusion about the risk-taking activities 
Chapter IV examined whether the issue of ultimate ownership is of importance in 
relation to business activities at the corporate level. Based on the company's 
product mix consisting of a number of unit trusts with various investment 
objectives, the managerial decision indicators are defined in three ways; business 
specialisation, business concentration and the magnitude of risk-taking activities. 
The main reason for the multiple indication approach is that a single measure can 
not be representative of the company's managerial decision making as a whole. 
1 The Financial Service Act 1986, section 78 (3). 
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Consistent with the Mayers and Smith approach (1988), the second measure is a 
preliminary one, which asks whether companies with different organisational 
forms operate on a different product mix. The first and third measures attempt to 
capture the different risk-taking choices by ultimate ownership type. 
7.2.1 Choice of high and low risky sectors 
The first risk-taking analysis started to split the unit trust sectors into high and 
low risk sectors based on (i) return volatility and (ii) money flow volatility for 
each sector. The proportion of unit trusts with the high risk within the company 
is subsequently compared by ultimate ownership type. Overall, the analysis 
reported mixed evidence that stock owned company groups are associated with 
relatively more risky activities than the mutual owned counterparts (H 1). The 
reason is that the findings are subject to the basis for the high and low risk 
sectors. On the one hand, there is weak evidence to support hypothesis (HI) in 
using the monthly return volatility. On the other hand, stock owned company 
groups, e. g. listed companies and privately owned companies, have more unit 
trusts categorised into the high risk sectors where money flow from unit holders 
is relatively unstable. 
Following the approach of Schrand and Unal (1998), who made a distinction 
between interest-rate risk and credit risk for their thrift study, it can be said that 
stock owned company groups take more business risk than the mutual ownership 
group whereas no difference is present by the ownership group in terms of the 
market risk. 
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The result of the current analysis is in concordance with the findings of the U. S 
savings and loans (S&L's or thrifts) industry studied by Esty (1997a and b) and 
the U. S property-liability insurance industry studied by Lamm-Tennt and Starks 
(1993). To the extent that the risk activity choice differs by ownership group in 
terms of money flow volatility, such an agreement is interesting because the 
present study and the U. S studies differ in respect of the industries and countries 
that they analyse. In addition to the agreement on the risk-taking choice, these 
research works roughly coincide in terms of the development of the risk measure. 
The common focus of the U. S studies is on cash flow in order to create a risk 
proxy for each company. Similarly, the current thesis classifies the various fund 
sectors on the basis of cash flow, which is affected by unit holders' new 
purchases and redemptions. 
7.2.2 Business specialisation 
The analysis of the business specialisation indicated that the unit trust companies 
with different ultimate ownership display particular preferences for investment 
objectives within the category of unit trusts. The finding is consistent with 
earlier studies of the U. S property-liability insurance (Mayers and Smith, 1988 
and Lamm-Tannant and Starks, 1993) and of the U. S health insurance study 
(Pottier and Sommer, 1997). The agreement among these studies leads to two 
indications. From a theoretical perspective, the managerial discretion hypothesis 
seems to account for the finding, predicting that companies with distinctive 
organisational form are sorted into specific market segments where they have 
comparative advantages. From a literature perspective, the analysis of business 
specialisation in this thesis offers a useful contribution to the literature, serving 
347 
as an out-of-sample test. It is clear that the tendency of business specialisation 
reported here is neither industry nor country specific. 
7.2.3 Business concentration 
The business concentration analysis with the Herfindahl index finds the 
difference between the quoted and non-quoted company ownership groups, 
partially supporting the primary hypothesis that stock owned companies exhibit 
relatively high-risk preferences in comparison to their the mutual counterparts. 
The degree of concentration differs between the market listed and the non-listed 
company groups in terms of the Herfindahl index, based on the number of unit 
trusts per company. Similarly but slightly less significantly, such a difference 
holds in terms of the Herfindahl index based on the number of funds' investment 
objectives within the company. 
In light of the managerial discretion hypothesis, it is not surprising to see the 
quoted company group having a more diversified product mix. The explanation 
based on the managerial discretion hypothesis is that listed companies are 
associated with diversification that requires greater managerial autonomy. On 
the contrary, by managing the concentrated product mix, mutual organisations 
can limit managerial discretion, which is more costly for the mutual institutions 
than for the stock owned companies. 
However, on examination of existing empirical works, it appears that the result 
of Chapter IV is inconsistent with the findings of the previous literature. Mayers 
and Smith (1988) found that the mutual insurers appeared slightly more 
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diversified than the stock insurers in the U. S property-liability insurance market. 
In a similar vein, no linkage was found between ownership form and the line of 
business concentration in the U. S life-health insurance industry (Pottier and 
Sommer, 1997). 
The discrepancy between the result of Chapter IV and the findings of previous 
studies can be explained by the methodological differences. For example, 
comparing the degree of business concentration, Mayers and Smith (1988) 
employed analysis of variance whilst this thesis used Tobit regression model. 
Another example is that the Pottier and Sommer's study (1997) included not only 
the size, but also age, credit rating and location of the company as their 
controlling variables. In contrast, the corresponding analysis in Chapter IV takes 
into account the potential size effect, leaving aside the other controlling factors 
because of the limited data availability. 
7.2.4 Discussion 
Other than the quoted company's tendency toward the more diversified product 
mix, there is an indistinguishable pattern between the mutual and privately 
owned company groups in terms of the business concentration. This gives rise 
to the question why the business concentration differs between the quoted and 
non-quoted company groups. More precisely, why does the quoted company 
group prefer the more diversified product mix? 
The findings appear to contradict the primary proposition that stock owned 
companies are more associated with higher risk-taking activities. The underlying 
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logic of this view is that "diversification is designed to reduce risk" (Milgron 
and Roberts, 1992, p 598). That is, all else being equal, the more diversification 
a company pursues, the less risky the company's business becomes. 
There are two possible reasons for the preference for the more diversified 
product mix of the quoted company group. The first and most general reason is 
the choice of corporate strategy, derived from the difference between the market 
listed and non-market listed companies with regard to the access to capital 
markets. Despite the fact that effects of economies of scale are not substantial 
(Chapter III), the relatively large size in terms of the asset under management 
(Table 4.2) and the capital employed (Table 5.1) can provide the quoted 
company group with competitive advantages. No other class of organisational 
form can attain the scale of operation that large public listed companies can 
achieve. Hence, taking advantage of easy access to financing, the listed 
company secures their competitive advantage by offering a broad range of 
products. On the other hand, it may be necessary for non-listed companies e. g 
privately and mutual owned groups, to choose a niche strategy because of their 
financial constraints. 
The next possible reason is that diversification effect is specific to each industry 
or subject to the definition of the diversification and its effect. In the context of 
the fund management industry, this may mean that a diversification strategy 
which offers a wide range of fund products may not necessarily reduce risk. A 
recent study by Massa (2003) seems to validate the above remark. Massa reveals 
that funds belonging to companies that offer more funds tend to have less stable 
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investors as investors tend to move money from one fund to another, taking 
advantage of the low switching costs. This results in less stability of money 
flows, which increases the company's risk. Moreover, such unstable money 
flows are likely to require the higher managerial discretion. If this is the case. 
the finding of the diversified product set of the quoted company group supports 
the Mayers and Smith prediction that quoted companies are successful in 
business where a greater managerial discretion is needed. 
The implication is that care should be taken to make a conclusion by applying the 
conventional risk proxy such as the business concentration ratio. It is, therefore, 
necessary to check the validity from the industry-specific perspective. In a 
similar vein, it may also be dangerous to rely on a single risk measure. In this 
sense, an approach from multiple risk dimensions is essential in analysing the 
risk-taking activities of a company. 
7.3 Conclusion about efficiency 
7.3.1 Methods and findings 
The objective of Chapter V is to examine the relationship between performance 
and ultimate organisational form for a sample of unit trust management 
companies in the U. K. In developing the performance measure 
for the 
investigation, two methodological difficulties are described. First of all, many 
studies of publicly traded companies emphasise a company's stock return as 
the 
primary performance of the companies. Nonetheless, no unit trust management 
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company in the U. K is traded in stock exchanges so that the stock price is simply 
not available. Secondly and more challenging, the financial data for these 
companies is limited in the sense that belonging to the large parent companies, 
the unit trust management companies take advantage of limited disclosure 
requirement. A further complication of such companies' financial statements 
occurs due to the possible transfer pricing between the unit trust company and 
their affiliated companies within the group and for this reason standard financial 
ratios are not reliable. To overcome these problems, Chapter V considers 
efficiency as the performance of the unit trust management company. One 
justification is that the primary goal of mutual organisations could differ from 
that of stock companies. Arguably, the mutual organisation aims at providing 
lower-cost mortgages or insurance policies to their members whereas the 
comparable stock company may be more concerned with maximising their own 
profit (Swiss Re, 1999). If this is the case, an efficiency ratio based on revenue 
and cost is more suitable than the conventional profitability measures such as 
return on equity in comparing the mutual organisation and stock company. To 
this end, the current thesis employs Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to 
generates the efficiency score for each unit trust management company on the 
basis of carefully selected items from the financial statement. 
Overall evidence suggests that the mutual ownership group is less efficient than 
the proprietary rivals in the unit trust industry. Notably, the inefficiency of the 
mutual ownership group is attributable to its high administration expenses, 
indicating the weaker cost control mechanism in the mutual ownership group. 
The results support the prediction from agency theory, specifically the expense 
preference hypothesis (for instance, see Rasmusen, 1988). What is more, the 
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results are consistent with those of earlier empirical researches such as Masulis 
(1987) and Hermalin and Wallace (1994) who studied the U. S S&L's; Cummins 
et al (1999) who investigated the U. S property-liability insurers. 
7.3.2 Considerations 
Comparison to previous researches 
In addition to these U. S studies, a recent study (Genetay, 1999) about U. K life 
insurance companies presented a similar finding in that the mutual insurers 
display lower return on total assets than the proprietary insurers. Nonetheless, it 
should be noted that as for the expense ratio, the Genetay study presented scant 
support for the expense preference hypothesis because the expense ratio was not 
significantly related to form of the insurer's ownership. Such an inconsistency 
between the findings of the present analysis and those of the early literature is not 
surprising because several studies have presented contradictory evidence. For 
example, according to Cebenoyan et al (1993), the cost structure and the 
operating efficiency are indistinguishable between the mutual and the proprietary 
S&L's. Similarly, Caudill et al (2001) found that the mutual S&L's exhibit cost 
efficiency in comparison with the proprietary counterparts. 
As for other U. K examples, Armitage and Kirk (1994) presented evidence that on 
average, the mutual life insurers demonstrate higher pay-out, lower cost ratio, 
and a greater growth rate than their proprietary rivals. Letza et al (2001) found 
that the mutual life insurers outperformed their proprietary insurers in terms of 
the year-end surplus, and annual investment income. More recently, O'Sullivan 
and Diacon (2003) presents evidence that there is no significant difference 
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between the mutual and stock owned companies with regard to four performance 
measures2, (i) the annual percentage change in the company's life fund; (ii) the 
annual percentage change in the market value of total investment; (iii) the annual 
percentage change in total direct premiums written; (iv) the volume of new 
business sales in a particular year. 
It follows from these discrepancies that the different performance measure or 
different computation framework are likely to influence the estimation of a 
company's efficiency. The typical contrast for this point is that: Chapter V and 
Cummins et (1999) employ the DEA whereas Cebenoyan et al (1993) and Cardill 
et al (2001) used a stochastic cost frontier method. In essence, the critical issue 
in selecting the estimation model is whether the cost or production function is 
known. Moreover, the choice is subject to the data availability. 
In Chapter V, it is assumed that the cost function is unknown mainly because the 
literature has paid little attention to the cost function in the U. K unit trust 
industry. Another justification for the DEA approach is the limited and complex 
disclosure practice of the sample companies' financial statements. On these 
grounds, the findings of Chapter V still have validity of the model selection, 
providing valuable additions to the evidence for the effect of organisational form. 
2 There is the fifth measure of performance defined by the salary of the highest-paid director. The authors 
find that this proxy is significant greater in the case of proprietary companies. 
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The quoted versus non-quoted company ownership 
As for the argument on the quoted versus non-quoted company ownership, the 
finding was contrary to the hypothesis that market listed companies operate their 
business more efficiently than their non-listed counterparts. Of greater interest is 
the fact that an additional analysis revealed no significant differences between 
the quoted company and the private company owned groups. Three possible 
explanations can be made for these observations. Firstly, along with the 
hypothesis assumption, the market for corporate control may not be sufficient 
enough to differentiate efficiency between the listed company and the private 
company. Secondly and as an extension of the first point, the effect of the 
market for corporate control may not be monotonic, but more complex as 
Mudambi and Nicosia (1998) argued. If this is the case, a simple comparison 
between the listed and the privately owned companies is not adequate. Finally, 
in a view similar to O'Sullivan and Diacon (2003) that mutuals have stronger 
broad governance as a substitute for external governance mechanisms, non- 
quoted company groups have their unique internal disciplinary forces acting on 
their managers in the same way to control comparable managers in public listed 
companies. For instance, as viewed in the Fama and Jensen's hypothesis (1983), 
the closeness between decision management and decision control can be a good 
source of management control when privately owned companies run their unit 
trust business. 
Hence, the observation of the insignificant difference between the quoted 
company ownership and private company ownership offers a useful contribution 
to the literature on the impact of the market for corporate control. 
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7.4 Conclusion about fund performance 
The final chapter continues the line of enquiry on the effect of ultimate 
ownership form. However, what differs from Chapter VI and the preceding two 
chapters is that Chapter VI explores the linkage between ultimate ownership and 
performance of products of the sample companies. Viewed from agency theory, 
the product analysis is interesting because the analysis can capture the conflict of 
interests between owners and customers as Mayers and Smith (1986) suggested. 
In more general term, if ultimate ownership of a unit trust management company 
is related to the ability to provide superior performance via its incentive or 
managerial mechanism, the type of ultimate ownership should be a factor in 
explaining the performance of individual unit trusts. Furthermore, the 
performance analysis of individual unit trusts is essential in a sense that a study 
like Chapter V is incomplete without considering the quality of products that the 
company offers. The underlying assumption is that higher quality products 
require higher costs. 
7.4.1 Methods and findings 
In evaluating performance of unit trusts, a number of conventional measurers are 
available. It is essential from the viewpoint of owner-customer conflict that the 
performance measure must incorporate three components into the measurement 
framework. These components are risk, return and fees of an individual unit 
trust. In order to consider the three factors simultaneously, DEA is employed in 
a similar manner to Chapter V. 
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The results of Chapter VI suggest that there are no significant differences in 
terms of the DEA performance measure across the different ownership groups. 
The results hold after controlling for various influential factors such as the size of 
the unit trust and the company's total asset. Consequently, there is no 
compelling reason to believe that the performance of individual unit trusts is 
dependent either on the management company's ownership or on the size of the 
unit trust management company. 
7.4.2 Implications of Chapter VI for theory 
The above findings above have important implications for the agency theory 
literature and for the financial market literature. Agency theory argues that 
managers at mutuals are typically not as motivated as their proprietary 
counterparts (Rasmusen, 1988) because different incentive schemes or weak 
monitoring by owners. As a consequence, unit trusts offered by the mutual 
groups should be characterised by poor performance. More generally, it is also 
argued that performance of unit trusts differs according to ultimate ownership 
form, reflecting comparative advantages or disadvantages associated with the 
ultimate ownership form. 
Implications for agency theory 
Two indications can be found for explaining the findings that contradict agent 
theory. Firstly, at the individual portfolio manager level, there are some common 
incentive or remuneration schemes regardless of their company's ownership 
form. In other words, a variation on the incentive practice is practically trivial 
across the fund management industry. An extreme but convincing indication for 
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such a common incentive to portfolio managers is the threat of losing their job 
(something which is documented by Khorana, 1996). Given the ultimate 
incentive effect, it is in the portfolio manager's best interest to work hard. A 
second possible explanation is that the performance linked remuneration scheme 
may be in place at the level of individual portfolio managers. Whilst competing 
with their rival companies for good portfolio managers, most of the unit trust 
management companies are likely to offer the performance based reward system 
in order to employ and retain good portfolio managers. The similar remuneration 
package across the industry may not lead to performance differences at the 
individual unit trust level. Certainly, in order to verify the latter argument, 
obtaining the information about the reward is of paramount importance. 
However, the data regarding the remuneration scheme is the most secretive 
information and difficult to obtain. Therefore, further studies could explore this 
line of enquiry by collecting the salary and incentive data from practitioners. 
Implication for financial theory 
As for the financial market theory, the major strand of the literature pursues the 
question of whether unit trusts can beat the market. In this connection, the 
efficient market hypothesis is supported by the finding that there is no linkage 
between ultimate ownership and unit trust's performance of the company. 
To some extent, Chapter VI departs from the "beat the market" literature by 
focusing on the company ownership as a key factor for the performance of their 
individual unit trusts. As summarised in Chapter II and VI, there are several 
attempts to identify effects associated with superior performance. For example, 
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two studies (Golec, 1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 1999) found that a fund 
manager's educational background has an impact on their managed funds. Other 
researchers examined this issue from the standpoint of; manager's gender, (Bliss 
and Potter, 2002) and Atkinson et al (2003); fund management by team (Prather 
and Middleton, 2002) and banking group ownership (Frey 2001). The latter 
studies found no significant relationship between performance and these 
variables. In light of this, the principal finding of Chapter VI compliments the 
line of research by highlighting that no relationship exists between ownership 
and fund performance of the unit trust management company. 
This topic is one of the research areas not covered in the financial literature until 
very recently (Berkowitz and Qiu, 2003). The result of Chapter VI is 
inconsistent with Berkowit and Qiu's study as the result of Chapter VI showed 
that the risk adjusted return of mutual funds run by the quoted companies does 
not differ from that run by the privately owned companies. As counter-evidence 
to Berkowits and Qiu's study, Chapter VI makes a useful contribution to our 
understanding of the ownership effect on the investment product. 
7.5 Limitation and future research 
7.5.1 Limitation 
This thesis considers just one-year period, e. g. year 2000, after the wave of 
mutuals' conversions occurred in the half of the 1990s. This is partly because 
only one demutaulisation occurred in the year, providing the "stable" sample in 
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terms of the category of ultimate organisational form. Another reason is that the 
limited data does not allow an investigation by the panel-study that are similar to 
the cross-sectional design with multiple points in time. 
However, the one-year cross-sectional approach is a concern for this thesis in 
two respects. Firstly, the results from the cross-sectional analysis may not 
generalised to other time periods because the results may be influenced by year- 
specific factors. In short, there is a possible sample period bias. One counter 
argument to this limitation is that focusing on a very short time period can allow 
for more homogeneity in the market conditions changed significantly in 1990's. 
The second potential shortcoming involves a potential time-lag effect after the 
change of organisational form. The one-year approach implicitly assumes that 
the changes of ownership form occur immediately after the demutualisation. 
However, changes in efficiency of the unit trust management companies and 
shifts in performance of their managed unit trusts may not be observed instantly 
after the organisational changes because the converted companies need some 
time to adjust themselves to the market listed companies. The analysis with the 
snap-shot in time is unlikely to capture the potential time-lag effects for the 
converted mutual groups. Nonetheless, one possible counter-argument is that 
there are only 11 ex-mutual groups out of 118 stock owned companies. More 
specifically, two of the converted companies were demutualised before 1995 and 
the rest of them were demutaulised after 1995. Therefore, it can be assumed that 
the impact of these ex-mutual groups within the stock group is marginal. 
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There is another possible limitation of this thesis with regard to the unit holder 
segmentation. It is important to note that behaviour of certain unit holders, e. g. 
wealthy individuals, institutional investors, and in-house insurance investors, 
may be different from that of retail unit holders. If this is the case, the mixture of 
the customer segments is likely to affect the corporate profitability or efficiency. 
For exmple, a large number of small retail accounts incurs higher administration 
costs than a small number of institute accounts. On the other hand, institutional 
investors have more negotiating power over the initial and management fees 
whereas the retail investors are not in the position to negotiate the fees. Such a 
potential effect of the unit holder segmentation is an interesting topic, but this 
thesis did not pursue this line of inquiry. This is due to the fact that the data is 
not in a public domain or easily assessable with regard to a type of the existing 
unit holders in the unit trust management companies. 
Related to the above data limitation, this study implicitly assumes that unit 
holders of unit trusts run by the mutual groups are accountholders or 
policyholders of the mutual groups. However, the assumption seems to be 
sensible because of the cross-selling practice in many financial services in the 
U. K. 
The cross-selling refers to promoting additional products and services to the 
existing customer base. The logic behind the cross-selling is that if longer term 
customers are satisfied with the company and the company has what the 
customers want, they will buy more or buy different products from the same 
financial service providers (Harrison, 2000, p. 231). 
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Traditionally, working as the tied agents of insurance companies, most banks and 
building societies have offered insurance products and become "bancassurers" 
referred to as organisations that sell insurance products through banking branch 
networks (Stephens, 2001, p338). A more recent example is that the lenders 
established their own insurance and investment subsidiaries. These subsidiaries 
have been used for promoting a range of long term saving products such as unit 
trusts and Individual Savings Account (ISA) to their entire customer base. These 
products are distributed via branch networks or their own sales forces. 
Certainly, future researchers can pursue these research options. In spite of the 
these limitations, it is still believed that the results at least reveal interesting links 
between ultimate organisational form and risky activities and the efficiency of 
the unit trust management companies. At the product level, the results show no 
relationship between the company's ultimate organisational form and the 
performance of unit trusts 
7.5.2 Future research 
Given the above limitations, future research can be developed in several different 
ways. The first and most general question to be addressed in future research is 
whether the results of this thesis hold in other countries. For this purpose, future 
research can expand the data collection beyond the U. K. 
Additional future research could compensate for the drawback of the snap-shot 
approach used in this thesis. That is, more data collection using a longitudinal 
approach can allow for the event-study. The general applicability of the event 
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study methodology in finance literature is the effect of an event such as mergers 
and acquisitions, and earnings announcements on the price of common stocks of 
the company. However, applications in other fields of studies are possible. For 
example, Campbell et al (1999) point out that event studies are of use in 
evaluating the impact on he value of a company of a change in the regulatory 
environment. 
One potential applications of such a longitudinal approach is the evaluation of 
ex-mutual's efficiency or fund performance over the 3 to 5 year period prior to 
and following demutualisations. By comparing the pre-post conversion values 
for their fund performance or the company efficiency score, it is possible to 
examine whether there has been significant improvement in the fund 
performance and in the management efficiency. This type of a event study gives 
insight into the progression of the demutualisation process, reflecting the effect 
of the ownership change. 
Finally, as Stephens (2001) suggests in his case studies with regard to the U. K 
building societies, survey and interview to the demutualised groups could help 
compliment the quantitative data, providing a more qualitative assessment on the 
effect of organisational change. 
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7.6 Concluding remark 
Chapter IV and V reported evidence that at the corporate level, there are 
differences of risk and performance between the mutual and proprietary 
ownership companies. By contrast, an empirical analysis in Chapter VI provided 
no evidence of the ownership effect on performance of their managed unit trusts. 
Therefore, as the concluding remark, this research indicates that competition 
rather than governance mechanisms associated with ultimate ownership, 
disciplines managers in the unit trust management companies in the UK. 
The concluding remark is consistent with the general consensus that the product 
market competition leads to higher economic performance (OECD, 2002)3. In a 
similar context it is argued that product market competition acts to align 
managers' goals with those of the owners (Nickell et al 1997; OECD 2002; 
Köke, 2002, and Januszewsk et al 2002). Within the context of this thesis, the 
degree of competition in a market seems to be more important than 
organisational or corporate forms in terms of influencing a firm's objectives and 
strategy (Llewellyn, 1997) 
The underlying mechanisms for improving performance are twofold. Firstly, as 
the number of products increases, greater opportunities for the product 
comparison emerge, enhancing managerial incentives. Consequently, it is easier 
for the shareholders or the market to monitor managers in such a competitive 
environment. Secondly, fierce competition will raise the possibility of business 
3 Economic Outlook No 72 OECD, 2002 
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failure at any given level of managerial efforts. Hence, management will have to 
work harder to avoid bankruptcy. 
From an empirical perspective, several recent studies support the positive effect 
of product competition on corporate performance. For example, using a panel 
data of 580 UK manufacturing companies, Nickell et al (1997) found a positive 
relationship between the degree of competition4 and sales growth. 
As for the unit trust industry, the practice of performance comparison in the 
industry provides some validity for the two explanations above. A variety of 
tools such as financial websites, magazines and newspaper articles conduct fund 
performance comparisons, leading to the sharpening of managerial incentives. In 
short, this thesis provides further evidence for the positive role of the product 
market competition on managerial behaviour at their product management level. 
One question may arise from an implication of the concluding remark. If the 
product competition is fierce enough to discipline managers irrespective of their 
company's organisational form, then, such an organisational from is only of 
second importance. 
The answer to the question is that ultimate organisational form is still of 
consequence given the findings across the empirical analyses in this thesis. The 
analysis of corporate efficiency in Chapter V uncovered the relative inefficiency 
of mutual owned unit trust companies in comparison with those owned by stock 
4 The magnitude of competition is measured by the size of price-cost margins. 
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companies. Moreover, the relative inefficiency of the mutual group companies 
can be hardly justified either by their product mix (Chapter IV) or by their 
product performance (Chapter VI). 
Viewed in the realm of agency theory in Chapter II, such a difference could be a 
reflection of different forms of corporate governance. The idea above leads to 
the conclusion that due to their weak corporate governance mechanisms, mutual 
ownership systematically induces such inefficiency at their subsidiary level. In 
particular, the present research suggests that mutual organisations are inefficient 
with respect to administrative costs and to a lesser degree the use of capital 
employed. Although the lack of market-based governance may be used to 
explain their failings, O'Sullivan and Diacon (2003) suggest that the board of 
directors act as a substitute for the external discipline mechanisms within mutual 
institutions. The present thesis suggests however that if this is the case, this form 
of internal governance force is ineffective in managing their affiliated unit trust 
companies. 
In summary, evidence from this thesis suggests that ultimate organisational form 
or ownership seems to play some disciplinary roles at the corporate level whereas 
the product market competition fulfils a governance mechanism at the product 
level. 
The final and more serious issue emerges from the finding that given the higher 
administration expenses, mutual organisations appear to need more financial 
resources in providing competitive products in the unit trust industry. In line 
with the finding, it can be said that if such a resource hungry characteristic of 
366 
mutual organisations remains for a prolonged period, eventually, the mutual 
group will fail financially (Hermalin and Wallance, 1994). This concluding view 
is welcomed by the pro-demutualisation side and unpleasant for supporters of 
mutual organisations. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Company Data Set for DEA (Type: O=mutual, 1=listed, 2=private. 3=others) 
Company Name 
Tesco 
Arbuthnot 
Burrage 
Belvin Frank 
Saracen 
Gresham 
MPFS 
McHattie 
Maldon 
Homeowner 
Discretionary 
Consistent 
Lombard Odier 
Saltire 
Mayflower 
Endurance 
Leggmason (Johnson Fry) 
MW Joint 
MGM 
Mirabaud 
T Bailey 
Liverpool 
ACM 
Taube 
Fleming Unit (JP Morgan Fleming Fund) 
Police Mutual 
Allchurch 
Duncan Lawrie 
GA 
Thesis (Thomas Eggar) 
New Street 
MT General 
Aberforth 
Wesleyan 
Sanwa 
Direct Line 
State Street 
KBL 
Premier 
Bank of Ireland 
Eagle Star 
Hargreaves 
Family 
TU 
Marlborough 
Norwich Union 
NUF 
City Financial Managers 
Thornhill 
Sand Aire 
Reliance 
Sarasin 
Close 
GAM 
AXA 
e Net Revenues 
1- 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
0 
2 
2 
0 
3 
3 
3 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
0 
2 
2 
0 
1 
2 
2 
0 
0 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
3 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
0 
3 
2 
1 
0 
2 
2 
2 
0 
3 
2 
1 
12,000 
12,503 
51,132 
62505 
76,683 
91,000.00 
92,358 
92,972 
136,614 
170,984 
225,675 
234,358 
234,958 
236,101 
238,014 
345,024 
452,000 
452,095 
471,067 
489,091 
574,000 
600,000 
706,298 
770,658 
777,333 
812,000 
946,012 
961,232 
982,000 
1,043,436 
1,120,139 
1,169,890 
1,229,337 
1,246,909 
1,322,973 
1,332,000 
1,393,125 
1,465,524 
1,479,000 
1,614,376 
1,763,000 
1,860,162 
1,876,940 
1,940,476 
1,949,248 
2,010,000 
2,157,849 
2,378,706 
2,545,979 
2,690,000 
2,761,706 
2,815,357 
2,886,624 
2,957,784.00 
3,302,579 
Admin costs 
752,000 
12,087 
21,185 
100955 
75,750 
25,000.00 
112,375 
76,207 
136,395 
204,016 
103,352 
187,017 
174,800 
97,556 
242,918 
326,121 
560,000 
392,019 
646,908 
429,387 
553,000 
2,021,000 
854,716 
329,660 
816,000 
564,000 
595,676 
208,257 
495,000 
1,043,436 
750,111 
1,058,666 
966,126 
1,184,670 
1,342,379 
1,695,200 
1,342,569 
534,287 
744,000 
1,469,805 
5,074,000 
1,833,666 
1,672,242 
1,920,190 
1,883,456 
14,430,000 
1,904,137 
1,246,209 
906,881 
2,070,000 
2,095,763 
2,560,900 
3,081,276 
2,880,000.00 
2,633,062 
Cap Employed 
1.647,000 
36,116 
127.432 
325,585 
14.411 
630.500 
49,83 31 
119,964 
75.302 
639,544 
244.905 
596,562 
3,994,336 
23,082 
104,370 
180,745 
2,003,000 
218,796 
521,037 
225,530 
100,500 
1,912,000 
2,233,890 
949,674 
1,821,000 
822,500 
1,127,530 
180,294 
5,393,000 
88,398 
394,648 
238,087 
142,133 
1,116,018 
207,567 
1,342,000 
520,674 
774,722 
2,277,000 
1,459,712 
17,957,000 
638,657 
607,255 
1.361,180 
275,046 
7,280,500 
1,815,445 
558,269 
125,575 
1,289,500 
187,028 
922.499 
1.765.394 
1,708,391 
11,717.028 
Appendix 1: Company Data Set for DEA (Type: O=mutual, 1=listed, 2=private, 3=others) 
Company Name type Net Revenues Admin costs Cap Employed 
Artemis 3 3,512,685 3,301,407 925.85-1 United 1 3,537,000 3,597,000 4,063.500 
NPI 1 3,570,920 1,629,207 4,45,, 808 
Lincoln 1 3,604,000 2,224,000 2.118.500 
Quilter 1 3,607,062 2,822,458 1,332.641 
BWD 1 3,809,518 3,022,965 1,485.487 
Royal Bank of Scotland 1 4,258,000 2,490,000 7,883,500 
Manek 2 4,554,604 2,218,946 3,071,469 
Portfolio 1 4,595,000 4,733,000 7,863,000 
Singer & Friedlander 1 4,943,011 3,320,072 1,47 7,192 
Martin Currie 2 5,275,815 5,201,838 2,267.445 
Rathborne 1 5,382,748 4,825,918 1.376.051 
Sovereign 0 5,459,107 5,331,730 3,633,739 
Colonial First State 1 5,560,666.67 4,589,333.33 2,101,000 
FPFM (Fleming Private F) 2 5,611,299 2,789,000 623,590 
Alliance & Leicester 1 6,051,000 1,634,000 6,348,500 
Liontrust 1 6,456,000 4,203,000 2,262,000 
Edingburgh 1 6,720,159 5,578,029 5,360,659 
AIB_JGovett 1 6,835,498 5,626,879 1,984,757 
Smith & Williamson 2 7,209,652 6,975,967 1,317,275 
Exeter 1 7,517,506 5,683,872 2,099,566 
Scot Amicable 1 7,869,000 7,437,000 7,363,500 
Canlife 0 8,001,000 4,814,000 9,425,500 
ABN Amro 1 8,207,672 8,100,784 5,401,469 
National Australia 1 8,335,000 8,726,000 4,726,340 
SoGen 1 9,160,649 9,839,245 3,757,171 
Clerical Med 1 9,476,000 7,248,000 3,232,500 
Equitable 0 9,485,173 10,309,127 13,122,402 
Royal London 0 9,562,000 9,150,000 2,678,500 
Abbey Life 1 9,750,000 3,105,000 6,995,500 
Capel Cure Sharp 1 9,957,000 5,775,000 2,969,500 
Foreign & Colonial 1 10,230,000 2,619,000 2,756,000 
Old Mutual 0 10,792,000 12,193,000 2,507,500 
Scot Mutual 1 11,044,435 10,371,585 5,913,086 
Pearl 1 11,314,000 11,742,000 19,673,000 
Rothschild 2 11,486,000 10,976,000 2,595,500 
Lazard 1 11,660,163 10,611,151 2,014.763 
SunLife Canada 0 11,666,000 7,235,000 5,566,500 
_ Dresdner 1 11,697,220 7,943,372 22,247,080 
Investec 1 12,883,000 5,023,000 1,488,538 
Cazenove 3 13,307,000 12,323,000 7,338,000 
Legal & General 1 13,566,000 12,169,000 16,006,000 
Marks & Spencer 1 14,254,000 10,017,000 11,506,000 
AEGON (Scott Equitable) 1 14,434,000 11,993,000 4,963,500 
CGU 1 14,718,000 10,515,000 8,499,500 
HSBC Unit 1 14,846,000 10,621,000 12,963,500 
Scot Widow 0 14,916,000 9,320,000 10,058,000 
Guardian 1 15,422,000 11,532,000 4,365,500 
Credit Swiss 1 15,599,385 10,372,000 12,200.500 
Royal & SunAlliance 1 15,975,000 15,944,000 13.242,000 
Kleinwor 1 16,222,513 13,919,432 4,351.023 
Nationwide 0 17,617,000 18,482,000 9.93 1,000 
Prudential 1 18,244,000 18,875,000 21,177,000 
Hill Sam 1 18,508,000 7,764,000 14.547,000 
Stan Life Inv (Mutual) 0 19,143,000 26,148.000 32,063,000 
Appendix 1: Company Data Set for DEA (Type: O=mutual, Misted, 2=private, 3=others) 
Company Name type Net Revenues Admin costs Cap Employed 
Phillips&Drew 1 19,461,000 19,872,000 9,043,000 
Virgin Direct 1 19,467,000 15,599,000 ß, 92-1s00 
St James 1 21,839,000 15,288,000 9.109,000 
Britanic 1 22,802,000 18,668,000 3,76,, 500 
Scot-Life 0 22,817,463 22,037,262 5,1 13,1 18 
CIS 0 23,600,891 35,564,709 20,701,370 
Halifax 1 25,253,000 15,967,000 23,077,000 
Stan_Life_Unit (SLTM) 0 26,384,000 25,041,000 4,092,500 
Woolwich 1 28,261,000 7,409,000 4,806,000 
Deutsche 1 29,926,000 17,827,000 38,300,500 
Save & Prosper 2 33,930,666.67 12,508,000.00 9,686,500 
Newton 1 34,292,000 22,996,000 18,297,000 
Framlington 1 34,723,000 17,304,000 2,957.500 
Friends Provident 0 36,359,000 29,756,000 18,287,000 
Abbey national 1 38,809,456 10,437,699 51,272.792 
perpetual 1 43,556,129 25,583,892 37,631,139 
HSBC Inv 1 49,850,000 13,578,000 9,302,000 
Henderson 1 50,530,000 39,178,000 17,634,500 
Baring 1 57,890,357 49,494,651 10,370,048 
Invesco 1 60,746,828 46,938,501 99,621,665 
Scottish Widow Unit (Lloyds) 1 70,936,000 51,375,000 57,139,000 
Aberdeen 1 73,683,000 62,623,000 10,345,500 
Fidelity 2 79,577,000 70,295,000 52,563,500 
Jupiter 1 90,938,691 55,611,919 10,538,087 
Gartmore 1 91,310,000 49,278,000 31,802,000 
Berclays 1 93,454,000 73,109,000 31,301,000 
Threadneedle 1 97,171,000 96,736,000 108,585,500 
Mercury 1 123,909,417 134,311,061 101,169,437 
M&G 1 129,905,600 107,656,800 75,741,800 
Schroder 1 140,330,000 135,633,000 22,889,000 
Bank Scot I 
Cavendish 2 _ 
CIM 1 - 
City Financial (investors) 2 - 
City London 3 - 
Scot Friend 0 - 500 259 
Tilney 2 
3 
, 
791,500 
Baillie G 270 018 1 
Stewart Ivory 2 
1 
, , 
1,967,000 
Templeton 000 884 7 
Murray J 1 , , 000 543 41 
Morgan Stanley 1 , , 
Appendix 2: Company Data Set (Control Variables: Log Asset size Herfindahl Index Nurnhýr of Catýýýýriýý and Funds) 
Company Name Lg_AUM HI 99 Sectors Funds 
Tesco 1.992951 8473.7752 2 
Arbuthnot 0.2201081 10000 1 1 
Burrage 0.7041505 10000 1 1 
Belvin Frank 0.794488 6136.3361 2 2 
Saracen 0.6394865 10000 1 1 
Gresham 0.9222063 5601.6632 2 2 
MPFS 0.9242793 10000 1 1 
McHattie 0.5965971 10000 1 1 
Maldon 1.1436392 10000 1 1 
Homeowner 1.2380461 6178.7898 2 2 
Discretionary 1.2581582 10000 1 1 
Consistent 1.3967223 10000 1 1 
Lombard Odier 0.8976271 10000 1 1 
Saltire 1.3273589 2331.4093 2 5 
Mayflower 1.2833012 4549.7125 4 4 
Endurance 1.3694014 10000 1 1 
Leggmason (Johnson Fry) 2.5279133 4020.4363 7 8 
MW Joint 1.3760292 3513.5428 2 3 
MGM 2.5353448 4393.9988 5 6 
Mirabaud 1.4589399 10000 1 1 
T Bailey 1.6062739 10000 1 1 
Liverpool 1.6866363 5002.3785 2 2 
ACM 1.8426716 2379.3283 4 6 
Taube 2.0098332 4413.4871 2 3 
Fleming Unit (JP Morgan Fleming Fund) 3.1624091 1175.042 13 17 
Police Mutual 1.2750809 7001.5236 2 2 
Allchurch 2.114611 2570.3931 5 5 
Duncan Lawrie 1.25042 10000 1 1 
GA 2.5225225 3321.3233 7 9 
Thesis (Thomas Eggar) 1.9557358 3891.1811 3 3 
New Street 1.8846821 1658.4372 3 10 
MT General 2.2873986 10000 1 1 
Aberforth 2.2671717 10000 1 1 
Wesleyan 1.7273786 9818.0959 2 2 
Sanwa 1.869701 3588.8176 3 3 
Direct Line 2.1525024 10000 1 1 
State Street 2.118397 3061.6445 7 8 
KBL 2.1314262 1266.9751 10 12 
Premier 2.2784106 1170.2289 10 12 
Bank of Ireland 2.2445245 3367.0189 4 6 
Eagle Star 2.2749426 2216.6926 6 7 
Hargreaves 1.8827522 2302.1727 3 6 
Family 2.507613 2043.8241 6 8 
TU 2.2534592 5510.9181 3 3 
Marlborough 2.0853619 3220.0887 10 12 
Norwich Union 3.4843283 1354.4192 16 21 
NUF 2.0712927 10000 1 1 
City Financial Managers 2.6244574 978.53464 9 32 
Thornhill 1.9876663 7441.3656 2 2 
Sand Aire 2.4562597 10000 1 1 
Reliance 2.4843426 10000 1 1 
Sarasin 1.8288532 6597.1348 2 2 
Close 2.5251744 1778.0483 5 11 
GAM 2.3895028 1894.9836 8 9 
AXA 3.4756044 1321.1597 16 18 
e, nnendix 2: Company Data Set (Control Variables: Log Asset size Herfindahl Index Number of Catecuries allj f 
Company Name Lg_AUM HI 99 Sectors Funds 
Artemis 1.6023856 5023.9419 2 
United 3.1123536 2872.3098 8 9 
NPI 3.0108001 2104.6469 11 14 
Lincoln 3.0261163 2197.1606 10 10 
Quilter 2.0817073 1944.2066 6 7 
BWD 2.3205409 3060.4458 4 6 
Royal Bank of Scotland 2.928109 2337.3817 6 7 
Manek 2.2605484 10000 1 1 
Portfolio 2.3744551 1744.2413 9 9 
Singer & Friedlander 2.4914597 2380.7328 6 6 
Martin Currie 2.8058609 1824.355 12 16 
Rathborne 2.2582061 2076.1941 6 7 
Sovereign 2.6206461 1845.6113 6 8 
Colonial First State 3.4354733 2873.6874 15 18 
FPFM (Fleming Private F) 2.7084719 804.49215 7 20 
Alliance & Leicester 2.7010151 5771.489 3 5 
Liontrust 2.7455432 2846.3168 9 15 
Edingburgh 2.6090499 1130.2658 15 16 
AIBJGovett 2.86163 1217.3073 15 22 
Smith & Williamson 2.744066 1075.9768 10 16 
Exeter 2.4612734 3659.3446 7 9 
Scot Amicable 3.4583039 3104.6259 15 25 
Canlife 3.2621852 1728.99 12 13 
ABN Amro 2.2961385 6363.7168 5 5 
National Australia 2.6033826 6489.4749 3 4 
SoGen 2.8328537 1484.6177 12 15 
Clerical Med 3.3690079 1834.6236 11 11 
Equitable 3.5382054 1237.0817 8 12 
Royal London 3.0188461 2408.6753 8 8 
Abbey Life 3.5007303 1383.9848 16 20 
Capel Cure Sharp 3.0363294 1361.7524 14 17 
Foreign & Colonial 2.9214732 2840.1603 11 11 
Old Mutual 3.5503715 1132.9097 11 24 
Scot Mutual 3.010003 1776.3109 8 10 
Pearl 3.1862555 1977.961 5 8 
Rothschild 2.8744818 1723.4822 10 12 
Lazard 3.0305269 1548.3419 12 15 
SunLife Canada 3.2749495 1490.3085 11 15 
_ Dresdner 3.2138895 869.44495 12 16 
Investec 2.6142115 1240.5881 10 18 
Cazenove 3.2862745 1749.3857 13 13 
Legal & General 3.6919104 1776.159 14 23 
Marks & Spencer 3.065841 3577.2646 3 4 
AEGON (Scott Equitable) 3.1309799 1144.435 17 22 
CGU 3.4532847 2841.5946 16 20 
HSBC Unit 3.3229838 1135.3153 13 24 
Scot Widow 3.5242806 971.51829 21 35 
Guardian 3.024539 1775.7249 11 13 
Credit Swiss 3.1320002 1358.9383 9 11 
Royal & SunAlliance 3.3645791 1202.2692 12 17 
Kleinwor 2.1651256 5022.1736 2 2 
Nationwide 2.8379544 5492.8561 2 3 
Prudential 3.569608 1700.7196 11 12 
Hill Sam 3.5471788 3201.1776 16 26 
Stan Life Inv (Mutual) 3.1654521 3171.9085 13 1 5 
ý1- 
Appell(ý1X 2: Company Data Set (Control Variables: Lod Asset size. Herfindahl Indek Number of Categories and Funds) 
Company Name Lg_AUM HI 99 Sectors Funds 
Phillips&Drew 2.8153519 8700.2936 3 3 
Virgin Direct 3.3766682 7977.177 2 2 
St James 3.0950123 2006.3049 8 11 
Britanic 3.2487357 1391.835 11 13 
Scot Life 3.3590401 3983.6199 5 5 
CIS 3.4057117 6137.9581 3 3 
Halifax 3.2810311 3551.6857 3 5 
Stan 
_Life 
Unit (SLTM) 3.9227856 5044.7492 6 6 
Woolwich 3.3129597 4792.8382 3 3 
Deutsche 3.5595679 1339.9435 14 21 
Save & Prosper 3.7125453 847.82328 18 26 
Newton 3.4475224 1421.6514 15 26 
Framlington 3.0890357 678.54221 18 22 
Friends Provident 3.7753002 1083.6801 18 26 
Abbey national 3.4532021 5454.9856 7 9 
perpetual 3.9866952 1376.3 804 16 21 
HSBC Inv 3.5219679 1822.0502 8 12 
Henderson 3.5320508 780.05816 18 28 
Baring 3.5352599 914.72198 19 32 
Invesco 3.7080723 1794.6348 18 29 
Scottish Widow Unit (Lloyds) 3.9262997 1295.762 16 25 
Aberdeen 3.7057671 1016.4862 18 27 
Fidelity 4.1753668 467.14166 14 36 
Jupiter 3.6356546 2129.8873 12 17 
Gartmore 3.9591268 595.01273 21 50 
Berclays 3.888595 763.85806 13 28 
Threadneedle 4.0361053 879.65658 22 36 
Mercury 3.9345479 2536.602 21 43 
M&G 4.1229272 563.51358 21 41 
Schroder 4.1637879 705.9551 20 40 
Bank Scot 1.7834033 3408.8048 3 3 
Cavendish 1.1682027 0.5011617 2 2 
CIM 1.0021661 8647.0038 2 3 
City Financial (investors) 1.7762652 3795.3826 5 5 
City London 1.5158738 9351.7623 2 2 
Scot Friend 0.346353 10000 1 1 
Tilney 2.4753951 2218.9299 6 7 
Baillie G 3.3974064 3061.4934 15 19 
Stewart Ivory 2.5826314 2068.265 9 10 
Templeton 1.6683859 6846.5067 2 3 
Murray J 2.3452757 1379.5679 13 15 
Morgan Stanley 1.2395497 3336.6537 3 3 
ýý 
ýý 
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Appendix 3: Unit Trust Data Set For DEA (Fund Sector atesorv = UK All Companies) 
DMU output-1. Input_1 Input_2 Input-3 
Unit Trust Ave. Monthly Return volatility Initial Fee°ö Annual Fe, 7. 
INIU [vwiu41 JIui rvig_rivvn Cgwty I. L /I OVUL. )) 4 3 1 
Reliance Unit Mgrs_ British Life UT 1.491509256 4 6 1 
Abbey National Utm N&P Uk 1.356034764 4.3 4 125 
Abbey National Utm Uk Growth 1.385357844 4.2 4 1.25 
Abbey Ut Managers Asset & Earnings 0.666144775 3.9 6 1 
Abbey Ut Managers Abbey General 0.731451758 3.7 6 1 
Aberdeen Ut Mgrs Uk Blue chip 1.354300596 4.1 4.25 1.25 
Aberdeen Ut Mgrs Uk Growth 1.417783222 3.9 4.25 1.25 
Aberdeen Ut Mgrs Uk Mid C (Spec Situ) 1.127034564 4.7 4.25 1.25 
Abn Amro Fd Mgrs Uk Growth 2.329463438 5.8 5 1.25 
Aegon Fund Mgt Uk Eqt Groth (Scot Eq) 1.094957051 4.2 5.5 1.25 
Aegon Fund Mgt Uk Uk Blue (Scot Eq) 1.027771553 4 5.5 1.25 
Alliance Leicester Capital Growth 1.354300596 4.2 3 1.25 
Axa Fund Managers General 1.155045497 4.1 5 1 
Axa Fund Managers Uk Grow 1.202963854 4.1 3.5 1 
Baille Gifford British 350 1.579502094 4.1 5 1.25 
Barclays Fds Ltd 500 0.621768201 4.2 5.25 1.25 
Barclays Fds Ltd Capital 1.338646173 4.2 5.25 1.25 
Barclays Fds Ltd Ftse 100 1.397346299 4.4 5 
Barclays Fds Ltd General 1.271600255 4.1 5.25 1.25 
Barclays Fds Ltd Trustee 1.230252057 4.1 5.25 1.25 
Barclays Gbl Inv Bgi Grow(& Income) 1.273384666 4 5.25 1.25 
Barclays Gbl Inv Bgi Uk (Growth) 1.444810153 4 5.25 1.25 
Baring Fd Mngrs Uk Growth 1.600292917 4.8 5 1.5 
Bk Of Ireland Fm Capital Growth 1.050983121 4.5 5 1 
Britannic I'd Mngrs Balanc 1.259078465 4.3 5.25 1.5 
Britannic I'd Mngrs Uk Gen 1.547222514 4.7 5.25 1.5 
BWD Equity Growth 1.206617193 4.3 4.5 1.5 
Bwd Rensburg Uk Blue-Chip Growth 1.235678935 4.3 4.5 1.5 
Canada Life Mgmt (Growth) 1.273384666 4.2 5 1.25 
Canada Life Mgmt General 1.162469452 4.4 5.75 1.25 
Cavendish Un Mngrs Opport 1.550466679 4.8 3.5 1 
Cazenove UK Equity 1.110096729 4.1 5 1 
CF Friars House Capital 1.224814976 4.7 5.5 1.25 
CF Quontock 1.489854319 4.5 5 1.5 
CGU PPT UK & General 1.269814742 4.2 4 1 
CGU PPT UK Growth 1.132658514 4.1 4 1.25 
CGU UK Index Tracking 1.516220648 4.5 1 0.85 
CIM Community Growth 1.156903274 4.4 0 1.5 
Cis Unit Mngrs Uk Gth Tst 1.434704568 4.3 5 1 
City Finance Assets 0.910850729 4.9 5 1 
Cler Med Inv General Equity 1.0797376 4.1 5.25 1.25 
Cler Med Inv Pedigree Growth 1.735726777 4.7 5.25 1.25 
Cler Med Inv Special Situation 1.093059 3.9 6 1.25 
Consistent 0.797414043 3.1 5 1 
Credit Suisse AM Growth 1.301786614 4.8 5.25 1.5 
Deutsche Inv Fds Uk Blue 1.664905412 4.3 5.25 1.5 
Deutsche Inv Fds Uk Equit trucker 1.250101031 4.2 0 0.75 
Appendix 3: Unit Trust Data Set For DEA (Fund Sector ategory = UK All Companies) 
Deutsche Inv Fds Uk Growt 
Direct Line Ut Direct Line 100 Tracker 
Dresdner Rcm (Uk) Exempt 
Dresdner Rcm (Uk) Uk Growth 
Dresdner Rcm (Uk) Uk Index 
Dresdner Rcm (Uk) Uk Mid Cap 
Edinburgh Ut Mngrs Uk Growth 
Equitable Pelican 
Equitable Special Situation 
Equitable UK Index Tracking 
Exeter I'd Mngrs Capital G 
Family Inv Mgmt Family Asset 
Fidelity Growth & Income 
Fidelity Insutitutional UK 
Fidelity Inv Svcs Money Builder Growth 
Fidelity Inv Svcs Money Builder Index 
Fidelity Inv Svcs Special Situations 
Fidelity Inv Svcs UK Growth 
Fidelity Recovery 
Five Allows UK Major Companies 
Fleming (FPFM) General Opportunity 
Fleming Growth (FPFM) 
Framlington Ut Mgt Income (& Growth) 
Framlington Ut Mgt Uk Gro 
Friends Prov U/T'S Fp Uk Focus 
Friends Prov U/T'S Uk Gro 
Friends Provident Fp Equi 
GA Equity Growth 
GA GANDA 
Gartmore Fund Mgrs Uk Equity 
Gartmore Fund Mgrs Uk Gro 
Gartmore Fund Mgrs Uk Ind(ex) 
Gartmore UK Select Opportunity 
Gerrard Uk Growth (CCS UK Gro) 
Gerrard Uk Opport (CCS UK Opp) 
Global Asset Mgt Gam Uk (Diversified) 
Govett Geared UK index 
Govett Investments Govett FTSE 250 
Govett UK Equity General 
Guardhill 
Guardian Growth Equity 
Halifax Ut Mgt Growth Inc 
Halifax Ut Mgt Halifax Accmulation 
Hargreaves Lansd'N HI The Utilities 
Hargreaves Lansd'N Optimum Income & Growth 
Henderson Gbl Invs Uk Cap 
Henderson Income&Growth 
Henderson Income&Growth Exempt 
Hill Samuel Utm British T 
Hill Samuel Utm Uk Select Growth 
1.404174637 4.3 5.25 1.5 
1.558561258 4.1 0 1 
1.752409662 4.5 2.5 0.75 
1.997377365 5.3 4 125 
1.499769805 4.2 0 0.5 
2.465223959 6.6 4 1.25 
1.378484956 3.8 3.5 1.25 
1.319397329 3.9 5 0.5 
0.945028574 4.7 5 0.5 
1.483225108 4.2 5 0.5 
2.304543165 6.8 5 1.25 
2.087717214 4.7 5 1 
1.301786614 4.1 5.25 1 
1.352565389 4.5 0 0.8 
1.173569754 4 0 1 
1.644573751 4.4 0 0.5 
1.177260402 4.2 5.25 1.5 
1.233871107 4.3 5.25 1.5 
0.964945598 5.2 5.25 1.25 
1.448170867 4.7 5 1.5 
1.356034764 3.1 0 1.25 
1.393926086 4 0 1.5 
1.096853856 4.2 5 1 
1.340389739 4.3 5 1 
1.378484956 4.4 5.75 1.5 
1.410986919 4.3 5.75 1.5 
1.356034764 4.3 5.75 1 
0.670545 4.2 5 1.5 
1.115753715 4.1 5 1.5 
1.542349455 4.4 0 1 
1.380204707 4.1 5.25 1.5 
1.489854319 4.2 5 1.25 
1.158759858 4.1 5.25 1.5 
1.553707221 5.2 5 1.25 
1.410986919 4.8 5 1.25 
1.199305893 4.6 5 1.5 
1.555326136 7 5.5 1 
0.898690578 4.8 3.5 1 
1.226628472 4.3 5 1.5 
0.89462577 4.1 6 1.5 
1.08735735 4.4 6 1.5 
1.08735735 3.9 3 1.5 
1.208442133 3.9 5 0.5 
1.36469006 3.6 5.75 1.5 
1.104428645 4.3 5.25 1 
1.151326356 4.3 5.25 1.5 
1.16061525 4.1 5.25 1 
1.315883747 4 2.5 0.5 
1.356034764 4.1 4 1.5 
1.255490834 4.1 4 1.5 
Appendix 3: Unit Trust Data Set For DEA (Fund Sector ategory = UK All Companies) 
Hsbc Inv Fds (Uk) British 1.484883832 44 4 1.5 
HSBC Unit Fds (Uk) Uk Growth 1.661786713 4.9 5.25 1.25 
HSBC Unit The Footsie Fund 1.579502094 4.4 0 1 
HSBC Unit UK Index 1.488198436 4.2 0 0.5 
HSBC Inv UK Top 100 Tracker 1.444810153 4.4 4 
Invesco Fund Mgrs Gt Uk Blue Chip 1.201 135452 4.5 5.25 1.5 
Invesco Fund Mgrs Perp Rupert Children's 1.40758278 4.6 5.25 1.5 
Invesco UK Growth 1.307081088 4.6 5.25 1.5 
Invesco UK Income & Growth 1.08735735 4.2 5.25 1.5 
Investec (Guinnes F)Blue Chip Port 1.223000342 4 5 1.25 
Investec (Guinnes F) Uk Opp 0.89665889 5.4 5 
Jpmorgan Fleming (Unit) Specialist Equity 1.375042387 4.2 1 0.5 
Jpmorgan Fleming A Instl UK Income 1.453204643 4.2 1 0.5 
Jupiter Ut Mngrs Uk Growth 1.106319242 3.6 5 1.5 
Jupiter Ut Mngrs Uk Growth Exempt 2.201384932 5.2 5 
Jupiter Ut Mngrs Uk Special Situation 1.4981 19577 4.9 5.25 1.5 
Lazard Fund Mgrs Uk Growth Retail 1.166174291 4.3 3.75 1.25 
Legal & General Ut Equity 1.380204707 4.2 0 
Legal & General Ut Uk Index 1.521 137761 4.2 0 0.5 
Legal & General Ut Uk Recovery 1.368144949 4.1 0 1.5 
Legal & General Ut Uk Stock Market 1.51 1295186 4.5 0 2 
Legal & General Ut Uk TAA 1.441445538 4.4 0 I. 5 
Leggmason Inv Utm Uk Emergin Growth 1.241095651 4.3 5 1.5 
Leggmason Inv Utm Uk Growth 1.657102377 4.5 5 1.5 
Lincoln Utm Mgrs Growth 1.269814742 4.3 5.82 1.25 
Liontrust Inv Fds First Growth (exempt) 1.677346833 4.1 5 1.5 
Liontrust Inv Fds Top 100 (exempt) 1.535839284 4.3 0 0.35 
M&G Securities British Opportunity 1.010239562 4.5 5 
M&G Securities Ltd Blue Chip 1.232062148 4.2 5 
M&G Securities Ltd Capita 0.612810102 3.9 5 
M&G Securities Ltd Pension Exempt 1.32641 1725 4 2 0.44 
M&G Securities Ltd Recovery 0.85572 1473 4.9 5 
M&G Securities Ltd UK Equity 0.659531788 3.7 5 
M&G Securities Ltd Uk Growth 1.356034764 4.3 5 I 
Maldon General 0.955004277 4.2 0 1.05 
Marks & Spencer Ut Uk 100 1.56824504 4.3 0 1 
Marks & Spencer Ut Uk Select Port 1.226628472 3.8 3 1.5 
Marlborough F Mgrs Hargre 1.168024932 4 5 1.5 
Marlborough F Mgrs Uk Equ 1.919894228 5 5.25 1.5 
Martin Currie Ut Uk Growt 0.707677631 4.6 5.25 1.25 
Mayflower British Leaders 0.542421577 4.3 5 
Mercury Recovery 1.012192829 5.1 5 1.5 
Merrill (Mercury) Fd M British Blue Chip 1.077829517 4.1 5 1.5 
Merrill (MAMPI)Growth 1.041334305 4 6 1.5 
Merrill (MAMPI) Income 0.953011895 4.1 6 1.5 
Merrill Lynch I'd M Uk Equ (exempt) 1.121399645 4.2 2 0.5 
Merrill Lynch I'd M Uk Equity Bull 1.451527688 4.3 4 0.75 
Merrill Lynch Fd M Uk Gen 0.912872443 4.4 5 1.5 
Mgm Unit Managers Special 1.269814742 4 5 1 
Mgm Unit Managers Uk Grow 1.2047911 4.1 5 0.75 
ý7 
Appendix 3: Unit Trust Data Set For DEA (Fund Sector ateeorv = UK All Companies) 
MT General 1.221 184569 3.8 0 0.62 
Murray UK Growth 0.776300557 3.9 5 1.5 
National Australia Stockmarket Growth 1.224814976 4 3 1.5 
Nationwide Utm Uk Growth 1.275167978 4.1 3 1.25 
Newton I'd Mgrs Growth Fun 1.195643298 4.6 4 1.25 
Newton Fd Mgrs Income Nav 1.595508235 3.8 4 1.25 
Norwich Union T/Mg Uk Equ 1.486541608 4.8 0 1 
Norwich Union T/Mg Uk Gro 2.004320169 6 0 
Norwich Union T/Mg Uk Idx 1.321152522 3.9 0 0.9 
Npi Inv Mgrs Uk Equity Retail 1.331661392 4.5 0 0.5 
Npi Inv Mgrs Uk Growth Ac 1.349091853 4.4 4.5 1.5 
Old Mutual I'd Mgrs Uk All Share Mirror Trust 1.392214464 4.1 0 
Old Mutual I'd Mgrs Uk Gro 1.368144949 4.3 5.5 1.5 
Pearl Unit Trusts Equity 1.268028127 4.3 4 1.5 
Pearl Unit Trusts Equity Growth 1.262661652 4.2 4 1.5 
Pearl Unit Trusts Pearl Growth 1.421 175405 43 4 
Perpetual UK Growth 0.663942135 4.7 5.25 1.25 
Prudential Uts Uk Growth 1.012192829 4.2 5.5 1.5 
Rathbone Ut Mgt Rathbone Income Growth 1.378484956 4.3 5.5 1 
Rathbone Ut Mgt Rathbone Special Situation 1.085454297 4.6 5 1.5 
Rothschild I'd Mgt Five Arrows UK Portfolio 1.123279173 4 4.17 1.5 
Royal Bk Scot Ut Growth 1.023884748 4 6 1.25 
Royal Bk Scot Ut income 1.230252057 4 6 1.25 
Royal London Utm Uk Growt 1.287620483 4.4 4 
Royal&Sun AlInc Ut Equity Fund 1.448170867 4.4 5 1 
Royal&Sun AlInc Ut Ftse All Share Track 1.340389739 4.1 5 0.3 
Royal&Sun Allnc Ut Gth & Income 1.307081088 4 5 
Sanwa Intl Inv Ser Sanwa Growth 1.715886394 4.5 5.5 1.25 
Save & Prosper Premier Equity 1.563407188 4 5.5 1.5 
Save & Prosper UK Growth & Income 1.378484956 4.1 5.5 1.5 
Schroder Ut'S Ltd Index 1.36641802 4.1 3 0.3 
Schroder Ut'S Ltd Instl Growth 0.843325986 3.5 6 0.5 
Schroder Ut'S Ltd Instl Recovery 0.755031106 5.1 3 0.5 
Schroder Ut'S Ltd Uk Enterprise 0.851595566 5 5.25 1.5 
Schroder Ut'S Ltd Uk Equi 1.221184569 4.3 5.25 1.25 
Scot Amicable Utm Equity 1.168024932 4.1 4.54 1.5 
Scot Amicable Utm Equity Income 1.119518894 4.8 4.54 1.5 
Scot Amicable Utm Equity Strategy 0.841254877 4.1 4.54 1.5 
Scot Life Invest Uk Equit 1.321152522 4.2 5 1 
Scot Mutual Inv Uk Equity 1.427947882 4.4 5.25 
Scot Mutual Inv Uk Select Opportunity 1.385357844 4.6 5.75 
Scot Widows Fd Mgt Uk Equity Acc 1.098749416 4.1 5 1 
Scot Widows Fd Mgt Uk Index 1.584313211 4.4 0 0.5 
Scot Widows Fd Mgt Uk Special Situation 1.149464989 4.5 5 1.25 
Scot Widows Balance (x LTSB) 1.219367655 3.9 6 1 
Scot Widows Environment (x LTSB) 1.955369521 4.6 5.5 1.5 
Scot Widows Ut Mgr Ftse 100 (x LTSB) 1.388788182 4.3 6 1 
Scot Widows Uk Equity Growth (xLTSB) 1.310605364 4 6 0.25 
Scot Widows Uk Growth (x LTSB) 1.262661652 3.9 5.5 1.5 
Smith & Williamson S&W Growth 1.692824054 5 5 1.25 
t-ý 
Appendix 3: Unit Trust Data Set For DEA (Fund Sector ategory = UK All Companies) 
Solus Funds Solus Uk Grow 0.6815 16205 3.7 3.5 125 
Solus Funds Solus Uk Special 2.758052721 8.1 3.5 15 
Sovereign Ut Mgrs Ftse 100 1.381923438 4.4 2.5 
Sovereign Ut Mgrs Uk Grow 0.966929758 4.4 5.5 1.5 
St James Place Ut Uk Gene 2.079619186 4.4 5 1.5 
Standard Life Invs Growth & Income 1.169874388 4.1 3 0.95 
Standard Life Invs UK Equity Growth Retail 1.145738655 4 3.5 1.5 
Standard Life Tst Uk Equity General 1.149464989 3.9 5.75 1.5 
Stewart Ivory British 1.484883832 4.2 5 
Sun Life Canada UK Growth 1.191976058 4.2 4.95 1.5 
Thornhill Utm Capital Trust 1.791465519 4.4 5 1.75 
Threadneedle Inv Uk Growt(&Inc) 1.242898971 4 175 1.5 
Threadneedle Inv Uk Growth(l) 1.257285205 3.9 3.75 1.5 
Threadneedle Inv Uk Institutional Growth 1.291168522 4 0 0.75 
Threadneedle Inv Uk Overseas Earns 1.273384666 4.2 0 1.5 
Threadneedle Inv Uk Select Growth 1.224814976 4.1 3.75 1.5 
Tilney Collective Uk Equity 1.387073521 4.5 5 1.25 
T British 1.285844831 4.1 5 
United Friendly UK Equity Growth 1.199305893 4.1 6 
Virgin Direct Pfs Uk Index Tracker 1.469921042 3.9 0 1 
Wesleyan Ut Mgrs Wesleyan Growth 1.127034564 3.4 4 1.25 
Woolwich Ut Mgrs Uk Stock 1.284068089 4.2 5 1.25 
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Appendix 5-a: The DEA linear programme (the CRS model) 
yrj = known positive output level of company or fund j, r=1,2,.... s where. s is the number of outputs 
x; j = known positive output level of company or fund j, r=1,2,..., s where, s is the 
number of outputs 
n= total number of companies or funds 
The Constant Return of Scale for determining the relative efficiency of a designated company or fund "0" is given 
S 
Y 
UrYro 
Max 
= 
r=1 
vIxio 
u, 
-Yrj 
subject to r-' m 
v, x! / 
<_ 1, j=1,2,... n, 
r=1,2,..., s, and i=1,2, 
..., 
m. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
The variables in the above model are input and output weights ur and v; 
respectively. 
The objective function (1) is the ratio of weighted sum of outputs to weighted 
sum of inputs with weights being the optimal values of the variables u, and v; to 
be determined as a solution to the CRS model. 
Appendix 5-b: The DEA linear programme (the VRS model) 
The CRS model can be transformed into an equivalent linear programming 
model. The VRS model is the dual of this equivalent linear programme together 
with a constant capturing returns to scale characteristics. The linear programme 
so obtained for determining the relative efficiency score, 0 of company or fund 
"0" is given by 
Min 0 ý4ý 
n 
subject to lljy, >_ yrO r 
. 
i=1 
11 
&%o ý JA, xj, i= 1,2,..., m, (6) 
1=1 
n 
I 
=1 (7) 
J=l 
kj >_0 j=1,2,... n. (8) 
The variables in the VRS model are 0 and 2,, which is non-negative. The variable 
Ois the proportional reduction required in each input of the designated company 
or fund to achieve efficiency. The constraints in the model ensure that relative 
efficiency of the company or fund never exceeds 1. The sufficient condition for 
efficiency of the company or fund is that the optimum value of 0 is 1. 
Otherwise, it is labelled as inefficient compared to the other companies or funds 
in the sample. Thus, a DEA run will produce a relative efficiency score and a set 
of ?, j j=1,2 
... 
n, values for each company or fund. The set of ? values defines a 
point on the envelopment surface. 
Therefore, for an inefficient company or fund the point so defined by the Xj 
values becomes a role model that in turn establishes precedence for it to become 
efficient. The set of efficient companies or funds {j: Xj >01 is called the peer 
group of the designated company or fund. 
The constraint given in (7) is referred to as the convexity constraint and accounts 
for variable returns to scale (VRS). When the convexity constraint is removed 
the resulting model represents the constant returns to scale (CRS) situation. The 
relative efficiency score obtained for a designated company or fund under CRS is 
a measure of overall technical efficiency of the company or fund. The relative 
efficiency score obtained under VRS is a measure of pure technical efficiency. 
The difference in overall and pure technical efficiencies is attributed to scale 
efficiency that is measured as the ratio of overall and pure technical efficiencies. 
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